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This dissertation intervenes in debates about the ethics and politics of interpretation by 
articulating a phenomenology of the interpretive process rooted in the concepts of risk, 
responsibility, error, and complicity. In order to consider how the interpreter incurs risks 
and responsibilities by participating in a conversation both with her object and with other 
interpreters, this dissertation explores how two modern authors, Brecht and Arendt, have 
interpreted and shaped the disparate legacies of two classical authors, Sophocles and 
Plato. 
 
The first chapter examines how Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus defines the power of 
interpretation as a power of mobility, and shows how the systematic disruption of 
locative language connected to Oedipus poetically expresses the risks and responsibilities 
of the interpreter as one who is perpetually “out of order.” Turning to the modernist 
revolt against classical drama, the second chapter uses Brecht's Life of Galileo (1938-39) 
and his theoretical writings to explore how Brecht's resolutely anti-tragic dramaturgy 
actually reinstates the risks and responsibilities of the tragic attitude towards 
interpretation on the level of historical time rather than cultural space. The third chapter 
returns to antiquity to trace the beginnings of the philosophical response to tragedy in 
Plato's Apology, where Socrates embraces the plurality and indeterminacy of 
vii 
interpretation by consciously cultivating these aspects of his literary voice. In the fourth 
chapter, Socrates' philosophical affirmation of risk is revived in the thinking of Hannah 
Arendt, in whose later writings both the life of thought and the life of action take on a 
distinctly Socratic cast in their common connection to a realm of phenomenal appearance 
inherently bound to interpretation. This shared form of life overcomes the traditional 
division between thought and action by affirming interpretive risk and responsibility as 
essential to a life that is properly human. 
 
This dissertation contributes to debates in classical reception studies, ancient and 
continental philosophy, and German and ancient Greek literature, as well as theories of 
tragedy and of its relationship to philosophy. Most importantly, it aims to give new 
impetus to conversations on the theory and practice of interpretation, the future of 









BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME 
 
I. Two Turntables and a Microphone: Interpretation, Reception, and Risk 
So: what is interpretation good for, anyway? 
 In the wake of the post-structuralist debates that have dominated scholarship in 
the humanities for the last twenty to thirty years in the United States, it has become a 
virtual non-starter to claim that there are ethical and political stakes attached to the 
activity of interpretation. Critics schooled in the post-structuralist mode have become 
extraordinarily sensitive to the many ways in which their chosen objects of study are 
produced by processes of interpretation that are entangled in every element of social, 
economic, and political history. By the very same token, furthermore, they have become 
perhaps even more extraordinarily sensitive to the comparable entanglements in which 
they themselves stand by virtue of existing within their respective authorizing 
institutions, disciplines, and discourses. Ethics and politics have loomed large as issues in 
these directions of research, in short, because these become immediate problems 
whenever and wherever the conditions of possibility for our actions and thoughts can no 
longer be taken for granted. This is as it must be. 
 Debates about the ethical and political stakes of interpretation in many specific 
areas, however, have recently grown confused and sterile – and not merely because the 
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questions they address are inherently self-reflexive. We have reached a certain point of 
impasse because we lack a critical vocabulary for admitting and even affirming the perils 
of interpretation as a practical activity; we no longer have a common set of categories 
with which to describe the situation of interpretation in human life. True, most post-
structuralist approaches to interpretation have explored how the ethical and political 
dangers that accompany the interpretive activity penetrate the entire experience of the 
subject as a thinking and acting being – even to the point of constituting subjectivity 
itself. Yet at the same time, precisely by uncovering the dangers, uncertainties, and 
complicities that lie in ambush for the interpreter, these critical approaches inevitably 
stop short of justifying or affirming interpretation itself. In short: while these modes of 
thinking have sharpened our awareness of the stakes attached to the activity of 
interpretation, they have proven incapable of defining and affirming the wager involved 
in every act of interpretation as something both necessary and central to human 
experience. We are left in a situation in which we embrace the idea that everything we 
know, feel, or think takes shape through a complex act of interpretation, but we 
simultaneously fear and flee the ethical and political web of entanglements dictated by 
interpretation as such. So: what is interpretation good for? 
 There can be no definitive answer to such a question, but there can be a 
contingent and provisional one to match the historical and institutional circumstance in 
which we find ourselves confronted with it now. The answer I offer here must necessarily 
begin with the vocabulary we use at present to define, however unsatisfactorily, what I 
have called the situation of interpretation in life. This, I believe, is a language generally 
driven by the concept of reception. The ascent of language, signification, and textuality 
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as the favored categories of post-structuralist thought has led to the more or less implicit 
triumph of reception, viewed not only as the basic pursuit of humanistic scholars, but also 
as the paradigm-giving activity for individuals and groups at large who produce culture. 
Appropriately, the guiding metaphor for the concept of reception appears in the everyday 
use of language, whereby the production of speech is primarily understood as an activity 
of receiving, reconsidering, and rearranging something already given, of “interpreting” 
roughly in the same sense as an actor interprets a script or a musician interprets a score. 
Thus the artist, like the critic, becomes an interpreter of forms, meanings, values, and 
genres which preexist his interpretive activity, even as they expedite it, resist it, and stand 
to be transformed by its outcome. In criticism guided by post-structuralist thinkers, in 
fact, what has effectively replaced the Romantic category of originality, which 
distinguished the genius of the poet from the intelligence of the ordinary craftsman, is a 
kind of virtuosity in reception: godlike creation has ceded its place to the demiurgic 
manipulations of Lévi-Strauss' bricoleur. As such, it must be emphasized that the 
contemporary vocabulary of reception stands quite distant from the older humanist idea 
of the individual interpreter's relationship to tradition. Nothing that falls into the dubious 
hands of a 'receptor' can hope to be handled with the same attitude of preservative care 
that we see reflected quite splendidly in the German term Überlieferung. Under the post-
structuralist aegis of reception, both artist and critic dissolve, jostle about, and recombine 
the once-venerable objects of tradition with the same energy and pungency as a working 
DJ rewrites the history of popular music across the surface of a turntable. 
 It should be noted, however, that what distinguishes reception as the characteristic 
mode of interpretation for our time – the specific work that gets done, as it were, by 
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thinking of the latter in terms of the former – lies in the way reception performs a twofold 
intervention: it actively intervenes both in the structures of meaning and value that appear 
in its object and in the web of expectations, attitudes, and experiences that appear in its 
subject. Most importantly, it performs this twofold intervention in such a way as to put 
both subject and object at risk. What is this “being at risk”? Since much of the present 
project depends on a clear understanding of this condition shared by both subject and 
object in the process of reception, I want to turn briefly to Hans-Georg Gadamer's 
account of the formation of meaning in interpretive experience in Truth and Method. As 
will become clear in the sequel, my intention in doing so is very far indeed from a 
restoration of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. Whereas Gadamer describes 
something analogous to this as a continuous byproduct or side-effect of the interpretive 
process, “being at risk” in fact not only forms part of the governing purpose of every act 
of interpretation, but also constitutes what I believe interpretation qua reception is “good 
for” at our present juncture. 
 Gadamer's account of the formation of meaning in interpretation takes shape as an 
exegesis of a passage from Heidegger's Being and Time on the necessary and productive 
role of 'fore-structures' – in a word, prejudices – in hermeneutic experience: “[O]ur first, 
last, and constant task in interpreting is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and 
fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to 
make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the 
things themselves.”1
                                                 
1  Martin Heidegger quoted in Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., trans. rev. Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2004), 269. 
 Gadamer asks what Heidegger might mean by enjoining us, 
apparently, to make ourselves prejudiced in the work of interpretation, but to keep these 
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prejudices rooted in “the things themselves.” He goes on to describe how interpretation 
actually depends on prejudices drawn from past and present interpretive experience, 
working themselves out through successive 'projections' of meaning which are 
necessarily modified during the process of interpretation: 
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as 
a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only 
because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out 
this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the 
meaning, is understanding what is there. […] The process that Heidegger describes is that every 
revision of the fore-projection is capable of projecting before itself a new projection of meaning; rival 
projects can emerge side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of meaning is; interpretation 
begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones. (Gadamer 269) 
The account of hermeneutic understanding offered here depends on the unspoken priority 
of a meaning inscribed in the “thing itself” which interpretation approaches – as it were, 
asymptotically – through the gradual replacement of the interpreter's fore-conceptions 
with an accurate conception of the meaning present in the text. The hermeneutic 
procedure achieves understanding only insofar as the interpreter can judge between her 
subjective projection of meaning and its objective mode of presence in the object. More 
importantly, however, Gadamer allows the provisional fore-structures that operate within 
interpretation simply to fall away, like a snake shedding its skin, the moment they are 
revealed as erroneous. What if, indeed, our object refutes that particular interpretive fore-
structure which contains and organizes all the others – what if, instead of asking us to 
shed our skin, we find ourselves compelled to shed our very existence as interpreting 
beings as a source of errors that obstruct understanding? And can we legitimately claim, 
on the side of the object, that meaning as such inheres in a univocal codification that 
appears at the end of the interpretive process rather than within the serial projection of 
fore-conceptions? Can we claim, furthermore, that meaning inheres in a truth that has 
emerged from error as the sculpture emerges from the marble, rather than in the happily 
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coherent residue of errors which this particular interpretive experience has not managed 
to purge from us? After all, our apprehension in reading a difficult text stems from a 
twofold awareness. On the one hand, with regard to our subjectivity as interpreters, we 
are aware that the text will compel us to interpret in unaccustomed ways, will challenge 
our ordinary habits and modes of being as interpreters. On the other, with regard to the 
objectivity of the thing we interpret, we are aware that the present and future meaning of 
the text wholly depends on our efforts to (re)construct it as a compelling and persuasive 
experience now. In effect, our fore-conceptions are all we have to go on – and all the text 
has to go on as well. 
 Gadamer's defense of the necessity and productivity of prejudice ultimately 
maintains a fairly low estimate of its decisive role in the interpretive process. In the 
concept of reception, on the other hand, prejudice – in all its extraordinary delusion and 
prodigious fertility – takes the stage front and center, and submits both the subject and 
object of interpretation to the rigors of what I have called “being at risk.” In contrast to 
Gadamer's account, risk does not just describe the condition of both subject and object 
during the various stages of messiness and uncertainty we pass through and eventually 
leave behind once we form “an” interpretation. In Gadamer's description of hermeneutic 
experience, meaning is at stake, “in play,” we might say, only as long as the subject's 
fore-conceptions obstruct the full disclosure of meaning in the object. Once this meaning 
is disclosed to understanding and “an” interpretation precipitates from the process, the 
element of risk evaporates along with the apprehension of error. When we interpret in the 
mode of reception, however, risk and error are the inevitable companions of 
interpretation before, during, and after its process, because subject and object themselves 
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take shape within, are even created by the process of projection. Whatever I am, and 
whatever my object is, actually come into being through the interplay of (fore-
)conceptions, the music of error. “Being at risk” thus denotes the mode of subjective 
being deliberately and continually chosen by the interpreter, and thereby also the mode of 
objective being deliberately and continually imposed on the objects of interpretation. As 
such, within any given act of reception, risk and error are not simply stops we make on 
the way to meaning, but together constitute both the path and the destination. One 
interprets in order to gain access to the meaning of one's object – certainly. But we must 
also admit that interpretation is directly motivated by a spirit of serious-reckless play, by 
an impulse to see what one can get away with, by a desire not only to risk oneself through 
the object and to risk one's object through oneself, but also to take pleasure in such risk – 
even and especially to take pleasure in one's errors. 
 Insofar as we use reception as our model for what an interpreter does, then, “being 
at risk” and “being in error” name her basic condition as well as the condition of what she 
interprets. In this project, they form the point of departure for understanding the situation 
of interpretation in life, and they are what any such account must ultimately 
acknowledge, accept, and especially affirm as inherent in that life-situation. The 
experiences in which risk and error make themselves most palpably felt as part of the 
situation of interpretation, furthermore, chiefly arise when the object of interpretation 
throws the subject back on to the conditions and limits of her interpretation, when the 
object transforms the subject into an interpretive problem for herself. In such experiences, 
the subject that “receives”, that rewrites and reconstructs as she interprets, must now 
consciously “receive”, rewrite and reconstruct herself, all under the auspices of risk and 
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error. The noise that comes to interfere with reception, as it were, appears in the signal 
and in the receiver simultaneously. Hence the guiding questions for this inquiry will be 
the following. First: In the process of interpreting an object, how do interpreters become 
problems to themselves through interaction with the object? Second: How does this 
experience reveal the conditions and limits within which interpretation creates meaning, 
and, most importantly, the condition of being-at-risk and being-in-error assumed by 
interpreters? 
 
II. The Life of Meaning: Risk, Error, Complicity, Responsibility 
Before I explain how the lineages of reception I have chosen to treat in the current project 
are uniquely placed to provide initial answers to these questions, I must still account for 
the mode of life in which interpretation has a situation to begin with, as well as offer a 
preliminary account, to be fleshed out in the concrete discussions that follow, of what I 
believe interpretation qua reception “looks like on the ground”, in the midst of this life. 
What is called for, then, is a phenomenology of reception from the standpoint of the 
living human being, focused specifically on the integral relationship between 
interpretation and life. 
 When we approach an object in order to interpret it, we do so because we feel that 
the object has addressed us in the form of a question, a question which concerns the 
various relations we bear to that object as a concentrate of meaning, as something that 
challenges us with respect to our life, but with which we nonetheless seek to live. In the 
radicalized vocabulary of reception I am applying here, in fact, we can say that the object 
of interpretation comes into being as such only by virtue of this power of address; 
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without it, the object may still be an object in some sense, but it does not stake a claim on 
our power to make sense of the world. If we view the event of this question in terms of its 
significance to life as such, we find it very aptly described by John Dewey in his seminal 
work Art As Experience.2
The nature of experience is determined by the essential conditions of life. […] The first great 
consideration is that life goes on in an environment; not merely in it but because of it, through 
interaction with it. No creature lives merely under its skin; its subcutaneous organs are means of 
connection with what lies beyond its bodily frame, and to which, in order to live, it must adjust itself, 
by accommodation and defense but also by conquest. […] Life itself consists of phases in which the 
organism falls out of step with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with it – 
either through effort or by some happy chance. And, in a growing life, the recovery is never mere 
return to a prior state, for it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through which it has 
successfully passed. […] Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive 
balance of the energies of the organism with those of the conditions under which it lives. (Dewey 12f., 
emphasis mine) 
 The event of the question in life, in Dewey's language, 
corresponds to a distinct point in the rhythm of relation between the living being and its 
environment: 
The question posed to us by our nascent object of interpretation is always defined and 
motivated by the structure of concern we bring to the object, the preexisting relationship 
to ourselves and our environments which we have built up through a comparable process 
of questioning and responding in the past. It is just such a preexisting set of relations, in 
fact, that now itself provides the occasion for interpretation, that makes the experience of 
address possible and forceful for us in the first place. The event of the question not only 
belongs to the natural rhythm between the living being and its environment, but can 
actually offer a point at which the scope and pattern of this rhythm itself becomes part of 
the problem under consideration for the interpreter. In other words, the question is not 
only part of the living thing's rhythm or mode of being, but a point of decision at which 
other modes of being, other rhythms, even other lives become possible for it. 
                                                 
2  John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Penguin, 2005). 
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 As we set about the task of interpretation, then, we formulate a response to the 
question posed by our object – on this occasion, in these circumstances, with these 
concerns in mind – and life itself forms the shared horizon from which both the question 
and its response derive their meaning. Only once the object at hand, as part of our 
environment, is animated – even, as it were, resurrected – by the living concerns we bring 
to it, does it pose its more or less formidable question. In the same way as our experience 
of address by the object brings that object into being, so does the character and structure 
of our varied interpretive responses bring us into being as well, as living beings seeking 
to make sense. Whereas the object is born for us in the moment it challenges our life as 
interpreters, we ourselves are only born into this life through responding to the object – 
the paradox, like it or not, reflects precisely the tangled character of the experience. The 
response, to return to Dewey's thinking, is a measure not only of the degree of self-
reflection possessed by the living thing, but also of the degree of life it has achieved for 
itself in contact with its environment: 
An environment that was always and everywhere congenial to the straightaway execution of our 
impulsions would set a term to growth as surely as one always hostile would irritate and destroy. 
Impulsion forever boosted on its forward way would run its course thoughtless, and dead to emotion. 
For it would not have to give an account of itself in terms of the things it encounters, and hence they 
would not become significant objects. The only way it can become aware of its nature and its goal is 
by obstacles surmounted and means employed; means which are only means from the very beginning 
are too much one with an impulsion, on a way smoothed and oiled in advance, to permit consciousness 
of them. Nor without resistance from surroundings would the self become aware of itself; it would 
have neither feeling nor interest, neither fear nor hope, neither disappointment nor elation. Mere 
opposition that completely thwarts, creates irritation and rage. But resistance that calls out thought 
generates curiosity and solicitous care, and, when it is overcome and utilized, eventuates in elation. 
(Dewey 61f.) 
What we perceive in the object as its initial resistance to interpretation – the relative 
difficulty, as it were, of the question it poses – is actually a demand for us as living 
beings to “give an account of ourselves in terms of” the object: to encounter ourselves 
within and alongside the object we encounter in the world. The greater the variety and 
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coherence of such accounts we have at our disposal as remembered processes of 
interpretation, the greater the complexity of the rhythms and modes of being which 
crisscross the surface of individual life, the greater – in Dewey's word – our elation. 
 No matter how unexpected and troubling the object's question should prove to be, 
moreover, we should never forget that the question receives its force, its direction, even 
its voice, from some demonic faculty in us which, even against our will, transforms a 
resistance on the part of our environment into an instrument by means of which some 
necessary, but often unclear, task must be accomplished. In short, the object serves as a 
privileged medium of reflection by means of which we come to converse with ourselves 
in a certain way, to ask and answer across the surface of an exceedingly strange mirror, to 
convert the energies of this life into another life. At the end of the day, too, it may very 
well be a demon that conjures obscure spirits by our hands, that suavely arrests us by 
giving new breath to dead languages, that dictates the conditions and limits of the bizarre 
games of chance we play with these walking dead. But ultimately it is we and our modes 
of living that stand to lose or gain from playing the game, from responding to the 
question. 
In this exchange of question and answer, then, we voluntarily initiate a 
conversation with our object, and with ourselves, in a very real and binding sense. 
Everyone has had the experience in which one enters into a certain conversation quite 
casually, with no particular aim in mind, but thanks to a whole array of tangible and 
intangible circumstances, the exchange ultimately proves crucial to one's entire life by the 
time it ends.  Just as the end of this conversation reveals a goal which could not possibly 
have been discerned at its beginning, but in which the whole exchange is now 
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consummated and transfigured, so does the task laid upon us by the object in our 
experience of address only become fully clear at the end of our interpretive process. Only 
then, too, is it revealed as having been accomplished by a singular and unrepeatable 
dialogue. The distinct character of conversation as an activity, in fact, hinges on this 
willing submission to the contingency and uncertainty of a genuine process – in a word, 
its risk, which Gadamer describes quite well: 
We say that we “conduct” a conversation, but the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct 
lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to 
conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we 
become involved in it. […] No one knows in advance what will “come out” of a conversation. 
(Gadamer 385) 
Dewey's  articulation of the experience of a living being is likewise punctuated by a 
rhythm that is immediately recognizable as conversational, a rhythm of acting and 
undergoing, speaking and listening: 
Experiencing like breathing is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings. Their succession is punctuated 
and made a rhythm by the existence of intervals, periods in which one phase is ceasing and the other is 
inchoate and preparing. William James aptly compared the course of a conscious experience to the 
alternate flights and perchings of a bird. The flights and perchings are intimately connected with one 
another; they are not so many unrelated hoppings. Each resting place in experience is an undergoing in 
which is absorbed and taken home the consequences of prior doing, and, unless the doing is that of 
utter caprice or sheer routine, each doing carries in itself meaning that has been extracted and 
conserved. (Dewey 58) 
Just as a conversation scarcely merits the name if it only serves to amplify one 
interlocutor and silence the other, so too does the interpretive conversation never issue in 
the silence of the object and the triumph of the interpreter. What both face, and both gain, 
through the process of the conversation is nothing less than a will to risk: we begin a 
conversation, after all, by submitting to the uncertainty and indeterminacy introduced by 
the other, whereby we end up uncovering the uncertainty and indeterminacy at the heart 
of the same. In a word: the noise we hear in the other is an invitation to hear noise in the 
same. As a being that lives only in relation to an environment, moreover, an interpreter 
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can offer a more or less legitimate response according to the constraints of the question 
addressed to her, but she cannot create a mode of interpretive response that transcends all 
environments, that knows no conditions or limits, that answers all questions at once and 
takes no risks. She cannot invent a mode of response that would effectively silence the 
object as a thing that provokes us with its questions, for the silence of the object, in the 
end, would also mean the silence of the interpreter. The object must retain its power to 
respond in turn, or else the very life which the interpreter seeks to share with her object 
renders itself lifeless. An essential part, then, of the conversational task that is revealed at 
the end of – or, to speak more precisely, at a given resting-point within – an ongoing 
process of interpretation, lies precisely in the mutual renewal and, indeed, the mutual 
endangerment of life which the exchange itself effects on both sides. The invigorations 
and the dangers of a conversation go hand in hand. 
So far, however, I have only focused on the form of life that makes itself most 
immediately manifest in the simple confrontation between interpreter and object. No 
interpreter, however, is perfectly alone with her object, since interpretation entails at a 
bare minimum that we are at least with ourselves in the activity of interpretation. Part of 
the force of the object's address, after all, is that it compels us to dwell in our own 
company and respond to ourselves – as it were, to live the possibilities of the life we 
happen upon as our own. Nor does every process of interpretation necessarily originate in 
the life of the interpreter herself, which would entail that each of us would quite literally 
have to reinvent the wheel – especially for interpretation qua reception, quite the opposite 
is the case. By virtue of existing at a certain point in space and time, of speaking a certain 
language, of sharing a certain culture, etc., the interpreter enters into a multitude of 
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interpretive processes begun by others, takes on the imprint of their pasts, and receives 
the impetus of their present movements. It would be wholly meaningless, after all, to 
pursue meaning in the total absence of others past, present, and future to whom this 
meaning relates us more or less directly. What guarantees that the object does not 
arbitrarily fall silent, that every interpretation remains valid within constraints, is the real 
or potential existence of other interpretations and modes of interpretation – other 
interpreters, who find different questions posed by the object to their modes of life and 
who offer different answers. Even the most one-dimensional, summary exchange of 
question and answer between the object and the interpreter, between the thing that asks 
and the person who answers, must find itself challenged and renewed  through the 
presence of other interpreters and their interpretations. Just as these other interpreters 
respond to their common object, their interpretations respond to each other, indirectly 
revealing the constraints under which each response takes shape and evincing other 
pathways of questioning and answering. In doing so, furthermore, these other responses 
demonstrate how the exchange between object and interpreter has already been informed 
by just such long-standing conversations between interpreters: they demonstrate, in other 
words, how a given interpretation always takes on the flavor and momentum of a certain 
tradition of interpretation, a pre-existing and continuing conversation, and never appears 
ex nihilo. The presence of others who are or have been in the process of interpretation, 
even and especially when these are invisibly inscribed into our most intimate inner 
experience of meaning, gives interpretation its proper historical depth above and beyond 
the mere duration of a single day's reading or thinking, or, for that matter, the duration of 
a human life. 
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Above all, however, the plurality of interpreters upon which the pursuit of 
meaning depends necessarily establishes difference as a possibility, even an inalienable 
condition, of interpretation itself. This possibility of difference between interpreters 
brings us back to the parallel strand at work in the activity of reception: namely, that of 
error, which is the primary form such difference takes in our experience of interpretation. 
The criterion of error not only allows us to discriminate between interpretations we judge 
to be authentic or inauthentic according to a conventional standard. More seriously, error 
also marks the effective disintegration of the integral relationship that interpretation is 
meant to create between the interpreter and his object, or even between the interpreter 
and himself. In order to do justice to the problem of error in interpretation and to 
understand its intimate relation to risk, we must leave behind Dewey's individualist and 
evolutionary model, which treats the individual living being more or less in isolation and 
which views the living being as striving to attain progressively higher levels of 
equilibrium between its own powers and the challenges of its environment. If 
interpretation represents the specific domain in which the life of the living being is 
augmented, enriched, and heightened, what exactly happens to this life when 
interpretation terminates in error? What does error mean for living beings who live and 
interpret as a plurality in which error is a constant possibility, and difference very often 
an actuality? What, above all, might error be good for, in the life of interpretation? 
 To answer these new questions, I want to turn to a provocative line of thought 
about life and error that appears in the very last essay authorized for publication by 
Michel Foucault, a tribute to his mentor Georges Canguilhem entitled “Life: Experience 
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and Science.”3
At the end of the eighteenth century, it was thought that one could find the common element between a 
physiology studying the phenomena of life and a pathology devoted to the analysis of diseases, and 
that this element would enable one to consider the normal processes and the disease processes as a 
unit. […] People expected the healthy organism to provide the general framework in which these 
pathological phenomena took hold and assumed, for a time, their own form. It seems that this 
pathology, grounded in normality, characterized the whole of medical thought for a long time. 
 As Foucault recounts, Canguilhem distinguished himself as an historian of 
science by taking the life sciences, biology and medicine, as paradigm cases for the 
history of science rather than the exact sciences of chemistry or physics. The focus in 
Canguilhem's research on sciences in which life itself represents the value that guides 
thought transforms the relationship between healthy and diseased processes in the 
organism into a central epistemological issue for science as such: 
 But there are phenomena in the study of life which keep it separate from any knowledge that may 
refer to the physiochemical domains; the fact is that it has been able to find the principle of its 
development only in the investigation of pathological phenomena. It has not been possible to constitute 
a science of the living without taking into account, as something essential to its object, the possibility 
of disease, death, monstrosity, anomaly, and error. (Foucault 13, emphases mine) 
Just as life itself by definition is capable of error, insofar as it can wander into mutation 
and pathology, and just as life can only be comprehended by exploring and articulating 
the shapes taken by its errors, so the history of science unfolds not by the continuous 
progress of truth but by the jagged, discontinuous succession of its errors. In no other 
science is the object of inquiry capable of making a “mistake” in its internal organization 
in the same way as the subject of inquiry is capable of committing an error in 
interpretation and reinterpretation. In this capacity for error, Foucault continues, “the 
biologist recognizes the mark of his own object – and of a type of object to which he 
himself belongs, since he lives and since he […] develops this nature of the living in an 
activity of knowledge” (Foucault 14). 
                                                 
3  Michel Foucault, “Life: Experience and Science,” in: Foucault, The Essential Foucault: 
Selections from The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, eds. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New 
York: The New Press, 2003), 6-17. 
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 By defining this unique capacity that unites life and thought, moreover, 
Canguilhem brilliantly discerned the mode of being distinct to the scientist and, even 
more provocatively, to the philosopher insofar as both of these are forms of life rooted in 
interpretation. Error offers the point at which the history of human thought and the 
history of human life find their shared horizon of intelligibility, precisely because, as 
Foucault finally argues, error is the conscious and deliberate condition of the mode of life 
we call human: 
At the center of [the] problems [concerning the specific nature of life] one finds that of error. For, at 
the most basic level of life, the processes of coding and decoding give way to a chance occurrence that, 
before becoming a disease, a deficiency, or a monstrosity, is something like a disturbance in the 
informative system, something like a “mistake.” In this sense, life – and this is its radical feature – is 
that which is capable of error. [...W]ith man, life has led to a living being that is never completely in 
the right place, that is destined to “err” and to be “wrong.” (Foucault 13, emphasis mine) 
The rhythmic, harmonious striving for dynamic equilibrium envisioned by Dewey, the 
perfectly reciprocal conversation between life and environment, now must appear to us as 
a process full of blind spots and willful incoherencies that nonetheless retain a 
remarkable vigor, a process driven by an instinct that wills to be in error by being in the 
truth and wills to be in the truth by being in error. What distinguishes human life from 
life as such, furthermore, is that human life not only seeks to interpret and respond to life 
through the formation of concepts, but also possesses and actively risks being in the 
wrong about itself, making an error in its interpretations: 
[I]f one grants that the concept is the reply that life itself has given to that chance process, one must 
agree that error is the root of what produces human thought and its history. […] Nietzsche said that 
truth was the greatest lie. Canguilhem […] would perhaps say that on the huge calendar of life it is the 
most recent error; or, more exactly, he would say that the true/false dichotomy and the value accorded 
to truth constitute the most singular way of living that has been invented by a life that, from the depths 
of its origin, bore the potential for error within itself. (Foucault 15) 
Just as life evolves through the endless proliferation of monstrosities, interpretation 
survives by constantly submitting itself to the recombinant logic of error. Humanity's 
distinguishing monstrosity on “the huge calendar of life,” for Foucault as for 
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Canguilhem, is his free election to embark on the adventure of error, to risk himself on 
the wandering ways of thought. 
Where does this consideration of risk and error leave us with respect to our 
original line of thinking about interpretation as a process of interrogation and response? 
Plurality and difference, already cited as the conditions of possibility for error in 
interpretation, now reveal their positive fertility and vitality as forces that deepen the life 
of interpretation by multiplying its possibilities in conversation. The interpreter’s 
entrance into conversation with her object now appears overlaid, redoubled, and 
deepened by her entrance into conversation with other interpreters, or rather her 
recognition that she had already been participating in that conversation all along. In the 
terminology which I will apply throughout this project, we can say that the ethical 
dimension of interpretation, which relates the interpreter to herself through the object, is 
hereby overlaid with a political dimension, which relates the interpreter to others in the 
same activity at one and the same time. Hence the immediate situation of interpretive 
response is likewise overlaid, redoubled, and deepened with that of interpretive 
responsibility, which names the whole range of entanglements inscribed in her own 
position with positions occupied by other real or possible interpreters. In a sense, 
interpretive responsibility is the folding-back of the conversational ethos practiced 
between interpreters into the immediate confrontation between interpreter and object. The 
responsibilities that the interpreter bears to the object itself, to himself, and to other 
interpreters entail that she shapes her response in the awareness that it, too, will become 
an object to which others will respond. Just as the giving of answers in one interpretation 
becomes the occasion for questions in another, so in responsible interpretation the 
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response opens up to further interrogation rather than foreclosing on it. With her 
response, however, the interpreter can no more hope to silence her fellow interpreters or 
their posterity than she can hope to silence the artifact itself: that is the element of 
interpretive risk. The peculiar quality of the responsible interpretation, then, is the way it 
responds to its object even as it submits to response in turn. 
At a bare minimum, responsibility demands a constant acknowledgment by the 
interpreter that she is bound to countless historical, cultural, institutional, and discursive 
contingencies – contingencies which, paradoxically, grant her the freedom to speak even 
as they resist her efforts to free herself from them in speaking. The simultaneously 
liberating and binding force exercised by these contingencies on the interpreter represents 
one way of approaching what I call interpretive complicity. To be sure, there are positive 
and negative complicities. Those who partake in an abundant meal on a joyous occasion 
are bound to the event and to each other by virtue of the present they share, the past they 
recall, the future they anticipate: their conviviality is a positive complicity, for in coming 
to share something that belongs not to each alone but only to all together, they create and 
maintain a life greater in breadth and depth than the life each individual lives and 
commands alone. The same is true of 'accomplices' proper, who are bound by conspiracy 
to commit an abominable crime: their conspiracy is a negative complicity which in equal 
measure creates a broader and deeper life in which they all participate and which none of 
them definitively possesses or controls. Whether positive or negative, each member is 
made complicit with all, just as each is made responsible to all. The interpreter's 
relationship to his object, to other interpreters, to the prehistory and posterity of his own 
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interpretation – all of these entail complicities of both the positive and negative kinds, all 
of them render the interpreter both a celebrant and a criminal 
Even when the interpreter practices the form of attention dictated by an awareness 
of interpretive responsibility, however, it must be emphasized that the constraints within 
which meaningful responses take shape cannot ultimately be known and articulated in 
their totality before the moment of response. This means that assuming responsibility for 
interpretation, making oneself knowingly and voluntarily complicit in conversation, 
entails the acceptance of a certain amount of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and 
unpredictability in the interpreter’s relationship to both the object at hand and other 
interpreters. Even the responsible interpreter can never know with impunity the 
conversational straits into which her response and its elective complicities may lead him: 
she can never be fully aware of how the conditions upon which her response depends 
may change, or how far beyond its proper limits she may stray either in maintaining or 
changing a response. This is simply one way of describing the relationship between 
interpretive responsibility or complicity, on the one hand, and interpretive risk on the 
other. These are so closely bound to each other, in fact, that it may even be the 
interpreter’s zealous effort to practice responsibility that leads him to assume ever greater 
and ever more insidious risks, to drive himself more deeply and more blindly into his 
complicities. The same path he follows into what he believes to be the truth of the object 
and the heart of the conversation may in fact lead him ever further away from that truth 
and out of the conversation. 
To accept the ubiquitous risk of interpretive error, and to submit to the constant 
vigilance of interpretive responsibility, mean that the interpreter establishes and 
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maintains a relationship with her own limits as a living being that interprets – hence, in 
the final analysis, a relationship with her own death. The relative constraints within 
which interpretation can remain meaningful run parallel to the constraints of life itself, 
both of which demand that certain conditions be fulfilled and certain limits not be 
crossed. Interpretation qua reception is one name for how this finite life remakes itself 
and redefines its finite meanings within and against the boundaries of what is possible for 
it. Reception ultimately becomes a way not only of receiving and re-creating the meaning 
of some object or group of objects from a past that is truly “passed,” but also of receiving 
and re-creating one's own present life – as if one were already “passed,” as if one already 
existed in the continuum of one's own posterity. For all the accusations of derivativeness 
and triviality that have been leveled against the various cultural and critical practices of 
reception in our time, furthermore, neither its proponents nor its detractors seem to 
perceive the chaste and profound awareness of human finitude it expresses. This is, at 
last, what interpretation might be “good for” in spite of – or rather precisely because of – 
the ethical and political problems with which it makes us live, the risks and 
responsibilities in which it entangles us. Interpretation unites deadly seriousness with 
irrepressible play because the experience of risk so central to it similarly unites intense 
danger and ecstatic pleasure – and these last are, after all, the best teachers of how to live 
and how to die. 
 
III. Strange Company: The Persistence(s) of the Classical 
In addition to exploring how these basic conditions affect individual processes of 
interpretation, we must also reckon with the changing responses or overarching attitudes 
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that interpreters in the Western tradition have formed in the face of such conditions. How 
has it been possible to live with risk and responsibility in the past, at what costs and with 
what gains? How are these possible responses or attitudes directly reflected in the forms 
of life to which they give rise? When we turn from this “subject-side” set of concerns to 
the “object-side” of interpretive activity, we must likewise ask how objects of 
interpretation sustain being-at-risk or being-in-error in interpretation. How are they in 
fact constituted and productively deformed in the perilous undertaking of reception, and 
how does reception itself effectively render the historical past as contemporary as, or 
even more contemporary than, the contemporaneous present? 
 One could scarcely hope to find another area of inquiry where all of these 
questions are simultaneously and vitally at play than in the burgeoning field of classical 
reception studies.4
                                                 
4  The bibliography in this area, though quite recent, is already substantial. I can do no more here 
than point to some of the seminal works in the field which have directly or indirectly guided my own 
inquiries: Lorna Hardwick, Reception Studies (Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 2003); Charles A. Martindale and 
Richard F. Thomas, eds., Classics and the Uses of Reception (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006); James I. 
Porter, ed., Classical Pasts: The Classical Traditions of Greece and Rome (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
2006); Lorna Hardwick and Christopher Stray, eds., A Companion to Classical Receptions (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2008); Neville Morley, Antiquity and Modernity (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). 
 For precisely this reason, I have chosen two particular lineages of 
thought that are central to our understanding of interpretation in the present and which 
have transparent roots in Greek antiquity – namely, the tragic and the philosophical 
traditions. In terms of fundamental attitudes or evaluative stances that our tradition has 
taken up in regard to risk and responsibility, each of these traditions has developed a set 
of attitudes that remains strongly antithetical to the other, but also depends upon a group 
of concerns and problems that both hold in common. In tandem with producing various 
kinds of interpreting subjects, various forms of life, the virtually uninterrupted 
conversation about classical culture and literature that has marked Western tradition has 
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also continually (re)produced an ensemble of objects called “classical antiquity.” What 
has seemed to be the spontaneous, intrinsic, and defining peculiarity of these objects, 
furthermore, lies in the way they are paradoxically made to assert their contemporaneity 
with, and their untimeliness within, any given present.5 The timeless aura of 
“classicalness,” in other words, remains an epiphenomenon of each age's self-imposed 
efforts to receive, reconfigure, and respond to this particular past for itself6
 The conversational structure of these genealogies demands a conversational 
approach and a conversational sequence. Accordingly, in the first and third chapters 
respectively of this work, I take up Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus and Plato's Apology of 
Socrates, classical texts that confront similar problems of interpretation in subtly different 
ways, marking out the territory on which the historical and cultural antagonism between 
'literary' and 'philosophical' attitudes toward risk and responsibility would eventually play 
itself out. In my second and fourth chapters respectively, I explore how the works of two 
modern German writers – namely, Bertolt Brecht's Life of Galileo and Hannah Arendt's 
The Life of the Mind – receive and reenact the crises of interpretation articulated in their 
classical forebears. Their modern solutions seek to resolve ancient problems of risk and 
 – in other 
words, to place that past at risk in present reception and so to make the present 
responsible to it. Alongside the more general question, then, of how risk and 
responsibility actually work in the experience of the interpreter, the present study is 
structured by the different ways in which ancient tragedy and philosophy have been 
enlisted as referees in the ongoing gamble of modern interpretive conversation. 
                                                 
5  James I. Porter offers a remarkable psychodynamic reading of antiquity's contemporaneity in 
“Feeling Classical: Classicism and Ancient Literary Criticism,” in: Porter, op. cit., 301-352. 
6  On which issue, see Porter, “What Is Classical About Classical Antiquity?”, in: Porter, op. cit., 1-
65. 
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responsibility, but the solutions, as we will see, only end up creating new and intensified 
risks and responsibilities. Ultimately, the question faced by both the tragic and the 
philosophical lineages, in antiquity as in modernity, becomes not how to eliminate error 
and complicity from the activity of interpretation, but how to dwell within them, even to 
affirm them. By situating literary and philosophical forms of reflection in a common 
conversation in this way, this discussion aims to suggest how these problems crossed the 
frontiers between genres of discourse as much as intellectual disciplines and historical 
contexts. 
 Chapter I, “The Noise of Interpretive Travel in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus”, 
explores how the disruption of locative values – center and margin, native and exile, 
arrival and departure – not only shapes the play's poetic language and drives its dramatic 
action, but also articulates the condition of wandering, flight, and error that distinguishes 
the tragic tradition of thinking about interpretation. As an archetypal interpreter, Oedipus 
defines the faculty of interpretation in the first instance as a virtuoso power of mobility. 
As a literal and figurative traveler across boundaries, however, he violates the normative 
meaning of place through the very same power of mobility that he uses in the attempt to 
restore and protect that meaning. The effect of the tragedy, and its significance for this 
inquiry, depend upon the troubling revelation that Oedipus’ mobile pursuit of truth was in 
fact a flight into error, that his renowned wisdom depended upon ignorance of where he 
was, whence he came and whither he was going. The mounting contradiction between 
‘where’ Oedipus is in terms of religious, political, and domestic topographies, and 
‘where’ he believes himself to be, generates the distinctive irony that first marks the 
language of the play with what I call ironic interference, but then ultimately dissolves this 
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language into pure, inarticulate noise. It is this intolerable noise, finally, born of the risks 
to which Oedipus succumbs and the responsibilities he fails to acknowledge as an 
interpreter, that must be forcibly driven to flight outside the ordered polarities of 
religious, political, and domestic spaces. In short, Oedipus’ interpretive talent for 
constantly taking up a new position and a new perspective in space threatens the 
meaningful structure of space itself as a medium of interpretation. When the city of 
Thebes at last confronts him, the mobile interpreter of riddles, he has himself become an 
elusive riddle demanding interpretation – a point of rupture in their shared space and a 
source of noise in their shared language, foreclosing on the same interpretive 
conversation that he renders so desperately necessary. 
 Turning to the modern legacy of Oedipus' tragic challenge to interpretation, 
Chapter II, “Say Hello to the New: Tragic Technologies in Brecht’s Epic Theater,” 
investigates how Brecht’s Life of Galileo (1938/39) presents a compelling modern 
reconfiguration of the risks and responsibilities originally introduced into the activity of 
interpretation by Oedipus' 'dislocated locatedness.' Contextualizing Brecht's play within 
the 19th- and 20th-century German reception of classical tragedy as well as Brecht's own 
theoretical writings on modern theater, this chapter explores how Brecht’s theories of 
modern theater as a scientific technology of vision resonate with his Galileo’s 
pronouncement of a “new age” rooted in the interpretive power of individual, empirical 
vision. Galileo’s reinterpretation of nature opens up subversive new political perspectives 
by circumventing the highly theatricalized arena of Aristotelian discourse and appealing 
to the immediate authority of the senses. In a similar way, Brecht’s theory and practice of 
theater appeals directly to the political authority of its spectator, taking aim at a bourgeois 
26 
German tradition of drama that required the spectator to subsume his perspective and 
powers of judgment to that of the dramatic hero through identification. While both 
Brecht’s Galileo and Brecht himself thus seek to replace a falsified or ideological 
interpretive authority with an authentic and revolutionary one, each risks ignoring the 
necessary role of authority in their own interpretations as a stable perspective that can be 
assumed by others – not unlike a dramatic persona. The complicity thus forged between 
the interpretive instruments of the Church and those of modern science, or the 
representational methods of bourgeois German theater and those of Brechtian epic 
theater, reconfigures the danger of spatial ambiguity to which Oedipus succumbs as a 
danger of temporal ambiguity. Like Galileo, the interpreter never knows ‘when’ he is, 
whether in the old age of exploitation or in the new age of emancipation, or what role he 
might come to play in either. In view of Galileo’s final capitulation to the Church, these 
parallels with Oedipus' drama serve to reveal the risks and responsibilities implicit in 
Brecht’s attempts to replace the archetype of the classical, tragic interpreter with a 
modern, anti-tragic model of his own. Whereas both Brecht and Galileo, like Oedipus 
before them, promise a certain collective emancipation through interpretation, they 
endanger this same emancipation by remaining blind to the risks and responsibilities 
inherent in the exercise of interpretive authority. 
 Drawing upon the full breadth of this exchange between ancients and moderns 
about the tragic potential of interpretation, the turn – or rather, the return – to the figure 
of Socrates represents a crucial point of synthesis and of departure in this genealogy. 
Chapter III, “A Reckless Voice of Conscience: Socrates at Risk in Plato’s Apology,” 
reclaims Plato as a participant in a conversation with tragedy about interpretation by 
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working with Pierre Hadot’s and Michel Foucault’s research on the relationship between 
philosophical discourse and the philosophical way of life in antiquity. This chapter 
explores how Socrates presents the philosophical way of life in literary form as a 
fragmentation and multiplication of the voice, arguing that we can best understand the 
dialogic character of Socratic philosophy by recourse to the one text in Plato's oeuvre that 
does not take the form of a dialogue. Socrates' provocative and paradoxical use of his 
own voice in the Apology seeks to establish a relation of integral coherence between the 
subject and his voice in the interpretive practice of philosophy even as it constantly 
threatens their mutual dis-integration. In order to 'speak for himself' as an interpreter, the 
Socratic philosopher must thus constantly assume new voices and new viewpoints in the 
game of conversation, cultivating the endangerment of the self as a deliberate way of life. 
The preeminent risk inscribed within the interpretive language of philosophy, then, lies in 
the fact that it arrives at self-identity and coherence only by constantly returning to the 
condition of difference and error it sought to escape – a paradox directly comparable to 
Oedipus’ contradictory flight. Its primary form of responsibility, on the other hand, 
emerges from its appropriation of this paradox from tragedy, where it emerges in the 
relation of the individual to others, and its installation of the paradox at the very center of 
the individual's relation to himself and his way of life. Socrates and the new set of 
interpretive attitudes he embodies thus turn against the tragic tradition of thought on 
interpretation, where the interpreter’s self-confrontation under the sign of error and 
complicity marks the catastrophic limit of all meaning. Instead, Socrates transforms this 
self-confrontation into the endlessly renewable origin of dialogue, in which the language 
and life of the philosopher both reinforce and endanger one another. Socratic dialogue 
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thus emerges as what I call a genre of both language and life that affirms and embraces 
the self-endangerment that the interpreter faces in the process of conversation. 
Chapter IV, “A Strange New Form of Life: Thinking, Acting, and Endangerment 
in the Thought of Hannah Arendt,” examines how the legacy of Socratic self-
endangerment forms a bridge between Hannah Arendt's concepts of acting and thinking 
by defining a truly interpretive way of life. Despite the strong distinction between acting 
and thinking Arendt retains throughout her work, her thought intimately connects each 
activity to the other by using a common figurative language of appearance and 
disappearance, especially in her final book, The Life of the Mind. Here, Arendt argues 
that inasmuch as the life of thought and the life of action share a common passion for 
appearance, each depends equally on the willing self-endangerment of the subject, who 
both interprets appearances and presents his or her appearance – to him- or herself and to 
others – to be interpreted. Affirming the web of risks and responsibilities that emerges as 
a result, Arendt reworks the Socratic ethos of dialogic interpretation as a modern way of 
life that rejoins philosophy with politics. For Arendt, the conversation we carry on about 
the meaning of things, and the way we make ourselves both subjects and objects of that 
conversation, charge our ethical and political lives with risk and place the task of 
interpretation at the center of both the life of thought and that of action. 
The particular set of categories to which this genealogy adheres – ancient and 
modern, tragic and philosophical – should by no means be taken as the only valid 
distinctions for an inquiry of this kind, nor should the choice of case studies be taken as 
definitive for the questions under consideration. The necessary as opposed to the 
contingent elements of this project, however, lie in what can loosely be called its 
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'existential' approach to risk and responsibility, an approach that focuses on the 
interpreter's experience of herself as a finite being related to both herself and other finite 
beings through meaning. It bears emphasizing, however, that this 'existential' approach 
does not ultimately depend upon a unified, coherent, self-identical subject that remains 
relatively unaffected qua subject by the activity of interpretation. Instead, the 
indeterminacy and relativity built into the concepts of risk and responsibility already 
assume to a certain degree that a subject can only be defined as a matrix of strategic 
positions – or rather, to use the term that I adopt later in this project, as an ensemble of 
voices. Voice, along with the problems that grow up around it such as those of authority, 
identity, and impersonation, remains a persistent if “undertheorized” concept in the story 
I seek to tell here. Its unanticipated appearance at the very center of this project, like an 
uninvited guest to a party, could promise either disaster or revelation – but certainly, for a 
project that foregrounds the ambiguity, uncertainty, and contingency of the very same 
critical activity in which it participates, it would be ludicrous to turn such a guest away 
from the door. Every book claims to be about one thing, but its best readers usually 
discover that it is about something else entirely. In the case of this book, the problem of 
voice may, in fact, prove to be what risk and responsibility are actually 'about': the gate 
crasher may actually be the host. But that is something for my readers, and my own 
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THE NOISE OF INTERPRETIVE TRAVEL 
IN SOPHOCLES' OEDIPUS TYRANNUS 
 
1. Introduction: Are We There Yet? 
Language is [...] great for solving problems, after it creates a problem. 
– Modest Mouse, “Blame It on the Tetons” 
In many respects, Oedipus' failure to recognize himself simply magnifies our own 
mundane, everyday failure to recognize properly those things that we see every day – the 
things that escape our notice precisely because they stand in the plainest sight, in the most 
intimate relationship to what we think we are and what we think we understand. 
Unfortunately, this inertia of the mundane mind, its failure to make sense again of what 
seems to make eminently good sense already, also plays a key structural role in the 
language of literary criticism – particularly for a work that has generated as much 
criticism as Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus, and along such regular avenues of 
proliferation to boot. In the process of interpretation, we often speak a language we think 
we understand, or at least one we think we ourselves have invented and therefore one we 
fully control, but, like Oedipus himself, we all too often fail to perceive the patterns we 
obediently reproduce, fail to listen to the words we are actually using. 
 Simon Goldhill’s influential reading of the Oedipus Tyrannus1, though very far 
indeed in most respects from representing a mundane failure of any kind, ends with a 
                                                 
1  I will hereafter refer to the Oedipus Tyrannus solely by its conventional abbreviation, OT. 
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statement that remains paradigmatically inaudible, as it were, in the hearing we grant to 
certain kinds of critical language. If we listen hard enough and long enough to it, if we 
overcome our deafness by saturating the ear with its sound, we find that Goldhill's 
language does not so much achieve the closure of his own act of reading as suggest the 
opening of another: 
In the interplays of […] arbitrary interpretation and ironic hidden truths, of insight and blindness, the 
Oedipus Tyrannus offers a paradoxical paradigm of man and his knowledge that challenges not only 
fifth-century or modern claims for the rigour, certainty and exhaustiveness of man’s intellectual 
progress, but also the security of the reading process itself with its aim of finding, and delimiting, the 
precise, fixed and absolute sense of a text, a word. Athenian tragedy questions again and again the 
place and role of man in the order of things; and in its specific questioning of man’s status with regard 
to the object and processes of knowledge and intellectual enquiry, the Oedipus Tyrannus instigates a 
critique relevant not only to the fifth-century enlightenment and its view of man’s progress and 
achievement but also to the play’s subsequent readings and readers. […] The model of Oedipus as 
interpreter of signs and solver of riddles, of Oedipus as the confident pursuer of knowledge through 
rational enquiry, of Oedipus as the searcher for insight, clarity, understanding, indeed provides a model 
for our institutions of criticism. It is as readers and writers that we fulfil the potential of Oedipus’ 
paradigm of transgression.2 
Though Goldhill's is an exceptionally perceptive treatment of the play, we hear many of 
these words so often in connection to the OT that we no longer listen to them – and this 
failure of the ear, no longer so mundane now, represents the locus of a particular risk. 
The question concerning “the place […] of man in the order of things,” central to 
Athenian tragedy as well as the fifth-century (BCE) enlightenment in which it took root, 
makes itself felt in the OT as a question about the place of man as an interpreter – as a 
creature that makes sense. Against this background, as Goldhill presents it, Oedipus is 
nothing if not an archetypal reader of signs, a virtuoso of evidence, inference, and 
argument, a kind of secular soothsayer. Goldhill’s implicit question about the place 
                                                 
2  Simon Goldhill, Reading Greek Tragedy (New York: Cambridge UP, 1986), 221; qv. 210. 
Goldhill offers an excellent discussion of the OT in the context of the 5th-century (BCE) Athenian 
enlightenment, during which a whole host of thinkers systematically challenged traditional Greek ideas 
about nature, law, the gods, and human nature. In Section 3 of my discussion (see below), I suggest how 
the religious and familial vocabulary of place derived from the Archaic era (ca. 750-480 BCE) is contested 
in the Classical text of the OT by Oedipus’ unique and paradoxical relationship to place: one way of 
thinking among many that were up for grabs during the culturally and politically tumultuous era in which 
Sophocles lived. 
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assigned to man the interpreter by the OT pales in comparison, nonetheless, to the 
provocation of his final statement: that when we become interpreters, we necessarily 
transgress against the ordered boundaries that we set out to understand – and transgress, 
moreover, in a degree comparable to Oedipus’ own extremes. From this perspective, 
Oedipus’ formidable power to determine the proper place and hence the true meaning of 
everything is suddenly made to converge with his no less formidable power to step out of 
place and to destroy meaning – hence the task we face in reading the play, and in 
assigning Oedipus himself a place and a meaning. But are we so deadened to our own 
critical vocabulary and our own mundane habits that we fail to hear Goldhill talking 
about issues of place, about negotiating positions or crossing boundaries in space, as the 
leading metaphors of interpretation for both Oedipus and for us? 
If we listen to Goldhill's words themselves on this point, and if, through this 
listening, we come to hear a cadence in our critical language as a whole which we had not 
perceived as such before, I believe we stand to win a new conception of the tragedy of 
Oedipus. In essence, I think we can say that the OT marks the point at which the 
vocabulary of place itself, as an instrument of interpretation, appeared as a problem in the 
history of interpretation. Listen now, with different ears, to Peter Euben as he suggests 
how the location of Oedipus' crimes directly implicates space in the categories by which 
we interpret political experience: 
The play suggests that in the end and for all our efforts the most carefully wrought boundaries are 
breached by the men most responsible for building them. […T]he outside is also inside. The wild 
cannot be banished for it lies, if not in our being, then in our politics. Oedipus commits patricide in the 
desolate place where the roads meet. There, in no man's land, between cities, he refuses to be pushed 
off the road and so kills his father. But the commits incest not in the wild but in the city, in his house, 
in his very bed. Patricide and incest, the prohibitions against which were thought to separate humans 
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from beasts, are committed by this greatest of men who collapses space and time into perverse 
singularity.3 
Employing a set of figures so frequently applied to this play that they almost cease to be 
perceptible as figures, Euben's language suggests that Oedipus, as one who definitively 
uncovers the place of the interpreter in the order of things, necessarily challenges the 
notion of place itself, dislocates the very idea of location in a way that makes dislocation 
central to the politics and ethics of interpretation. What Oedipus discovers for us is that 
the activity of interpretation only exists within the cosmic order – whatever that is – by 
taking up a position outside of it, a position from which virtually anything becomes the 
occasion for asking a question, voicing a doubt, seeing from a new angle – in a word, 
getting out of place. The most troubling question this particular version of Oedipus poses 
to us is not Where do I belong? but rather, Why should I belong anywhere? 
If we ask what place Oedipus – that archetypal interpreter – occupies, we are also 
bound to ask what place we must occupy in order to understand him, in order to become 
his interpreters. This line of thinking about the OT leads directly out of the metacritical 
problem Goldhill sounds out so pregnantly in his conclusion. If the tragedy of Oedipus 
ultimately expresses a profound doubt about the interpreter’s secure place in the order of 
meaning, then we must also ask: where does the play itself place the interpretive 
conversation about its meaning, or even our conversation about meaning as such? Where 
does this text make us stand, what place and perspective does it make us occupy, and 
what object does it make us take up – if not ourselves and our own processes of 
interpretation? Goldhill’s reading confirms how much the OT’s attraction for generations 
of interpreters owes its force to the metacritical perspective it opens up on interpretation 
                                                 
3  Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road Not Taken (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
1990), 103; qv. 98, 102. 
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itself. At the same time, Goldhill only hints at how the figure of place, as it is developed 
through the play’s poetic language, forms the unacknowledged sine qua non for this line 
of thinking about the tragedy – let alone how much the OT’s problematization of place 
may have made the very concept of metacriticism possible at all. 
If Oedipus has retained his paradigmatic value because his narrative offers a kind 
of Archimedean point around which an interpreter can turn in order to encounter himself, 
this already suggests that the meaning or structure of place in the OT changes depending 
on our position, and that such changes lead us to reflect upon our own efforts to establish, 
as it were, the place of place. Even when we consider Oedipus’ career as an interpreter in 
the broadest terms, furthermore, his tragedy demonstrates the dynamic and reflexive 
character of place as an interpretive category. The interpretive problem Oedipus sets for 
himself at the beginning of the play lies in the enigma of the plague; this figurative riddle, 
while reiterating the literal riddle of the Sphinx and demanding a “solution” (ἔκλυσις 
306, qv. 35)4 perhaps even more urgently, eventually turns back its interpreter to reflect 
upon his own place in the first riddle as well as the utterly changed landscape of meaning 
he now confronts. The riddle of the plague retrospectively uncovers the intractable, or 
indeed, “incurable” (ἀνήκεστον 98) character of the Sphinx’s riddle about man – 
because the riddle turns back upon the solver of riddles himself. In the language and 
action of the tragedy as a whole, this same movement of epistrophy (Grk: ἐπιστροφή) – a 
turning-around to reverse one’s direction or to regard that which previously escaped 
one’s perspective – represents the chief risk inscribed in the problem of place as it is 
                                                 
4  My basic source for the text of the OT is the Oxford Classical Text: Sophocles, Sophoclis fabulae, 
ed. H. Lloyd-Jones & N.G. Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). I have also consulted the editions and 
commentaries of R.C. Jebb (Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments. Part I: The Oedipus Tyrannus 
[Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1883]) and R.D. Dawe (Oedipus Rex, 2nd rev. ed. [New York: 
Cambridge UP, 2006]). Henceforth I will cite the Oxford text of the OT by line number alone. 
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articulated in the OT. Not just in spatial, but also in temporal, political, and familial 
terms, this symptomatic turnaround offers perhaps the neatest summary metaphor for the 
hermeneutic procedure that occupies the center of the drama, which hinges on reversal 
and inversion of every conceivable kind. Most importantly, however, the reversing move 
of the Oedipal epistrophy marks out a condition that has become chronic in the 
interpretation of the play just as in the practice of metacriticism. As Oedipus’ own 
interpreters, we discover that once we turn around to reconsider, we can never stop 
turning. 
While epistrophy presents us with the chief source of ambiguity and paradox in 
the OT’s figure of place, it represents only the representative moment of crisis in the 
ongoing process of interpretation in which both we and Oedipus are continuously 
engaged. In the uneasiness surrounding the question of where?,5 in the shifting 
restlessness of viewpoints that pervades the OT, the problem of interpretive risk in its 
political significance always remains bound to the arbitrary power of the interpreter to 
move: to cross boundaries, take up new positions, and redefine viewpoints. The drama of 
Oedipus asks how the topography of the real can change its form and value as a result of 
this restlessness, which carries us from one viewpoint to another, which turns us around 
and makes us look again – and then it asks what we stand to lose or even gain in 
restlessly moving along this circular path. Just as one cannot turn around unless one is 
already in motion in a certain direction, the prerequisite to Oedipus’ turnaround in the 
language and action of the drama lies in the restless, single-minded movement that 
                                                 
5  An uneasiness that becomes virtually neurotic at OT 924-926, where the Messenger’s entrance 
speech is marked by a series of puns involving pou, a Greek particle that can mean ‘where?’, and Oedipus’ 
name (Grk: Oidipous). For more on this passage, see Goldhill 217, Euben 103f., Charles Segal, Tragedy 
and Civilization: An Interpretation of Sophocles (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1981), 223, and Bernard 
Knox, Word and Action: Essays on the Ancient Theater [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1979], 99-100. 
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constantly alters his place as an interpreter. This condition of simultaneous escape and 
pursuit, arriving and departing, coming and going constitutes the native habitat of his 
conspicuously rootless character, just as it does for the practicing metacritic. More than 
anything else, what is truly awesome and terrifying about Oedipus is just how much he 
can and does move across the literal and symbolic landscapes of the drama, how his 
points of arrival only coincide with new points of departure, how he comes to occupy 
every possible position on the board and none of them at the same time. Just as his 
ultimate arrival at truth in the moment of epistrophy unmasks his single-minded pursuit 
as a wandering in oblivion, it condemns him outright to undertake the same wandering in 
full awareness for the rest of his days. The discovery that should have cured and cast out 
(ἐλαύνειν, 98) the plague from the body of Thebes has instead only revealed the extent 
to which Thebes has nourished its own disease (μίασμα […] τρέφειν, 97-98; cf. 217) in 
the person of its king; the capture that should have triumphantly crowned the interpreter’s 
pursuit of truth has only marked the distance from the truth he has reached in flight. The 
virtuoso mobility that consistently distinguishes Oedipus’ interpretive attitude I will call 
his power of kinesis (κίνησις [n.], ‘motion’), in which epistrophy forms the moment of 
crisis. The combination of flight and reversal, kinesis and epistrophy, in the figurative 
language of the Oedipus Tyrannus thus offers a point of entry to understanding how the 
condition of risk governs the activity of interpretation. That our pursuit of meaning may 
in fact put us in flight from it, that our arrival at the truth may in fact be a departure from 
it, that we may be all too much at home when we think we are distantly abroad: these 
name just a few of the risks that the narrative of Oedipus marks out for the activity of the 
interpreter. In the first section of my discussion here, I will investigate how the play 
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defines Oedipus’ hermeneutic perspective in the vocabulary of kinesis, how this kinesis 
presages and finally reaches its point of turnaround, and how this turnaround poses a risk 
not only in Oedipus’ interpretation of his own career, but also in our interpretation of the 
tragedy that bears his name. 
In addition to exploring the kinetic character of the topos (τόπος, ‘place’) 
inhabited by Oedipus as an interpreter, we must also consider how the cultural and 
historical topography that pre-exists the interpreter, the collective mapping and naming of 
the landscape in which he orients himself, defines the forms of responsibility at stake in 
his movement toward truth.6 Oedipus does not invent whole-cloth the symbolic 
                                                 
6  Because of my specialized use of the term ‘responsibility,’ and because of the way the question of 
Oedipus’ moral responsibility has loomed large in the reception of the OT, it seems necessary at this point 
to prevent any misunderstanding of my treatment of Oedipus’ responsibility by firmly separating it from 
this tradition. The present discussion does not engage the questions of whether the OT represents a ‘tragedy 
of guilt’ or a ‘tragedy of fate,’ whether Oedipus possesses a ‘tragic fault’ (hamartia) as defined by 
Aristotle, or comparable matters that are central to this lineage of scholarship. The enormity of the 
scholarship devoted to these questions and to the reception of the play along these lines may be judged by 
the sheer 500-page heft of Michael Lurje’s exhaustive volume Die Suche nach der Schuld: Sophokles’ 
Oedipus Rex, Aristoteles’ Poetik, und das Tragödienverständnis der Neuzeit (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2004). 
Aside from referring to Walter Burkert’s and E.R. Dodds’ definitive responses to the questions surrounding 
Oedipus’ moral responsibility (Burkert, Oedipus, Oracles, and Meaning: From Sophocles to Umberto Eco 
[Toronto: U. of Toronto Press, 1991], 15-18; Dodds, “On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex,” Greece & 
Rome, 2nd ser., 13:1 [April 1966], 37-49), I will simply quote John Gould’s assessment of these issues in his 
classic essay “The Language of Oedipus” (in: Modern Critical Views: Sophocles, ed. Harold Bloom [New 
York: Chelsea House, 1990]). Out of context, the passage is doomed to sound a bit flippant, but I 
emphatically agree with his treatment of the question: “I have largely ignored issues of moral responsibility 
[…]. That is because, it seems to me, that is how the play is. It has nothing to say about responsibility, 
almost nothing about fate, and seemingly very little about the workings of divinity. […] To have dealt with 
those other issues, implicit though they might be taken to be in the story of Oedipus, would be to have 
written another play” (220). Here (but more explicitly in Burkert) we might perceive the echo of a passage 
from Freud’s discussion of the OT that is cited and discussed far less than his various expositions of the 
famous Oedipus complex: “Es ist zu verwundern, daß die Tragödie des Sophokles nicht vielmehr empörte 
Ablehnung beim Zuhörer hervorruft […]. Denn sie ist im Grunde ein unmoralisches Stück, sie hebt die 
sittliche Verantwortlichkeit des Menschen auf, zeigt göttliche Mächte als die Anordner des Verbrechens 
und die Ohnmacht der sittlichen Regungen des Menschen, die sich gegen das Verbrechen wehren.” (“It is 
astonishing that Sophocles’ tragedy has not provoked much more enraged indignation on the part of its 
auditors […]. For it is basically an unmoral play: it abolishes the moral responsibility of the individual, 
shows divine powers as the orchestrators of crime and the powerlessness of human moral feelings to guard 
human beings against wrongdoing.”) Sigmund Freud, Gesammelte Werke. Elfter Band [Vol. 11]: 
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), 
343 (translation mine). This is also perhaps one of very few points on which Freud’s reception of the 
Sophoclean Oedipus coincides with my own: it recognizes the basic absence of an explicit horizon in the 
play by which Oedipus’ moral responsibility could be measured – though this is by no means the same as 
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topography – literally, the ‘writing of place’ – that both authorizes and opposes his 
interpretive topos. Rather, this topography has emerged in the plural and contingent 
conversation of the classical Greek culture that informs Sophocles’ text, to which 
Oedipus’ viewpoint responds and to which, with tragic force, it is ultimately held 
accountable. As Jean-Pierre Vernant’s work on the Greek conceptualization of space and 
movement indicates, this topography is organized according to a dichotomy derived from 
the Archaic period: on the one hand, an immobile center that guarantees the stability and 
continuity of individual, familial, and collective identities; on the other hand, a dynamic 
periphery that oversees the uncertain and dangerous realm of contact, exchange, and 
transformation. In this topographic model, the polar relation between center and 
periphery, between ‘in here’ and ‘out there,’ generates a fundamental tension in the 
Greek vocabulary of place. Although the center strives toward the absolute immobility 
and self-sufficiency, it necessarily depends upon that which lies on its shifting and 
unstable margin. In interpretive terms, we might say that while the center works to 
stabilize the meanings of language or the boundaries of human identity, it stands in 
constant communication with a periphery that contests and destabilizes meaning and 
identity. Rather than letting it remain in the background, moreover, the poetic language of 
the OT plays on this basic tension in the Archaic vocabulary of place by its conspicuous 
                                                                                                                                                 
saying that there is no implicit moral horizon. Instead of then imposing on the drama models of moral 
responsibility which have nothing to do with either the text itself or its historical horizon, Gould chooses 
instead to trace out the mutual overlap and mutual contradiction between “realms of human and divine 
intelligibility” (221) in the play’s narrative and poetic texture. While his essay only suggests how these 
“realms” are figured in “the oppositions of place within the play” (ibid.; qv. 210) near its end, my 
discussion takes this and Goldhill’s similar conclusion as their points of departure. For a brilliant treatment 
of moral agency and responsibility in Greek tragedy, including the OT, that encounters text and context on 
their own terms, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Intimations of the Will in Greek Tragedy,” in: id. & Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 49-84; for an equally 
masterful rebuttal to the psychoanalytic reception of Oedipus, see Vernant, “Oedipus Without the 
Complex,” op. cit. 85-111.  
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failure to locate Oedipus within its polarized scheme. The implicitly Archaic topography 
that informs the Chorus’ language in the first stasimon (463-482), for instance, yields one 
contradiction after another. On the one hand, the radiant, immutable center represented 
by the Delphic oracle leaves the Chorus wandering in interpretive uncertainty; on the 
other hand, the obscure, peripheral murderer they condemn stands before them in the 
person of their sovereign, who, as master interpreter, resides at the very center of the 
city’s self-understanding. 
In his very person, then, Oedipus represents an interpretive response that defies 
and confuses the terms of the conversation even as he seeks to uphold and defend these 
categories in his leadership of the public inquiry into the murder of Laius. While 
Oedipus’ responsibility to Archaic topography compels him to interpret his own and 
others’ topoi according to its vocabulary, his effort to redraw that topography according 
to his individual powers of interpretive kinesis threatens to collapse the distinction 
between center and periphery. After all, it is the very same mastery of the ‘writing of 
place’ that disposes him to “walk on many pathways in the wanderings of thought” at his 
own peril (πολλὰς […] ὁδοὺς ἐλθόντα φροντίδος πλάνοις, 67). In the tragic turnaround 
of his desire to re-map and re-name space according to his own vocabulary, Oedipus 
ultimately comes to confront himself as the man from nowhere, who belongs nowhere, 
and who will end up nowhere, in relation to gods, city, and household alike. In a word, he 
succumbs to the condition of perpetual ectopia (Grk. ἐκτοπία = “being out-of-place, 
strange, eccentric, foreign”) that at once nourishes and threatens responsible 
interpretation. The OT plays out its literary problematization of place, furthermore, by 
bringing the interpretive conversation to a head around the figure of the interpreter 
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himself. Just as the interpreter strives to re-locate, re-connect, re-integrate each discrete 
sign, each disparate piece of evidence into an articulate whole, he must as part of the 
same process dis-locate, dis-connect, and dis-integrate his own perspective from the 
topography he inherits and to which he responds. The second part of my discussion here 
will thus examine how the OT, through the figure of Oedipus, reasserts Archaic 
topography in the same moment as it interrogates the univocal authority of its coordinate 
system. 
Whereas the first two sections of my analysis of the OT will uncover how the 
condition of ectopia both dictates certain risks for the interpreter and entangles his 
responsibility in certain paradoxes, my third section will consider the broader 
consequences of the interpreter’s ectopia for the shared language and shared sense of 
place that constitutes the political realm. With his restless movement from one place to 
another, one frame of reference to another, Oedipus’ ectopia does not exhaust its 
implications merely in his own subjectivity, but puts at risk the common space and shared 
language that integrate him with others: in short, it endangers the entire substance of 
politics. Here we approach the uniquely tragic significance of Sophocles’ play for the 
problem of interpretation as a political question. As an interpreter, Oedipus’ triumph and 
tragedy alike depends on the way his language both overstates the normative vocabulary 
of place and undermines it at once. Ultimately, however, once the internal and external 
audiences of the drama are compelled to become his interpreters in turn, they – and we – 
must assign Oedipus a place and a meaning for the political community. Oedipus eludes 
every attempt to make sense of him because he reveals the degree to which the language 
of the interpreter – the language we share with him – is unwittingly complicit in the 
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unmaking of sense. When we attempt to apply normative language to Oedipus, when we 
try to respond to the political challenge he poses, we find that it can only produce 
multiple, fragmentary, and divergent evaluations of one and the same phenomenon: like 
Oedipus’ voice, the voice of his interpreter seems to contain a multitude of voices that 
approach from every direction and cannot be reconciled with each other. 
The troubling polyvocality of Oedipus’ voice challenges the common places and 
common language upon which politics depend, threatening the integrity of individual 
identities and viewpoints. Polyvocality inflects the poetic language of the OT, moreover, 
through the conspicuous multiplication and dislocation of meaning in not only Oedipus’ 
language, but also the language of his interlocutors. From our viewpoint, the dramatis 
personae constantly mean both more and less than they intend to say: their language is 
rife with double and triple meanings of which they remain hopelessly unaware, even 
going so far as to undermine or contradict the meaning of which they are aware.7 Of 
course, the basic features of this kind of language have long been noted in criticism and 
have come to be considered part of the characteristic tragic irony that distinguishes the 
play.8 Critics typically read the ironic language as an effect of the asymmetry in 
knowledge possessed on the one hand by the dramatis personae and on the other by the 
external audience. In so doing, however, they implicitly privilege the more 
comprehensive knowledge of the latter, who already knows the outcome of the story and 
                                                 
7  See Burkert 11. 
8  Gould is also typical in this regard when he writes, “King Oedipus is a play whose qualities of 
inscrutability and of pervasive irony quickly come to complicate any critical discussion. It is a play of 
transformations in which things turn into other things as we watch, where meanings and implications seem 
to be half-glimpsed beneath the surface of the text only to vanish as we try to take them in, and where 
ironical resemblances and reflections abound to confuse our response” (208). Less typical is when Gould 
broaches the territory of my own discussion here, and suggests its reflexive or metacritical form, in arguing 
that Sophoclean irony is “practiced upon ourselves as audience as much as upon the characters of the play” 
(ibid.). 
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can read it back into the language of the play as the drama progresses. This line of 
thinking also implies that the tensions and paradoxes created by the tragic irony of the OT 
resolve themselves once the asymmetry in knowledge disappears and the full meaning of 
Oedipus’ deeds come to light. What we are left with on this reading is not so much a 
challenge to the meaningfulness of language and the coherence of the political sphere as a 
fleeting sense of embarrassment at things said in temporary ignorance of their ‘true’ 
import. 
What if the critic interprets the OT’s tragic irony not as an artificial dissonance 
that the play ultimately resolves into consonance, but rather as a means to reflect on the 
irresolvable and elusive dissonance that suffuses interpretive language as such – even our 
own? What if we read not to congratulate ourselves for having the resources to steer clear 
of Oedipus’ interpretive morass, but instead to see ourselves, who are his respondents, as 
perhaps even more deeply and ignorantly implicated in it than he is? To pursue such a 
course, which seeks not to avert Oedipus’ political challenge but to meet it head-on in our 
own discourse and practice of interpretation, we must proceed beyond the point where we 
simply explain how the play’s language lends itself to multiple meanings, and ask instead 
how the mutual interferences between these different meanings, the clash of voices 
within the interpreter’s voice, might put our own practice of interpretation in question. If 
we trace the roots of this kind of polyvocal language, we find that the language of the 
tragedy itself becomes a topos of contestation that challenges univocal meanings, 
fragments singular identities, and multiplies places of origin. Vernant, for instance, 
describes the function of such language as being “not so much to establish 
communication between the various characters as to indicate the blockages and barriers 
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between them and the impermeability of their minds, to locate the points of conflict.”9 In 
the OT, the voices that appear in the political realm do not rest easily within the confines 
of established facts and conventional values, but become echo-chambers in which every 
utterance is fraught with unforeseeable risks and ponderous responsibilities. Instead of 
achieving transparency of comprehension, the language of the play’s agents renders their 
experiences and attitudes as something opaque and obscure to their own understanding: 
language dis-integrates each subject from himself. Instead of connecting subjects to each 
other through a shared vocabulary, their language rebounds upon its own semantic limits 
or opens up contradictions that ordinarily remain concealed: language dis-integrates 
subjects from each other. When the interpreter, like Oedipus, succumbs to the risks of his 
endless movement and fails to negotiate the terrain he shares with others, the dissonant 
voices that seethed and roiled within his language now reveal themselves outright, and 
meaningful speech descends to the level of abhorrent, clamorous, corrupt noise.10 
This noise, which overpowers the denouement of the tragedy, represents the worst 
possible outcome for the interpreter who risks moving beyond the limits of a singular 
viewpoint and of a univocal language in order to reach the meaning of his object. 
Furthermore, it defines the worst possible failure of interpretive responsibility, insofar as 
the triumph of noise erases the lines on the map, nullifying the terms of the conversation 
                                                 
9  Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek Tragedy,” in: Vernant and Pierre Vidal-
Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 42. 
Goldhill echoes Vernant directly when he writes: “Language, rather than being an instrument of order, 
becomes a network of imperfections and gaps” (211). 
10  Compare, for instance, Buxton’s description of how the language of the OT marks the transition 
from partial to complete insight – or, in my terms, ‘false’ to ‘true’ interpretation – with inarticulate speech-
sounds: “The same exclamation is uttered by Jokasta (OT 1071) and Oedipus (OT 1182) when they see 
‘how the pattern fits,’ ἰού ἰού marks a sudden release of energy, when the irony of partial knowledge is 
instantaneously discharged. It denotes the transition from blindness to insight.” R.G.A. Buxton, “Blindness 
and Limits: Sophokles and the Logic of Myth,” in: Bloom (ed.) 110-111. The passage into noise thus 
simultaneously marks the revelation of truth and the dissolution of meaning. 
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in which the interpreter takes part and to which he could perhaps still be held 
accountable. Rather than answer his interlocutors, Oedipus’ response simply drowns 
them out, leaving them with no definite place where they could meet and no meaningful 
language to speak with. Most importantly, however, the noise that dominates the end of 
the OT also returns its spectators or readers to the zero degree of the interpretive 
endeavor, the same threat of semantic disorder that Oedipus confronts and overcomes in 
the vertiginous music of the Sphinx or in the half-articulate din of a Thebes rocked by 
plague. But this time, it is not Oedipus, but we ourselves who are charged with making 
sense of the noise – and this time Oedipus himself, the model interpreter, is its source and 
origin.  
The poetic and narrative structure of the tragedy is thus designed to foreground 
the mutual interference between the sense-making and sense-unmaking functions of 
interpretive language, which is the kind of language we share with Oedipus as much as it 
is the language that we use to talk about him. The play is constructed so as to allow the 
audience the rare and troubling privilege of simultaneously assuming a human and a 
super-human perspective on the interpretive meaning of speech, of perceiving that what 
appears true and just to the former appears as equivocal and erroneous to the latter.11 This 
                                                 
11  The concept of a double perspective – one that combines both Archaic mythic thought and 
Classical political awareness, the religious viewpoint and the secular – is a mainstay of Jean-Pierre 
Vernant’s powerful and influential readings of Greek tragedy, which bespeak a “gap [that] develops at the 
heart of the social experience [of the ancient Greeks]. It is wide enough for the oppositions between legal 
and political thought on the one hand and the mythical and heroic traditions on the other to stand out quite 
clearly. Yet it is narrow enough for the conflict in values still to be a painful one and for the clash to 
continue to take place.” Jean-Pierre Vernant, “The Historical Moment of Tragedy in Greece: Some of the 
Social and Psychological Conditions,” in: Myth and Tragedy, 27. The formation and the persistence of this 
gap in individual and social experience creates the necessary historical and cultural preconditions for 
tragedy as a literary genre and as a form of awareness. The same sense of a conflict-ridden combination of 
viewpoints illuminates Winnington-Ingram’s remarks on fate and choice in the OT: “The divinely 
appointed destiny of Oedipus comes about – and comes to light – largely through actions on his part which 
spring directly from his character […]. ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων: character is destiny. Yet, when, still acting 
characteristically, he blinds himself, the action is attributed to the influence of a daimon – and Heraclitus is 
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is why both location and dislocation, both vision and blindness, both articulate meaning 
and arbitary noise can appear simultaneously in the language of the OT, and why, as 
Goldhill warns us, we are destined to reproduce these interferences in our own 
interpretive conversation about the tragedy – or, indeed, in any interpretive conversation. 
By the same token, the OT poses a challenge to the meaning of political life by 
suggesting that the conversation upon which politics depends, the plurality of interpretive 
viewpoints responsible to a shared topography, is a game of risk constantly threatened 
from within by the openness of political space to multiple perspectives and the openness 
of political language to multiple meanings. The drama points to both the stern risks and 
the demanding responsibilities of political life by suggesting that interpretation may open 
up new and unexpected places to stand, but that these new vantage points may unmask 
our shared language as a chaos of internal echoes and counter-echoes, a self-confounding 
mass of noise – sounding, in other words, very much like the language of Oedipus. 
 
2. Station to Station: Risks of Interpretive Travel 
If, as I have already suggested, what is astonishing and frightening about Oedipus is his 
exceptional ability to move, this begs the simple question: what is he moving towards? At 
the beginning of the drama, a simple answer presents itself: he moves towards noise. In 
the initial encounter between interpreter and interpretandum captured in his opening 
speech, Oedipus describes in calm but searching tones the confusing disarray of 
                                                                                                                                                 
turned inside out. It needed the unwitting characteristic actions of Oedipus to bring about his fated destiny; 
it needed the influence of a daimon to explain his deliberate act. Here is that interpenetration of the divine 
and human worlds – Homeric, archaic, and Aeschylean – which we can describe, though not elucidate, with 
the blessed word ‘over-determination.’ It is something more than that: it is a recognition that there is a 
given factor in human character which is no less a part of man’s destiny than those events which character 
may (or may not) help to mould.” R.P. Winnington-Ingram, “Fate in Sophocles,” in: Bloom (ed.), op. cit., 
136. 
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sensations that confronts him upon entering (1-13): “the city is as filled with the smoke of 
burnt offerings / as it is with both songs of prayer and groans of lamentation”12 (πόλις δʹ 
ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμει, / ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων 4f).13 Swirling 
smoke, hopeful singing, desperate cries: the clear and the unclear, the articulate and the 
inarticulate mingle and interact in the mass of noise that confronts the interpreter and 
demands his response. The chorus describes how the women of Thebes “cry out in 
response to each other for their miserable sufferings” (λυγρῶν πόνων […] 
ἐπιστενάχουσιν 184) and how “the song of prayer rings out in concert with the groaning 
voice” (παιὼν δὲ λάμπει στονόεσσά τε γῆρυς ὅμαυλος 185), two figures that render 
the interaction of sounds within the noise in musical terms, as a kind of antiphonal 
singing. In its dense interweaving of sounds, the city itself now repeats in changed form 
that other interpretive enigma confronted by Oedipus not so long ago, the riddling music 
of the Sphinx, who is characterized throughout the play as a “cruel singer” (σκληρᾶς 
ἀοιδοῦ 36) a “bitch rhapsode” (ἡ ῥαψῳδὸς […] κύων 391) who recites “intricate, 
convoluted song” (ποικιλῳδὸς 130). Oedipus’ first response to the confusion makes 
conspicuous both the autonomy of his understanding and the boldness of his approach – 
in interpretive as well as physical terms – by placing upon these the seal of his own 
name: “not judging it right to hear of these matters from others, I have come [ἐλήλυθα] 
here myself – I who am called Oedipus, renowned among all men” (ἁγὼ δικαιῶν μὴ 
παρʹ ἀγγέλων […] / ἄλλων ἀκούειν αὐτὸς ὧδʹ ἐλήλυθα, / ὁ πᾶσι κλεινὸς Οἰδίπους 
                                                 
12  All translations from ancient Greek into English are my own. 
13  Gould (in: Bloom [ed.] 210-211) offers a similar assessment of Oedipus’ statement upon entering 
the play: “His opening words, the first of the play, form a question as to the meaning of the ritual he sees 
before him. They are followed by a statement of other ritual sounds and smells which fill the polis that he 
cannot see, and of his concern to learn their sense.” 
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καλούμενος 6ff). The declaration “I have come” (ἐλήλυθα), expressed with the first-
person singular perfect form of ἔρχομαι (= I come), is given added gravity through its 
placement at line-end and in its sheer tetrasyllabic sprawl: the very name of Oedipus is 
thus made synonymous with the one who comes to hear the noise for himself. Just as he 
did with the riddle of the Sphinx,14 so now with the riddle of the plague he has voluntarily 
come forth in order to understand and overcome the disordered music that holds Thebes 
in its grip. 
The emphasis laid upon Oedipus’ arrival by his self-nomination sounds out for the 
first time the restless, roving ubiquity, the eagerness to confront and inquire, and the 
courage to overcome every obstacle that distinguish his interpretive personality. But even 
in this brief dossier of character traits, the unmistakable mark of the figure of place 
begins to reveal itself: as we shall see, in both literal and figurative terms, Oedipus enjoys 
                                                 
14  The OT nowhere contains a text of this riddle, nor does it contain any clear indication what 
Sophocles believed or imagined to have been its content. A number of different versions of the riddle do, 
however, exist in a tradition that dates back to Sophocles’ active period or shortly thereafter. One 
particularly provocative version of the riddle – which, it should be stressed, is not the work of Sophocles – 
is inserted before the text of the play in at least two major manuscripts (L [Laurentian MS, 1st half 11th c., 
Florence], and A [13th c., Paris]). The riddle is given verbatim in virtually identical form by Athenaeus (The 
Learned Banqueters [Δειπνοσοφισταί] Book X, 456B), who claims to be quoting it from a lost work of 
Asclepiades of Tragilus called Subjects of Tragedy (Τραγῳδούμενα) from circa 340 B.C.E.; hence Jebb 
concludes that the riddle dates back to “at least the earlier part of the fourth century B.C.” Sir Richard C. 
Jebb, Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments. Part I: The Oedipus Tyrannus, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge UP, 1914), 6. I adduce this version of the “Riddle of the Sphinx” purely for its suggestive value 
in relation to the language of movement and place in the OT proper, on the one hand, and to the figure of 
Oedipus as an interpreter in both the OT and in contemporary or near-contemporary mythology, on the 







 [THE RIDDLE OF THE SPHINX. 
 There is on earth a two-footed thing that is also four-footed and three-footed, yet it has one voice; 
of all the crawling things that move upon the earth and through the air and across the water, it alone 
changes its nature. But whenever it walks supporting itself upon the greatest number of feet, that is when 
the speed in its limbs is most feeble.] 
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an uncommon and at times unsettling freedom in relation to place, a virtuoso power of 
kinesis. The first section of the play, up to the entrance of Teiresias at v. 300, implicitly 
establishes this continuous movement at the very root of Oedipus’ interpretive viewpoint, 
thus preparing the poetic ground for the epistrophy that marks the play’s crisis and makes 
the risks of this mobility explicit only in retrospect. Like the interpreter of the play, 
Oedipus himself can only realize he is pursuing the same truth that he has fled once he 
turns around to survey his own route. Consequently, my discussion here will first 
consider the poetic language of kinesis in the play’s opening section ‘naively,’15 and then 
a second time from the retrospective or epistrophic viewpoint provided by certain later 
passages. In essence, the interpretive risk that is inscribed in Oedipus’ elusive mobility as 
an interpreter is twofold. First, kinesis always risks the possibility of an abrupt 
turnaround that radically reconfigures the meaning of both the terminus and the route of 
interpretation: in seeking to reach his destination by the direct route, Oedipus realizes to 
his horror that his straight-line path was actually a great circle. Second, the interpreter’s 
kinesis risks setting into motion the stable meaning of every value or concept: in seeking 
to assign everything to its proper place, Oedipus’ tireless movement ultimately allows 
nothing to remain in its proper place. 
The exceptional power of movement that distinguishes Oedipus at the very 
opening of the play stands in stark contrast to the group of suppliants he encounters, who 
seem almost rooted in their positions of desperation in front of the royal palace and at 
                                                 
15  ‘Naively,’ that is, keeping our interpretation of the words and events of the play as much as 
possible in line with that of the characters directly involved in them, and resisting whatever meaning we 
may see in them that derives from our superior or retrospective knowledge of their circumstances. Gould 
(in: Bloom [ed.] 215-216) makes an impassioned plea for this kind of reading in the exchange between 
Oedipus and Teiresias, which makes for a productive, if underused, method in interpreting the OT because 
it does not allow us to privilege the process of our own interpretation over that of the dramatis personae. 
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different points around Thebes (“these seats you assume,” ἕδρας τάσδε […] θοάζετε 2; 
“we are seated,” προσήμεθα 15 and ἑζόμεσθ’ 32; “sits,” θακεῖ 20). The group of youths 
and old men who have been dispatched to seek Oedipus’ help is even described by the 
Priest as if they were flightless birds, the former being “not yet strong enough to take 
wing” (οὐδέπω μακρὰν / πτέσθαι σθένοντες 16f) and the latter “weighed down with 
old age” (σὺν γήρᾳ βαρεῖς 17).16 The same sense of the dead weight and immobility 
imposed by the sufferings of the plague takes on a particularly ominous color in the 
Priest’s comparison of the city to a ship beleaguered by a storm or a man drowning in the 
sea: “the city [...] already rocks back and forth violently, and can no longer lift up its head 
from the depths of the bloody surf” (πόλις […] ἄγαν / ἤδη σαλεύει κἀνακουφίσαι κάρα 
/ βυθῶν ἔτʹ οὐχ οἵα τε φοινίου σάλου 22ff; cf. 101). The series of figures that describe 
the helpless condition of Thebes in terms of being unable to rise, stand upright or move 
freely culminates in the Priest’s emphatically repeated request to Oedipus to “set this city 
upright so that it cannot fall” (ἀσφαλείᾳ τήνδʹ ἀνόρθωσον πόλιν 51; cf. 39, 46, 104). 
He adds force to this plea and, from our point of view, gives it a presciently ironic turn by 
reminding Oedipus of his previous triumph over the Sphinx (46-47) and declaring, “let us 
by no means remember your reign as men who stood upright at first only to fall flat later” 
(ἀρχῆς δὲ τῆς σῆς μηδαμῶς μεμνῄμεθα / στάντες τʹ ἐς ὀρθὸν καὶ πεσόντες ὕστερον 
49-50). 
Against the plague’s overpowering noise and the dull paralysis of the Theban 
suppliants, Oedipus asserts his acute awareness of the situation – “you have not roused 
                                                 
16  The description of the Sphinx at 508 as a “winged maiden” (πτερόεσσʹ […] κόρα) proves even 
more provocative in this context, only to turn savagely ironic when considered in light of Oedipus’ 
extraordinary power of movement (see next paragraph). 
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me awake, as if I were someone fast asleep” (οὐχ ὕπνῳ γʹ εὕδοντά μʹ ἐξεγείρετε 65) – 
and his agile efforts, quite literally, to pursue every possible avenue toward discovering 
the plague’s cause – “you should know that […] I have walked on many pathways in the 
wanderings of thought” (ἴστε […] πολλὰς δʹ ὁδοὺς ἐλθόντα φροντίδος πλάνοις 67). 
Far from the drowning man or flightless bird of the Priest’s language, the efficient and 
insuperable Oedipus has already set his sense-making mind in motion to confront the 
crisis. Moreover, he has set others in motion toward this end – namely, his brother-in-law 
Creon, who now opportunely returns from the consultation with the oracle at Delphi 
which Oedipus has already commanded. Creon reports that the plague is a result of the 
pollution17 incurred by the city (96ff) in its failure to avenge the murder of Laius, the 
former king of Thebes, who was killed under mysterious circumstances while traveling 
back from Delphi himself (114f). Immediately upon learning of the murder (106f), 
Oedipus figures his own interpretive role in terms of a hunter reading the tracks of his 
quarry and following it to its hiding-place18 – that is, in a figure of active pursuit: “In 
what part of the country are they now? Where will this indiscernible track of ancient guilt 
be found?” (οἳ δʹ εἰσὶ ποῦ γῆς; ποῦ τόδʹ εὑρεθήσεται / ἴχνος παλαιᾶς δυστέκμαρτον 
αἰτίας; 108f; cf. 220-221).19 Creon’s reply develops the same metaphor and expresses the 
                                                 
17  The concept of ritual pollution in Greek religion has been treated exhaustively by Robert Parker, 
Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 
18  While my reading of the hunting-figure here remains relatively straightforward, Richard Goodkin 
develops a fascinating Derridean reading of the OT, as well as an Oedipean reading of Derrida, by 
articulating the complex, half-disavowed intertextual debt owed by Derrida to the OT in the former's widely 
influential concept of the trace. In Goodkin's hands, Oedipus embodies and enacts the hunt for an origin of 
writing, an original for the trace, which slowly and inevitably erodes the very origin it seeks. From this 
perspective, the hunting-figure employed by Sophocles becomes the central motif of the play's language 
and reveals its legacy in the nomenclature of Derrida's Of Grammatology. Richard Goodkin, “Tracing the 
Trace: Oedipus and Derrida,” Helios 9:1 (Spring 1982), 15-27. 
19  Goldhill constructs a fascinating intertextual reading that pairs the famous ‘Ode to Man’ from 
Sophocles’ Antigone with Oedipus’ various poetic roles as ship’s captain, ploughman, and hunter at various 
points in the OT. All three of these roles take on paradigmatic significance for man’s power over and 
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heuristic principle upon which rest both the hunting-figure itself and the interpretive 
pursuit for which this figure stands: “[The oracle] was saying that they were in this 
country [i.e. the province of Thebes]. What is sought after can be captured, but what is 
neglected escapes” (ἐν τῇδʹ ἔφασκε γῇ. τὸ δὲ ζητούμενον / ἁλωτόν, ἐκφεύγει δὲ 
τἀμελούμενον 110f). Oedipus’ active and agile intellect, already on the trail, is quick to 
extract from Creon all the information the latter recalls about the circumstances and 
aftermath of the crime (112-123). Born along this path of evidence by his own 
interpretive momentum, Oedipus even wonders aloud why the Thebans were not equally 
nimble in their own pursuit when the murder came to light: “What kind of unfortunate 
obstacle [ἐμποδών, lit. ‘something in the way of the feet’]20 hindered you [εἶργε] from 
finding this out?” (κακὸν δὲ ποῖον ἐμποδών […] / […] εἶργε τοῦτʹ ἐξειδέναι; 128f).21 
Just as he had done with the hunting-figure at 110f, Creon again picks up Oedipus’ figure 
of an obstructed pathway in his understated and ironic response: “The Sphinx had 
persuaded [προσήγετο, an especially gentle and alluring kind of coercion] us to defer 
these obscure matters and attend to what was right under our noses [πρὸς ποσὶν, lit., ‘at 
our feet’]” (ἡ […] Σφὶγξ τὸ πρὸς ποσὶν σκοπεῖν / μεθέντας ἡμᾶς τἀφανῆ προσήγετο 
130f). The obstruction posed by the Sphinx, of course, was precisely what Oedipus was 
able to overcome through his own interpretive kinesis before he ascended the throne of 
                                                                                                                                                 
knowledge of nature in the passage from the Antigone, while Oedipus’ performance of each role proves 
both exemplary and perverse (Goldhill 205-207; qv. Knox 97-99). Goldhill does not, however, pay much 
attention to how each of these exemplary poetic roles involves a specific kind of mastery over space; while 
elaborating the function of space in each of these constellations of imagery would take me well beyond my 
present scope, it could prove valuable in discovering further dimensions of Oedipus’ troubled relationship 
to space. Compare, also, Euben's provocative riff on the verb pelei in the opening of the 'Ode to Man' as a 
bridge to Oedipus' lameness: “If nothing walks stranger than man, what man walks more strangely than 
Oedipus?” (102). 
20  Compare the English idiom, ‘being a stumbling block.’ 
21  Oedipus uses precisely similar language in widely varying contexts: qv. 227f. in the edict, and 
445f. in his vituperation of Teiresias. 
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Thebes: his mobile power of sense-making is such that it recognizes no obstacles and no 
limits. 
Yet herein lies the problem Oedipus poses through the interpretive metaphor of 
kinesis. For it is precisely in the ambiguities surrounding Oedipus’ vigorous and, indeed, 
admirable defiance of all limits that even this comparatively naïve reading of the drama’s 
opening must begin to acknowledge the interpretive risks that make him complicit in the 
problem he seeks to overcome. These ambiguities begin to surface once the language in 
which Oedipus describes his own relentless interpretive pursuit and the language he 
applies to the murderer’s transgressive flight begin – ever so subtly – to converge. 
Oedipus’ remarkably quick first conjecture in interpreting the information Creon gives 
him is to suspect a conspiracy in Thebes to assassinate Laius. Nonetheless, in the poetic 
language he uses to describe the crime as the bold transgression of a limit set on physical 
movement, Oedipus necessarily implicates his own disregard for interpretive limits as a 
comparable transgression: “Unless some intrigue had been worked with bribes from here 
in Thebes, how would the robber have proceeded [ἔβη, lit. ‘walked’] to such a point of 
daring [ἐς τόδ[ε] […] τόλμης]?” (πῶς οὖν ὁ λῃστής, εἴ τι μὴ ξὺν ἀργύρῳ / ἐπράσσετʹ 
ἐνθένδʹ, ἐς τόδʹ ἂν τόλμης ἔβη; 124f).22 Later, in his long speech to the assembled 
Theban elders (216-275), this ambiguity emerges with even greater force when Oedipus 
assures the citizens that he will apply all his resources in pursuing the killer: translated 
literally, he says that he “will arrive at all points” ([ἐ]πὶ πάντʹ ἀφίξομαι 265). In this 
                                                 
22  Although elaborating this point further would take me well beyond my present scope, it is worth 
noting that at the end of the tragedy, the Chorus characterizes the cause of Oedipus’ fall as both a force of 
madness that “walked toward” (i.e. overtook) him (τίς σʹ, ὦ τλῆμον, / προσέβη μανία; 1299f) and as a 
hostile spirit (daimōn) that leaps “beyond the utmost limits” to pounce on Oedipus’ life (τίς ὁ πηδήσας / 
μείζονα δαίμων τῶν μακίστων / πρὸς σῇ δυσδαίμονι μοίρᾳ; 1300ff). The mirror-image symmetry of these 
images, which appear very late in the play, with those in 124f at the very beginning of the play, is 
unmistakable. 
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context, Oedipus’ choice of words unintentionally evokes his own arrival at the criminal 
“point of daring” beyond all acceptable limits that he describes at 125. His language 
evinces a similar ambiguity when he assures the suppliants that he “will leave nothing 
untried” (πᾶν ἐμοῦ δράσοντος 145). To the Greek ear, his diction would recall an 
expression for criminal unscrupulousness used to great effect elsewhere in Sophoclean 
tragedy, not to mention classical Attic prose: πανουργέω, “to stop at nothing,” literally 
“to do everything,” i.e. even things that are strictly forbidden (see Sophocles, Antigone 
74).23 Even at this early point in the drama, these and other crucial ambiguities that begin 
to appear in the language of kinesis provide a clear index of Oedipus’ interpretive risks. 
The agile mobility so central to his interpretive method, and so incomparably valuable to 
both the king himself and his city, may make him indistinguishable from the criminal he 
is hunting down and even render him complicit in the latter’s crimes. After all, both 
hunter and hunted are transgressors in the etymological sense: each of them boldly 
‘moves across’ boundaries that are set up to contain and control movement, or to 
distinguish one meaning of a word from another. Just as Oedipus does not know and 
cannot control the meanings of his own language, he does not know and cannot control 
the kinesis of his interpreting mind either. Oedipus’ risk, in both literal and figurative 
senses, lies in the fact that he can never be sure where interpretation will take him – nor 
what it will make him leave behind. In the last analysis, the interpreter can determine 
                                                 
23  In his note on OT 145 (31, 145n.), Jebb tellingly cites a passage (39a) from Plato’s Apology of 
Socrates, in which Socrates explicitly associates ‘doing’ or ‘saying all’ with a shameless or criminal lack of 
scruple: “It is often obvious in battle that one could escape death by throwing away one’s weapons and by 
turning to supplicate one’s pursuers, and there are many ways to avoid death in every kind of danger if one 
will do or say anything [ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν] to avoid it. It is not difficult to avoid death, 
gentlemen; it is much more difficult to avoid wickedness, for it runs faster than death.” Plato, Apology, 
trans. G.M.A. Grube, in: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 34. Could 
Socrates' choice of words here, as with so many other aspects of the Apology, adapt Oedipus' language or 
the language of tragedy more generally with the ironic intent of casting his auditors, rather than himself, as 
the tragic hero? 
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neither his point of departure nor his destination: his undertaking has as much to do with 
the truth he is attempting to escape as it does with the truth he pursues. 
As we discover much later in the drama, Oedipus’ career of constant, restless 
kinesis, which began even before his defeat of the Sphinx, provides a paradigmatic 
instance of how interpretation allows the interpreter both to pursue and to flee from truth 
by the same means. In the long monologue he delivers to Jocasta relating the story of 
how he came to Thebes and what happened during the journey (771-833), his language 
dramatizes his efforts to interpret the riddle of his own origins in terms of aggress and 
regress, approach and retreat, pushing through and falling back – the very same terms he 
then applies to his murderous encounter with Laius in the Theban countryside. Oedipus 
relates how he grew up in Corinth and enjoyed a place of preeminence among the citizens 
there “before a chance event fell upon me” (πρίν μοι τύχη / τοιάδʹ ἐπέστη 776f). Using a 
verb (ἐφίστημι) which, as Jebb notes, is “often used of enemies suddenly coming upon 
one” (Jebb 106-107, 776n.), Oedipus thus describes in terms of a physical attack the 
unnerving experience in which a drunken companion happened to accuse him of being a 
“fabricated” (πλαστὸς 780) son to Polybus, Oedipus’ putative father. In language we 
already recognize from the plague-induced torpor of Thebes described by the Priest, 
Oedipus tells how he was “heavily burdened” (βαρυνθεὶς 781) by this accusation. He 
reacts to this potentially paralyzing blow, however, with aggression and pursuit of his 
own: he can “scarcely hold himself back” (μόλις κατέσχον 782) before “approaching” 
(ἰὼν πέλας, lit. “coming near to”; 782) his parents to demand enlightenment. Polybus 
and Merope are subsequently enraged at “the one who shot forth this word” (τῷ μεθέντι 
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τὸν λόγον 784), a phrase that again uses a verb (μεθίημι) typically applied to the release 
of an arrow or the throwing of a stone in combat.24  
Though Oedipus is temporarily satisfied with his parents’ action, the thought 
continues to “irritate” him (ἔκνιζέ , also ‘to prick, goad, provoke’; 786), not least of all 
because the rumor, like an enemy preparing a future ambush, “crept around a great deal 
in secret” (ὑφεῖρπε γὰρ πολύ 786).25 His interpretive pursuit compels him to go to 
Delphi without his parents’ knowledge (“I journeyed in secret,” λάθρᾳ […] πορεύομαι 
787) and to ask Apollo’s oracle about his parentage, whereupon the god abruptly repels 
his approach, “[sending] me away deprived of the answers for which I came” (ὧν μὲν 
ἱκόμην / ἄτιμον ἐξέπεμψεν 788-789). Rather than resolving the interpretive noise 
generated by hearing the drunkard’s accusation, as Oedipus had hoped, Apollo redoubles 
its impact by forcing Oedipus to “listen” ([ἐ]πακούσας 794) yet again to the terrifying 
and confusing prophecies about the abominable crimes that still lie in his future (789-
793). Although he continues on the same path away from Corinth and toward Thebes, 
Oedipus’ former strategy of attack and pursuit now quite suddenly turns to one of retreat 
and flight: in order to avoid fulfilling the dreadful oracles he has heard, he resolves never 
to return home, orienting himself solely by his power to interpret his environment and 
move within it accordingly: “I fled [ἔφευγον] from the land of Corinth, judging its 
position from then on by the stars” (τὴν Κορινθίαν / ἄστροις τὸ λοιπὸν τεκμαρούμενος 
χθόνα / ἔφευγον 794ff). His continuing effort to reach the truth about his parentage 
through interpretation now cannot be separated from his effort to evade the fulfillment of 
                                                 
24  Jebb similarly compares the drunken insult to “a random missile” (Jebb 107, 784n.). 
25  As Dawe notes (139, 786n.), this densely elliptical phrase could also mean something like “it 
crept under [sc. ‘my skin’] a great deal.” 
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Apollo’s oracles, which directly concern his relationship to his parents: even before he 
begins the inquiry that drives the dramatic plot, Oedipus is both pursuer of, and fugitive 
from, himself. 
We have seen how what I called Oedipus’ virtuoso mobility, driven by his 
indefatigable will to interpret, does not exist in a vacuum, but rather results from his no 
less extraordinary talent for offering and overcoming resistance, by either physical or 
intellectual means. Once he enters the vicinity of Thebes, however, he narrates how this 
talent was put to a very literal and, indeed, violent test. The circumstances of this test 
demonstrate how the same deliberate drive of interpretive pursuit that took Oedipus to 
Delphi has all too easily combined itself with the arbitrary drive of flight from Corinth: 














When in my journeying [ὁδοιπορῶν] I was close to that intersection of three roads [which Jocasta has 
already mentioned as the scene of Laius’ murder], there I encountered [ξυνηντίαζον] a herald and a 
man mounted upon a horse-drawn carriage, just as you described; the leader and the old man himself 
tried to drive [ἠλαυνέτην] me off the road by force. The one who was trying to turn me aside [τὸν 
ἐκτρέποντα], the charioteer, I struck out of anger; when the old man saw this, he kept a lookout as I 
was passing alongside [παραστείχοντα] the carriage, and then came down hard [καθίκετο] on the 
crown of my head with his double goad. Yet he was paid back with interest:26 with a summary blow 
                                                 
26  This is Jebb’s turn of phrase, but is still as close to perfect as an English translation can get at 
rendering οὐ μὴν ἴσην γʹ ἔτισεν (lit. “he was not compensated in equal measure”) with the proper tone 
(Jebb 111, trans.). For as alien a language as ancient Greek is, even the distance of two and a half millennia 
cannot completely efface the grim braggadocio that suffuses Oedipus’ anecdote here, nor the shudder one 
must feel at the chilling nonchalance of 813. 
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from the staff held in this very hand, he rolled [ἐκκυλίνδεται] straight out of the carriage and flat on 
his back [ὕπτιος]. And then I killed them all. 
The implicit and metaphorical hostility that suffused Oedipus’ language in describing the 
events that led to his departure from Corinth now appears in the context of explicit and 
literal combat – the murder of the man he later discovers to be his father, Laius. In the 
verb meaning “I met with, encountered” (ξυνηντίαζον 804), the confrontation is 
represented as hostile even before it becomes hostile in fact. Once this happens, the 
passage’s verbs vividly capture the highly animated and physical clash between the 
opponents: “drive hard” (ἠλαυνέτην 805), “turn aside” or “push out of the way” 
(ἐκτρέποντα 806), “come down hard” (καθίκετο 809) “roll out flat on one’s back” 
(ὕπτιος […] ἐκκυλίνδεται 811f). Despite the fact that it shares with the preceding 
narrative a common language derived from hostile encounter, what is it that makes this 
passage so brusque and unsettling in comparison – what makes us abhor rather than 
admire Oedipus’ inexorable forward drive at this moment? 
I propose that the language of confrontation in this passage is distinctly unlike 
that of the preceding passage when judged according to the opposition of flight and 
pursuit. Since Oedipus never expresses any specific motivation on his part to travel to 
Thebes that would justify particular haste or persistence – the way that, for instance, his 
journey to Delphi did – his aggression here seems all the more arbitrary. By his own 
admission, Thebes is simply a place other than Corinth where, in the absence of his 
parents, he believes he can safely evade the fulfillment of the Delphic oracle (796f) – a 
place where he can exist indefinitely in perpetual flight. The term here translated as 
“journeying” (ὁδοιπορῶν = walking, wayfaring, lit. ‘making one’s way on the road’) 
conveys just this tone of arbitrary perambulation, and acquires an even more sinister cast 
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by recalling the Chorus’ testimony that the regicide was carried out by “highwaymen” 
(ὁδοιπόρων 292) – a genitive noun that differs only in its accent from the verb form that 
Oedipus uses to describe his travels. Furthermore, Oedipus never offers any reason 
external to the moment of confrontation that would justify such a violent assertion of his 
own right-of-way other than his implicit eagerness to flee Corinth. While his assault, and 
then his wholesale slaughter, of Laius and his retinue could have been acquitted under 
contemporary Athenian law as self-defense27 – the driver does, after all, provoke him first 
(804f) – his narrative indicates that his primary motivation for going to such extremes 
was the fact that his victims simply refused to get out of his way. Jonathan Lear artfully 
assimilates Oedipus' parricide on the highway to his encounter with Teiresias precisely 
by means of the figure of the obstructed path: “Laius blocked [Oedipus'] physical path to 
Thebes, Tiresias blocks his mental path to a conclusion, and in each case Oedipus strikes 
a retaliatory blow.” Even more provocatively, Lear goes so far as to suggest that the 
scene with Tiresias symbolically repeats the murder of Laius: both figures obstruct 
Oedipus' fugitive mobility, so they become subject to his murderous pursuit.28 
Even this neat symmetry of flight and pursuit, however, does not quite reach the 
source of the real horror in this brief narrative: this can only be understood when we 
contrast the role of Oedipus’ will to interpret in his departure from Corinth with its role 
here in the confrontation with Laius. And here we are brought up short by the fact that the 
cool reportage and self-assured brutality that mark Oedipus’ narrative tone indicate that 
he quite literally never gave his actions a second thought: he never paused once to make 
                                                 
27  This not unimportant point has been acknowledged in scholarship since at least C.M. Bowra, 
Sophoclean Tragedy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), 164-165. 
28  Jonathan Lear, “Knowingness and Abandonment: An Oedipus for Our Time,” in: Open Minded: 
Working Out the Logic of the Soul (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1998), 44. 
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sense of them. Unlike the symbolic aggression he suffers at the hands of the Corinthian 
drunkard, which becomes the occasion for a fairly ambitious hermeneutic expedition, 
Oedipus has been completely unconcerned about the possible larger significance of his 
own literal aggression – it has simply never presented itself as a point of departure for his 
interpretive perambulations. Just as Oedipus’ interpretive pursuit was motivated by a will 
to approach and to know, this will becomes inseparably combined with a will to ignore 
and to evade: his mobility serves flight and pursuit in equal measure. As Lear writes, 
Oedipus characteristically “is under so much pressure to get to his conclusion that there is 
no time to grasp the full meaning of what he is doing” (44). Both the drive to interpret 
and the drive not to interpret are equally served by the ability to overcome resistance and, 
above all, to remain in continuous motion. 
Once we account for the broader context that prompts Oedipus’ narrative of 
pursuit and flight here, however, it becomes clear that the primary significance of his 
anecdote lies in the interpretive ‘second thoughts’ that he is now forced to apply to it, and 
in the risks that those second thoughts suddenly uncover in his interpretive enterprise. As 
we shall soon see, in order to proceed beyond the point he has reached, Oedipus’ kinesis 
must now turn around, reflect upon itself, and reverse its route, making the object of his 
pursuit converge with that of his flight. In an effort to refute Teiresias’ troubling 
prophecies about Oedipus’ crimes, Jocasta has been relating how comparable prophecies 
given to Laius – to the effect that he would be murdered by his own son – were never 
fulfilled, since he was killed by highwaymen “at a place where three roads meet” (ἐν 
τριπλαῖς ἁμαξιτοῖς 716). She therefore advises Oedipus to disregard Teiresias’ 
statements, saying “These are the sorts of things that prophetic statements set forth 
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[διώρισαν, ‘to distinguish, determine, define,’ lit. ‘to separate by drawing boundaries’] – 
but you should take no heed [ἐντρέπου, lit. ‘to turn towards’] whatsoever of these 
things” (τοιαῦτα φῆμαι μαντικαὶ διώρισαν, / ὧν ἐντρέπου σὺ μηδέν 723f).29 In 
figurative terms, Jocasta tells Oedipus not only to disregard boundaries – something he 
has already made a career of, in moral, geographical, and hermeneutic terms – but also 
not to turn towards the interpretive statements that have hampered the momentum of his 
inquiry the most. Nonetheless, her offhand mention of the place where Laius was killed 
has, ironically and quite unforeseeably, delivered a shock to her husband’s momentum – 
it has compelled him to ‘epistrophize,’ to turn around so as to confront in a new light the 
literal and figurative terrain he has passed over. The force of this shock has shifted a 
marginal and near-forgotten past experience to the very center of Oedipus’ attention and 
anxiety, where its bare outlines have suddenly been filled with the horrendous 
possibilities of meaning and consequence that he dwells on after completing his narrative 
(813-833). The identification of the place where the crime was committed, furthermore, 
has made Oedipus’ experience alter its place in the context of his interpretation, just as he 
has constantly altered his own place and his own context all along – by crossing 
boundaries, overcoming resistances, and solving riddles. The risks of Oedipus’ incessant 
motion, in a very real sense, have started to come home to him – and they do so by 
enacting a dramatic reversal in his interpretive direction. 
Considering the subjective effect of the shift in meaning Oedipus experiences, we 
should not be surprised that he chooses to express the immediate effect of his recognition 
                                                 
29  Jocasta uses precisely the same verb, and nearly the same phrasing, later in the play when 
Oedipus is on the verge of discovering all and she is vainly trying to dissuade him: “Take no heed of 
anything” (μηδὲν ἐντραπῇς 1056; lit. “turn towards nothing”; ἐντραπῇς [subj.] > ἐντρέπω, ‘to turn 
towards’). 
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as an intense vertigo that dislodges every object of sense and thought from its place and 
sets it in headlong motion: “while I was listening to you, my wife, what a wandering of 
the soul [ψυχῆς πλάνημα] and a stirring-up of the mind [ἀνακίνησις φρενῶν] just now 
took hold of me!” (οἷόν μʹ ἀκούσαντʹ ἀρτίως ἔχει, γύναι, / ψυχῆς πλάνημα 
κἀνακίνησις φρενῶν 726f). The “wandering of the soul” that Oedipus experiences here 
directly recalls the “wanderings of thought” he undertook on behalf of the plague-ridden 
city (φροντίδος πλάνοις 67), not least of all because both words for “wandering” share a 
common root (πλάνημα and πλάνοις [n.] > πλανάω [v.] = to wander, stray, err). 
Whereas his previous wandering (at 67) had an active character, the same wandering now 
(at 726) assumes a passive character (μʹ […] ἔχει 726), almost as if Oedipus can no 
longer control his power to move himself or others towards the truth through 
interpretation – as if his kinesis itself had suddenly turned around to confront him as a 
powerful and autonomous being, a hostile daimon that has done the moving and 
controlling all along (qv. 1299-1302). Appropriately, Jocasta’s reaction to Oedipus’ 
outburst again describes this abrupt and unsettling turnaround with an epistrophic figure. 
Her somewhat convoluted question translates literally as “having been turned around 
[ὑποστραφεὶς] by what source of anxiety do you say this?” (ποίας μερίμνης τοῦθʹ 
ὑποστραφεὶς λέγεις; 728). The further progress of the inquiry after this point in the play 
repeats, in varied forms, the epistrophic reversal he suffers here – the first crucial ‘turning 
point’ in Oedipus’ perambulations. 
 Nonetheless, the epistrophy that Oedipus experiences would only be of limited 
interest if it did not also implicate the experience of the reader and/or spectator in the 
risks it reveals – that is, if it did not directly pose a challenge to the direction and 
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meaning of our own interpretive kinesis in making sense of the play. This challenge only 
becomes clear, in fact, when we interpret epistrophically, re-opening the question of 
kinesis in the play’s opening section from the vantage point of its crisis and discovering 
how the risk of turning around is inscribed in Oedipus’ interpretive mobility – and in our 
own – from its very beginnings. Without belaboring the passages already discussed, we 
can say that there are two immediately identifiable levels on which, for both Oedipus and 
the reader, kinesis already contains the risk of epistrophy in the first portion of the play: 
one might be called structural or macroscopic, and the other semantic or microscopic. 
On the semantic level, one of Oedipus’ responses to Creon provides a particularly 
striking example of how, even in the course of a single utterance, the structure and 
meaning of Oedipus’ own language move, shift, and turn back upon themselves. From 
the viewpoint of the reader/spectator, Oedipus’ reply performs an ingenious combination 
of kinesis and epistrophy, embodying in the semantic movement of its language both the 
virtues and the risks of Oedipus’ interpretive mobility. When Creon asks whether he 
should report the message from Delphi in public rather than in the privacy of the palace, 
Oedipus replies: “Give your report before all these men, for I bear the sorrow more on 
their behalf than I do for my own soul” (ἐς πάντας αὔδα· τῶνδε γὰρ πλέον φέρω / τὸ 
πένθος ἢ καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς πέρι 93f). My admittedly flat translation does not capture 
the real figurative thrust of the statement, which inheres in its syntax rather than its 
diction or imagery. The sequence of words in recitation necessitates that an auditor would 
initially understand τῶνδε γὰρ πλέον φέρω / τὸ πένθος to mean “I bear more sorrow 
than they,” i.e. that Oedipus’ sufferings, as the unknowing murderer of his father and 
defiler of his mother, exceed even those imposed on plague-ridden Thebes. Upon hearing 
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the rest of the statement, the genitive τῶνδε, originally understood as a genitive of 
comparison (“than they”), would consequently shift its meaning to an objective genitive 
(“for them” or “on their behalf”); likewise, πλέον (“more”) shifts from an adjective 
modifying τὸ πένθος (“more sorrow”) to an adverb modifying φέρω (“I bear it more for 
this than for that reason”).30 The auditor’s initial interpretation of the statement – an 
entirely adequate one, given the semantic material and syntactic structure already 
communicated – yields to another which is diametrically opposed in meaning. This 
second interpretation, based on the complete communication, demonstrates that the initial 
interpretation was quite literally headed in the wrong direction, that it was actually in 
flight from the meaning it pursued. The turnabout or epistrophy that the auditor is 
compelled to perform in order to reach the intended meaning, however, carries with it the 
                                                 
30  A philological note. I read the close proximity of πλέον [‘more’] and τῶνδε [initially: ‘than 
they’] as immediately suggesting to the auditor a comparative phrase rather than the more remote 
possibility of an adverb and an objective genitive. After all, the auditor only hears ἢ, the alternate particle 
of comparison (which excludes the possibility of a comparison with the genitive; cf. Smyth 1433), several 
words after this initial interpretation has already been established, i.e. in the middle of the next verse and 
well after the main verb φέρω (‘I bear’). It is worth noting that the major commentators by and large only 
admit the possibility of this initial, ‘aberrant’ reading of 93-94 negatively, i.e. by explicitly seeking to steer 
their readers away from it and toward the final, ‘true’ reading I identify here. Jebb reads πλέον as an 
adverb and τῶνδε as an objective genitive with τὸ πένθος (= “sorrow for these people”), consequently 
translating these lines as “The sorrow which I bear is for these more than for mine own life.” (The scholiast 
Jebb cites also apparently felt the need to gloss these difficult lines: περὶ τούτων πλέον ἀγωνίζομαι ἢ περὶ 
τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ψυχῆς [“I exert myself [sic] for these people more than for my own soul”].) Jebb’s reading 
thus elides what I am proposing as the initial or ‘false’ interpretation and cleaves firmly to the final or ‘true’ 
one. Dawe, probably following Jebb, takes the objective genitive for granted in his note and translates 
similarly: “The sorrow I feel for these people weighs more with me than where my own life is concerned.” 
Dawe does, however, sense a shift in syntax here, but locates the crucial turn at the very end of 94, i.e. after 
πέρι (‘for’): “When we reach this last word a slight anacolouthon becomes noticeable, for τῶνδε (93) is 
governed by τὸ πένθος [‘sorrow’], but τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς [‘my own soul’] by πέρι, and πένθος is not exactly 
the feeling that Oedipus would have for his own life.” While Dawe may be right about Oedipus’ diction, 
the conclusion he ultimately draws, however, proves unsatisfying: “More than Aeschylus or Euripides, 
Sophocles likes to mirror in his own verse the imprecisions of real speech.” Nonetheless, and unlike Jebb, 
Dawe does register some of the ironic undertoe in the line: “In reality Oedipus’ own life is concerned, and 
threatened by more than just the plague.” The initial, ‘aberrant’ reading of these lines that I develop here is 
not intended to supplant the final, ‘orthodox’ reading formulated by the commentators; rather, it is designed 
to supplement the latter by demonstrating how the enunciatory character of the Sophoclean text unlocks 
additional, highly resonant layers of meaning that a more straightforward, ‘problem-oriented’ philological 
treatment can overlook. 
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ironic awareness that the initial interpretation – that Oedipus is describing the greater 
burden imposed by his own crimes – is, in fact, more true than the second, intended 
meaning, which is as good as a red herring in the long view. Unlike the more 
straightforward tragic irony that blankets the OT, this kind of “enunciatory irony,” made 
possible by the syntactic and semantic flexibility of ancient Greek on the one hand and 
the temporally-bound character of dramatic performance on the other, has only 
sporadically been recognized as a major factor in the play’s poetic and dramatic effects.31 
It depends on the fact that auditors do not establish the meaning of a given statement only 
at its end, but are rather engaged in interpretation during the entire process of utterance – 
that the mind of the interpreter, like Oedipus, is constantly in motion.32 By the same 
token, the reader/auditor of the play is compelled by syntactic figures such as these to 
perform the same interpretive movements as Oedipus himself, who simultaneously 
                                                 
31  Segal’s brilliant reading of OT 73f is comparable, though not identical, in its method (Segal 229-
230). 
32  In comparison to the auditor of the performed drama, the reader of Sophocles’ dramatic text – 
especially the contemporary reader whose native language is not ancient Greek – has a decisive 
disadvantage in perceiving this kind of semantic shift. John Gould is one of the few critics to acknowledge 
the differences in properly literary experience between the auditor and the reader of the OT: “It is a play of 
which the theatergoer’s experience is very different from that of the reader of the play-text. For the latter, it 
seems all too easy to restructure the play in the memory according to a logical or chronological sequence 
which is quite different from the one Sophocles has given it, and then to draw inferences from the 
remembered structure that are quite alien to the play as Sophocles wrote it for performance.” Gould, in: 
Bloom (ed.) 207-208. What Gould claims for the play as a whole is equally true for its constituent parts: the 
sense we tend to make as readers of Sophocles’ individual words in sequence, and the syntactic structures 
in which they are placed, departs considerably from the sense we tend to make of the same words as 
listeners. I believe this is mostly because the traditional method of reading a Greek text privileges the 
visual and conceptual image of the complete sentence, grasped in its syntactic and semantic entirety, over 
the partial or perspectival interpretations which inevitably develop in the process of reading, but which 
more often exert their proper effect only in the experience of listening. This idea bears all the more force in 
the interpretation of the OT, if not Sophoclean tragedy in general, in which so much of the poetry depends 
upon bold and unsettling enjambments, double or triple meanings, and ambiguous syntax – all of which are 
already mainstays of the scholarly tradition, and all of which depend to some degree on temporal and aural 
sequence. With a poet of such redoubtable magnitude as Sophocles, and in a drama where very little 
actually happens but a great number of things change their meaning, is it not worth considering that the 
gaps, ambiguities, and shifts in meaning we perceive in the text might not merely be a concession to 
colloquial realism – a dubious contention amid the high artifice of Greek tragedy – but rather an integral 
part of the text’s design as an aural and temporal experience, and not just a visual one? –– I would like to 
acknowledge the extraordinarily fertile and provocative conversations I have shared with Nicholas Theisen 
which have led to this and other insights on the text of the OT; I can scarcely take credit for them alone.   
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pursues and flees from the truth, and whose drama is enacted as a series of abrupt and 
unforeseeable turnabouts in meaning. The risk of epistrophy that we incur by interpreting 
Oedipus, like the risk Oedipus incurs by interpreting the plague, is that the momentum 
built up by our own interpretive language may actually rebound upon its own limits, 
revealing not the meaning of its object, but the degree to which our own language has led 
us astray from that meaning. 
On the macroscopic level of the play’s overall structure, Oedipus quite literally 
identifies the inquiry into Laius’ murder as an epistrophy at its very inception, but not 
without unwittingly putting his finger on the risks that accompany his subsequent moves 
toward the truth. Once Creon admits that the Thebans had neglected the prosecution of 
Laius’ murderer because of their more immediate concern with the Sphinx (130f), 
Oedipus says he will open the inquiry afresh: “Then I will bring these same things [sc. 
the “obscure matters” Creon mentions at 131] to light all over again from the beginning 
[ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς αὖθις]. Most worthily has Phoebus Apollo, and worthily have you insisted 
upon this regard [ἐπιστροφήν = epistrophē, attention, respect, regard; lit. ‘turning-
around, twisting’] for the deceased” (ἀλλʹ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς αὖθις αὔτʹ ἐγὼ φανῶ. / ἐπαξίως 
γὰρ Φοῖβος, ἀξίως δὲ σὺ / πρὸ τοῦ θανόντος τήνδʹ ἔθεσθʹ ἐπιστροφήν 132ff). For 
Oedipus, on the one hand, this statement means that the kinesis of his inquiry, which 
proceeds toward the truth and the future deliverance of the city, paradoxically depends 
upon a recursive epistrophy that recedes ever more deeply into the obscure distances of 
the past. Hermeneutic progress and regress can no longer be distinguished in this circular 
path, forged equally of kinesis and epistrophy. From this viewpoint, Oedipus’ travels 
unfold as if he keeps one foot in continuous motion and the other firmly fixed: the end 
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and the beginning of the interpreter’s path coincide, with horrible precision. For the 
reader/spectator of the play, on the other hand, this same statement proves to be prophetic 
insofar as we try to approach, understand, and overcome Oedipus himself through our 
own interpretive moves, and incur the same risks along the way. He is a destination that 
we reach only when, like him, we remain in continuous motion: beginning from the 
beginning over and over again, constantly moving forward in false confidence and 
turning around again to reconsider in fear and doubt. The interpreter never arrives, and he 
never departs: he only wanders. 
 
3. In A Lonely Place: Interpretive Responsibility and the Crisis of Topography 
Oedipus’ wandering from place to place, however, is no ordinary wandering. His impetus 
is so strong, the various points he connects so far-flung, and the interpretive leaps by 
which he moves from one to the next so bold that he draws the stable mapping of place 
itself into the undertow of his interpretive kinesis. As Charles Segal’s work has shown, 
Oedipus blurs the boundaries that separate the human from the divine, on the one hand, 
and ordered, civilized space from disordered, savage wilderness, on the other.33 As 
opposed to the collective topography inherited from the Archaic age that reflects these 
distinctions, Oedipus’ remapping of place finds its mobile center in the individual 
interpreter, whose concern is not so much his static location as his kinetic destination. By 
examining how the traditional mapping of place inherited from the Archaic age informs 
                                                 
33  Segal passim. Compare, however, the predominantly vertical orientation of Segal’s spatial 
taxonomy (“Man is threatened by the beast world pushing up from below, but he is also illuminated by the 
radiance of the Olympian gods above” [3]; qv. 227) – probably under the influence of Freud’s topographic 
model of the psychoanalytic subject – as opposed to the mainly horizontal orientation of the topography I 
investigate in this section. Despite these and other differences of varying importance, my debts to 
structuralist and post-structuralist approaches to classical literature, such as those of Segal and Jean-Pierre 
Vernant in particular, should be clear enough in the present discussion. 
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the OT, we can thus begin to appreciate how Oedipus’ interpretive kinesis accomplishes a 
destabilization of place and space even as he struggles to reassert traditional topographic 
categories through his interpretive thinking. In the language of the first stasimon (463-
512), for instance, the relationship of interpretive responsibility between Archaic 
topography and the kinesis of Oedipus plays itself out in the ambiguities and ironies that 
undermine the Chorus’ vocabulary of place from within. As the Chorus applies the 
normative Archaic terms to map the symbolic location of the solitary and outcast 
criminal, they fail to recognize this same criminal in the central and authoritative figure 
of Oedipus. Through his kinetic crossing and recrossing of the spatial boundaries that 
distinguish human from divine, native from alien, and human citizen from solitary 
animal, Oedipus’ tacit role as the true object of the Chorus’ discourse does more than 
reveal the tensions and ambiguities inscribed within the Archaic vocabulary. More 
importantly, it indicates how the kinetic subject of Sophocles' 5th century enlightenment, 
so perfectly embodied by Oedipus, first makes itself complicit in, and then tragically 
succumbs to, the very same contradictions it reveals with such clarity.34 For all his power 
to change places, Oedipus remains perennially out of place: he defines ectopia as the 
native habitat of the interpreter. While the terms of the Archaic topography eventually 
reassert their authoritative claim on the meaning of place by condemning him, the 
                                                 
34  While it lies outside the scope of the present discussion to offer a broader, culturally- and 
historically-oriented analysis of how the OT might in part reflect contemporary anxieties about the 
denaturing of Archaic topography, I need only refer the interested reader to the meticulous and pioneering 
historical research of Pierre Lévêque and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Clisthène l'Athénien: essai sur la 
représentation de l'espace et du temps dans la pensée politique grecque de la fin du VIe siècle à la mort de 
Platon (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964), of which the most recent English translation is Cleisthenes the 
Athenian: An Essay on the Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought from the End of 
the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato, trans. David Ames Curtis (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities 
Press, 1996); see esp. 9-17, 81-97. Lévêque and Vidal-Naquet explore how the political reforms at Athens 
at the end of the 6th century BCE led to a wholesale reconceptualization of space and time that emerged in 
tandem with the intellectual florescence of 5th century Athens. 
69 
audience must still confront Oedipus himself, qua interpreter, as the embodied riddle of 
politics and place in the polis – a riddle that evades every response. 
In order to understand how Oedipus’ kinetic vocabulary of place defines itself in 
response to a normative vocabulary in the OT, we must first articulate the nature of this 
normative vocabulary in its historically- and culturally-bound character. In other words, 
we must ask what specific experience of movement and space informs the tragedy, what 
meaningful structure this experience has, and how Oedipus’ kinesis foregrounds the 
tensions and ambiguities at work within it. The structure of topographic experience in the 
Archaic age forms the subject of Jean-Pierre Vernant’s 1963 essay “Hestia-Hermes: The 
Religious Expression of Space and Movement in Ancient Greece.”35 Vernant takes as his 
point of departure the pairing of Hestia, the goddess of the hearth, and Hermes, the 
messenger-god, on the base of Pheidias’ statue of Zeus at Olympia, on which the twelve 
Olympian gods are depicted in such pairs (157). To Vernant, the Hestia-Hermes 
combination presents the only pairing for which there is no ready explanation in the logic 
of Greek myth. Rather than dismissing their joint representation as an idiosyncrasy of 
Pheidias’ work, Vernant suggests that “the two powers are present in the same places and 
carry out their complementary activities side by side. [… O]ne could say that Hermes and 
Hestia are ‘neighbors’” (158). Vernant goes on to argue that the Hermes-Hestia polarity 
expressed the Archaic experience of space and movement in the anthropomorphic terms 
of Greek religion. As Vernant writes: 
                                                 
35  Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Hestia-Hermes: The Religious Expression of Space and Movement in 
Ancient Greece,” in: id., Myth and Thought Among the Greeks, trans. Janet Lloyd with Jeff Fort (New 
York: Zone Books, 2006), 157-196. This essay is an English translation of “Hestia-Hermes: Sur 
l’expression religieuse de l’espace et du movement chez les Grecs,” L’Homme: Revue française 
d’anthropologie 3 (1963), 12-50, which was republished in id., Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs (Paris: 
Librairie François Maspero, 1965). 
70 
To Hestia belongs the world of the interior, the enclosed, the stable, the retreat of the human group 
within itself; to Hermes, the outside world, opportunity, movement, interchange with others. It could 
be said that, by virtue of their polarity, the Hermes-Hestia couple represents the marked tension in the 
Archaic conception of space: space requires a center, a nodal point, with a special value, from which 
all directions, all qualitatively different, may be channeled and defined; yet, at the same time, space is 
the medium of movement, implying the possibility of transition and passage from any point to another 
(161). 
Thus the Archaic experience of space was organized in gendered and polarized terms, in 
which a static, immobile center associated with the feminine Hestia was contrasted with a 
dynamic, mobile periphery associated with the masculine Hermes (163-164). The 
experience of movement was accordingly defined in terms of its centrifugal or centripetal 
character, what we might call its respectively Hermic or Hestic tendency. Vernant’s 
exposition of this polarity in Archaic religious thought, furthermore, establishes the 
points of tension and ambiguity that are exploited so effectively in the figure of Oedipus. 
Drawing on a wide range of literary, archaeological, and anthropological 
evidence, Vernant articulates the rich and far-reaching image of Hestia in the Archaic 
religious imagination, expressed in forms ranging from the gender-based division of labor 
in Greek domestic life to the architecture of the Greek household itself. Hestia’s tangible 
embodiment, the circular household hearth, “is the navel that ties the house to the earth. It 
is the symbol and pledge of fixity, immutability, and permanence […], the node and 
starting point of the orientation and arrangement of human space” (158-159). Just as the 
physical space of the household was centered on the hearth as a kind of immovable axis, 
so the affective, economic, and religious connections between members of the same 
household found their figurative axis in the warmth provided by the hearth, the 
sustenance shared in common around its edges, and the connection it created to the realm 
of the divine. Wherever a member of the household might travel, his life and person were 
bound to this hearth and those who shared it with him: the common hearth thus embodied 
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the set of specific and indissoluble bonds that separated and distinguished the family 
group from the outside world. As Vernant writes, “Hestia thus expresses – by pushing it 
to its limits – the [household’s] tendency toward self-isolation and withdrawal, as though 
the ideal for the family should be complete self-sufficiency, which means total economic 
self-sufficiency and strict endogamy in marriage” (165).36 While this latter ideal was, of 
course, never attained in cultural reality, Vernant details how the Hestic attraction to the 
economic and affective autonomy of the family unit left its distinct mark on Archaic 
rituals of marriage, naming, and patrimony. The firm distinction thus created between 
insiders and outsiders by the rituals centered on the Hestic hearth imbued the Greek 
vocabulary of domestic relations with strong connections to the interior space of the oikos 
(οἶκος, ‘household,’ also ‘the members of a household’) and the hearth itself.37 As part of 
the same delineating function, however, Hestia also presided over the rituals of guest-
friendship or xenia (ξένια) whereby outsiders could be integrated into the community of 
the hearth to share in its sustenance, its affections, and its connection to the divine. “The 
center symbolized by Hestia, therefore, not only defines a closed and isolated world but 
also presupposes, as a corollary, other, analogous centers. Through the exchange of goods 
and the movement of people – women, heralds, ambassadors, guests, and table 
companions – a network of ‘alliances’ is built up among domestic groups” (174). Both as 
the divine custodian of insider-outsider relations and as the central architectural feature of 
                                                 
36  The significance of this ‘endogamous ideal’ in relation to the Oedipus myth should speak for 
itself. 
37  Inmates of the household are called sunontes (συνόντες, “those who live together, associate with 
one another, or are joined together”), sunoikoi (σύνοικοι, “those who share a dwelling”), or sunestioi 
(συνέστιοι, “those who share a hearth”); the blanket term for these relations, but also for the strongest and 
closest affective relations with non-household members, is philoi (φίλοι, “relatives, friends, loved ones”). 
Outsiders to the household can be referred to either as xenoi (ξένοι, “guests, strangers, foreigners”), in a 
neutral or positive light, or in a negative light as echthroi (ἐχθροί “hated or hateful ones, enemies”). 
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the family dwelling, Hestia thus exerted a centripetal, stabilizing, and ultimately 
conservative force within the clan-based social organization of the Archaic age. 
 Whereas Hestia, as goddess of the domestic interior, embodied the permanence of 
the family unit and its centeredness in a specific place and specific relationships, the god 
Hermes performed the complementary function for the space either liminal or exterior to 
the household and the activities proper to these areas. Against the stability and centrality 
of the Hestic hearth, Hermes presided over a dynamic periphery characterized by 
mobility, contact, exchange, and transformation. By virtue of this basic character trait, he 
was the multifarious patron deity of messengers, thieves, travelers, crossroads, and 
thresholds, and accompanied the souls of the recently deceased into the underworld 
(Vernant 159-161). As Vernant describes him, Hermes’ entire character consists in 
crossing-over, passing-beyond, becoming-other: 
Nothing about [Hermes] is settled, stable, permanent, restricted, or definite. He represents, in space and 
in the human world, movement and flow, mutation and transition, contact among foreign elements. In 
the house, his place is at the door, protecting the threshold, repelling thieves because he is himself the 
thief […] for whom no lock, no barricade, no frontier exists. […] In mingling with humanity, Hermes 
remains at once elusive and ubiquitous. He makes an abrupt appearance where least expected, only to 
disappear again immediately. […] He wears the helmet of Hades, which grants the wearer invisibility, 
and winged sandals that do away with distance. He carries a magic wand that transforms all he 
touches. He is the unpredictable, the uncontrollable (160). 
As a deity of contingency and interchange, the domain of Hermes encompassed all the 
enterprises that required human beings to leave the safe and stable enclosure of the 
household, to depart from the secure warmth and familiar company of the Hestic hearth, 
and move beyond the threshold. It was for this reason that in the Archaic cultural 
imagination, the Hestic oikos possessed an essentially feminine character, while the 
mobile and aggressive aspect of the Hermic beyond had a masculine one: 
In Greek, the domestic sphere, the enclosed space that is roofed over (protected), has a feminine 
connotation; the exterior, the open air, has a masculine one. The woman’s domain is the house. That is 
her place, and, as a rule, she should not leave it. In contrast, in the oikos, the man represents the 
centrifugal element. It is for him to leave the reassuring enclosure of the home, to confront the fatigues 
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and dangers of the outside world, to brave the unknown, to establish contact with the outside, to enter 
into negotiations with strangers. Whether he is engaged in work, war, trade, social contracts, or public 
life, whether he is in the country or the agora, on sea or on land, man’s activities are oriented towards 
the outside (163-164). 
The stable center and the mobile periphery were thus made symbolically dependent upon 
each other, just as male and female members of the family performed mutually opposed 
roles that nonetheless supported each other. The polarized concept of Archaic space was 
thus reflected and reinforced not only in the gender roles of practical life, but in the 
imaginary pairing of Hestia and Hermes. These deities “fulfill their functions as a couple: 
the existence of the one implies that of the other. […] Furthermore, their very 
complementarity implies a contradiction or internal tension in each of them that gives 
their characters as gods a fundamental ambiguity” (174). Pheidias’ pairing, then, 
represents a fragile harmony maintained against a background of tense antagonism: only 
by expressing contradictory tendencies in the experience of space, by moving in 
diametrically opposite directions, can Hestia and Hermes work towards a common 
purpose. 
How is the Archaic topography of center and periphery deployed in the text of the 
OT, and how might its deployment reflect the tensions and ambiguities in its structure 
that are suggested by Vernant’s historical analysis? In the first stasimon (463-482), the 
chorus of Theban elders contemplates the identity and whereabouts of the murderer in 
language that directly evokes the topography of Archaic religion and culture. Although 
the Chorus is far from ready to embrace the idea, however, Teiresias’ accusations in the 
preceding episode (300-462) have opened up the possibility that Oedipus, who occupies 
the central position of political power and interpretive skill in all of Thebes, has 
committed crimes that render him outcast from civilized humanity. In the range of 
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associations the chorus seeks to create between the realm peripheral to the polis and the 
outcast murderer, their application of Archaic spatial categories unwittingly generates a 
cluster of paradoxes focused on Oedipus himself. Despite his symbolic place at the center 
of the city, as “the holder of the community’s secular power and the representative of its 
norms and laws,”38 he is in fact the outcast and fugitive murderer they condemn. The 
passage thus not only offers us a point of entry for exploring how the OT invokes Archaic 
spatial categories only to destabilize them, but also begins to reveal some of the ironies 
surrounding Oedipus’ interpretive ectopia. In the public forum before the royal 
























Who is this man, whom the oracular stone of Delphi knew to have committed utterly unspeakable acts 
with his murderous hands? It is time for him to ply a foot in flight that is mightier than storm-swift 
horses. Fully armed, the offspring of Zeus [sc. Apollo] leaps upon him with fire and lightning-bolt, and 
along with him follow the terrible unerring Furies. 
                                                 
38  Gould, in: Bloom (ed.) 211. 
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Just now, there shone forth the manifest voice from snowy Parnassus, that we must by all means hunt 
down the unknown man. For he has his haunts among the savage woods and in the caves like a bull of 
the rocks, a miserable exile with a miserable path to tread, keeping himself far from the oracular navel 
of the world; he hovers about those things which live forever. 
Given the traditional role of the tragic chorus as a kind of deliberative body that 
communicates the significance of dramatic events for the collectives that exist both inside 
and outside the world of the drama,39 what should strike us immediately about this 
passage is the way its main accent falls on places and figures which are far removed from 
the centralized and collective milieu of polis life. First, however, we must consider the 
figurative language through which the Chorus defines the center and the periphery of this 
landscape against each other, and the values and functions they attach to each. The 
“Delphic stone” (Δελφὶς […] πέτρα 464) that stands at the “navel of the earth” (τὰ 
μεσόμφαλα γᾶς […] μαντεῖα 480f.; cf. 899) and “speaks oracles” (θεσπιέπεια 463f.) 
marks the definitive center of the space described by the Chorus. This smooth, round 
stone, often referred to as the omphalos gēs (“navel of the world”) and strongly 
associated with Hestia, marked the traditional seat or hearth of Apollo, the god of 
prophecy, at Delphi, which was thought to be located at the center of the earth. Like the 
umbilical cord between mother and child, this stone served as a point of connection 
between the human and divine worlds, transmitting divine knowledge to mortals through 
the institution of the Delphic oracle (Vernant 178-180). Although this divine hearth 
occupies an immovable center far removed from the city of Thebes (cf. 69-75), it is 
nonetheless central to the collective well-being of the city. In contrast to the distant fixity 
of the oracle that knows the “utterly unspeakable things” (ἄρρητʹ ἀρρήτων 465) 
                                                 
39  The most recent focused treatment of the chorus in Sophocles’ tragedies is Cynthia P. Gardiner, 
The Sophoclean Chorus: A Study of Character and Function (Iowa City: U. of Iowa Press, 1987); an older 
study of the same subject is R.W.B. Burton, The Chorus in Sophocles’ Tragedies (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980). 
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committed by the murderer’s “bloody hands” (φοινίαισι χερσίν 466), the chorus shifts 
abruptly to suggesting the latter apply not his hands, but his feet, to swift flight from the 
Theban territory that his blood-guilt has contaminated (468; qv. 100, 110) – the 
immediate urgency of which command is heightened by ὥρα, “it is time” (467). The next 
four lines expand the imagery of the murderer’s flight to include an armed attack by 
Apollo himself (ὁ Διὸς γενέτας 470; qv. 1300-1302) and continuous pursuit by the 
terrifying Furies, who never “come short” or “go astray” (both are connotations of 
ἀναπλάκητοι 472). Each element of the strophe’s figurative language thus seeks to 
contrast the akinetic fixity of the Delphic topos with the kinetic and peripheral condition 
of Laius’ murderer.  
The question concerning the murderer’s identity, however, which the chorus 
indirectly addresses to the oracle – “who is it?” (τίς;, 463) – complicates this dichotomy 
by indicating how the oracle’s omission and the murderer’s presumed efforts to remain 
unknown have conspired to the same result. While his deeds are “utterly unspeakable” 
(465) by virtue of the piety that conceals their enormity in silence, his identity remains 
“unspeakable” for quite another reason – namely, the oracle’s reticence in revealing it. 
On this crucial point, the transmission of divine knowledge to human beings through the 
prophetic hearth at Delphi has failed, as the Chorus themselves have already complained 
(278f). The binding, centering, and stabilizing power of the Hestic center has only given 
rise to more Hermic uncertainties, imperfectly carrying out its role of connecting men 
with divine knowledge and allowing the transgressor to escape detection – as if the gods 
who now pursue him simultaneously conspire against their own laws to let him escape. 
From the human point of view, the divine center that organizes space, and that defines the 
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identities of those who move and interact within that space, has abdicated from its 
ordering and stabilizing role.40 In this abdication, moreover, the crucial ambiguity 
developed in the stasimon as a whole takes root. As we shall see, the distinction between 
the immutable center and the uncertain periphery begins to collapse as both perpetuate 
the same interpretive uncertainty. 
The antistrophe begins by recalling both the omphalos that opened the strophe and 
the motif of flight and pursuit associated with the murderer, but in either case these 
motifs are marked by some significant differences. In a pregnant synesthesia, the chorus 
describes how the divine voice (φήμα, 475) of Apollo’s oracle “has just now flashed 
forth from snowy [Mount] Parnassus” (ἔλαμψε […] τοῦ νιφόεντος ἀρτίως […] 
Παρνασοῦ, 473-475). The object of the god’s communication could not be more 
different in character from the radiant clarity or monumental immobility of the mountain 
peak: Apollo commands the city to “hunt after” or “get on the track of” (ἰχνεύειν, 476) 
the “obscure” or “unknown man” (τὸν ἄδηλον ἄνδρα, 475f.), now a fugitive. The term 
ichneuein (ἰχνεύειν) directly recalls Oedipus’ earlier reference to the “indiscernible 
tracks” (ἴχνος δυστέκμαρτον, 108-109; qv. 220-221) of Laius’ murder, thus grafting the 
divine pursuit of the murderer (469-472) on to the hunting imagery associated earlier 
with the public inquiry: both god and man now hunt down the murderer as they would a 
wild animal. Similarly, the keen sense of vision necessary to find and interpret the “track” 
of the hunter’s quarry, at both 108-109 and 475, will be tested by the visually obscure 
                                                 
40  Bushnell, on the other hand, sees the oracle’s action not as an abdication from its proper role but 
as the perpetuation of this role, which is to confront the interpreter not with meaningful speech, but with 
silence. Rebecca W. Bushnell, Prophesying Tragedy: Sign and Voice in Sophocles’ Theban Plays (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell UP, 1988), 67-69. 
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fugitive.41 In addition to the contrast already drawn between the immobile stone at Delphi 
and the desperate haste of the murderer, another contrast that applies the Archaic 
topography – though by no means unproblematically – is drawn here between the 
interpretive transparency of the Delphic center and the source of obscurity or interpretive 
uncertainty that lies on its periphery. We will have reason to return to this ambiguity 
again in a moment. 
If we compare the strophe with the antistrophe at this point, we will note that the 
focus on the precise manner of the murderer’s flight from Thebes in the strophe (466-
468) has shifted, in the parallel verses of the antistrophe, to an evocative description of 
his movements in the Theban countryside prior to his flight (476-478): the murderer’s 
rapid, unidirectional line of flight (φυγᾷ, 468), which emphatically leads away from the 
polis, has been replaced by an evocation of the less urgent, more perambulatory, and 
certainly more furtive wandering implied in φοιτᾷ (“haunts,” “frequents,” “moves about 
in,” 477). This term aptly describes the murderer’s presumed movements while hiding in 
the countryside surrounding the polis, movements which, especially in the wake of 
ἰχνεύειν at 475, indeed appear similar to those of a wild game animal in a habitat 
consisting of “savage forest” and “caves” (ἀγρίαν ὕλαν […] ἄντρα, 476f.). “Savage” 
(ἀγρίαν), moreover, is a highly freighted term with which to characterize the criminal’s 
country haunts, as it designates the realm of wild beasts, brute violence, and untamed 
nature that is excluded from, and spatially peripheral to, the civilized and law-abiding 
existence of human beings in the polis (Segal 1, 32-33). The murderer thus becomes a 
monstrous and solitary “bull of the rocks” (πετραῖος ὁ ταῦρος, 478), existing beyond the 
                                                 
41  Like ἀσαφής, another favorite word of Sophocles, ἄδηλον primarily signifies lack of visual 
clarity. 
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spatial and political center that defines the human. Just as his hideouts in the “savage 
forest” and the “caves” locate him in a realm opposed to the lawful and civilized topos of 
Thebes, so now the fact that he “holds himself aloof” or “keeps himself far” 
(ἀπονοσφίζων, 480) from the divine and omniscient topos of Delphi locates him 
physically and spiritually on the periphery of the god’s authority as well. His separation 
from Delphi, however, does not prevent him from remaining in orbit around it: in his 
wanderings, he “hovers about” (περιποτᾶται, 482) the imperishable topos of the oracle, 
just as in his separation from Thebes he remains in the city’s orbit through the hardship of 
exile and loss (479). Thus, even as his centrifugal tendency drives him away from the 
Delphic and Theban centers, his movements exhibit a certain centripetal tendency as 
well; the paradoxical combination of both these tendencies is what keeps him endlessly 
turning around the center, ‘hovering about’ on their periphery. 
The paradoxical character of the murderer’s movement becomes even clearer 
when we compare the “foot […] that is mightier than storm-swift horses” that serves as 
his instrument of flight in the strophe, with the “care-worn” or “miserable foot” (μελέῳ 
ποδὶ 479) with which he wanders the countryside “in exile” (χηρεύων, also “in a state of 
bereavement,” 479) here in the antistrophe. Both the swift foot that flees the center and 
the stumbling foot that longs to return to it, both a creature with more freedom of 
movement than the strongest beasts and a creature vexed and hindered by anxious 
suffering: not only does the murderer possess extreme mobility and pathetic frailty alike, 
but he also partakes in the contradictory tendencies of both Hermes and Hestia. Turning 
back further, we can perceive a related ambiguity in the brilliance and clarity of the 
divine voice issuing from Parnassus (473), which seems patently at odds with the glaring 
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omission that prompts the Chorus’ question (464f). The image of Apollo’s clarion-voiced 
commandment issuing from the mountaintop also stands at odds with the impenetrable 
obscurity of the prophecies just delivered by Teiresias in the preceding episode (see esp. 
408-428, 447-462), which derive just as directly from Apollo himself (284ff). Even 
Oedipus, the proven master of riddles, has declared that Teiresias’ speech is “puzzling 
and unclear” (αἰνικτὰ κἀσαφῆ, 439). In either case, the meaning of the divine voice 
consistently proves to be as duplicitous and elusive as the identity of the murderer: the 
hearth of the god and the outlands of the criminal are implicated in the same 
impenetrability, the same resistance to interpretation. In making center and periphery 
resemble each other, this shared resistance renders illegible the topography they map out 
between them. 
It is no accident, furthermore, that these ambiguities emerge simultaneously 
within poetic figures of movement, on the one hand, and of interpretation on the other: 
Oedipus’ interpretive kinesis maps out the new topography on which these two figures 
combine and interact. Unlike the Chorus, we know that the godlike, brilliant king and the 
monstrous, suffering “bull of the rocks” are one and the same: as Oedipus circulates 
between center and periphery, he blurs the boundaries between them. Taking his own 
human and mobile mind as a source of prophecy (393-398), Oedipus now traces his 
broad circumference around that other prophetic center at Delphi, the immobile center of 
the world and the divine origin of truth. Each forms a center located at the other’s 
periphery; each pursues the truth at its own center, but also flees the truth at its periphery. 
In essence, Oedipus has elevated the shifting, kinetic uncertainty of the periphery to a 
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new center and a dangerous source of authority: his center is nowhere and everywhere at 
once. 
In the second half of the stasimon (483-512), the Chorus reacts to the 
uncertainties inspired in them by hearing the heated exchange between Oedipus and 
Teiresias. They now find themselves forced to choose between the truth of the Delphic 
hearth and that of Oedipus’ kinetic mind – each with mutually incommensurable but 
equally convincing claims to authority, each inhabiting a topographic order with a center 
that relegates the other to the periphery. The Chorus’ language registers the uncertainty of 
the choice they face through its vacillation between figures of intense agitation and those 
of total paralysis. In contrast to the first half of their song, the second strophe is sung by a 







Dreadfully, how dreadfully does the wise bird-augur stir up my soul [ταράσσει, also ‘to move, trouble, 
shake’], I who can neither confirm nor deny [sc. what he has said]. As for what I should say [λέξω, i.e. 
confirm as true], I am utterly at a loss [ἀπορῶ, ‘to be without means or resource,’ lit. ‘to have no 
path’]. My soul takes wing [πέτομαι, ‘to fly,’ here: ‘to be on the wing, flutter’] in forebodings, neither 
seeing what is present [ἐνθάδ[ε], lit. ‘right here’ or ‘right now’] nor what is to come [ὀπίσω = ‘what is 
behind us,’ thus ‘what has yet to be seen or known’]. 
The exchange between Teiresias and Oedipus has unsettled the Chorus’ belief, not 
merely in their king, in Apollo’s prophet, or in the public inquiry, but more importantly in 
the simple and inviolable boundaries that define the place they inhabit as deliberating 
citizens, or as receivers of divine revelation – in a word: as interpreters. Teiresias’ words 
have stirred them up, their minds take flight like birds in countless directions – yet at the 
same time, they do not know where they are, where they should go, or whom they should 
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follow. Just as their overburdening of topographic terms in the first half of the stasimon 
implied a certain uncertainty about their viability – a fear that revealed the ambiguities in 
these terms even as it sought to conceal them – so now their uncertainty about place 
comes to speech in its own right. All at once, the lines on the map have been erased, and 
neither god, nor man, nor city is spared the repercussions. 
 In Thebes' situation, there is certainly reason enough to declare, as the Chorus 
does in the pithy phrase that closes the second stasimon, that “divine things are going 
astray” (ἔρρει δὲ τὰ θεῖα 910). The immutable dwelling-places of the gods, along with 
the divine dominion over nature and man to which these places gave concrete expression 
in space, have quite literally begun to wander away from their rightful places and out of 
their proper roles.42 Furthermore, and despite his virtuoso mobility in pursuit of – and in 
flight from – the truth, Oedipus' struggle against the political and religious erosion of 
space must proceed from willful oblivion to his own moral and physical location. This, 
above all, is the significance of the locative terms in Teiresias’ accusation against 
Oedipus: “You have sight, and yet you do not see where you stand in evil, nor where you 
dwell, nor with whom you live” (emphasis mine; σὺ καὶ δέδορκας κοὐ βλέπεις ἵνʹ εἶ 
κακοῦ, / οὐδʹ ἔνθα ναίεις, οὐδʹ ὅτων οἰκεῖς μέτα 413f, qv. 366f). For as much as the 
newfound intellectual mobility of 5th century Athens had opened up new and unimagined 
pathways to knowledge and action, Oedipus' fate demonstrates that such extreme 
mobility blurs the map that would have served as a guide to these new roads, breaking the 
links between the center and periphery of space, on the one hand, and truth and error in 
                                                 
42  See Burkert 22-24 for an excellent reading of this passage and its context. 
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interpretation, on the other. The interpretive traveler could go virtually anywhere, but 
only on the condition that, like Oedipus, he would never know for sure where he stood. 
 
4. The Plague of Voices: From Confronting Noise to Becoming Noise 
In the first part of my discussion here, I explained how the kinetic nature of Oedipus’ 
interpretive method exposes him to certain risks as an agent of interpretation. From this 
perspective, Oedipus’ relationship to the object of his inquiry can be adequately 
characterized as both a dogged pursuit after the truth – discovering his parentage, solving 
the Sphinx’s riddle, bringing Laius’ killer to justice – and a headlong flight away from it 
– evading the Delphic oracle, living in exile from Corinth, ignoring or concealing his 
murderous past. The risk of this kinetic method that fuses pursuit and flight lies in the 
possibility of epistrophy – that is, that the straight-line path of kinesis might, in fact, be a 
subtle curve, eventually turning the interpreter around to confront both the terminus of his 
pursuit and the origin of his flight in one and the same truth. What this risk of epistrophy 
reveals more generally about the condition of interpretation is the fact that the path of the 
interpreter is equally determined by the truth that he pursues as it is by the truth that he 
flees. In the extreme case of Oedipus, these two truths converge into one, collapsing the 
entire kinetic logic of origin, journey, and destination into a single entity: the person of 
the interpreter himself. In the second part of my discussion, I explored how this 
disturbing convergence of points within Oedipus’ kinesis, when understood in its cultural 
and historical context, results from his responsibility to Archaic topography, with all its 
inherent tensions and contradictions. The figure of Oedipus thus forces not only a 
confrontation with the ambiguities in the structure of Greek political space, but also an 
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interrogation of space itself as a fundamental category of interpretive experience. Just as 
the experience of epistrophy made the origin and destination of Oedipus’ kinesis 
converge with one another, so does his embattled responsibility to Archaic topography 
force the center of space to converge with its periphery. 
What remains for us to consider, then, in the present reading of the play, is the 
final significance of these convergences between mutually exclusive points in space or 
mutually exclusive value-categories for the activity of interpretation. What does Oedipus’ 
situation mean – finding himself at home when he thinks he is distantly abroad, standing 
at the very center of Theban society when he deserves to be ejected beyond its borders – 
what set of conditions does this unique spatial predicament reveal within the activity of 
interpretation in general? I believe the hermeneutic significance of these convergences 
lies in their direct effect on the language of the interpreter. That is to say, they constantly 
displace the stable frame of reference within which the spatial and evaluative categories 
at work in Oedipus’ language are able to possess a univocal meaning. The result of this 
continuous displacement is poetically expressed as the multiplication and dislocation of 
the places from which Oedipus’ voice, the voice of the interpreter, issues. In effect, his 
voice comes to contain a contradictory multitude of voices that proceed not from 
Oedipus’ immediately present self, but from every imaginable point and direction at 
once. Part of the force of his tragic realization, then, derives from this brutal awakening 
to the polyvocal nature of his own language – the degree to which the truth it has tried to 
reach is criss-crossed by paths of error that lead elsewhere. On the one hand, his speech 
possesses a meaning that he knows and intends, such that his voice issues from the place 
where he believes himself to be; on the other hand, the same speech also possesses a 
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meaning that he neither knows nor intends, such that his voice issues from somewhere 
else – the place where he actually is. The language of Oedipus thus demonstrates how the 
speech of the interpreter exists in a sort of twilight between the singular, articulate 
character of ordinary speech and the multiple, disarticulate character of pure noise. The 
closer Oedipus comes to revealing the duplicities of his own speech and discovering 
where he actually is, the more his speech approximates and finally arrives at the extreme 
limit of noise. It remains for us, Oedipus’ interpreters, to confront this same noise that 
now seems to issue not just from Oedipus, but also from the language of interpretation in 
general – that is, our own language. 
The choral parodos (entrance-song) provides a convenient point of entry for 
considering how the destabilization of place is linked to the multiplication and dislocation 
of the interpreter’s voice in the OT. The Chorus, still unaware of Creon’s recent return 
from Delphi with the oracle’s response (78-150), enters the theater full of forebodings 
about the god’s reply and addresses a song of entreaty to the “immortal voice” (ἄμβροτε 
Φάμα, 158) of the oracle. In Sophocles’ hands, moreover, the ritualistic circumlocutions 
that mark the Chorus’ language become so many points through which to reflect upon the 
paradoxical dislocations to which even the divine voice of the oracle, the bringer of truth 






O sweetly-speaking voice from Zeus, who are you who have traveled [ἔβας, lit. ‘walked’] from Pytho 
[i.e. Delphi], with all its gold, to shining Thebes? I am on the rack, making my own anxious heart 
tremble in terror, O Delian healer to whom we cry out, with dreadful reverence for you. 
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Although the Chorus is clearly addressing Apollo in his function as the god of the 
Delphic oracle, they immediately invoke the belief that Apollo’s prophecies issued from 
the omniscient awareness of Zeus, for whom Apollo simply served as a mouthpiece. 
Apollo’s prophetic voice thus comes from elsewhere – it is “from Zeus” or “of Zeus” 
(Διὸς, 151) as the Chorus says – rather than properly originating with Apollo himself 
(Jebb 31, 151n.). A similar dislocation or multiplication of the origin of speech appears 
when the Chorus invokes Apollo not as the god of prophecy who dwells at Delphi, but 
rather as the god of healing who comes from the island of Delos. While Delos claimed to 
be the birthplace of the god, Delphi claimed to be his adopted home – hence the god 
originates in more than one place at once.44 In syntax that strangely anticipates the 
Chorus’ opening question in the first stasimon (463-466) about the identity of Laius’ 
killer (“who is that man?”), the Chorus here asks the oracular voice of Apollo, “who are 
you?” – that is, what the content of the oracle’s reply is, whether favorable or unfavorable 
to Thebes, and what demands it will make on the city in terms of expiatory prayer and 
sacrifice (155f). In poetic terms, however, the Chorus asks this question as it would of a 
stranger who comes from elsewhere: if we follow the figure exactly, we see that the voice 
(φάτις) of the god is figured as a person of indeterminate identity who has traveled (τίς 
                                                 
44  Gould notes a similar status for both the Dionysus of Euripides’ Bacchae, who is native to 
Thebes, Lydia, and Thrace all at once, and Apollo in the same play, who comes from both Delos and Lykia: 
“Gods such as Apollo and Dionysus are always both (and simultaneously) ‘of the place’ and ‘from 
elsewhere,’ and this double-sidedness is not merely asserted in myths of arrival and return, but also enacted 
in ritual, in the processions which escort the god ‘back’ to the sanctuary where he lives and has power” 
(Gould 222; qv. Jebb 32, 154n. and Burkert 21). While Gould capitalizes upon these divine duplicities to 
confirm what he sees as Oedipus’ quasi-divine, exceptional status, they are equally strong evidence for how 
the play compares the divine or oracular voice with the voice of the human interpreter: while the former 
remains elusive in origin and obscure in meaning, the latter seems to issue from a definite origin and 
possess a clear meaning – until, that is, Oedipus actually begins to ask questions about his origins and about 
the meaning of his strange career. Oedipus ends up being a kind of “man from nowhere” precisely because 
he is a native of too many places – like the god Apollo whom he seeks, in some measure, to supplant. Yet 
quid licet Iovi non licet bovi. 
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[…] ἔβας) from Delphi to Thebes. The Chorus’ circumlocutions thus tacitly acknowledge 
that the voice of revelation, even when it issues from the very person of divinity, always 
comes from elsewhere, from an unclear point of origin, and has to travel far in order to 
reach the place – let alone the awareness – that men inhabit. Whatever grim hermeneutic 
skepticism this figurative language might inspire in and of themselves, we are inevitably 
brought up short by the further realization that just like the itinerant voice of the god, 
Oedipus himself is a person of uncertain origins who has lately traveled from Delphi to 
Thebes and whose import for the city remains ambiguous. The Chorus could just as 
easily be addressing their king here as the “sweetly-speaking voice of Zeus” (151): the 
mobile and dislocated character of the divine voice, which forms the object of 
interpretation, corresponds to precisely the same qualities in Oedipus, the subject of 
interpretation. Both the voice that communicates the truth and the one who receives this 
voice are, in a word, out of place. 
The dislocated quality that the Chorus identifies in both the voice of Apollo and 
the person of Oedipus comes to infect the Chorus’ language itself in the antistrophe, 
where its collective voice suffers a multiplication of its origins and a diffusion of its 
meanings. Instead of originating in one speaker and communicating one meaning, the 
Chorus’ language seems to come from at least two different origins – like Oedipus or 
Apollo – and proceed along at least two different pathways at once. The resulting 
polysemy or, more precisely, polyphony of their language makes itself manifest only in 
our awareness as readers or spectators, and escapes the notice of the Chorus itself 
entirely. In its direct appeal to the gods for release from the plague, the Chorus uses an 
unorthodox phrase that exhibits precisely this kind of polyphony: “If ever before, when a 
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previous calamity had risen up and was looming over the city, you made foreign the fire 
of misery [ἠνύσατʹ ἐκτοπίαν φλόγα πήματος – emphasis mine in trans.], so come now 
as well [sc. and do the same]” (εἴ ποτε καὶ προτέρας ἄτας ὑπερορνυμένας πόλει / 
ἠνύσατʹ ἐκτοπίαν φλόγα πήματος, ἔλθετε καὶ νῦν 165ff). The Chorus asks the gods to 
“render the fire foreign” or “make the fire out-of-place” (167), meaning simply that they 
should drive the plague out of the city.45 Accordingly, the major commentators and 
translators of this line read ἐκτοπίαν (ἐκτόπιος [ectopios], ‘foreign, from elsewhere,’ lit. 
‘out of place’) as a final predicate, i.e. they render the line as “bring it about (so that) the 
fire (becomes) out-of-place.” The considerable semantic breadth of ἀνύω (“to bring 
about, render, change into, bring to completion or fulfillment” > ἠνύσατ[ε] 167), 
however, makes another, quite distinct version possible, which expresses a contradictory 
meaning through precisely the same sequence of words. Roughly translated, this reading 
would come through as “bring this fire from elsewhere to its completion (or fulfillment),” 
i.e. expedite the progress of the fire so that it consumes everything.46 On the former 
reading, the Chorus is asking the gods to drive the plague-fire out of the city (ἐκτοπίαν); 
on the latter reading, it asks them to fan the flames of the plague, which has invaded the 
city from elsewhere (ἐκτοπίαν). Of course, the Chorus is ignorant of the fact that 
Oedipus, who is both a native Theban and a foreign overlord, is himself the primary 
cause of the plague as well as the eventual instrument of divine salvation from its 
destructive grip. By virtue of Oedipus’ own ectopic dislocation, which conflates distinct 
places and multiplies points of origin, the Chorus’ appeal to the gods for release from the 
                                                 
45  Jebb notes that this is “a rare use of ἀνύω like ποιεῖν [to make]” (34, 166n.). 
46  In this alternate reading, the adjective ἐκτοπίαν is a static modifier rather than a final predicate, 
i.e. an ‘out-of-place fire,’ rather than a ‘fire that is made to be out-of-place.’ 
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plague thus appears to speak in more than one voice, or from more than one frame of 
reference, at the same time. If, furthermore, Oedipus is both the physician that ministers 
to the ravages of the plague and the primary agent of its epidemic spread, then we should 
likewise note that the disease he causes and the cure he applies are identical. Both the 
poison and the antidote, as it were, are to be found in the interpreter’s capacity to set 
words and places perilously into motion, to multiply the voices that resound within 
speech.47 
I would like to propose polyphony, then, as a concept that not only is more 
suggestive and more inclusive than tragic irony in describing the poetic texture of 
Sophocles’ language in the OT, but also directly acknowledges the interrogations of place 
and the indeterminacies of origin that are so pivotal in the play’s structure. Investigating 
the polyphonic aspect of Oedipus’ speech in particular leads us to broader reflections on 
the multiple voices and points of origin that resonate in the language of interpretation as 
such, beyond the immediate awareness of the one who speaks it. If, like Oedipus, the 
interpreter unknowingly exists in many different places at once, his voice necessarily 
proceeds from many different directions and intersects with itself at many different 
points. In this light, passages such as the edict against the killer of Laius (216-275), in 
which critics have so often and so productively perceived one tragic irony after another in 
the way Oedipus applies the terminology of native and foreign, now become object-
                                                 
47  The preceding statements serve as ample evidence that I do not entirely share in the scholarly 
consensus that views the plague as merely a red herring that sets the plot in motion initially only to be 
disposed of as more central issues come to light. Gould, for instance, describes a great turning, both in the 
play’s overall structure and in its range of interest, away from the question of curing the plague and toward 
the question of Oedipus’ identity; “The issues of the polis, of Thebes and its plague, gradually fade over 
and dissolve until by the end of the play they are quite lost sight of.” Gould, in: Bloom [ed.] 217. I am 
convinced that, even though the plague does not remain an explicit motif beyond the first third or so of the 
drama, the poetic language in which the plague is described does pervade the entire text, making the plague 
an implicit, if not explicit presence throughout. However, since my interests inevitably lie elsewhere, I 
cannot argue this point in full here. 
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You pray; and regarding those things for which you pray – if you prove willing to receive my words 
and minister to your disease [τῇ νόσῳ (…) ὑπηρετεῖν, also ‘to acquiesce in, submit to, or humor your 
disease’] – you may find deliverance and relief from your sufferings. I will proclaim this much, being a 
stranger to the report (sc. of the murder) [ξένος (…) τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ(ε)] as I have been a stranger to 
the deed itself [ξένος (…) τοῦ πραχθέντος], for I would not have had to go far in order to track it 
down [ἴχνευον] if I possessed any clue [σύμβολον]. But as things now stand, since it was only later 
that I was counted as a citizen among fellow-citizens [ὕστερος (…) ἀστὸς εἰς ἀστοὺς τελῶ], I do thus 
proclaim these things before all of you Cadmeans [i.e. Thebans]. 
This passage opens Oedipus’ public address directly after the choral parodos, a text 
which, as we have just seen, is already fraught with the problems of location and 
affiliation that now directly threaten the logic of Oedipus’ own language here. 
Commentators have long pointed out the sharp irony in 219f, where Oedipus claims to be 
as much a xenos (which means ‘stranger’ or ‘foreigner,’ but also ‘guest-friend’) to the 
accounts of Laius’ murder, which he has just heard for the first time, as he is to the 
bloody deed itself. The basis of the irony here, of course, is the fact that Oedipus is 
actually no ‘stranger’ to the murder at all, but committed it himself.48 All the same, this 
summary reading does not quite exhaust the ambiguities set loose by Oedipus’ self-
application of the term xenos, which resonates somewhat more deeply in light of the 
multiple places Oedipus inhabits and the multiple origins from which he derives. From 
one point of view, Oedipus is a xenos in every sense: he came to Thebes as a stranger and 
                                                 
48  Dawe remarks simply, “The whole passage is thick with dramatic irony. He was not a stranger to 
the events or to what was said about them” (95, 222n.). 
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a foreigner, and thereafter was not only accepted as a ‘guest-friend’ of the city in his 
repatriation (222), but also elevated to the status of tyrannos (king) in recognition of his 
triumph over the Sphinx. At the same time, he is not a xenos at all: he is a member of the 
Theban royal family and the heir of the autochthonous Labdacid line. Through this 
oblique and unwitting reference to his status as a ‘naturalized native,’ as it were, 
Oedipus’ twice-repeated claim (ξένος […] ξένος 219f) to the figurative status of xenos in 
relation to Laius’ murder achieves a multiple voicing of this term – not only revealing the 
multiplicity and indeterminacy of Oedipus’ own origins, but infecting the term itself with 
a kind of irresolvable internal polyphony.49 
It should come as no surprise, then, that Oedipus unknowingly betrays his status 
as carrier of this infectious polyphony at the very beginning of his proclamation, in the 
equally ambiguous wording of 216f. The grammatical parallelism between the infinitives 
“to receive my words” (τἄμʹ […] ἔπη κλύων δέχεσθαι) and “to minister to your disease” 
(τῇ νόσῳ […] ὑπηρετεῖν), which superficially implies a close correlation, if not an 
equivalence, between heeding Oedipus’ command and curing the plague, is sharply 
undercut by the ambiguity of ὑπηρετεῖν, which means ‘to minister to, care for’ in the 
sense of ‘to acquiesce in, submit to, or humor.’50 The idea of curing the city’s disease is 
thus rendered inseparable from the idea of submitting to the will of the plague as a 
servant submits to his master. As with the grammatical polyphony of the “foreign fire” 
                                                 
49  A further point: none of the commentators or scholars of whose work I am aware notes that 
σύμβολον, the word Oedipus uses in this passage for “clue,” is also a term appearing in Aristophanes for a 
permit to reside given to aliens living within the limits of Attica (LSJ sub σύμβολον). 
50  It is a telling moment for many scholars’ treatment of the text of the OT when the ambiguity of 
ὑπηρετεῖν prompts Dawe to sense textual corruption right away, but then, failing that, to domesticate the 
duplicity of the line by comparison to contemporary English idiom: “At first sight ὑπηρετεῖν seems to give 
the reverse of the sense required, but the text is sound. […] So in English when we say that quinine is good 
for malaria, what we mean is that it is bad for malaria but good for the patient” (94, 217n.). This exegesis 
of idiom does not resolve the slipperiness of the diction in this context. 
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(167), the more strictly semantic polyphony of ὑπηρετεῖν suggests that the salvation 
from the plague that Oedipus promises is identical with an intensification of its effects. 
The ambiguity of this term, moreover, also twists around into its opposite the reassuring 
parallelism Oedipus wants to establish between the proclamation he speaks against the 
polluting killer and the cure that the city needs against the plague. Instead, Oedipus’ 
words, which multiply and disseminate their own meanings as readily as a virus 
duplicates and spreads in a vulnerable host, implicitly betray their role as agents of 
infection.51 This role becomes quite explicit towards the end of Oedipus’ edict, where he 
solemnly calls down all the sufferings of the plague on the heads of those who continue 
to conceal the identity of the murderer. His words here are quite literally intended to cure 
and to infect at the same time: “And for those who do not obey these commands, I pray 
that the gods send them neither crops from their tilled land nor children from their 
women, but rather that they be ruined by their current condition, or by one even more 
hateful than this” (καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς μὴ δρῶσιν εὔχομαι θεοὺς / μήτʹ ἄροτον αὐτοῖς γῆς 
ἀνιέναι τινὰ / μήτʹ οὖν γυναικῶν παῖδας, ἀλλὰ τῷ πότμῳ / τῷ νῦν φθερεῖσθαι κἄτι 
τοῦδʹ ἐχθίονι 269-272). It is ultimately immaterial whether the people of Thebes obey or 
disobey Oedipus’ edict, since the polyphony of Oedipus’ language entails that they 
‘submit to’ the plague either way. 
So far I have tried to understand the multiple meanings of the OT’s language as 
issuing from multiple voices that are simultaneously present in a single utterance as a 
result of Oedipus’ mobile and dislocated condition. These voices originate in different 
                                                 
51  In the wider context of the parodos, too, it is worth noting the Chorus’ “horror at the terrifying 
and uncanny speed, like that of a fire borne before the wind or like the sudden flight of a flock of migrating 
birds, with which the sickness spreads and the deaths become too numerous to count” (Gould, in: Bloom 
[ed.] 211). The plague’s considerable power of movement, as represented in the Chorus’ awestruck 
language, is directly reminiscent of Oedipus’ own strange powers. 
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viewpoints, conflict with or openly contradict each other, and ultimately work to multiply 
or diffuse the identity of the speaker: the interpreter’s language, in short, unwittingly 
transforms him into a dispersed and contentious multitude. The fragmentation, 
dissemination, and contradiction of voices that we hear inside Oedipus’ voice, however, 
presses ever harder at the bounds of sense as the drama’s net of revelations begins to 
close around him. After Teiresias, for instance, brings his accusations against the king, he 
discharges his frustration and powerlessness in four incredibly dense and obscure verses 
that take the measure not only of Oedipus’ tragic destiny in general, but the destiny of 





And what place will not be a harbor [λιμήν] to your cry [βοή], what part of Cithaeron will not soon 
sound in unison [σύμφωνος] with it, when you learn the meaning [καταίσθῃ] of the bridal hymn 
[ὑμέναιος] in which, within that house, you found no refuge [ἄνορμον εἰσέπλευσας, approx. ‘you 
sailed into a place without a harbor’] after such a fair voyage? 
Teiresias’ four verses develop two figurative complexes in parallel. The first cluster of 
images depicts different registers of the human voice: the prophet imagines, on the one 
hand, the inarticulate voice of Oedipus’ shout or cry (βοή 420) upon discovering his 
origins, and, on the other hand, the articulate musical voice of the choral song 
(σύμφωνος 421) with which Mount Cithaeron figuratively echoes Oedipus’ shout, along 
with that of the bridal hymn (ὑμέναιος 422) that accompanied Oedipus’ perverse 
marriage to his mother Jocasta. These two registers of the voice, furthermore, are 
represented as moving within two specific and mutually exclusive spaces. Teiresias 
depicts Mount Cithaeron and the wilderness beyond as a welcoming space of “harbor” or 
“refuge” (λιμήν 420) for Oedipus’ roving cry; this cry, however, is motivated by 
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Oedipus’ horror at “fully perceiving” or “recognizing” (καταίσθῃ 422) the meaning of 
the hymn that accompanied his entrance into a very different space, that of the royal 
palace (δόμοις 422), which is paradoxically rendered as a place that offers him no refuge 
(ἄνορμον 423). This imagery of harbor or refuge provides the point of overlap between 
the first and the second major cluster of images, which depict Oedipus’ past and future 
peregrinations alike in terms of a ship sailing into harbor (εἰσέπλευσας, εὐπλοίας 423) – 
all the more baffling, since the places in question are all on land.52 The tone of bitter 
irony that blankets the entire passage reaches its height in the mention of the “fair 
voyage” (εὐπλοίας 423, lit. ‘favorable sailing’) that sped Oedipus on his way into 
disaster. So much for analysis: what are we to make of this extraordinary statement – 
itself a masterpiece of intricate and enigmatic counterpoint between voices and places – 
in relation to Oedipus’ own voice and place? 
In the context of polyphony, it is vital to see that Teiresias’ words form 
associations, on the one hand, between inarticulate vocal sound and the exterior space of 
uncivilized wilderness, and, on the other hand, between the articulate voices of the 
wedding song and the interior space of the Theban royal household.53 Oedipus goes 
inside to the sound of music, and goes outside to the sound of noise – yet both he and his 
noisy cry find their proper home and safe haven in the wilderness, while the domestic 
space is his real wilderness, full of danger and horror. Oedipus’ cry of horror, 
                                                 
52  Although it should be noted, as Goldhill does, that “the imagery of disastrous sailing has a 
specific sexual connotation” in this passage: “The inescapability of Oedipus’ cursed journey back to his 
mother is ironically heightened by the use of the language of control over the sea. […] Jocasta is a 
‘harbour’ to and from which Oedipus has sailed. The imagery of control and order in travelling is turned to 
the expression of an overdetermined arrival in the place of departure” (Goldhill 206-207). 
53  Segal discusses similar verbal associations in the context of tragedy as a whole: “The language of 
tragedy presents the violation of linguistic norms: ambiguity, confusion, screams of agony, roars of pain, 
the incoherence of terror or madness. Logical argument fails. […] Civilized discourse gives way suddenly 
to curse or bellow, to horrendous cries or ominous silences” (53; for spatial significance, qv. 38). 
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furthermore is not merely a reaction to discovering the truth of his marriage: the 
inarticulate cry is the true meaning of the seemingly articulate wedding-song. In spatial 
terms, we could say that when Teiresias imagines Oedipus’ flight into the wilderness of 
Cithaeron, it is simply as a repetition of the latter’s entrance into the royal household, but 
this time in full awareness of its true significance. In effect, the boundaries separating 
song, speech, and cry of horror for Oedipus become as indistinct and as easy to transgress 
as those separating household, city, and wilderness. Just as Oedipus’ proper place seems 
to be both everywhere and nowhere, so his voice seems to occupy every point on the 
whole range of sonic possibilities simultaneously.54 What we hear, then, when we listen 
to the voice of Oedipus is the mutual complicity of sense and senselessness, the inside 
and the outside, the saving cure and the wasting plague, that governs the language of 
interpretation. In his fall, we come to recognize that the truth the interpreter speaks in 
order to resolve the noise of his object – like Oedipus speaking the solution to the 
Sphinx’s riddle – is so full of conflicting voices, and speaks from so many different 
places, that it comes dangerously close to becoming noise itself. 
 This risk – the challenge of overcoming noise without becoming noise, of being 
out-of-place without turning against place altogether – is the one to which Oedipus 
tragically succumbs. Once the truth has been revealed at last, the poetry of the drama 
fuses Oedipus’ multifarious voice with his multidirectional power of movement to reveal 
                                                 
54  In a different vein, Gould describes Oedipus’ alienated self-awareness at this point quite 
eloquently, though his viewpoint is more psychologically interested than mine: Oedipus’ “vision of himself 
is as a being from another world of discourse than the now familiar political world of Thebes or Corinth. 
Here is one who speaks a new language of abstraction and metaphor, a child of nature to whom the 
concerns of human society are less than real. […] Oedipus, for all his conviction of belonging, and of 
mastery of political power and social observance, is an alien, he does not belong and his not belonging is 
figured in the contradictions of his human relationships.” Gould, in: Bloom (ed.) 218, 221; qv. 222. In the 
context of the present discussion, of course, the relations in which Oedipus “does not belong” are spatial 
rather than interpersonal, but the point holds equally in both contexts. 
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the truth of his character: a single impetus toward transgression against which no spatial 
boundary nor verbal distinction can hold firm. After Jocasta disappears into the innermost 
chamber of the house to kill herself, the Second Messenger describes how Oedipus’ 








And how she perished after these things happened [sc. Jocasta’s disappearance into the inner chamber] 
I no longer know. For Oedipus burst in [εἰσέπαισεν, lit. ‘struck inwards’] shouting [βοῶν > βοάω [v.], 
‘to cry, shout’ > βοή [n.], ‘cry, shout’ 420], and did not allow us to watch her misfortune through to the 
end [τὸ κείνης ἐκθεάσασθαι κακόν]: but as he rushed around [περιπολοῦντ(α)], our eyes were set 
steadily on him. He rushed to and fro [φοιτᾷ], asking us to give him a sword, asking where he could 
find [πορεῖν, lit. ‘make or find a path to’] the wife who was no wife [γυναῖκά τʹ οὐ γυναῖκα], but a 
mother whose womb had borne both him and his children.  
Oedipus’ initial, violent irruption into the space of the household (εἰσέπαισεν 1252) 
precedes an uncontrolled frenzy of physical movement (περιπολοῦντ(α) 1254, φοιτᾷ 
1255) and overpowering speech (βοῶν 1252), both of which are so powerfully distracting 
that they draw away all attention from Jocasta’s actions and then obscure what transpires 
with Jocasta in the inner chamber. A moment later, both the spatial and the vocal 
elements of Oedipus’ transgressive fury escalate even further: “Screaming with awesome 
force […] he drove himself hard against the double doors [sc. of the bedroom], tearing 
the bolts from their sockets so that the doors broke inwards, and rushed into the chamber” 
(δεινὸν δʹ ἀύσας […] / πύλαις διπλαῖς ἐνήλατʹ, ἐκ δὲ πυθμένων / ἔκλινε κοῖλα 
κλῇθρα κἀμπίπτει στέγῃ 1260-1262). Oedipus’ articulate language – or what remains 
of it – now begins to surrender itself explicitly to the multitude of voices that have 
implicitly appeared within it through the entire play: his language bends back upon itself 
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in paradoxes, or dissolves into pure animalistic sound. When he finally finds his “wife 
that is no wife” (γυναῖκά τʹ οὐ γυναῖκα 1256) hung by the neck,55 he “bellows terribly” 
(δεινὰ βρυχηθεὶς 1265), now transforming himself in fact into the “bull of the rocks” 
(πετραῖος ὁ ταῦρος 478) of the first stasimon – but one that stalks the inner halls of the 
royal palace, not the open wilderness.  
In the very moment when he has fulfilled Teiresias’ obscure prophecy, 
furthermore, Oedipus’ last coherent statement before blinding himself responds to 
Teiresias’ enigmatic anticipation of the future with an equally enigmatic interpretation of 
his own past crimes56 – the meaning of which now stands forth in words which 
themselves defy meaning. As the intense convolution of his language approaches the 
outer limits of sense, verging on sheer noise, he turns all the violence of his 







He shouted words like these: “No more shall you [sc. Oedipus’ eyes] behold such horrors as I was 
suffering and working! Long enough have you looked on those whom you ought never to have seen, 
failed in knowledge of those whom I yearned to know – henceforth you shall be dark!” To such dire 
                                                 
55  One of several self-negating phrases used by Oedipus in this section of the play; others are to be 
found at 1405-1407 and 1214 (qv. Goldhill 215). 
56  Bushnell offers a provocative political reading of the Oedipus-Teiresias axis in the OT, with 
particular attention to how Oedipus shapes his own secular, political, and individual discourse of 
‘prophecy’ in reaction to the collective and religious discourse of Teiresias, reading Oedipus’ position as 
one caught between “the defiance of [prophetic] authority and the appropriation of that authority in the city 
or state, through the power of interpretation.” (11). While I have examined Oedipus’ interpretive 
responsibility through the failure of traditional topographic vocabulary to locate him within an Archaic 
terrain, Bushnell’s reading can be understood as directed toward other, related dimensions of Oedipus’ 
responsibility to prophetic discourse – or, as she puts it, “Oedipus’ entire life is an answer to oracular 
prediction” (67). 
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refrain [ἐφυμνῶν, lit. ‘hymning, accompanying with song’], not once alone but often he struck his 
eyes with lifted hand.57 
Oedipus’ perverse “singing” (ἐφυμνῶν 1275) in these verses repeats and reconfigures 
the uncanny “bridal hymn” (ὑμέναιον 422) of Teiresias’ prophecy: whereas in the former 
case, he had transgressed the threshold and the sanctity of the house to the 
accompaniment of song, in the latter case, he transgresses against his own body to a 
similar accompaniment. The many voices contained in Oedipus’ voice reach their highest 
intensity of both sound and sense in this passage – so intense, in fact, that the Second 
Messenger can only conclude his narrative by heaping one term for extreme suffering on 
top of another in the attempt to capture the plenitude of horrors that have now taken 
possession of the Labdacids: “The ancient happiness they possessed before was true 
happiness indeed; but now, today – lamentation, ruin, death, shame – of all the evils that 
have names, nothing, nothing is lacking” (ὁ πρὶν παλαιὸς δʹ ὄλβος ἦν πάροιθε μὲν / 
ὄλβος δικαίως∙ νῦν δὲ τῇδε θἠμέρᾳ / στεναγμός, ἄτη, θάνατος, αἰσχύνη, κακῶν / ὅσʹ 
ἐστὶ πάντων ὀνόματʹ, οὐδέν ἐστʹ ἀπόν 1282-1285). The Messenger points to the total 
indeterminacy of words, the speechlessness of speech itself, as it were, that faces one 
who attempts to describe Oedipus’ crimes. Across the gap created by Oedipus’ 
realizations, his previous “blessedness” (ὄλβος 1282) and his present “ruin” (ἄτη 1284) 
now confront each other as contradictory synonyms for the same destiny: nothing about 
him has changed in the course of the play, after all, except the degree of self-
understanding he has gained through interpretation. The voice that speaks either of these 
terms refers to the same object as the voice that speaks the other, but neither term and 
                                                 
57  For this passage, I have reproduced Jebb’s English translation with modernized diction and 
emendations (Jebb 167). 
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neither voice can be logically reconciled with the other. As a result, Oedipus’ own 
polyphony has infected the very language in which the people of Thebes must make 
sense of his fate: he has erased all distinctions and crossed all boundaries. 
 At this outermost limit, Oedipus has become the noise and chaos he originally set 
out to conquer. His constant and far-reaching mobility has been unmasked, only to reveal 
that he has returned to the place from whence he began; his place at the center of 
household, city, and human civilization has been unmasked, only to reveal that he has 
placed himself at the periphery of each; the razor-sharp language of interpretation with 
which he sought a cure for the city’s disease has been unmasked, only to reveal that its 
unwitting equivocations and misrepresentations have infected the meaningfulness of 
language itself with an incurable sickness. Oedipus himself, the archetypal interpreter, 
has now become the archetypal interpretive problem. The Chorus now confronts him as 
he once confronted the Sphinx: “Alas, alas, miserable one – I cannot even look at you, 
though there are so many things I would like to ask, so many things I would like to find 
out, so many things I would like to look at more closely – oh, how you fill me with 
shuddering!” (φεῦ φεῦ, δύστηνʹ, ἀλλʹ οὐδʹ ἐσιδεῖν / δύναμαί σʹ, ἐθέλων πόλλʹ 
ἀνερέσθαι, / πολλὰ πυθέσθαι, πολλὰ δʹ ἀθρῆσαι· / τοίαν φρίκην παρέχεις μοι 1303-
1306). The only answer Oedipus can offer he expresses in language that remains almost 
completely dessicated of meaning, but rather, like the Messenger’s summation at 1282-
1285, exerts its force purely through redundant qualifiers and a surfeit of endlessly 
repeated vocalic sounds. In essence, it is language that resists interpretation above the 
level of noise: just as the short o and the on phoneme dominate iō skotou / nephos emon 
apotropon, epiplomenon aphaton, / adamaton te kai dusouriston <on> (“O my cloud of 
100 
darkness, hideous, unspeakable, inexorably approaching – inconquerable and sped on by 
an ill wind,” 1313ff) to the point of monotony, so the long a renders ō kaka kaka telōn 
ema tad’ ema pathea (“O bringing my evils, these evil sufferings to fulfillment”) almost 
completely devoid of articulation or meaning. But Oedipus’ frightful and deafening 
gibberish makes a point about the language of the interpreter that his eloquence in the rest 
of the play could only conceal and evade: that this language is full of noise, full of truths 
and errors that cannot be separated, full of clashing voices that approach from every 
direction and depart just as readily to every corner of the earth. Oedipus himself puts it 





Alas, alas, how miserable I am, where on earth am I being carried in my misery? Where is my voice 
being swept away to, born on the wings of the air? O my spirit, how far you sprang forth!58 
                                                 
58  Bushnell sees a similar logic at work in this passage: “His very voice seems ‘disembodied,’ not 
his own, in the initial moments of his pain” (83; qv. Segal 242). Yet she ultimately develops the point in the 
opposite direction, in which the fragmentation of Oedipus’ identity implicit in such ‘disembodiment’ is 
saved by a heroic turn: “Oedipus the King celebrates the power of human speech to represent a self, even in 
such a defeat. […] For Oedipus, as for Antigone, even in disaster the human voice achieves a dramatic or 
apostrophic significance without power to command” (85). 
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SAY HELLO TO THE NEW: 
TRAGIC TECHNOLOGIES IN BRECHT'S EPIC THEATER 
 
1. Dawn, Twilight and Apocalypse: The Theater of the New Age as a Technology of 
Vision 
As we have just seen, Oedipus raises the question of “where” in relation to both the 
subject and object of interpretation, and answers it – tragically – by showing how 
“nowhere” and “everywhere” can collapse into a singularity by the very same interpretive 
process that was intended to reestablish their differences. Particularly in the modern 
world, however, the legacy of Oedipus in the experience of interpretation comprehends 
not only our understanding of space as mediated by culture, but also our understanding of 
time as mediated by history. If the concept of modernity always depends on some sort of 
'now' counterposed to some sort of 'then', then we are continually faced by the nagging 
question about the 'now-ness’ to which we lay claim when we make the boast of 'being 
modern' in our interpretive attitudes and methods. When exactly does this now arrive? 
We might pose the question somewhat wryly by invoking the adolescent impatience 
expressed in the title of a song by The Smiths: “How Soon Is Now?” And what, for that 
matter, is the 'then-ness' that forms the counterweight to the modern 'now,' and thus 
stubbornly persists alongside and within it? And could Greek antiquity, by offering one 
of the most powerful sources of 'then-ness' in the West, remain uncomfortably 
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contemporary, even in the midst of modernity? These latter questions can be posed, as it 
were, by standing Morrissey on his head so that he asks: “How Then Is Now?” 
 These questions are charged by a recognizably tragic ambiguity that not only 
translates Oedipus' interpretive problem from one of space to one of time, but also makes 
him into our contemporary instead of our (dubious) ancestor. Despite the promise of 
progress, the new age in which we allegedly dwell constantly threatens to collapse into 
the old, and the old constantly threatens to reclaim the new – just as Oedipus made the 
center of the city interchangeable with its savage margins. The high stakes attached to an 
interpretive slippage of this kind, furthermore, appear quite clearly in historical and 
political experiences that have become virtually everyday and certainly carry a tragic 
sting in their tail: namely, those moments in which the promises of modernity, of freedom 
and enlightenment, reap their harvest in the trembling submission to force and the 
voluntary embrace of delusion. All the more fitting, then, that in the effort to define the 
new age of modernity and the interpretive outlook appropriate to it, our major antagonist 
and accomplice in the task should be a phenomenon that appears at once historically 
remote from, and philosophically contemporary with, modern consciousness on both 
these fronts: namely, the classical tragedy of Oedipus. 
 So: enter, stage right, our modern Oedipus. Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) never 
needed to persuade himself that he lived in a new age – for better or for worse: a pair of 
decimating world wars, a spiral of economic chaos, and the upheaval of intellectual 
tradition are not, after all, everyday occurrences in an epoch of stability. What Brecht 
needed was a way to convince himself, and anyone else who made it out the other end, 
that this new age could survive the revenge of the old. That peculiar speech-act, the 
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declaration of a new age – whatever this new age promises, and whatever obstacles stand 
in its way – is perhaps the only index common to all the manifestations of the modern 
outlook in politics, science, and the arts. Brecht’s modernism was no exception, but he 
put this new age, such as it was, to work in the theater. It could be argued, in fact, that the 
gestus (gesture),1
wie vorteilhaft die Überzeugung, an der Schwelle einer neuen Zeit zu stehen, die Menschen 
beeinflussen kann. Ihre Umgebung erscheint ihnen da als noch ganz unfertig, erfreulichster 
Verbesserungen fähig, voll von ungeahnten und geahnten Möglichkeiten, als fügsamer Rohstoff in 
ihrer Hand. Sie selbst kommen sich vor wie am Morgen, ausgeruht, kräftig, erfindungsreich. Bisheriger 
Glaube wird als Aberglaube behandelt, was gestern noch als selbstverständlich erschien, wird neuem 
 the fundamental building-block of acting in Brechtian theater, owed its 
shifting, self-interrupting rhythms to the heavy off-beat that marks the onset of the new 
age in the tempo of historical time. The technique of the gestus isolates and defines the 
individual attitudes that form, as it were, the molecular chain of a specific action in time, 
and separates them with an interruptive gap that allows the spectator to reflect on the 
determinate character of each atomic unit. In the same way that the gestus interrupts the 
temporality of dramatic performance, the proclamation of a new age interrupts the 
continuity of historical time: each is calculated to exert a powerful collective shock that 
prompts the reconsideration of received verities. The performance of either act articulates 
attitudes, reveals purposes, presents instruments – and above all, it invigorates. “Es ist 
bekannt,” writes Brecht in his “Anmerkungen zu »Leben des Galilei«” from 1939: 
                                                          
1  I owe the analogy of atomic bonds to Eric Bentley’s comparable formulation in describing the 
gestic structure of scenes in Brechtian drama: Eric Bentley, The Brecht Commentaries: 1943-1980 (New 
York: Grove Press, 1981), 35. For an approachable introductory discussion of the concept of gestus in 
Brecht’s theater, see Peter Brooker, “Key words in Brecht’s theory and practice of theatre,” in: Peter 
Thomson & Glendyr Sacks, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Brecht (Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
UP, 1994), 195-196, as well as Brooker's Bertolt Brecht: Dialectics, Poetry, Politics (New York: Croom 
Helm, 1988), 42-61; also Marc Silberman, “Brecht’s Gestus or Staging Contradictions,” in: The Brecht 
Yearbook / Das Brecht-Jahrbuch 31 (Pittsburgh: The International Brecht Society, 2006), 319-335. For 
discussion more specifically in the context of reception theory, see Gerold Koller, Der mitspielende 
Zuschauer. Theorie und Praxis im Schaffen Brechts (München: Artemis Verlag, 1979), 27-30. 
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Studium unterworfen. Wir sind beherrscht worden, sagen die Menschen, aber nun werden wir 
herrschen.2
It is well known how profitably the belief that one stands on the threshold of a new era can influence 
human beings. Their environment appears to them as still quite unfinished, capable of the most 
encouraging improvements, full of possibilities both unimagined and imagined, as a malleable raw 
material in their hands. They appear to themselves as they do in the morning, well-rested, strong, rich 
in invention. Received belief is treated as superstition: what even yesterday seemed self-evident is 
subjected to renewed scrutiny. We have been mastered, human beings say, but now we will be the 
masters. 
 
For as much as the attitude of the new age depends on clarity of final purpose and 
resourcefulness of instrumentation, it cannot do without the keen vision of the re-
interpreter – the innovative scientist, engineer, craftsman, or poet whose eye responds in 
equal measure to what was and is, and what can be. The power of this re-interpreter, as 
Brecht describes it here, is to seize upon the world as it suddenly appears to him – 
namely, under a striking guise, from an untried perspective, and amenable to a novel 
response. Most of all, this response, which culminates in active intervention, aspires to 
the freedom that comes with liberating oneself from the mastery of others, and with 
achieving mastery for oneself. In short, the political liberation promised by the new age 
begins with the liberation of vision in the gaze of the re-interpreter. 
Even when we define the new age that formed Brecht’s historical context in the 
narrowest terms, it still encompasses not only the interwar Germany of the Weimar 
Republic and the divided Germany of the postwar era, but also the wider international 
sphere of his wartime exile in northern Europe and California. Once we consider the 
scope of Brecht’s achievement in itself as well as its wider influence, however, even this 
immediate context begins to reveal itself as a microcosm for the tensions and crises of 
modern Western literature in the most general terms: Brecht’s new age, in many ways, is 
still the one we are struggling to begin in earnest. Brecht’s critical reflection on the form 
                                                          
2  Bertolt Brecht, “Anmerkungen zu »Leben des Galilei«,” in: Materialien zu Brechts ›Leben des 
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and function of modern theater first took shape in the contradictory atmosphere of the 
interwar Weimar Republic,3 a period best characterized by the volatile interplay of 
economic forces, tense and unlikely political coalitions between groups with opposed 
interests, and the precipitous rise of a consumer culture saturated by new technologies 
and new media. The accelerating modernization and rationalization of production in post-
WWI Germany, along with the economic and psychological instability of its attendant 
circumstances, placed increased pressure on a populace already wracked by the horrors of 
the first modern war, and, in response, it sought out new means of distraction, 
intoxication, and escape. As part of the nascent entertainment industry which grew up 
around these demands, the commodification of theater meant at once the expansion of its 
audience to mass proportions and the need to counter the intense competition offered by 
the exciting new stimulations of radio, phonograph, and cinema. The more theater took 
on the function of an escape from the production process for its consumers, however, the 
more it was forced to confront its own increasingly contradictory and circumscribed 
position, as both art and commodity at once, within that same process.4
                                                                                                                                                                             
Galilei‹, ed. Werner Hecht (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1963), 7. All translations are mine. 
 These issues 
3  My treatment of the historical context for Brecht’s epic theater is largely indebted to two surveys: 
Eve Rosenhaft’s “Brecht’s Germany: 1898-1933”, which gives a brief but detailed overview of the political 
and economic situation in Germany up to and including the rise of Hitler; and Peter Thomson’s “Brecht’s 
lives”, which discusses the decisive moments and milieus of Brecht’s career (Thomson and Sacks, 3-21 and 
22-39 respectively). For an extraordinarily detailed assessment of the German historical context centered 
on Brecht, see Jörg-Wilhelm Joost, Klaus-Detlef Müller, and Michael Voges, Bertolt Brecht. Epoche – 
Werk – Wirkung, ed. Klaus-Detlef Müller (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1985), 23-71. For a less 
comprehensive, but more in-depth viewpoint on one of Brecht’s formative Weimar-era milieus with an 
emphasis on its social history and material culture, see Wolf von Eckardt and Sander L. Gilman, Bertolt 
Brecht’s Berlin: A Scrapbook of the Twenties (Lincoln, Nebraska: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1993). 
4  From a leftist perspective, the most influential contemporary reflection on this problem is, of 
course, Walter Benjamin’s seminal essay from 1934, “Der Autor als Produzent,” in: Benjamin, Versuche 
über Brecht, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1966), 95-116; English trans.: “The Author as 
Producer,” in: Benjamin, Reflections, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 220-238. 
Benjamin’s treatment of artistic and cultural institutions like the theater as parts of the broader apparatus of 
social production helps him articulate the position of the radical author as one who recognizes his activity 
as production, and who therefore does not merely supply the productive apparatus, but through forging a 
dialectical relation with it, achieves its Umfunktioneriung (“functional transformation,” a word Benjamin 
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loomed large for the leftist avant-garde, to which Brecht belonged since his effective 
conversion to Marxism circa 1926 through the influence of his friends Karl Korsch and 
Walter Benjamin, and particularly through the readings in the Marxist classics suggested 
to him by Elisabeth Hauptmann.5 For Brecht, the question of the political function of 
theater, which rested upon its capacity to represent truthfully and to criticize 
meaningfully the ensemble of socioeconomic relations, if not to provoke revolutionary 
action directly, added an even more vexed and uncertain element to the mix. While the 
contemporary theater frequently criticized the intolerable social and economic conditions 
created by the ever-accelerating pace of capitalism, its aesthetic orientation – with its 
emphasis on a bourgeois-individualist worldview6
                                                                                                                                                                             
borrows from Brecht [Tiedemann 104, Demetz 228]). As the preeminent model of an author who has 
maintained this dialectical relation and transformed a cultural apparatus of production, Benjamin describes 
the work of Brecht’s epic theater (Tiedemann 110-116, Demetz 233-238). For more on the Brecht-
Benjamin relationship, see also David C. Durst, Weimar Modernism: Philosophy, Politics, and Culture in 
Germany 1918-1933 (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), Ch. 5, 181-208, and Erdmut Wizisla, Benjamin 
und Brecht: die Geschichte einer Freundschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004). 
 and the traditional classical unities of 
form – could not grant insight into the increasingly impersonal, fragmented, and often 
global systems of commerce that decided the fates of its characters. From the perspective 
of the avant-garde, the revolutionary indignation this theater sought to provoke was 
dissipated all too soon into emotional intoxication, and its increasingly sophisticated 
methods of illusion and suggestion often merely reproduced the theater’s function as an 
escape from, rather than a reckoning with, urgent political and economic realities, chief 
among which was the increasing power of fascist ideology and its agents. Brecht’s first 
reflections on the nature and function of theater in the new age of modernity thus sought 
5  See Joost, Müller & Voges, 204-208; also Douglas Kellner, “Brecht’s Marxist Aesthetic: The 
Korsch Connection,” in: Bertolt Brecht: Political Theory and Literary Practice, ed. Betty Nance Weber & 
Hubert Heinen (Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1980), 29-42. 
6  Darko Suvin provides a dense but helpful exposition of the individualist tradition in German 
drama, in Suvin, To Brecht and Beyond: Soundings in Modern Dramaturgy (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble 
Books, 1984), 19-74. 
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to respond directly to the entire Western landscape of artistic investments and 
entanglements as it emerged in Weimar: the truth-status of aesthetic experience in the 
theater, when its distinct forms of representation and perception are viewed from a 
political and economic angle; the productive function of theater, within a solipsistic 
economic process that reproduces its forms by consuming its own products; the political 
and ideological power of the theater, insofar as it can either provoke or silence criticism 
through ever more virtuosic manipulations of the senses, the emotions, and the reasoning 
mind; and lastly, the ethical implications of theatrical pleasure, working as either a 
stimulant or a narcotic, transforming its spectators into either active, sovereign subjects or 
passive, debased objects.7
Given this slippery terrain, however, even the most resolute exponent of the new 
age is not preserved from peril, and Brecht knew as well as anybody the risks that come 
with inscribing one’s own vision within the re-interpreter’s gaze – particularly when the 
representatives of the old age, unwilling to cede their place, assume the outward 
trappings of innovation to reclaim vision for their own political purposes. Brecht takes up 
the most pregnant instance of this kind of masquerade in his own era: Hitler, he writes, 
had likewise proclaimed a new age, and had thereby beguiled the ranks of German 
workers whose own new age had yet to get properly underway and would be effectively 
 Aesthetics, economics, politics, and ethics: each of these 
battlefields of modernity fell into the purview of Brecht’s theater, and each one 
demanded the vigilant and unprejudiced vision of the re-interpreter to negotiate the 
rhythms of conflict. 
                                                          
7  For an account that focuses on Brecht’s development during the Weimar period of the motifs and 
concepts that would come to dominate his later theoretical work, see Werner Hecht, Brechts Weg zum 
epischen Theater. Beitrag zur Entwicklung des epischen Theaters 1918 bis 1933 (Berlin: Henschelverlag, 
1962). 
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derailed by the triumph of fascism (Brecht 1963, 7). For Brecht, then, the investment of 
the new age in the power of reinterpretation is apocalyptic (> Grk.: apokalypto = to 
uncover, reveal) in more than one sense. The re-interpreter tears down the protective veils 
and pretenses upon which the old age depended, looks upon the world with fresh eyes, 
and sets forth his or her principles as a revelatory response to an old age whose power to 
conceal and suppress that revelation has been overcome. But re-interpretation can just as 
easily serve the subtle purposes of this old age, which takes its grim vengeance in a 
second apocalypse: a dreadful, unanticipated revelation in which the new age lifts its 
mask and reveals itself as a perpetuation of the old. In a prose-poem also composed in 
1939, “Parade des alten Neuen” (“Procession of the Old New”) – part of a group of 
poems composed in anticipation of the outbreak of the Second World War, and 
appropriately entitled “Visionen” (“Visions”) – Brecht figures the risks peculiar to life in 
a self-consciously new age in a succession of images that are apocalyptic in both of these 
senses at once: 
Ich stand auf einem Hügel, da sah ich das Alte herankommen, aber es kam als das Neue. 
 Es kroch heran auf neuen Krücken, die man nirgends je gesehen hatte, und stank nach neuen 
Dünsten der Verwesung, die man nirgends je gerochen hatte. 
 Der Stein rollte vorbei als die neueste Erfindung, und die Raubschreie der Gorillas, die sich die 
Brustkästen trommelten, gaben sich als die neuesten Kompositionen. 
 Allenthalben sah man geöffnete Gräber, die leer waren, als das Neue sich auf die Hauptstadt zu 
bewegte. 
 Ringsum standen solche, die Schrecken einflößten und schrien: Hier kommt das Neue, das ist alles 
neu, begrüßt das Neue, seid neu wie wir! Und wer hörte, hörte nur ihr Geschrei, doch wer sah, sah 
solche, die nicht schrien.  
 So schritt das Alte einher, verkleidet als das Neue, aber in seinem Triumphzug führte es das Neue 
mit sich und es wurde vorgeführt als das Alte. 
 Das Neue ging gefesselt und in Lumpen, sie entblößten die blühenden Glieder. 
 Und der Zug bewegte sich in der Nacht, aber es war eine Brandröte am Himmel, die wurde 
angesehen wie eine Morgenröte. Und das Geschrei: Hier kommt das Neue, das ist alles neu, begrüßt 
das Neue, seid neu wie wir! wäre noch hörbarer gewesen, wenn nicht ein Geschützdonner alles 
übertönt hätte.8
                                                          
8  Bertolt Brecht, “Parade des alten Neuen,” Ausgewählte Werke in sechs Bänden. Bd. 3: Gedichte 1 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005), 364. Hereafter, all of Brecht’s works that appear in this edition 
will be cited by title, followed by the abbreviation AW and the respective volume and page number(s) of 




I stood upon a hill, and there I saw the Old approaching, but it came as the New. 
 It crawled hither on new crutches that no one had ever seen before, and stank with new fumes of 
putrefaction that no one had ever smelled before. 
 The stone was rolled past touted as the newest invention, and the predatory howls of the gorillas, 
drumming on their chests, were presented as the newest musical compositions. 
 Everywhere open graves could be seen, which were empty, as the New moved towards the capital 
city. 
 All around, people were standing filled with terror, and they screamed: Here comes the New, it’s 
all New, say hello to the New, be New like us! And whoever listened heard only their screams, but 
whoever looked around saw only people who were not screaming. 
 So the Old paraded past, disguised as the New, but in its triumphal procession it led the New along 
with it and it was presented as the Old. 
 The New went forth shackled and in rags, they exposed its supple young limbs. 
 And the parade took place at night, but there was a light of fire in the sky which was looked at as 
if it were the light of early dawn. And the cry: Here comes the New, it’s all New, say hello to the New, 
be New like us! would have been more clearly audible, if the thunder of cannons had not drowned out 
everything else. 
The perils of political life in the new era, which can often confuse the progressive with 
the primitive, the liberator with the conqueror, or new freedom with renewed slavery, 
demand that a rare keenness of vision accompany the work of reinterpretation. The poet-
prophet, whose status as spectator to the triumphal march of history makes him just like 
the rest of us in one way, distinguishes himself from us precisely in the penetrating 
quality of his interpreting gaze. The risks of the new age, the optical illusions of its 
political life, only reveal their nature by being figured in a series of apocalyptic images 
such as these, the primary effect of which relies on their manifest and grotesque 
ambiguity – the twilight, as it were, in which truth and falsehood, hope and warning, 
intermingle. Whether the illusions of the new era succeed or fail, its progress inescapably 
depends on this kind of optically-centered theater. Not only in the rhetoric and the 
imagery that the new era invokes, but even in its preferred form of political action – 
revolution – it always makes for quite a show. The question is whether the adherents of 
the new age know what they are getting into when they willingly become spectators to 
and participants in this theater: whether, like the poet-prophet on his hill, they can 
unmask the real agents behind the dramatis personae and respond to them. This task of 
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the new age, which Brecht took up not only as a lyric poet, but all the more so as a 
politically-minded playwright, demanded that theater offer much more than new 
spectacles, new stimulations for the eye. Brechtian theater sought instead to offer its 
spectators new techniques and new technologies of seeing that would train them in the 
kinds of reinterpretation that the political life of the new age would require of them on a 
daily basis – for better and for worse. 
 The approach to Brecht’s oeuvre suggested by this line of thought realigns 
somewhat the genre-based approach established in both German and English scholarship. 
During the decades following the Second World War, scholarship in English was also 
relatively slow to reckon with the practical and historical field within which Brecht’s 
work was constantly developing and responding to new problems and contexts, but now 
the historicist approach has become more or less status quo.9
                                                          
9  Ernst Schuhmacher sets the tone for many subsequent readings of Brecht's plays when he writes 
about the changing meaning of Leben des Galilei (hereafter LdG) as Brecht revised it in the face of 
contemporary events: “Brecht bediente sich zur Verfremdung aktualer Geschehnisse – der mangelnden 
Verantwortung der Wissenschaft gegenüber der Gesellschaft, des komplizierten Ausbruchs einer neuen 
Zeit, der widerspruchsvollen Durchsetzung der Vernunft – , also zur »Historisierung«, der Historie. Im 
Leben Galileis fand er eine analoge »Situation mit Modellcharakter« für das aktuale Geschehen.” (“In order 
to alienate contemporary events – the failure of social responsibility on the part of science, the complicated 
inception of a new age, the contradictory achievement of reason – in a word, in order to ‘historicize’ them, 
Brecht made use of history. In the life of Galileo he found a ‘paradigmatic situation’ that offered an 
analogy to contemporary events.”) Schuhmacher, “Form und Einfühlung,” in Brecht, Materialien, ed. 
Hecht, 154; see also id., “Verfremdung durch Historisierung in Brechts »Leben des Galilei«” and “Stoff 
und Form in »Leben des Galilei«” both in: Schuhmacher, Brecht. Theater und Gesellschaft im 20. 
Jahrhundert. Einundzwanzig Aufsätze (Berlin: Henschelverlag, 1975), 191-200 and 201-241 respectively. 
Reinhold Grimm’s much more recent reading (1998) follows the same basic historicist line in reading LdG, 
but complicates it somewhat by suggesting its structural resemblances to the twofold form of the Baroque 
emblem. Like Schuhmacher, Grimm explains the differences in tone and attitude between the three 
different versions of the play as reinterpretations of its content in light of a changing historical context: “No 
doubt, this contradictoriness, this total reversal, these two blatantly opposite meanings were possible only 
because Brecht’s whole ‘Schauspiel’ amounts to a gigantic pictura for which he provided a subscriptio 
appropriate to the circumstances at hand. Only then does it become clear why the playwright was able to 
revise his drama and its message so rapidly and so radically. What was changed was not the representation, 
which he scarcely needed to touch, but merely the interpretation.” Reinhold Grimm, “A Couple of Notes on 
Two Brechtian Plays: Leben des Galilei and Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder,” in: Walter Delabar & Jörg 
Döring, eds., Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) (Berlin: Weidler, 1998), 191. 
 Unlike much work in either 
tradition of scholarship, however, the line of thinking I suggest here reasserts the 
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intertextual and multigeneric character of Brecht’s literary production at any given 
historical moment by pointing out common concerns as they are elaborated differently in 
Brecht’s poetry, essays, and theoretical writings.10 To distinguish rigidly between the 
poet and the dramatist, the theorist and the journalist, or the propagandist and the aesthete 
at a given moment in Brecht’s career, let alone in his corpus, reflects the prejudices of 
criticism in general, and of the individual critic in particular, more than the formidable 
and unreconstructed intellectual promiscuity of Brecht himself. Let us not forget, after 
all, that in Brecht we are dealing with a truly monumental pervert. Scholarship in 
English, for instance, has really only just begun to clear away the critical prejudice that 
still exists against Brecht’s theoretical writings and which was de rigeur for the pre-
historicist reception.11
                                                          
10  This is not to say that Brecht’s theoretical writings have always been strictly compartmentalized 
from his dramatic works. Arrigo Subiotto, for instance, offers a brief, clear, and rich historical survey of 
Brecht’s developing theories of theater in the context of his plays and the attendant historical and 
biographical circumstances: Arrigo Subiotto, “Epic Theatre: A Theatre for the Scientific Age,” in: Critical 
Essays on Bertolt Brecht, ed. Siegfried Mews (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1989). Subiotto’s piece, however, 
does remain strictly on the level of a broad survey, and does not offer specific intertextual and intergeneric 
readings between theoretical and literary texts. 
 His plays were typically read as timeless (read: apolitical) 
masterpieces at the cost of understanding their concrete historical and political roots as 
much as their theoretical justifications. To read Brecht in historical context, but to persist 
in the prejudice against his theoretical armature, as Peter Brooker argues, “is simply to 
read Brecht in terms of one favoured aesthetic ideology rather than another, and to 
compromise his art and ideas […].  If we are to approach his ideas more constructively, 
we need to understand how they emerged and changed in particular artistic and social 
11  It could be argued, perhaps uncharitably, that earlier scholarship in German proceeded to the 
other extreme, where historical and theoretical concerns sometimes jointly obstruct close reading. From this 
perspective, Ernst Schuhmacher’s voluminous Drama und Geschichte. Bertolt Brechts „Leben des Galilei“ 
und andere Stücke (Berlin: Henschelverlag, 1968), for instance, while exemplary and exhaustive in its 
treatment of the relationship between dramatic form and historical content in Leben des Galilei, seems to 
offer valuable scaffolding to support a close literary reading rather than articulating such a reading 
independently. 
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circumstances” (Thomson & Sacks 185). In English scholarship, progress towards 
scholarly reckoning with Brecht’s theoretical work in its historical and political context 
has just gotten on its feet with John J. White’s Bertolt Brecht’s Dramatic Theory.12 White 
offers the most ambitious and complete treatment of Brecht’s dramatic theory in English 
scholarship, with a strong focus on the textual history of Brecht’s major theoretical 
statements. It lies beyond the scope even of White’s expansive volume, however, to 
define all the major intertexual and intergeneric connections between Brecht’s drama and 
his theory: these must be approached as singular moments and convergences. If the 
history and politics of the West in the 20th
Reading the thematics of theater, visual technology, and the politics of the new 
age not only uncovers some of the intergeneric forms of reflection within Brecht’s 
corpus, but also necessarily places one text in particular at the focal point of such 
transactions between drama and dramatic theory. This text happens to be a drama, and 
 century offer the prime intertext for the whole 
of Brecht’s work, as Brooker, White, and many others suggest, this relationship was 
negotiated along paths that ran through a number of different genres and texts 
simultaneously, paths that often converged and diverged without any prudish regard for 
generic distinctions. For the critic of Brecht, the multitude of such interconnected 
pathways means that the generic and literary characteristics of individual texts can 
potentially provide surfaces of mutual reflection and critique. Not only does Brecht’s 
theoretical corpus reflect critically on the virtues and limits of his dramatic corpus, but 
his plays themselves reflect critically on the virtues and limits of his theoretical 
ambitions. 
                                                          
12  John J. White, Bertolt Brecht’s Dramatic Theory (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004). 
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happens to be a masterpiece: Leben des Galilei (1938/39).13
                                                          
13  The play exists in three distinct versions: the first “dänische Fassung” (“Danish version”) was 
written during Brecht’s exile in Denmark during 1938-1939 and premiered in Zürich on 9 September 1943. 
The second “amerikanische Fassung” (“American version”) represented an extensive revision and 
translation into English of the Danish version completed in collaboration with stage and screen actor 
Charles Laughton during Brecht’s Hollywood exile in 1944-1945, and premiered in Beverly Hills, 
California on 30 July 1947, and then in New York City on 7 December 1947. The third, “Berliner Fassung” 
(“Berlin version”), which Brecht worked on from his return to Germany (DDR) in 1948 until his death in 
1956, offered yet another revision – this time of the original German text in light of the English version 
produced with Laughton – and premiered in Köln on 16 April 1955, and then in Berlin on 15 January 1957, 
after Brecht’s death, under the direction of Erich Engel. While there are no major differences of event or 
substance between the three versions, what differs greatly between them is Brecht’s tone and implicit 
evaluation of Galileo’s ultimate recantation – differences which scholars have rightly understood as 
indicative Brecht’s changing attitude towards the story against the stormy and contradictory historical 
background of the years 1938-1956. The Danish version, written with Hitler’s rise and imminent military 
aggression in mind, represents Galileo as a cunning survivalist and anti-fascist revolutionary who recants in 
order to protect the future of his research, but accuses himself nonetheless of having failed to offer proper 
resistance to his opponents and a heroic figure for like-minded contemporaries. Two contemporary 
intertexts that help contextualize these aspects of the Danish version are Brecht’s “Fünf Schwierigkeiten 
beim Schreiben der Wahrheit” (“Five Difficulties in Writing the Truth,” 1934/35; AW 6:171-186), and 
“Rede über die Widerstandskraft der Vernunft” (“Speech on the Oppositional Power of Reason,” 1937; 
AW 6:281-284). The American version evaluates Galileo’s recantation in the context of the American 
atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and the abdication from responsibility on the 
part of the scientists who contributed to nuclear arms research; its emphasis falls more decidedly on 
Galileo’s self-condemnation for abdicating from the social responsibility of the individual scientist, and 
ends with a tone of prophetic warning for a human world that may be consumed instead of renewed by the 
discoveries of science. The third version combines the points of emphasis from the prior two versions in the 
context of a postwar world now rapidly turning towards the Cold War era: its definitive events for Brecht’s 
thinking included the inception of Soviet nuclear arms research, the Rosenberg trials, and the Korean war 
(Stefan Hauck, “Anmerkungen zu Leben des Galilei. Entstehung,” AW 2:679-686; for a more detailed 
account, see Werner Mittenzwei, Bertolt Brecht. Von der „Maßnahme“ zu „Leben des Galilei“ [Berlin: 
Aufbau-Verlag, 1962], 253-346). My discussion is founded upon the Berlin version printed in AW 2:7-109, 
which contains the “Ausgabe letzter Hand”: the final revision of the play Brecht was able to make before 
his death. 
 The penetrating gaze of 
Brecht’s Galileo, through the bold appropriation and application of a visual technology, 
actually does begin a new era – the epoch of modern empirical science – by formulating 
an innovative interpretive response to the natural universe. When Galileo delivers his 
virtuosic early-morning monologue in the first scene – itself practically a play within the 
play – he has yet to receive word of the technological innovation that will reconstitute the 
visible universe as the theater in which both his interpretive career and that of the new 
age will unfold: the telescope. Nonetheless, the tremendous promise of this age appears 
in his visionary paean as the desideratum towards which the whole civilized world 
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already inclines. He celebrates the incipient liberation of Europe from its spatial and 
temporal captivity to ancient tradition, and, in a last great crescendo, recites an aubade for 
the 17th as much as for the 20th century: “ ‘O früher Morgen des Beginnens! / O Hauch 
des Windes, der / Von neuen Küsten kommt!’ ” (LdG AW 2:12; “O early morning of 
beginning! / O breath of wind, that / Comes from new shores!”) In poetic form and 
dramatic situation, Galileo’s outburst captures precisely the re-interpreter’s mood of hope 
and eager expectation at the dawn of the new age: “ausgeruht, kräftig, erfindungsreich” 
(“well-rested, strong, rich in invention”). But it also serves a discreet historicizing 
function that stays true to Brecht’s position as apocalyptic prophet, insofar as the 17th-
century moment of Galileo’s utterance provides a strategic cipher for the 20th-century 
moment of its performance. All that is still needed in either context, it seems, is the 
instrument of vision, the technology of reinterpretation, with which the new age can 
begin in earnest. For the spectator, the historical case-study of Galileo himself in the 
drama provides the telescope through which the possibilities and dangers of the 20th
The tone of high optimism in Galileo’s verses takes on a decidedly different 
meaning, however, and enters the apocalyptic twilight of reinterpretation, when we 
consider both the subsequent course of the drama and the Galilean claims of Brecht’s 
theoretical writings on theater. Along both these paths, the theater of the new age finds in 
Galileo’s verses a spontaneous and self-confident prelude to a drama defined by 
compromises, confrontations, and ultimately dire risks that come to stand in the way of 
the free-ranging will to reinterpret. The instrument of vision with which the new age 
 
century can at last appear clearly: the theater itself provides the instrument of vision with 
which Brecht’s new age can begin. 
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begins in earnest must come to Galileo, the preeminent visionary of that age, from 
elsewhere and from others – for whom it is not an epochal innovation so much as an 
amusing novelty. Because Galileo assumes the role of the telescope’s inventor, and is 
publicly lauded for his “achievement” in a ceremony of the utmost theatricality, the 
authority that validates the interpretive work of his new age rests on a decidedly theatrical 
impersonation. Once he puts the telescope to work, Galileo’s immediate and passionate 
response to the visible universe, which was eagerly anticipated in the lyric coda to his 
monologue, is drawn ever closer into a reckoning with not only the traditional, textually-
based authority of the Church, but also the novel authority of technologically-enhanced 
vision, upon which both Galilean science and Brechtian theater depend in equal measure. 
As in the delicate and electrified confrontation at a masquerade ball between Galileo and 
Cardinal Barberini, the champion of the new age walks the razor’s edge between dawn 
and twilight, between spiritual and sensory revelation, in a struggle to establish and 
maintain interpretive authority that unfolds as a game of risk: 
GALILEI  [...] »Wer aber das Korn zurückhält, dem wird das Volk fluchen.« Sprüche Salomonis.  
BARBERINI  »Der Weise verbirget sein Wissen.« Sprüche Salomonis. 
GALILEI  »Wo da Ochsen sind, da ist der Stall unrein. Aber viel Gewinn ist durch die Stärke des 
Ochsen.« 
BARBERINI  »Der seine Vernunft im Zaum hält, ist besser als der eine Stadt nimmt.«  
GALILEI  »Des Geist aber gebrochen ist, dem verdorren die Gebeine.« Pause. »Schreiet die Wahrheit 
nicht laut?«  
BARBERINI  »Kann man den Fuß setzen auf glühende Kohle, und der Fuß verbrennt nicht?«
GALILEO  […] “The people curse the man who holds back grain.” Proverbs. 
 (LdG 
AW 2:56-57) 
BARBERINI  “The wise man conceals his knowledge.” Proverbs. 
GALILEO  “Where there are oxen, the stall is unclean. But great abundance is won through the 
strength of the ox.” 
BARBERINI  “He who reins in his reason is better than he who captures a city.” 
GALILEO  “The breaking of a man’s spirit dries out his bones.” Pause. “Does the truth not cry out 
loud?” 
BARBERINI  “Can one walk on glowing coals and not burn one’s feet?” 
This highly-coded exchange of biblical citations enacts an interpretive agōn, which, on 
either side of the conversation, invokes the same text to authorize two mutually 
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incommensurable viewpoints: Galileo, who favors full-scale assent to his revolutionary 
findings as established scientific truth, and the Cardinal, who favors the treatment of 
Galileo’s findings as convenient hypotheses so as to circumvent their politically- and 
theologically-freighted implications for the status quo. More importantly, the literary 
medium of this perspectival agon – the practice of citation itself – possesses an 
undeniably theatrical quality, and not only because it forms a scene in a play by Brecht. 
Within the work of interpretation, the establishment of interpretive authority implicitly 
demands that the interpreter assume a foreign viewpoint, speak in a foreign voice, appear 
in a foreign guise – not unlike someone who assumes a dramatic role. This viewpoint and 
this voice, here provided by the text of Scripture, legitimate interpretive claims according 
to, and integrate those claims within, a preexisting paradigm. In other words, the 
invocation of authority has the effect of both bestowing value upon the invoker’s claims, 
and of reproducing the value of the authority thus invoked. Authority produces the value 
of a given interpretation, just as interpretation reproduces the value of authority; each 
does so according to the demands of a calculated and persuasive impersonation – indeed, 
a transpersonation – which, in the last analysis, follows a theatrical logic. 
According to this model, both Galileo’s telescope and the Cardinal’s Bible, as 
authorizing instruments of interpretation, work to subsume the immediate present-tense 
of the interpreter’s work in his study or laboratory to the voices, viewpoints, and values 
of others. Absent, deceased, or revered, these others provide a repertoire of established 
dramatis personae that legitimate the performance of interpretation in the present 
moment. Citation, as the zero degree of textual authority, already resurrects the dead, 
makes the absent present, replaces the false or opaque present with an authentic and 
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transparent past: its medium of reference is made of discourse and human, historical time. 
In a similar way, telescopy, as the zero degree of empirical authority, brings distant 
objects into the most intimate proximity, makes what was previously invisible or barely 
visible manifestly visible, replaces the immediate purview of natural human vision with a 
greatly expanded and enriched panorama: its medium of reference is made of sense and 
natural, ahistorical space. Both these mediating technologies enact a strategic 
displacement of the “here and now” and their at least partial and temporary replacement 
with a “there and then.”14
                                                          
14  From this perspective, it would make for a fascinating reading of Brecht’s play to approach 
Galileo’s work of re-interpretation in the play as an attempt to escape from history and discourse, which 
here exert a differentiating and disseminating force, and to take refuge in the immediate, apparent unities of 
 They compel the present to impersonate the past, or the distant 
to impersonate the proximate, theatrically: they force it, in short, to put on an apocalyptic 
mask that imposes definite interpretive risks. Even the most radically innovative source 
of authority must at last exert a conservative and institutionalizing force – precisely 
because the interpretation it authorizes is performed in terms of definite theatrical roles 
and carefully scripted exchanges. If the exponents of a new age seek to establish a new 
authority, as Galileo so ardently desires to do, they do so quite literally at the risk of 
reinstating and reproducing the authority of the age just past – the risk of performing, all 
over again, the same scenes of oppression. Which, it’s worth adding, is precisely the risk 
Galileo assumes when he plays the high-stakes game of biblical citation with the Cardinal 
in this passage – and, even more insidiously, when he gives voice to the surging desire of 
the new age with that other citation, from lyric poetry, with which I began here. The fact 
that the poem Galileo cites at that point invokes a passage from Francis Bacon’s Novum 
Organum, furthermore, and approximates very closely a poem by Brecht himself, only 
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tacitly underlines the bonds of reciprocity, if not complicity, with authority into which the 
interpreter must enter – no matter how innovative, how conscious, or how willing he 
might be.15
Galileo’s authorizing citation finds reciprocation in Brecht’s theoretical 
reflections on drama, which are deeply informed by a specific reception of Galilean 
empirical science. If, as I have claimed, Brechtian theater embodies a technology of 
seeing designed for the new age of modernity, it can claim this function, at least in part, 
because it strategically invokes the authority of Galilean science. We have just seen how 
the specific textual and empirical games of interpretation Galileo chooses to play 
simultaneously establish and endanger the interpretive authority of his new age in the 
drama. In a similar way, Brecht’s articulation of modern theater in his “Kleines Organon 
für das Theater” (“Little Organon for the Theater”) turns significantly to Galileo at a 
crucial moment to authorize alienation – one of the central concepts of Brechtian theater 
– as a specifically visual technique of re-interpretation: 
 However they might be constituted, these are, after all, the powerful and 
intimate bonds between an actor and his role. 
Das lange nicht Geänderte nämlich scheint unänderbar. Allenthalben treffen wir auf etwas, das zu 
selbstverständlich ist, als daß wir uns bemühen müßten, es zu verstehen. Was sie miteinander erleben, 
scheint den Menschen das gegebene menschliche Erleben. Das Kind, lebend in einer Welt der Greise, 
lernt, wie es dort zugeht. Wie die Dinge eben laufen, so werden sie ihm geläufig. … Damit all dies 
viele Gegebene ihm als ebensoviel Zweifelhaftes erscheinen könnte, müßte er jenen fremden Blick 
entwickeln, mit dem der große Galilei einen ins Pendeln gekommenen Kronleuchter betrachtete. Den 
verwunderten diese Schwingungen, als hätte er sie so nicht erwartet und verstünde es nicht von ihnen, 
wodurch er dann auf die Gesetzmäßigkeiten kam. Diesen Blick, so schwierig wie produktiv, muß das 
Theater mit seinen Abbildungen des menschlichen Zusammenlebens provozieren. Es muß sein 
Publikum wundern machen, und dies geschieht vermittels einer Technik der Verfremdungen des 
Vertrauten (AW 6:536f., §44). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
space and sense. Unfortuantely, such a reading would take me far beyond the limits of the present 
discussion.  
15  Though the reference to Bacon (Jan Knopf, “Anmerkungen,” AW 4:548) fits the historical 
moment of the scene, the resonance with Brecht’s later poem from 1945, “O Lust des Beginnens!”, is 
unmistakable, and compels us to read the passage through the lens of a truly unique intertextual 
anachronism: Galileo tacitly invokes Bacon, and Brecht invokes both his own Galileo and Bacon again in 
his verses from several years later: “O Lust des Beginnens! O früher Morgen! / Erstes Gras, wenn 
vergessen scheint / Was grün ist!” (AW 4:383). 
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That which has not been changed for a long time appears unchangeable. On every side we encounter 
something that is too obvious for us to take the trouble to understand it. What human beings experience 
with each other appears to them to be human experience as such, as it is given. The child, living in a 
world of old people, learns what goes on there. For him, the way this world just happens to go [wie die 
Dinge eben laufen] becomes, for him, the way of the world [geläufig]. … So that all these ‘givens’ 
might appear to him as just so much to question and to doubt, he would have to develop that alien gaze 
with which the great Galileo observed a swinging lantern. The swinging astonished him, as if he had 
not expected it to be thus and did not understand how he might then grasp the law that governed its 
regular movements. It is this gaze, as difficult as it is productive, that the theater must provoke with its 
representations of human life in society. The theater must make its audience feel astonishment, and this 
occurs by means of a technique [Technik] of alienation from the familiar. 
Brechtian alienation trains the spectator of modern theater to assume and perform the role 
of a Galilean scientist in order to accede to the truth – not of nature, but of society – and 
thereby to become that representative character of the new age: the re-interpreter. The 
object of this training lies in the gaze. The spectator’s success in inscribing his gaze 
within a Galilean perspective, and his attitude within a Galilean sense of astonishment 
and curiosity, authorizes his innovative response according to the historical-material truth 
of human society grasped by this perspective. Ultimately, the access to this truth through 
interpretation is not an end in itself, but its relative value must be measured according to 
its usefulness as an instrument of political intervention and transformation, as a multiplier 
of effective force. No matter how transformative the technique of alienation may at last 
prove as a political instrument in the contemporary age, however, its operation depends 
on the spectator’s identification with an exemplary and authoritative perspective, here 
figured as that of a scientist from four centuries ago. Wherever the would-be re-
interpreter – Galileo, Brecht, et al. – may turn, he finds he must establish precedents, 
forebears, and analogies, all of which threaten to absorb or dissolve the impulse to “begin 
again” which was his point of departure. He cannot, in other words, start his performance 
without obeying the actor’s first mandate, that of “getting into character” – and a great 
deal depends upon both the role he selects from the available repertoire and what he 
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accomplishes with it. The risk of complicity in error that governs the relationship of 
identification between the individual interpreter and his elected authority likewise 
governs the relationship between actor and character, and that between spectator and 
spectacle: in Brecht’s thinking, they are all equally relationships of dramatic imitation, of 
mimēsis. It is this last concept, moreover, that establishes the common ground upon 
which Brecht’s theories of theater and his Leben des Galilei enter into dialogue with one 
another on the risks and responsibilities of interpretation. 
By invoking the concept of mimēsis, not only have I resurrected the specter of 
Aristotle16 that haunts Brecht’s entire dramatic achievement, but I have also reached the 
effective point of departure for the present inquiry. Before we undertake the intertextual 
and multigeneric reading just promised, which will examine the mutual complicity of 
Brechtian and Galilean technologies of interpretation as well as the risks given in such 
complicity, we must split the difference, as it were, between these two figures by 
examining the single authority to which both of their viewpoints respond, explicitly and 
antagonistically, but also to which they are thereby both made implicitly responsible.17
                                                          
16  One of a large number of prominent undead that knock about in the inner recesses of Brecht’s 
writing and thinking; I could just as easily have chosen Francis Bacon (see Ralph J. Ley, “Francis Bacon, 
Galileo, and the Brechtian Theater,” in: Essays on Brecht: Theater and Politics, ed. Siegfried Mews & 
Herbert Knust [Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 1974], 174-189; and Reinhold Grimm, “Vom Novum 
Organum zum Kleinen Organon. Gedanken zur Verfremdung,” in: Das Ärgernis Brecht, ed. Willy Jäggi & 
Hans Oesch [Stuttgart: Basilius Presse Basel, 1961], 45-70), Émile Zola and Henrik Ibsen (see Reinhold 
Grimm, “Naturalism and Epic Drama,” in Mews & Knust 1974, 3-27), or even Walter Benjamin in the 
years that Brecht survived him (see: Durst 181-208; Mi-Ae Yun, Walter Benjamin als Zeitgenosse Bertolt 
Brechts. Eine paradoxe Beziehung zwischen Nähe und Ferne [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000]; 
and, for the most recent and complete treatment, Wizisla op. cit.) – were it not for the central importance 
enjoyed by the reception of Aristotle’s Poetics in the German tradition of thought on identification in the 
theater, which is one of my major concerns here. 
 
Namely, this is the classical authority of Aristotle, reconstructed and invested as such by 
the medieval Catholic Church in Brecht’s play, on the one hand, and by the bourgeois 
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German dramatic tradition in Brecht’s theoretical writings on the other – more 
specifically, by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s highly influential reception of the Poetics in 
the late 18th century.18
                                                                                                                                                                             
17  The response does not liberate the respondent from the question he is asked: on the contrary, it 
subjects him, at least in part, to the viewpoint from which the question issues. The only answer that frees us 
entirely from the question is silence. 
 For Brecht, the chief consequence of Lessing’s reception of 
Aristotle for German dramaturgy was the ascendancy of emotional identification as the 
technique that allowed the classical principle of mimēsis to be utilized as a politically 
effective instrument in the service of bourgeois ideology. In the venerable name of 
antiquity, it legitimated a “brotherhood of man” by paradoxically persuading the 
spectator not to cling to his own concrete and limited historical perspective, but to 
impersonate the dramatic hero as the authoritative exemplar of “universal humanity.” For 
Brecht’s Galileo, the chief consequence of the medieval Church’s Aristotelianism for the 
development of modern empirical science is similar: the Church’s institutional and 
discursive forms reproduce the authority of a textual tradition through a system of 
theatrical identifications and impersonations that follow a mimetic logic. Again, in the 
venerable name of antiquity, the Church in the play legitimates a textual discourse 
originally based on concrete sensory observations by paradoxically persuading its 
adherents not to account for the re-visions suggested by the evidence of their own eyes, 
but to uphold the universal and transcendent authority of their textual tradition through 
ever more virtuosic theater. As we shall see, the principled revolt against these mimetic 
18  Angela Curran’s recent scholarly treatment of Brecht’s relationship to Aristotle suggests 
similiarities and differences in the conceptual architecture of either figure’s dramaturgy, but neglects the 
centuries-long tradition of interpretation and reception in dramatic theory, not to mention traditions of 
practical performance, that decided the meaning of the Aristotelian precepts for German drama, and to 
which Brecht’s theory and practice critically responds. Angela Curran, “Brecht’s Criticisms of Aristotle’s 
Aesthetics of Tragedy,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59:2 (Spring 2001), 167-184. My 
treatment of Lessing, one of the main sources for the German tradition of reception so crucial for 
understanding Brecht, aims at giving more historical depth-of-field to the Brecht-Aristotle relationship by 
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Aristotelianisms by both the fictional Galileo and the historical Brecht only consolidates 
the responsibility of either figure’s vision of the “new age” to the ancient horizon of 
Aristotle, and through Aristotle in turn to a classical tradition of tragedy suddenly 
rendered uncomfortably contemporary. In short, the call to arms against the paradoxes of 
interpretive authority, like Oedipus' crusade on behalf of Thebes, only ends up renewing 
those paradoxes by redrawing the boundaries of their risks and responsibilities. 
In either case, the paradoxes derive from the peculiarly stereoscopic viewpoint19 
imposed by the interpreter’s responsibility to authority: in the work of interpretation, one 
can never quite wholly see from one’s own viewpoint, nor wholly from that of the 
authority one invokes. The stereoscopic image formed equally by both cannot ultimately 
be decomposed into what belongs to one and what belongs to the other with any degree 
of certainty. The re-interpreter, like the dramatic actor, can never be entirely here or 
entirely there, now or then, alive or dead, himself or another. In short, he must approach 
us with the greeting of Teiresias in Sophocles’ Antigone: ἥκομεν κοινὴν ὁδὸν / δύ' ἐξ 
ἑνὸς βλέποντε: τοῖς τυφλοῖσι γὰρ / αὕτη κέλευθος ἐκ προηγητοῦ πέλει. (Soph. Ant. 
988-990;20
                                                                                                                                                                             
seeing both figures as participants in a conversation that reaches a decisive moment in 18th-century 
Germany. 
 “We have come on a shared path / two gazing from the eyes of one: after all, 
for the blind / such is the path one must tread, following a guide.”) In more Brechtian 
terms, we might say that at best, the modern Teiresias can only pronounce the dawn of a 
new era from behind the ambiguous and complicit mask of the apocalypse. 
19  The concept of stereoscopy – though not going under that name – is already active in much 
scholarship on Brecht; see, for instance, Brooker’s assessment of the effects of alienation: “The repertoire 
of estranging effects […] aim to produce a double perspective on events and actions so as at once to show 
their present contradictory nature and their historical cause or social motivation.  In a frequent image, this 
would be like following the course of a river and staying above it, remaining both inside and above the 
stream” (Thomson & Sacks 191, emphasis mine). 
20  Sophocles, Antigone, ed. Mark Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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2. Aristotle’s Spectacles, Part 1: Imitation, Authority, and Complicity in Brecht’s 
Leben des Galilei 
Ich entstehe in der Form einer Antwort.21
I come into being in the form of an answer. 
 
    – Brecht 
When Galileo encounters the Scholastic professors of the University of Padua in Scene 4 
of Leben des Galilei, the resulting dialogue between their interpretive perspectives 
gradually reveals the relationship of stereoscopy that these perspectives share on at least 
two different levels. Like the two eyes necessary for stereoscopic vision, each presents a 
distinct viewpoint on a common interpretive object – the natural universe – and, on the 
basis of its viewpoint, can make a limited claim to perceive that object clearly and thus 
grasp its truth. As the dialogue plays the truth-claims of one eye, as it were, against those 
of the other, it also brings to light a second and more subtle form of stereoscopy: the 
duality of viewpoint inherent to each individual perspective by virtue of its more or less 
implicit invocation of an interpretive authority. The interpretive tension between the 
empirical-inductive and the Scholastic-deductive viewpoints, embodied by Galileo and 
the professors respectively, is heightened and complemented by the theatrical tension 
between the individual interpreter on either side and the authority he literally im-
personates – the tension of difference, as I have argued, between the actor and his role. 
By the end of the scene, this multi-leveled conversation – between the authority of sense 
and the authority of discourse, between the immediate, individual interpreter and the 
mediating persona of authority – brings the theater itself to the flash-point of self-
reflection on the authority of its own interpretations: the imitations of reality it presents in 
performance. The scene is able to interrogate the interpretive authority of dramatic 
                                                          
21  Brecht, “Über die Person [1930/31]” in: Werke: grosse kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter 
Ausgabe. Bd. 21: Schriften 1. ed. Werner Hecht (Berlin: Aufbau, 1988-2000; this volume 1995), 404. 
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mimēsis, furthermore, precisely because the interlocutors themselves present their 
interpretive responses as impersonation, as theater. As the interpretation that each 
performs frustrates the other by calling attention to the limitations of its dramatic 
mimēsis, the theater of mimēsis in which the spectator sits is called into question by the 
same stroke. Likewise, while each interlocutor initially seeks to secure the unilateral 
hegemony of monologue, each is quickly driven back into the defensive strategies and 
countermaneuvers of dialogue. In the same way, the spectator’s potential assent to the 
monologic authority of dramatic representation is constantly undermined, rather than 
being reinforced, by the genuinely dialogic structure of that representation: the spectator, 
in short, has no choice but to assume responsibility as a participant in the conversation. 
Galileo begins his own performance, and establishes his own authority, with a 
monologue: 
GALILEI am Fernrohr: Wie Eure Hoheit zweifellos wissen, sind wir Astronomen seit einiger Zeit mit 
unseren Berechnungen in große Schwierigkeiten gekommen. Wir benützen dafür ein sehr altes System, 
das sich in Übereinstimmung mit der Philosophie, aber leider nicht mit den Fakten zu befinden scheint. 
Nach diesem alten System, dem ptolemäischen, werden die Bewegungen der Gestirne als äußerst 
verwickelt angenommen. Der Planet Venus zum Beispiel soll eine Bewegung von dieser Art 
vollführen. Er zeichnet auf eine Tafel die epizyklische Bahn der Venus nach der ptolemäischen 
Annahme. Aber selbst solche schwierigen Bewegungen annehmend, sind wir nicht in der Lage, die 
Stellung der Gestirne richtig vorauszuberechnen. Wir finden sie nicht an den Orten, wo sie eigentlich 
sein müßten. Dazu kommen solche Gestirnbewegungen, für welche das ptolemäische System 
überhaupt keine Erklärung hat. Bewegungen dieser Art scheinen mir einige von mir neu entdeckte 
kleine Sterne um den Planeten Jupiter zu vollführen. Ist es den Herren angenehm, mit einer 
Besichtigung der Jupitertrabanten zu beginnen, der Mediceischen Gestirne? (LdG 2:39) 
GALILEO at the telescope: As Your Highness doubtless knows, we astronomers have for some time 
encountered great difficulties with our calculations. For these, we use a very old system that seems to 
be consistent with our philosophy, but not, unfortunately, with the facts themselves. According to this 
old system, the Ptolemaic system, we assume that the movements of the heavenly bodies are extremely 
complicated. The planet Venus, for example, is supposed to follow a movement of this kind. On a 
board, he draws the epicyclical orbit of Venus according to the Ptolemaic conception. But even when 
we assume such difficult orbits, we are still not capable of correctly predicting the position of the 
heavenly bodies with our calculations. We do not find them in the places where they would actually 
have to be. In addition, there are a number of movements for which the Ptolemaic system has no 
explanation at all. Movements of this kind appear to me to be conducted by some small bodies that I 
have recently discovered around the planet Jupiter. Does it please your lordships to begin with a 
viewing of the satellites of Jupiter, the Medicean Stars? 
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Galileo’s interpretation clearly distinguishes between the categories of philosophical 
proposition, observable empirical fact, and the Ptolemaic system that is designed to 
reconcile the two through quantitative calculations that demonstrate the subservience of 
the fact to the proposition. His contention, furthermore, is that the Ptolemaic system 
performs this function neither elegantly – “We assume that the movements of the 
heavenly bodies are extremely complicated” – nor adequately – “We do not find 
[heavenly bodies] in the places where they would actually have to be” – nor exhaustively 
– “There are a number of movements for which the Ptolemaic system has no explanation 
at all.” From Galileo’s perspective, there is no question of whether the Ptolemaic system 
remains accountable to the propositions of Aristotelian philosophy; the question of real 
concern to him lies in its accountability to observable empirical facts. His argument 
accordingly unfolds with as much concern for logical as for sensory transparency; he 
pursues this transparency at one point by his visual representation of the orbit of Venus to 
his audience, and then, moving from visual representation to visual reality, he seeks to 
consolidate its effect through his invitation to view the bodies in question through the 
telescope. In short, the theater in which Galileo attempts to perform his interpretation 
assumes and establishes the authority of sensory facts as primary and the authority of 
explanatory schemes as secondary. From Galileo’s perspective, new sensory facts, which 
emerge with the application of new interpretive technologies – here, the telescope – 
demand new explanations: above all, what and how one sees decides what and how one 
interprets. The instrument of interpretation, furthermore, already informs the content of 
interpretation because it establishes the domain and the persona in which the interpreter 
claims authority. Galileo thus im-personates the combination of sensing eye and 
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reasoning mind which are united in a subject who simply desires to understand what he 
sees before him. 
For as smoothly and unobtrusively as Galileo performs this prologue to his 
interpretive drama, however, the response of the professors to his request abruptly 
interrupts its dramatic flow and turns it aside into quite another channel. The slight, 
jarring short circuit of mis-understanding from which the exchange now unfolds, and in 
which its effects find their constant source, reveals the relative limits within which each 
perspective can draw on its distinct authority to perform a persuasive and involving 
drama. 
DER PHILOSOPH […] Ich fürchte, das alles ist nicht ganz so einfach. Herr Galilei, bevor wir Ihr 
berühmtes Rohr applizieren, möchten wir um das Vergnügen eines Disputs bitten. Thema: Können 
solche Planeten existieren? 
DER MATHEMATIKER Eines formalen Disputs. 
GALILEI Ich dachte mir, Sie schauen einfach durch das Fernrohr und überzeugen sich?  
DER MATHEMATIKER […] Es ist Ihnen natürlich bekannt, daß nach der Ansicht der Alten Sterne nicht 
möglich sind, die um einen anderen Mittelpunkt als die Erde kreisen, noch solche Sterne, die im 
Himmel keine Stütze haben?  
GALILEI Ja. 
DER PHILOSOPH Und, ganz absehend von der Möglichkeit solcher Sterne, die der Mathematiker er 
verbeugt sich gegen den Mathematiker zu bezweifeln scheint, möchte ich in aller Bescheidenheit als 
Philosoph die Frage aufwerfen: sind solche Sterne nötig? […] 
GALILEI Wie, wenn Eure Hoheit die sowohl unmöglichen als auch unnötigen Sterne nun durch dieses 
Fernrohr wahrnehmen würden? (LdG 2:39) 
THE PHILOSOPHER […] I fear it’s not all quite that simple. Mr. Galilei, before we administer your 
famous tube, we would like to request the pleasure of a disputation. Topic: Can such planets exist? 
THE MATHEMATICIAN  A formal disputation. 
GALILEO  I just thought you could simply take a look through the telescope and would be convinced? 
THE MATHEMATICIAN […] You are of course aware that according to the view of the ancients, heavenly 
bodies that orbit around some other center than the earth are not possible, nor are bodies that have no 
support in the heavens? 
GALILEO  Yes. 
THE PHILOSOPHER  And furthermore, quite apart from the possibility that such stars exist, which the 
mathematician he bows to the mathematician appears to doubt, I, as a philosopher and in all modesty, 
would like to pose the question: are such bodies necessary? 
Delicately but no less effectively turning aside Galileo’s request to look through the 
telescope, the professors request instead that Galileo submit to a disputation, the 
theatrical and rhetorical spectacle of intellectual agōn by means of which intellectual 
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questions were decided in the medieval tradition of Scholastic philosophy. Within the 
context of the three categories outlined by Galileo’s introduction, the disputation 
represents a mode of inquiry with an interpretive orientation diametrically opposed to 
Galileo’s in both form and content. Its form follows the strictly defined logical coherence 
of a system of philosophical propositions, not the sensory coherence of empirical facts; 
its content depends upon the mutual confrontation of virtuosic arguments formulated by 
the two opponents, not through the mutual confrontation of empirical facts and 
explanatory schemes. Given these constraints, the two topics the professors propose for 
the debate, the possibility and the necessity of the existence of the stars in question, are in 
full accordance with their interpretive dramaturgy:22
                                                          
22  It is of the utmost importance to understand that the genuinely stereoscopic character of Scene 4, 
upon which the effectiveness of its alienation effect (see below) depends, demands that the spectator and/or 
reader be able to acknowledge the relative legitimacy of the Professors’ interpretive claims within the 
Scholastic paradigm of science. To treat the Professors’ claims as specious or absurd, and thereby to 
elevate Galileo’s as standing by the dictates of (modern and post-Galilean) common sense, not only 
commits a prejudicial anachronism, but also invites the spectator’s and/or reader’s total identification with 
Galileo – to the detriment, ultimately, of the scene’s stereoscopic structure. Brecht himself insisted on a 
non-prejudicial representation of the orthodox Scholastic view and its exponents in his productions of the 
play. In a letter dated 27 December 1955, he wrote of LdG: “Ich muß darauf achten, daß die Gegner 
Galileis, die Kirchenfürsten und Hofleute, so positiv wie möglich dargestellt werden” (“I must take pains 
that Galileo’s opponents, the princes of the Church and the courtiers, are presented in as positive a light as 
possible”; Brecht, “Vorbereitung der Aufführung,” in: Materialien, ed. Hecht, 87; see also “Darstellung der 
Kirche” in the same volume, 13-15). To lose the carefully-maintained balance between both perspectives in 
 they do not refer at all to the 
question of whether the stars can or must exist in the world of empirical facts, the 
undeniability of which Galileo emphasizes so strongly. Instead, they raise the question of 
whether the apparent existence of these stars can be submitted to the logical dictates of a 
philosophical discourse that serves as the final, infallible arbiter of “real” as opposed to 
“apparent” existence. The Mathematician, furthermore, reveals the source of the 
insuperable authority enjoyed by this discourse in his own theater of persuasion simply 
by making reference to its antiquity (“according to the view of the ancients”). If the 
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empirical facts are logically incoherent with this venerable discourse – to speak in 
Scholastic terms, if the stars’ apparent existence is neither a possible nor a necessary 
deduction from higher axioms – then by default the authoritative truth-value of the 
philosophical discourse must be preserved and the empirical facts must be condemned as 
false. When judged from Galileo’s perspective, who functions as both actor in his own 
theater of interpretation and spectator to that of the professors, the grand intellectual 
drama of vindication with which the Scholastics expect him to “play along” seems, from 
its premises down, to be nothing but an absurd farce of abstractions. From the point of 
view of the Professors, however, Galileo’s argument blithely overturns the venerable 
edifice upon which scientific and philosophical knowledge as such are founded, and 
seeks to replace it wholesale with a cheap, though ingenious, optical deception. 
As they did for him, however, Galileo manages to interrupt their progress towards 
establishing the theater of interpretation in which their philosophical discourse is to be 
vindicated by drawing explicit attention to the specific nature of their discourse itself. 
Following the exchange just quoted, the Philosopher tries to begin the disputation in 
earnest by shifting into Latin, the lingua franca of educated debate, and the dynamics of 
stereoscopy immediately begin to reveal the relative limits of the Professors’ perspective: 
THE PHILOSOPHER […] Aristotelis divini universum ... 
GALILEI  Sollten wir nicht in der Umgangssprache fortfahren? Mein Kollege, Herr Federzoni, versteht 
Latein nicht. 
DER PHILOSOPH  Ist es von Wichtigkeit, daß er uns versteht?  
GALILEI  Ja.  
DER PHILOSOPH  Entschuldigen Sie mich. Ich dachte, er ist Ihr Linsenschleifer.  
ANDREA  Herr Federzoni ist ein Linsenschleifer und ein Gelehrter.  
DER PHILOSOPH  Danke, mein Kind. Wenn Herr Federzoni darauf besteht ...  
GALILEI  Ich bestehe darauf.  
DER PHILOSOPH
                                                                                                                                                                             
this scene and elsewhere also points the way to a straightforwardly heroic reading of Galileo’s character, 
which stands at odds with the final scenes of the drama, regardless of the version in question. 
  Das Argument wird an Glanz verlieren, aber es ist Ihr Haus. -- Das Weltbild des 
göttlichen Aristoteles mit seinen mystisch musizierenden Sphären und kristallenen Gewölben und den 
Kreisläufen seiner Himmelskörper und dem Schiefenwinkel der Sonnenbahn und den Geheimnissen 
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der Satellitentafeln und dem Sternenreichtum des Katalogs der südlichen Halbkugel und der 
erleuchteten Konstruktion des celestialen Globus ist ein Gebäude von solcher Ordnung und Schönheit, 
daß wir wohl zögern sollten, diese Harmonie zu stören.  
GALILEI
THE PHILOSOPHER […] Aristotelis divini universum… 
  Wie, wenn Eure Hoheit die sowohl unmöglichen als auch unnötigen Sterne nun durch dieses 
Fernrohr wahrnehmen würden? (LdG 2:39-40) 
GALILEO  Shouldn’t we proceed in the vernacular? My colleague, Mr. Federzoni, does not understand 
Latin. 
THE PHILOSOPHER  Is it of importance that he understand us? 
GALILEO  Yes. 
THE PHILOSOPHER  I beg your pardon. I thought he was your lens-grinder. 
ANDREA  Mr. Federzoni is a lens-grinder and a man of learning. 
THE PHILOSOPHER  Thank you, my child. If Mr. Federzoni insists on it… 
GALILEO  I insist on it. 
THE PHILOSOPHER  The argument will lose some of its luster, but it is your house. -- The world-image 
of the divine Aristotle, with its mystically musical spheres and crystal vaults and the orbits of its 
heavenly bodies and the oblique angle of the sun’s orbit and the secrets of the satellite-tables and the 
abundance of stars in the catalog of the southern hemisphere and the enlightened construction of the 
celestial globe is an edifice of such order and beauty that we should well hesitate to disturb this 
harmony. 
GALILEO  How could I, if Your Highness were to perceive these both impossible and unnecessary stars 
through this telescope right now? 
At a stroke, Galileo’s razor-sharp irony cuts the professors’ perspective to the quick in a 
moment of stereoscopic co-optation: under the sarcastic pretense of acknowledging that 
the stars are “both impossible and unnecessary” from the Scholastic perspective, he 
nonetheless insists on their existence as immediately accessible empirical fact. His 
polemical point could not be clearer: the Professors’ concern as interpreters is indeed not 
with explaining empirical facts, but with preserving the authority of a philosophical 
discourse, and with performing that authority as a specific kind of verbal and intellectual 
spectacle. Galileo’s request to debate in the vernacular draws attention to the arbitrary 
conventions and privileges of the traditional educated elite to which his interlocutors 
belong, which include university training in Latin. Where Galileo had invoked as his 
authority the subject who merely desires to understand what he sees, the Professors 
invoke a subject who is distinguished in very definite ways by language, institution, 
cultivation, and status – an entire repertoire, in other words, of refined theatrical 
techniques. More importantly, Galileo’s move points out the mechanism of exclusion by 
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which the elite thus distinguished maintains its freedom from responsibility to individuals 
who stand outside these privileges, but who nonetheless have a distinct claim to 
intellectual authority.23
                                                          
23  Andrew James Johnston offers an excellent reading of Federzoni’s frustration here and in Scene 9 
that accounts for the issues of interlingualism and Scholastic Latinity. Brecht configures these issues in 
terms of the politically-charged friction between the revolutionary and reactionary tendencies embodied in 
the two different scientific paradigms that clash in the play, while Johnston is careful to point out the 
difference between Brecht’s presentation and the context of the historical Galileo’s research. Johnston, 
“Chaucer, Galilei, Brecht. Sprache und Diskurs im Leben des Galilei,” in: Walter Delabar & Jörg Döring, 
eds., Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) (Berlin: Weidler, 1998), 253-255. 
 In this case, Federzoni is just such an individual. Galileo’s 
intransigence boldly confirms Federzoni’s claim to authority, and the child Andrea states 
in the most disarmingly facile form what Galileo’s circle accepts as a straightforward 
case of “both/and”, but what must strike the privileged ears of the professors as the 
distortion of a no less straightforward “either-or”: “Mr. Federzoni is a lens-grinder and a 
man of learning” (emphasis mine). The professors acquiesce, this time, in Galileo’s 
request, but not without casually betraying some part of the prejudice that undergirds 
their attachment to conventions: “The argument will lose some of its luster, but it is your 
house.” Indirectly and a little sarcastically, the Philosopher here mourns the involuntary 
sacrifice of a kind of theatricality specific to his medieval, academic Latin, but which he 
nonetheless attempts to reconstitute in a translated, and thus de facto alienated, form in 
the overwrought, near-absurd flight of rhetorical fancy that follows his concession. What 
this purple outburst lacks in content, it seeks to compensate for in verbal effect. 
Substantially, it amounts to little more than a mystifying encomium to the Ptolemaic 
system, capped with an unintentionally ironic admonition against “disturbing” the 
“harmony” of a system that now seems to be largely kept in order solely by this sort of 
threadbare rhetoric. Stripped of its elitist and exotic verbal trappings, the Philosopher’s 
abortive effort to gain the upper hand in disputation exposes his theater of interpretation 
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to Galileo’s critique, if not ridicule. The Professor’s performance of interpretation is 
thereby stripped of its strictly interpretive value, leaving only void and illusory 
performance. 
Yet no single portion of Scene 4 reveals the political valence of these 
performances and counter-performances, nor presages the political consequences that will 
follow upon Galileo’s innovations, as clearly as does the dialogue that follows upon 
Federzoni’s indirect challenge to the authority of the textually-centered Scholastic 
tradition (LdG 2:42). This heated exchange leads at last to a line that adumbrates the 
primary risk of interpretation insofar as it works according to a stereoscopic logic: the 
risk, namely, of complicity in error, a complicity that results from Galileo’s responsibility 
to his opponents as much as his responsibility to the authority he invokes. The 
interpreter’s im-personation of authority thus works both for and against him 
simultaneously in performance, and the stakes are even higher where the performer does 
not acknowledge that he wears a mask at all: 
GALILEI fast unterwürfig: Meine Herren, der Glaube an die Autorität des Aristoteles ist eine Sache, 
Fakten, die mit Händen zu greifen sind, eine andere. [… I]ch ersuche Sie in aller Demut, Ihren Augen 
zu trauen.  
DER MATHEMATIKER Lieber Galilei, ich pflege mitunter, so altmodisch es Ihnen erscheinen mag, 
den Aristoteles zu lesen und kann Sie dessen versichern, daß ich da meinen Augen traue.  
GALILEI Ich bin es gewohnt, die Herren aller Fakultäten sämtlichen Fakten gegenüber die Augen 
schließen zu sehen und so zu tun, als sei nichts geschehen. Ich zeige meine Notierungen, und man 
lächelt, ich stelle mein Fernrohr zur Verfügung, daß man sich überzeugen kann, und man zitiert 
Aristoteles. Der Mann hatte kein Fernrohr! […] 
DER PHILOSOPH groß: Wenn hier Aristoteles in den Kot gezogen werden soll, eine Autorität, 
welche nicht nur die gesamte Wissenschaft der Antike, sondern auch die Hohen Kirchenväter selber 
anerkannten, so scheint jedenfalls mir eine Fortsetzung der Diskussion überflüssig. Unsachliche 
Diskussion lehne ich ab. Basta.  
GALILEI Die Wahrheit ist das Kind der Zeit, nicht der Autorität. Unsere Unwissenheit ist unendlich, 
tragen wir einen Kubikmillimeter ab! Wozu jetzt noch so klug sein wollen, wenn wir endlich ein klein 
wenig weniger dumm sein können! Ich habe das unvorstellbare Glück gehabt, ein neues Instrument in 
die Hand zu bekommen, mit dem man ein Zipfelchen des Universums etwas, nicht viel, näher besehen 
kann. Benützen Sie es.  
DER PHILOSOPH Eure Hoheit, meine Damen und Herren, ich frage mich nur, wohin dies alles führen 
soll.  
GALILEI Ich würde meinen, als Wissenschaftler haben wir uns nicht zu fragen, wohin die Wahrheit 
uns führen mag. 
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DER PHILOSOPH wild: Herr Galilei, die Wahrheit mag uns zu allem möglichen führen! (LdG 2:42-
43) 
GALILEO almost self-abasing: My lordships, the belief in the authority of Aristotle is one thing, facts 
that are immediate and tangible are another. […] I beseech you in all humility to trust your eyes. 
THE MATHEMATICIAN Dear Galileo, as old-fashioned as it may seem to you, every now and then I 
am accustomed to read Aristotle, and I can assure you that in those circumstances, I do indeed trust my 
eyes. 
GALILEO  I am accustomed to seeing the gentlemen of all the [academic] faculties closing their eyes 
to every single fact and acting as if nothing had happened. I show them my notations, and they smile, I 
put my telescope at their disposal so that they might be convinced, and they quote Aristotle at me. The 
man had no telescope! […] 
THE PHILOSOPHER grandly: If Aristotle is to be dragged through the muck here, an authority that 
not only the entire science of antiquity, but also the High Church Fathers themselves recognized, then a 
continuation of the discussion appears to me, in any case, to be superfluous. I refuse to engage in 
unobjective discussion. Basta. 
GALILEO  Truth is the child of time, not of authority. Our ignorance is infinite – let us subtract just 
one cubic millimeter from it! Why desire to be so clever, when we can finally be just a tiny bit less 
stupid! I have had the unimaginable good fortune of getting my hands on a new instrument with which 
one can view a tiny scrap of the universe somewhat – though not much – more closely. Use it. 
THE PHILOSOPHER  Your Highness, ladies and gentlemen, I must ask myself where all this is 
leading. 
GALILEO  I would venture to say that as scientists, we do not have to ask ourselves where the truth 
may lead us. 
THE PHILOSOPHER wildly: Mr. Galilei, the truth may lead us anywhere it likes! 
Galileo argues for the immediate, binding force of the senses and of “Fakten, die mit 
Händen zu greifen sind” (lit. “facts that can be grasped with the hands”). Nonetheless, he 
does not perceive that these sensory facts threaten to destabilize not just the interpretive 
edifice of science and philosophy as practiced since antiquity, but the social and political 
order built on their foundation.24
                                                          
24  Galileo himself seems even more acutely aware of this long-term threat than his interlocutors, and 
in fact vainly attempts to draw the Grand Duke’s attention to it somewhat later, still insisting on the new 
authority of vision and its potentially subversive effects: “In diesen Nächten werden über ganz Italien 
Fernrohre auf den Himmel gerichtet. Die Monde des Jupiter verbilligen nicht die Milch. Aber sie wurden 
nie je gesehen, und es gibt sie doch. Daraus zieht der Mann auf der Straße den Schluß, daß es noch vieles 
geben könnte, wenn er nur seine Augen aufmachte!” (“Every night now, telescopes all over Italy are being 
pointed to the heavens. The moons of Jupiter are not making milk any cheaper. But they have never, ever 
been seen before, and they are there beyond all question. From this fact, the man on the street concludes 
that there may be a great deal more [to be found] if he would only open his eyes!”) How Brecht’s Galileo 
imagines that he could ingratiate himself with the Medicean establishment by warning them against this 
threat without giving himself away as one of its prime movers is anyone’s guess – but provides another 
measure of the risk-laden ironies in his interpretive position. 
 Furthermore, by cleaving to the force of empirical facts, 
Galileo cannot recognize that the interpreter who attempts to understand such facts 
according to their own apparent logic nonetheless tacitly asserts their authority: he cannot 
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see, in other words, that his own “truth” is just as much a “child of authority” as that of 
his interlocutors, and that his method entails an im-personation of the senses just as that 
of his opponents entails one of the text. On the other side, the professors argue for the 
institutionalized authority of a textual and discursive tradition that stretches in a secure 
and continuous line from antiquity to the present. The tradition they defend nonetheless 
finds itself helpless in the face of radically new experiences made possible by its own 
progress, but without any precedent in its vocabulary. The very same eyes trained in 
searching out the wisdom of ancient books have now turned their considerable energies 
from discourse to sensation, from a textual to an optical organon.25
The uniquely Brechtian brilliance of Scene 4 lies in the way that the mutual 
appropriation and mis-appropriation of viewpoints between the empirical scientist and the 
deductive academics force both to show all their cards, to reveal the brute mechanics of 
their performances, and to betray the ambushes that await the one who gets caught up in 
the show. Their interaction is politically charged not only because of the political stakes 
attached to their respective viewpoints, but also because those viewpoints are developed 
and articulated within a plurality of possible positions. Whether manifested by stable 
dramatic characters or as functions of the dramatic action, perspectives in Brechtian 
theater generally take shape in this way, as responses addressed to a dynamic and 
 Between the seeing 
eye and the reading eye, as incommensurable as they are complicit, the spectator’s own 
eyes are asked to decide upon an authoritative point of view, in full awareness of the 
ways in which the compelling drama of either perspective may lead him “anywhere it 
likes” (“zu allem möglichen”) – namely, into the twilight territory of risk. 
                                                          
25  I owe this formulation to Darko Suvin, “Heavenly food denied: Life of Galileo,” in: Thomson & 
Sacks, 144-145. 
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contentious plurality of other perspectives that respond to it in turn. This plurality, 
furthermore, guarantees that the claims made by interpreters who represent a given 
authority must always retain a relative and polemical character: authority must be 
constantly re-impersonated precisely so that it can oppose, co-opt, defeat, or yield to the 
antagonists that constantly rise up against it. The shifting rhythm of stereoscopic combat 
can reveal the complicity of different viewpoints just as readily as it can separate and 
differentiate that which appeared uniform. Furthermore, because the process of their 
articulation and interaction takes place through the activity of response, each perspective 
never attains a pure self-identity or a transparent self-understanding. Viewpoints may 
shift, fragment, and reform from one moment to the next, but they never cease to be 
different in the process of interaction – the agents of the drama truly do “come into being 
in the form of an answer,” and, once born, they survive solely by virtue of their ability to 
answer each other, and to maintain their vital differences. That error regularly usurps the 
title of truth, that blindness constantly claims inheritance of true vision, that the mask 
always speaks more eloquently than the bare face – these matters of fact prove that the 
risk of complicity in error is the order of the day in the spectacular arena of interpretation. 
Like a boxer whose strengths and weaknesses become more evident the longer he 
fights his opponent and the longer his opponent fights him, the Brechtian interlocutor 
gradually reveals the conditions and limits of his perspective not only to his opponent, 
but even more so to his spectators. Not only do the blind spots and frailties of his 
interpretive vision begin to get the better of him, but he draws ever more openly on the 
reserve of strength afforded him by specific techniques of selection, ordering, and 
evaluation – techniques that depend on the regime of his training as much as his 
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fundamental disposition. When the contenders are equally matched, as they are in Scene 
4, each interlocutor both mis-understands the other and understands him all too well; each 
doesn’t quite catch the other’s drift, but has also long since caught it – in a trap. In 
following this pugilistic spectacle of blow and counter-blow, response and counter-
response, the spectator constantly realizes that he, too, has been “caught up” – by nothing 
other than theater itself, in a conversation of which he is usually only dimly or 
tangentially aware. If the spectator arrives at a judgment on the authority of one 
interpretive viewpoint, he must do so by identifying with the perspective of the other, 
which is equally subject to judgment in turn. One can only judge the quality of a given 
fighter, after all, by the way he performs against other fighters, not by any absolute or 
transcendent standard. The spectator remains continually aware of the perspective with 
which he identifies and which thus shapes his own complex activity of watching, 
listening, and judging – the awareness that any interlocutor can and should provide for 
another in the work of interpretation. Likewise, the spectator cannot ignore that his final, 
comprehensive judgment – and in this scene, the object implicated in judgment is nothing 
less than the universe itself – develops its specific character within dramatic intersections 
of viewpoints like this one, that is, in the performance of interpretation.26
                                                          
26  I owe this formulation and much of my overall outlook here to Benjamin Bennett’s reading of 
both LdG and the revolutionary claims Brecht makes for his theater. Bennett offers a strong and necessary 
distinction between interpretation itself and the performance of interpretation, foregrounding the way 
 The proper 
experience of interpretive responsibility in Brechtian theater emerges when its spectator 
discovers that he cannot settle back into rapt contemplation of a hermeticized and 
sacralized art-image, that he can never “be alone” or “be as one” with art – he must 
instead participate in the profane, unruly, but free plurality of perspectives that its 
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conversation opens up to him. He constantly finds himself not only in the company of 
others, but also in his own company, whenever he is in the company of art. In short, he is 
himself compelled to step into the ring, and respond. 
The activities of identification and judgment so crucial to the interpretive 
perspectivism of Scene 4 also govern the larger part of Brecht’s theoretical reflections on 
the role of alienation in the experience of theater, for both spectators and actors. Brecht’s 
thinking on alienation can be understood as an interrogation of the dramatist’s aims in 
persuading his spectator to accept or reject the interpretive authority of drama as an 
imitation of reality – just as Galileo and the professors set forth their own imitations of 
reality through dramatic impersonations of very different authorities. Brecht was by no 
means the first, moreover, to ask this question in the European traditions of theater: his 
formulation of the political responsibilities of theater in the interpretive imitation of 
reality took shape within a long-standing conversation in the German dramatic tradition 
about precisely these issues. What becomes unique and striking, however, about this 
tradition in the immediate context of Brecht and his Leben des Galilei is the fact that its 
seminal 18th
                                                                                                                                                                             
interpretation reaches the level of political efficacy by being performed as a kind of theater in LdG. 
Benjamin Bennett, All Theater Is Revolutionary Theater (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2005), 57-85. 
-century representatives – much like Galileo’s Scholastic antagonists in 
Scene 4, but according to their own distinct principles – had also formed their practice 
through a specific reception of Aristotle, that is, through the formation of a classical 
interpretive authority. Their model was based on the critical reconstruction of Aristotle’s 
Poetics as a handbook of literary and dramatic practice, a strategy which emerged under 
the influence of various national, ideological, and intellectual pressures to serve the ends 
of a specific political program – namely, the rising power of the bourgeoisie and the 
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formation of a German nation-state. In a similar manner, the medieval reception of 
Aristotle, the representatives of which we see everywhere in LdG, had historically 
provided the logical and philosophical instrument with which the early Catholic church 
could rigorously codify its doctrines and thereby consolidate the power of its worldly 
political claims. 
In view of this striking convergence, the questions posed by Scene 4 about 
authority, identification, and judgment, whether in scientific or dramatic form, now begin 
to evince a number of historical and even polemical indices of the relationship between 
Brecht’s dramatic methods and the authority of his tradition. In many of Brecht’s 
theoretical texts on dramatic practice, he explicitly defines his own literary and theatrical 
practices as “non-” or “anti-Aristotelian” and orients his own ideas against the prevailing 
reception of Aristotle in his tradition, which emphasized the spectator’s emotional 
identification with the dramatic hero. If we consider the resonances between Brecht’s 
response to the Aristotelian authority embedded in his German literary tradition on the 
one hand, and the response of Brecht’s fictional Galileo to the Aristotelian authority 
embedded in Scholastic thought on the other, we must likewise examine the risks and 
responsibilities of Brecht’s own position in his tradition just as we have done for his 
Galileo. Within the context of Brecht’s oeuvre, we quickly see that “Aristotle,” strictly 
speaking, designates neither a historical person, nor a corpus of texts, nor a philosophical 
system, nor a worldview with distinct political, social, and economic underpinnings. It is, 
rather, Brecht’s designation for the terrain upon which his work pitches its battles 
concerning the problem of authority and identification in interpretation, in the dramatic 
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world of his Galilei as much as in his engagement with the theory and practice of drama 
in his tradition. 
As such, Brecht’s relationship to Aristotle, like that of his Galileo, is far from one 
of straightforward appropriation or rejection. Andrew James Johnston puts the case most 
succinctly when he identifies the “Parallelität der [Brechtschen] anti-aristotelischen 
Dramenästhetik mit der anti-aristotelischen Physik des Protagonisten” (“parallelism 
between [Brecht's] anti-Aristotelian aesthetics of the drama and the anti-Aristotelian 
physics of its protagonist”) as a “besondere Ironie” (“unique irony”) of the play.27
                                                          
27  Johnston in Delabar & Döring, 239. Johnston’s rich and wide-ranging essay approaches this 
parallelism in Leben des Galilei through a comparative and historical survey of multilingualism in the 
intellectual life of early modern Europe. His work discusses the emergence – in clear opposition to the 
Latinate Aristotelianism of medieval Scholasticism – of literary, scientific, and philosophical texts in the 
vernacular, particularly those by Geoffrey Chaucer and the historical Galileo Galilei himself, as coincident 
with the rise of a humanism that was politically aligned neither with the Latin of the Church, nor with the 
vernacular of the downtrodden masses, but rather with a vernacular current as the lingua franca for courtly 
sophistication and self-cultivation that prevailed under the absolutist states of the era. Johnston then 
compares the political valence of this vernacular humanism with the reconstitution of the vernacular in 
Brecht’s play as an instrument of proletarian revolution, with ironic results. Though Johnston clearly ends 
up in different territory, the present discussion takes the same perplexing set of parallels as its point of 
departure, and overlaps at a number of points (see also 245-250 on Galileo Galilei). Nonetheless, Johnston 
does not treat the theoretical statements that undergird Brecht’s anti-Aristotelianism: his discussion is 
comparative and intertextual along a different, though equally rewarding, axis. 
 This 
parallelism, which binds together modernist dramatic form with early modern historical 
content, Johnston is right to call an instance of irony, and not a straightforward metaphor. 
While Johnston extracts a historical irony from the parallelism he points out by 
contrasting Brecht’s representation of medieval, Latinate Aristotelianism with its 
historical reality in the era of Galileo, it is equally possible to extract a different irony 
from the same source by virtue of the intertextual and multigeneric character of Brecht’s 
corpus. Along either path, Johnston’s parallelism rings true, particularly his claim that 
“Brecht bezieht […] in einem Konflikt Stellung, den in anderer Form und mit anderen 
Fronten schon sein Held ausfechten mußte” (“Brecht takes up […] a position in a conflict 
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which, in another form and with different battle-lines, his hero already had to fight to the 
finish”; Johnston in Delabar & Döring, 240). The conflict in which Brecht participated 
was the struggle to establish a new source of authority for the theory and practice of 
drama, just as his Galileo does for the theory and practice of science. Both figures are 
related to their traditions through the open disagreements and tacit complicities inherent 
to interpretive response. In order to understand how Brecht’s dramas and his theories of 
alienation formed just such a response to his tradition, let us now turn to Lessing, one of 
Brecht’s leading antagonists and interlocutors, who laid much of the theoretical 
groundwork for modern German dramatic practice and who was the thinker perhaps most 
responsible for the authoritative status of Aristotle in subsequent German tradition. 
 
3. Aristotle’s Spectacles, Part 2: Lessing’s Classical Vision and Brecht’s Mass 
Perspectives 
For the duration of Brecht’s activity in the German theater scene before his exile and 
after his return to a divided Germany, one of the main objects of his theoretical polemics 
and practical antagonism was a mainstream theater he characterized alternately as 
“bourgeois,” “Aristotelian,” and “dramatic” – as opposed to his preferred predications for 
his own practice of theater as “revolutionary” or “proletarian,” “non-Aristotelian,”28
                                                          
28  Brecht describes his dramatic methods as nicht-aristotelisch (“non-Aristotelian”) in many of his 
central theoretical texts, with different points of emphasis in his opposition to Aristotle according to his 
strategic aims in each case. The most prominent examples of these texts span the two most varied, troubled, 
and fertile decades of Brecht’s productive career (1935-1955): “Über die Verwendung von Musik für ein 
episches Theater” (“On the Use of Music in an Epic Theater,” 1935; AW 6:216-224), “Das deutsche Drama 
vor Hitler” (“German Drama Before Hitler,” 1935; AW 6:225-228), “Verfremdungseffekte in der 
chinesischen Schauspielkunst” (“Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting,” 1936; AW 6:232-242), “Über den 
Bühnenbau der nichtaristotelischen Dramatik” (“On Stage Production in Non-Aristotelian Dramaturgy,” 
1936/37; AW 6:246-253), “Über experimentelles Theater” (“On Experimental Theater,” 1939; AW 6:403-
421), “Kurze Beschreibung einer neuen Technik der Schauspielkunst, die einen Verfremdungseffekt 
hervorbringt” (Short Description of a New Technique of Acting That Produces an Alienation Effect,” 1937-
1939; AW 6:467-486) and “Kann die heutige Welt durch Theater wiedergegeben werden?” (“Can the 
Contemporary World Be Represented in Theater?” 1955; AW 6:646-648). For a valuable reading of 
 and, 
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of course, “epic.” By virtue of this particular series of juxtapositions, Brecht was 
asserting his own innovations against the formal, intellectual, and – most of all – political 
investments of an aesthetic tradition in the theater identified most prominently with the 
name of 18th-century philosopher and dramatist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), 
who along with Goethe and Schiller was one of the pivotal figures in the programmatic 
formation of a German national theater in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.29
Lessing emphasized that dramatic events should occur in a single, unbroken 
causal chain according to a process of “organic development”, without the interpolation 
of secondary plot material, and in such a way that each element of the drama contributes 
a necessary and integral part to the whole. The deployment of these formal unities, which 
aimed at achieving a unified and homogeneous emotional effect among the audience, 
served a specific ideological aim. For Lessing, Aristotle’s characterization of theater as 
an imitation of reality (Gr.: mimēsis) that could achieve the purification (katharsis) of the 
 Lessing’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics, formulated chiefly in the 
exchange of correspondence with Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) and Friedrich Nicolai 
(1733-1811) collected under the title Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel (1755-1757) and 
in Lessing’s own Hamburgische Dramaturgie (1769), offers one of the most influential 
receptions of classical dramaturgy in the German dramatic tradition. Like Brecht’s own 
project, Lessing’s Aristotelianism was an act of historical appropriation particularly well-
suited to the demands of the progressive political agenda of its era. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Brecht’s non-Aristotelianism in his earlier Lehrstücke (learning plays) as well as LdG, see Dirk Backes, Die 
erste Kunst ist die Beobachtungskunst. Bertolt Brecht und der Sozialistische Realismus (Berlin: Karin 
Kramer Verlag, 1981), Ch. 3-4, 69-157; in a poststructuralist context, see Elizabeth Wright, Postmodern 
Brecht: A Re-Presentation (New York: Routledge, 1989), 24-48. 
29  My reading of Lessing’s legacy in German dramatic tradition and Brecht’s anti-Aristotelianism is 
indebted to Helmut Jendreiek, Bertolt Brecht. Drama der Veränderung (Düsseldorf: August Basel Verlag, 
1969), particularly 27-30, 38-43. 
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spectator through the provocation of fear and pity (phobos and eleos) meant that theater 
could exert a morally and politically transformative force on its spectators. Making 
recourse to the Nicomachean Ethics as well as to contemporary theories of affect in order 
to understand Aristotle’s concepts of fear and pity, Lessing writes: 
Da nemlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts anders beruhet, als in der Verwandlung der 
Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten, bei jeder Tugend aber, nach unserm Philosophen 
[Aristoteles], sich diesseits und jensseits ein Extremum findet, zwischen welchem sie inne stehet: so 
muß die Tragödie, wenn sie unser Mitleid in Tugend verwandeln soll, uns von beiden Extremis des 
Mitleids zu reinigen vermögend sein; welches auch von der Furcht zu verstehen. Das tragische Mitleid 
muß nicht allein, in Ansehung des Mitleids, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher zu viel Mitleid 
fühlet, sondern auch desjenigen, welcher zu wenig empfindet. Die tragische Furcht muß nicht allein, in 
Ansehung der Furcht, die Seele desjenigen reinigen, welcher sich ganz und gar keines Unglücks 
befürchtet, sondern auch desjenigen, den ein jedes Unglück, auch das entfernteste, auch das 
unwahrscheinlichste, in Angst setzet.30
Since, in short, this purification [Reinigung = katharsis] consists in nothing other than the 
transformation of the passions into a readiness to practice the virtues, and since with every virtue, 
according to our philosopher [Aristotle], there are two extremes between which the virtue itself 
resides: so must tragedy, if it is meant to transform our pity [Mitleid = eleos] into virtue, be capable of 
purifying us from both of the extremes of pity; and the same should be understood for fear [Furcht = 
phobos]. Looking upon [the dramatic representation of] pity, tragic pity must purify not only the soul 
of a person who feels too much pity, but also that of a person who feels too little. Looking upon [the 
dramatic representation of] fear, tragic fear must purify not only the soul of a person who fears no 
misfortune whatsoever, but also that of a person in whom any misfortune, even the most distant, even 
the most improbable, inspires terror. 
 
Lessing’s interpretation of katharsis points directly to consequences which are 
transparently political: katharsis effects a kind of moral alchemy whereby the spectator, 
as the object of passions, is transformed into a subject of virtues – a subject who then 
acts, and virtuously at that, outside the theater. For Lessing, the mimēsis of individual and 
social reality is thus organized to transform the reality of which it is an imitation by 
transforming its spectators into free and rational beings. Dramatic representation, qua 
                                                          
30  Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Hamburgische Dramaturgie. Zweiter Band. In: Werke und Briefe in 
zwölf Bänden: Band 6: Werke 1767-1769, ed. Klaus Bohnen (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 
1985), §78, 574. Aristotle’s Poetics was primarily introduced into the fray of 18th-century debates in 
Germany on dramaturgy and aesthetics by the translation of Michael Conrad Curtius (1724-1802), which, 
despite its flaws, biases, and anachronisms, had a definitive impact on Lessing and his milieu. M.C. 
Curtius, Aristoteles Dichtkunst ins Deutsche übersetzet, mit Anmerkungen, und besondern Abhandlungen, 
versehen, von Michael Conrad Curtius (Hannover : Johann Christoph Richter, 1753). 
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imitation, thus stakes its claim as a revolutionary political strategy: its interpretation of 
reality actively intervenes in the reality that it interprets. 
In order for this intervention to be effective, however, virtues and passions, in 
both reality and imitation, must remain constant entities across differences of time, space, 
and milieu. Lessing thus furthermore posits that dramatic mimēsis must allow the 
spectator to feel that he inhabits the same moral world as is represented on stage. In 
contrast to the stricter French neoclassical models favored by some of his 
contemporaries, most prominently Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700-1766),31
Die Namen von Fürsten und Helden können einem Stücke Pomp und Majestät geben; aber zur 
Rührung tragen sie nichts bei. Das Unglück derjenigen, deren Umstände den unsrigen am nächsten 
kommen, muß natürlicher Weise am tiefsten in unsere Seele dringen; und wenn wir mit Königen 
Mitleiden haben, so haben wir es mit ihnen als mit Menschen, und nicht als mit Königen. Macht ihr 
Stand schon öfters ihre Unfälle wichtiger, so macht er sie darum nicht interessanter. Immerhin mögen 
ganze Völker darein verwickelt werden; unsere Sympathie erfodert einen einzeln Gegenstand, und ein 
Staat ist ein viel zu abstrakter Begriff für unsere Empfindungen (Ibid., §14, 251). 
 Lessing’s 
advocacy of a more accessible dramatic language and a more realistic psychology were 
designed to bridge this gap between the world of the stage and that of the spectator. 
Primarily, however, the morally transformative effect of the drama depended upon the 
spectator’s capacity to identify with the central figure of the work – to accept as 
immediate and consequential the world in which the hero moves and acts, and to view the 
hero’s values, motivations, and sufferings as either actually or potentially the spectator’s 
own. It was through this emphasis on identification that the political underpinnings of 
Lessing’s aesthetics in the worldview of the contemporary bourgeoisie made themselves 
most evident: 
The names of princes and heroes can give a play pomp and majesty; but they contribute nothing to its 
emotional effect. The misfortune of those whose circumstances most closely approximate our own 
must naturally make the deepest impression upon our souls; and if we take pity upon kings, we take 
pity on them as human beings, and not as kings. If their estate occasionally makes their misfortunes 
                                                          
31  Johann Christoph Gottsched, Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst vor die Deutschen (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962). 
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more important, it does not for that reason make them any more interesting. After all, entire peoples 
may be involved in [those misfortunes]; our sympathy demands a single object, and a state is a much 
too abstract concept for our emotions. 
Here Lessing reveals how the moral efficacy of psychological identification is guided by 
a principle of universal humanity. Our capacity to be moved, or even transformed, by 
what we see on stage ultimately derives from the common humanity we share with the 
dramatis personae, a categorical humanity that forms the indispensable ground for our 
identification with them. In a letter to Mendelssohn from 1757, Lessing describes the 
spectator’s experience of identification as analogous to the sympathetic vibration of a 
string brought near another string of equal length that has just been plucked. What the 
plucked string “perceives” as pain, its untouched, but sympathetically vibrating 
counterpart “perceives” as pleasure: hence the spectator’s capacity to understand and 
identify with the tragic hero, and hence the peculiar pleasure that emerges as the spectator 
watches calamity descend upon the hero.32
                                                          
32  Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn, and Friedrich Nicolai, “Briefwechsel über das 
Trauerspiel,” in: Lessing, Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden. Band 3: Werke 1754-1757, ed. Klaus Bohnen 
et al. (Frankfurt a.M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2003), 713-714. 
 The anthropomorphizing metaphor of the 
vibrating strings takes for granted the interchangeability of hero and spectator as two 
strings of the same material and length: in the experience of a powerful affect, the 
universal humanity they share responds with precisely the same tone. At the level of this 
universal humanity, all the political and socioeconomic differences between individuals, 
including those of group, race, class, or nation, as well as all the differences generated by 
historical, geographical, material, and cultural circumstance, recede or disappear 
completely. The theater thus aims at nothing less than the activation of this universality 
as a political principle, which thereby gains authoritative force, through unifying what 
would otherwise be the highly differentiated perspectives of its audience. 
148 
Given its Aristotelian roots, Lessing here attempts a maneuver that would 
promote a modern, universalist, and bourgeois politics on the basis of a classical 
authority reinterpreted and reconstituted according to his unique and historically specific 
ends. The exercise of this authority in the practice of dramatic representation for Lessing 
depends upon the maintenance of what might be called integrated unity. The classical 
unities of formal structure, which had the effect of narrowing the dramatic focus, 
naturalizing the chain of causality, and homogenizing the range of response, helped the 
work achieve its primary aim: the identification of the spectator with its central figure, 
which had the effect of eliding the differences between individual spectators and 
compelling their acquiescence to a principle of universal human brotherhood. In short, 
the political function of the dramatic work was to enforce a progressive and 
democratizing principle of universal human unity which had both formal and 
psychological dimensions, but which was legitimated by a classical authority – 
constituted as non-modern, depoliticized, and prescriptive at once. 
Lessing’s individualist and universalist humanism left its imprint on the post-18th 
century tradition of German theater with its focus on the relationship between forms of 
dramatic mimēsis and the political effects of dramatic spectatorship. Throughout the 
entire corpus of his theoretical writings, Brecht formed and re-formed his concept of 
modern theater in response to the legacy of Lessing’s reception of Aristotle in 
contemporary performance – a legacy which, from Brecht’s point of view, had become a 
liability in the radically altered context of the twentieth century. For Brecht, Lessing’s 
specific and historically-bound political agenda, which had sought to energize and 
organize theatrical practice as one of its instruments, had been inscribed into the German 
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tradition along with his stake in the politics of mimēsis. Where it had been a progressive 
agenda in its moment, however, it was fast becoming a reactionary one in both the 
politics and the aesthetics of the twentieth century. As Peter Brooker writes, 
Brecht saw drama as illusionistic and individualistic, a reactionary prop to petty-bourgeois morality, at 
a time when both artistic conventions and ideology had been superannuated by unprecedented social 
and economic change.  Scientific and technological advance and corporate capitalism had decentred 
and subordinated the individual. A new ‘epic’ theatre was therefore required which would be adequate 
to the new subject-matter[, a theater that] would present individuals as socially constructed and 
malleable (Thomson & Sacks 188). 
The traditional theater’s focus on the experience of the bourgeois individual – the 
keystone of what had been its simultaneously neoclassical and progressive project – was 
fast entering into an untenable contradiction with modern historical conditions, in which 
the individual and his subjective passions were ceding their place as the historical subject 
par excellence to the collective and its objective power – in the shape of mass 
movements, class conflict, and international systems of production and exchange. Brecht 
was among the modernist vanguard of European dramatists trying to rethink the political 
authority of dramatic theory and practice in the context of these epochal changes. A 1929 
radio broadcast entitled “Neue Dramatik” (“New Dramatic Form”), consisting of a 
conversation between Brecht, theater critic Herbert Ihering, and sociologist Fritz 
Sternberg, presents a crucial early document of Brecht’s developing attitude towards the 
historical background and the political significance of the aesthetic problems facing 
contemporary theater. Sympathetic to Brecht’s ambitions, Sternberg begins to 
contextualize the innovations of the former’s theater by tracing the historical emergence 
of the heroic bourgeois individual at the end of the Middle Ages and the aesthetic 
expression of its characteristics in dramatic form: 
Sternberg: Das europäische Drama ist keinen Schritt über Shakespeare hinausgegangen. Der stand am 
Wendepunkt zweier Epochen. Was wir mit dem Namen Mittelalter umgreifen, wirkte sich in ihm aus, 
aber schon war der mittelalterliche Mensch aus seinen Bindungen herausgebrochen worden durch die 
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Dynamik der Epoche; das Individuum war geboren worden als Individuum, als ein Nichtteilbares, 
Nichtvertauschbares. Und so wurde das Shakespearische Drama zum Drama des mittelalterlichen 
Menschen wie des Menschen, der sich immer mehr als Individuum zu entdecken begann und als 
solches in dramatische Situationen zu seinesgleichen wie zu übergeordneten Gewalten geriet. Es ist in 
diesem Zusammenhang bedeutsam, welche Stoffe sich Shakespeare für seine großen Römerdramen 
gewählt hat. Er hat uns kein Drama geschenkt über die großen republikanischen Zeiten Roms, in denen 
der einzelne Name noch nichts bedeutete, in denen der Kollektivwille schlechthin entscheidend ist, 
senatus populusque romanus, sondern er hat die Zeiten vor und hinter dem gewählt. Die große 
Mythenzeit, als der Einzelne sich noch der Masse entgegensetzte, im »Coriolan«, und die Zeit des sich 
auflösenden Reiches, das in seiner Expansion schon die Keime des Zerfalls trug (und dabei die großen 
Einzelnen hervorbrachte), im »Julius Caesar« und in »Antonius und Kleopatra«. (Neue Dramatik AW 
6:72) 
Sternberg: The European drama has not come one step further than Shakespeare. He stood at the 
turning point of two epochs. What we comprehend with the name of the Middle Ages played itself out 
in him, but the human being of the medieval era had already been broken out of his shackles by the 
dynamic of the epoch; the individual had been born as an individual, as something indivisible, non-
interchangeable. And so Shakespearean drama became the drama of the medieval human being as the 
human being who began to discover himself more and more as an individual, and, as such, came into 
dramatic situations involving his own kind as well as the power of traditional authority. In this context, 
it is significant to consider which matters Shakespeare chose for his great Roman history dramas. He 
has not given us a single drama about the great republican era of Rome, in which the individual name 
still meant nothing, in which the collective will holds the absolute power of decision, senatus 
populusque romanus; rather, he chose the eras before and after this one. The great mythical era, when 
the individual still set himself against the mass, in Coriolanus; and the era of the declining empire, 
which in its expansion already bore the seeds of its decay (and thereby brought forth the great 
individuals), in Julius Caesar and in Antony and Cleopatra. 
Here, Sternberg acknowledges that in its moment, the historical emergence of the 
individual in European drama gave expression to a revolutionary worldview, in which the 
individual as such transcended not only the boundaries of the feudal and ecclesiastical 
order, but the entire field of concrete historical relations as such. Similarly, this nascent 
concept of the individual arose dialectically, in response to the hegemonic order of a 
hierarchically-organized collective in the Middle Ages. Brecht’s response to Sternberg 
details how the dramatic form that emerged with Shakespeare corresponded perfectly to 
the desires, ambitions, and frailties of the emergent individual, whether he was 
represented on stage or he observed from the audience: 
Die großen Einzelnen waren der Stoff, und dieser Stoff ergab die Form dieser Dramen. Es war die 
sogenannte dramatische Form, und dramatisch bedeutet dabei: wild bewegt, leidenschaftlich, 
kontradiktorisch, dynamisch. Wie war diese dramatische Form? Was war ihr Zweck? Bei Shakespeare 
sehen Sie es genau. Shakespeare treibt durch vier Akte den großen Einzelnen, den Lear, den Othello, 
den Macbeth, aus allen seinen menschlichen Bindungen mit der Familie und mit dem Staat heraus in 
die Heide, in die vollständige Vereinsamung, wo er im Untergang sich groß zu zeigen hat. [...] Der 
erste Satz der Tragödie ist nur da für den zweiten, und alle Sätze sind nur da für den letzten Satz. Die 
151 
Leidenschaft ist es, die dieses Getriebe im Gang hält, und der Zweck des Getriebes ist das große 
individuelle Erlebnis. (Neue Dramatik AW 6:72) 
The great individuals were the content, and this content yielded the form of these dramas. It was the 
so-called dramatic form, and here ‘dramatic’ means: wildly driven, passionate, contradictory, dynamic. 
What was this dramatic form like? What was its aim? With Shakespeare you see it exactly. Through 
four acts, Shakespeare drives the great individual – Lear, Othello, Macbeth – out of all his ties with 
family and state, out on to the heath, into complete isolation, where he must prove his greatness in his 
downfall. [...] The first sentence of the tragedy is only there for the second, and all the sentences are 
only there for the last. It is passion that keeps the gears moving, and the aim of the device is the great 
individual experience (Erlebnis). 
Brecht’s commentary reveals how the elements of the bourgeois drama, even at its very 
beginnings with Shakespeare, were organized around the specific and irreducible aim of 
representing and transmitting what he calls the “great individual experience” of the 
dramatic hero. As we have just seen, this kind of experience remained central to the later 
bourgeois tradition represented by Lessing, whose entire theater of identification is 
designed to transform the individual experience of the dramatic hero into a universally 
human experience accessible to all. Brecht’s commentary here, furthermore, helps us see 
the extent to which Lessing’s invocation of a classical authority for his progressive 
dramatic practice is, in some sense, a politically- and philosophically-savvy equivocation. 
For Lessing, the authority of Aristotle serves only to legitimate in hegemonic terms what 
is really the decisive interpretive authority for dramatic mimēsis: the “great individual 
experience” of the rising bourgeoisie. This form of experience and its newfound 
authority, in Brecht’s time, had become synonymous with the meaning of drama as such 
in the European tradition: it had come to define what was “dramatic” about drama tout 
court – singular, passionate momentum coupled with dynamic and contradictory variety. 
And it was likewise this form of experience which, by Brecht’s time, had successfully 
defended its claim to the classical legacy against all challengers – this theater had 
become, for better or worse, “Aristotelian theater.” Sternberg’s rejoinder to Brecht, 
however, offers a thumbnail sketch of the fundamental historical shifts which have raised 
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doubts not only about the responsibility of the bourgeois, Aristotelian theater to political 
reality, but also about the interpretive authority of individual experience in grasping the 
truth of the modern world: 
Sternberg: Aber Shakespeare verkörperte noch die heroische Zeit des Dramas und damit das Zeitalter 
des heroischen Erlebnisses. Das Heroische verging und die Erlebnissuche blieb. Je mehr wir uns dem 
19. Jahrhundert [...] nähern, desto gleichförmiger wurde das bürgerliche Drama; der ganze 
Erlebniskreis des Bürgers drehte sich -- im Drama! -- im wesentlichen um die Beziehungen Mann -- 
Frau; Frau -- Mann. Sämtliche Möglichkeiten, die sich aus diesem Problem ergeben, sind einmal 
bürgerliches Drama geworden: [...] der größte Teil des Dramas des 19. Jahrhunderts ist mit dieser 
Persiflage erledigt. Was aber geschieht nun weiter, da doch nun einmal in der Wirklichkeit das 
Individuum als Individuum, als Individualität, als Unteilbares, als Unvertauschbares immer mehr 
schwindet, da im Ausgang des kapitalistischen Zeitalters wieder das Kollektive bestimmend ist. (Neue 
Dramatik AW 6:73) 
Sternberg: But Shakespeare still embodied the heroic age of the drama, and with it, the age of the 
heroic experience (Erlebnis). The heroic concept passed away, but the yearning for experience 
(Erlebnissuche) remained. The closer we get to the 19th century, the more homogeneous the bourgeois 
drama becomes; the bourgeoise’s whole sphere of experience (Erlebniskreis) – in the drama! – by and 
large turned around the relationships of man-to-woman and woman-to-man. The totality of 
possibilities that issue from this problem became bourgeois drama, pure and simple: […] the largest 
part of 19th
Sternberg’s statement closes with the diagnosis of an imminent contradiction between the 
facts of social reality and the individualist disposition of contemporary drama. His 
presentation indicates that the authoritative status of individual experience in dramatic 
mimēsis had been undermined not by the final exhaustion of its possibilities, but by the 
growing impoverishment and insularity of the spheres in which it could still be 
persuasively and meaningfully articulated – namely, the sphere of domestic relations. The 
passions and experiences of the heroic individual, insofar as they still offered the favored 
object of dramatic representation, now functioned not as a transparent and authoritative 
window on the whole of social reality – a reality in which the collective had already come 
to assert itself as the preeminent political agent – but as a clouded lens fixed on its tiniest 
part, obscuring and mystifying the rest. In other words, the mimēsis of reality in the 
-century drama is taken care of with this persiflage. Which is continuing to happen now, 
however, when the individual as individual, as individuality, as an indivisible, non-interchangeable 
entity is after all now disappearing more and more in reality, because the collective is once again the 
defining force in the decline of the capitalist era. 
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theater and reality itself had historically parted ways, and were headed for a collision. 
Although the fundamentally mimetic function of theater remained essentially the same – 
to represent, through artistic imitation, a certain experience of reality so as to make it 
available (whatever that might mean) to the grasp of the spectator – the crucial questions 
for contemporary theater very much concerned the authority to which one might have 
recourse for the experience that formed the core of drama. What kind of experience is to 
be imitated? Who or what is the subject of this experience? What form, level, or mode of 
reality is its object? How can it be adequately represented? What should its representation 
achieve? 
Given this assessment of the situation of contemporary theater, Brecht’s main 
aesthetic problem in relation to the bourgeois tradition was how to invent and practice a 
method of dramatic representation that offered an accurate, uncompromising, and timely 
representation of modern reality, in which both the historical significance and the 
interpretive authority of the individual had manifestly receded, and those of the mass had 
asserted themselves as definitive. Since the mass itself was plural, dynamic, and 
contradictory, such a representation would have to avoid the bourgeois trap of subjecting 
the whole teeming multitude of perspectives given in the mass to the homogenizing, 
unifying, and mollifying illusions of a universal humanity shared by all, and an 
individuality that heroically transcends historical and political particulars. Brecht is quite 
clear, in fact, about how his self-avowedly “nichtaristotelisch” (“non-Aristotelian”) 
theater actually seeks to intensify the differences between its individual spectators: by 
striving for responses that polarize the socially and economically distinct perspectives 
given in its mass audience, Brechtian theater brings these perspectives into engagement, 
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if not open conflict. In an essay from 1932 (revised and augmented in 1936), Brecht 
states his position in polemical terms: 
Die herrschende Ästhetik verlangt vom Kunstwerk […] eine alle sozialen und sonstigen Unterschiede 
der Individuen überbrückende Wirkung. Eine solche, die Klassengegensätze überbrückende Wirkung 
wird von Dramen der aristotelischen Dramatik auch heute noch erzielt, obwohl die 
Klassenunterschiede den Individuen immer mehr bewußt werden. Sie wird auch erzielt, wenn die 
Klassengegensätze der Gegenstand dieser Dramen sind, und sogar, wenn in ihnen für die eine oder 
andere Klasse Stellung genommen wird. In jedem Fall entsteht im Zuschauerraum auf der Basis des 
allen Zuhörern gemeinsamen „allgemein Menschlichen“ für die Dauer des Kunstgenusses ein 
Kollektivum. An der Herstellung dieses Kollektivums ist die nichtaristotelische Dramatik [...] nicht 
interessiert. Sie spaltet ihr Publikum.33
The dominant aesthetic demands from the work of art […] an effect that bridges all differences 
between individuals, whether social or otherwise. Even today, drama based on Aristotelian principles 
still strives for such an effect, which bridges class conflicts as well, although individuals are becoming 
ever more aware of class differences. Drama still strives for this effect when class conflicts form the 
main object of a particular work, and even when a play takes up a position for one class or another. In 
any case, what comes into being in the auditorium, on the basis of the “universal humanity” common 
to all spectators and for the duration of their enjoyment of the work, is a collective. The non-
Aristotelian dramaturgy […] is not interested in producing such a collective. It divides its audience. 
 
Brecht’s non-Aristotelian theater thus strives to imitate a reality authoritatively created 
and experienced not by the individual, but by the mass; in representing it thus, his theater 
strives equally to transform the mass it represents – to activate the vast and untapped 
network of differences that criss-crosses the bodies and minds of that mass, and to unlock 
its potential for reflection, deliberation, and action. It is worth noting that Brecht is in full 
agreement with Lessing and the latter’s tradition about the transformative effect of 
dramatic imitation on that which it imitates: in this respect, Brecht’s methods stand 
entirely within the reception of Aristotle established by the bourgeois neoclassical 
tradition, and is, indeed, quite far from being “non-Aristotelian.” As we have already 
seen, however, Lessing’s reception of Aristotle had stressed that the principle of 
integrated unity should govern the aesthetic relationships between all the elements of 
dramatic mimēsis itself, on the one hand, and the relationships of identification between 
                                                          
33  Bertolt Brecht, “Mittelbare Wirkung des epischen Theaters,” in: Schriften zum Theater, ed. 
Siegfried Unseld (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1957), 59, emphasis mine. Hereafter, texts by Brecht 
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the individual spectator, the dramatic hero, and the collective of the audience, on the 
other. In response to this component of the bourgeois tradition, Brecht’s theater aimed at 
nothing less than strategic and dialectical dis-integration on both of these fronts. In fact, 
it could be said that both the origin and the destination of Brecht’s theater lay in the dis-
integration of the modern mass itself – the sole interpretive authority of modern 
experience, whose claims had to be resolutely opposed to the unifying, classical authority 
inscribed in the bourgeois tradition. The realization of this dis-integration in the dramatic 
forms of Brecht’s theater, furthermore, would not attempt to mystify the alienated 
condition of the modern subject by symbolically resolving its contradictions through the 
experience of an inauthentic “universal humanity.” It would instead attempt to reenact 
that alienation in the theater as a dis-integration of interpretive perspectives, and to utilize 
all the methods of theater in rendering that alienation into an object of both recognition 
and interpretation from the plurality of perspectives given in its mass audience. The 
success of the alienation effect in Brecht’s theater really meant that the spectator had 
attained a specific and authentic perspective on his or her own condition of alienation and 
dis-integration within the modern mass, and, furthermore, was now in a position to 
understand, criticize, and overcome it in reality. 
 Brecht’s interpretive responsibility to the German bourgeois tradition of drama 
can thus itself be understood stereoscopically: it must be viewed from two different 
perspectives simultaneously, as both an intervention in, and a continuation of, the 
standing terms of the conversation into which Brecht enters. From one point of view, his 
theoretical texts actually perpetuate Lessing’s Aristotelianism, insofar as Brecht tacitly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
appearing in this volume will be cited by title, the abbreviation ST, and the page number(s) in this edition: 
e.g. Mittelbare Wirkung ST 59. 
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assents to the model of mimēsis in dramatic representation as well as dramatic 
spectatorship. Just as actors on stage imitate the reality of human experience and 
impersonate its agents, so the spectators in the auditorium imitate the imitations, and 
impersonate the impersonations, once they leave the theater and reenter the real world – 
hence the interpretive authority of dramatic representation. Insofar as mimēsis, for both 
Brecht and Lessing, establishes the point of mutual exchange between stage and spectator 
and thus grants the theater its instrumental leverage on political reality, we can rightly 
claim that Brecht here invokes the authority of his tradition. In this case, Brecht 
impersonates Lessing, and through Lessing, Aristotle. From a different, but equally 
legitimate point of view, Brecht refuses to don the mask of his bourgeois tradition. For 
him, the exchange between politics and theater enacted by mimēsis in the bourgeois 
tradition is too strictly defined in terms of an individuality and a universality which have 
ceased to exist as meaningful authorities in the interpretation of political reality: the 
modern subject can no more embody a universal than he can rightly claim to be an 
individual unto himself. The tangled plurality of perspectives given in the modern mass, 
which always exists in the dynamic middle ground between individual and universal, 
now offers the new instrument to aid dramatic vision and the new authority to legitimate 
the interpretation of experience. Actor and spectator alike must wear many contradictory 
masks at once, and perceive from a multitude of angles. 
 This mandate, as we are about to see, forms the core of Brecht’s theories of 
alienation. Having established his responsibility to the terms of the traditional 
conversation, terms which offer as much servitude as they do freedom, Brecht now stands 
poised on the threshold of a new age in theater – or, depending on your point of view, 
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balanced on the razor’s edge of risk. We should note, too, that Brecht's responsibility to 
the historical arc of his tradition – the ways he inserts himself into, and is borne along by, 
a current of interpretation in time, the way he resists and reverses part of its momentum 
in order to expedite another part – runs quite precisely in parallel with Oedipus' tangled, 
half-conscious responsibility to the spatial mapping of Greek political culture. What 
Oedipus is to the “center-periphery” spatial structure of the polis, Brecht is to what might 
be called the “now-then” historical structure of modernity. As we shall see, furthermore, 
the more that Brecht's anti-tragic modernity resists the gravitational pull of Oedipus', or 
Aristotle's, tragic antiquity, the more it actually risks augmenting and intensifying the 
irresistible force of attraction exerted by its opponent. 
 
4. Icarus and the Horse’s Ass: Alienation as the Pluralization of Vision in Brecht’s 
Theoretical Texts 
If we approach Brecht’s theories of alienation as an attempt to dis-integrate, modernize, 
and pluralize Lessing’s neoclassical ideal of integrated unity, we find ourselves 
particularly well situated to view them equally well as a political critique directed at the 
interpretive authority of dramatic mimēsis. Along either path, Brecht’s aim was to train 
actors and spectators alike in stereoscopic perspective as the authoritatively modern form 
of vision, the preeminent faculty of the new age. The Verfremdungseffekt (or V-Effekt), 
variously translated as “alienation effect” or “estrangement,” was Brecht’s name for the 
general device by which the spectator’s perspectival dis-integration was achieved and its 
implied critique of dramatic representation was executed.34
                                                          
34  Barring a lengthy discussion of the controversy surrounding the significance and adequate 
translation of Brecht’s term Verfremdung, I have chosen to settle for the most widely used and 
uncontroversial English rendering, “alienation” and “alienation effect.” 
 Brecht’s articulation of the 
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means and ends of the alienation effect arguably constitutes his single most significant 
innovation in modern dramatic theory and practice. More importantly, it represents the 
point at which Brecht’s responsibility to Lessing’s Aristotelianism, and the risks that 
accompany that responsibility, emerge in sharpest detail. 
One of the more inviting points of access to Brecht’s concept of alienation 
appears in a fragment from 1937, “Verfremdungstechnik in den erzählenden Bildern des 
älteren Breughel” (“Alienation Techniques in the Narrative Paintings of Brueghel the 
Elder”), in which Brecht outlines how a dis-integrating dynamic of painterly 
representation provokes stereoscopic perception through the alienation effect: 
Geht man den malerischen Kontrasten des Breughel auf den Grund, so gewahrt man, daß er 
Widersprüche malt. Im »Sturz des Ikarus« überfällt etwa die Katastrophe die Idylle in solcher Art, daß 
sie sich höchst deutlich absetzt und daß auch über die Idylle wertvolle Einsichten entstehen. Er erlaubt 
der Katastrophe nicht, die Idylle zu verändern; vielmehr wird diese, selbst unverändert bleibend, nach 
wie vor unzerstört erhalten, lediglich gestört. In dem großen Kriegsbild »Die tolle Grete« führt die 
Schreckensstimmung des Krieges dem Maler nicht den Pinsel, wenn er die Urheberin, die Kriegsfurie, 
in ihrer Hilflosigkeit und Beschränktheit zeigt und ihr einen Dienstbotencharakter verleiht; so schafft 
er einen tieferen Schrecken. Wenn in flämische Landschaft ein Alpenmassiv gesetzt ist oder dem 
zeitgemäßen europäischen Kostüm das antike asiatische entgegensteht, dann denunziert eines das 
andere und zeigt es in seiner Besonderheit, aber zugleich erhalten wir Landschaft schlechthin, Leute 
überall. 
 Nicht nur eine Stimmung geht von solchen Bildern aus, sondern eine Vielfalt von Stimmungen. 
Wenn der Breughel seine Gegensätze auch ins Gleichgewicht bringt, so gleicht er sie doch niemals 
einander an. 
 Noch gibt es bei ihm keine Trennung des Tragischen vom Komischen, sondern sein Tragisches 
enthält selber Komik und seine Komik Tragisches (Verfremdungstechnik in den erzählenden Bildern 
des älteren Breughel AW 6:254).35
If one gets to the root of Brueghel’s painterly contrasts, one perceives that he paints contradictions. In 
the “Fall of Icarus,” the catastrophe attacks the idyll in such a way that it very clearly defects [sic!] 
from it and valuable insights about the idyll also take shape. He does not allow the catastrophe to alter 
the idyll; rather, the latter – even though it remains unchanged, preserved intact (unzerstört) as it was 
before – is merely unsettled (gestört). In the great war painting “Dulle Griet,” the terrorized mood 
(Schreckensstimmung) of war does not lead the painter’s brush when he shows its author – the Fury of 
 
                                                          
35  See also the entire fascinating collection of fragments on Brueghel in the AW: “Über den V-
Effekt beim älteren Breughel” (6:254), “V-Effekte in einigen Bildern des älteren Brueghel” (6:255-256), 
and “Eine Verfremdungstechnik in der Malerei des älteren Brueghel” (6:256). Brecht’s reception of 
Brueghel in all of these pieces – which show that he shares far more with his forebear than a certain 
predilection for the earthiness and frugality of the peasant folk that was so often the subject of Brueghel’s 
work – readily demonstrates the deep roots of Brecht’s artistic methods not only in German literature and 
philosophy, but northern European art and culture more generally. They also make any narrow-minded 
attempt to write him out of these traditions for the sake of his Marxism (or, worse yet, for his unsavory 
personal and political decisions) seem self-defeating. 
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war – in her helplessness and incapacity and lends her the character of a servant; thus he creates an 
even deeper terror. When an Alpine peak is placed in a Flemish landscape, or an ancient Asiatic 
costume confronts a contemporary European one, then one denounces [sic!!!] the other and shows it 
forth in its specific character – but at the same time we get landscape as such, with people all over it. 
 One mood (Stimmung) only does not arise from such images – rather, a multitude of moods. If 
Breughel brings his contradictions into balance, he certainly never adapts them to each other. 
 With him there is still no separation of the tragic from the comic: rather, his tragedy itself contains 
comedy and his comedy tragedy. 
This conception of Brueghel’s alienating technique, outlined here in the context of visual 
art, reveals the basic method that underlies Brechtian alienation in both theory and 
practice. By representing situations, figures, and events in such a way that underlying 
contradictions are pulled to the surface and made to engage each other directly in the 
viewer’s experience, the viewer of Brueghel’s “Landscape with the Fall of Icarus”36
beruht wesentlich darauf, daß der Zuschauer den ästhetischen «Welt»-Entwurf des Dichters akzeptiert. 
Dieser Anfangsentwurf nun – man könnte ihn als ästhetischen Rahmen bezeichnen – ist Voraussetzung 
für die kausal vorwärtsschreitende Handlung. Das Handlungsgerüst stellt eine ästhetische Totalität dar, 
die nicht überschritten werden kann [...]. Sie erlaubt deshalb – zumindest während der Rezeption – 
keine Konfrontation mit der außerästhetischen Wirklichkeit. [...] Kritik ist lediglich als Kritik an der 
Darstellung, als ästhetische Kritik möglich, denn das Bühnengeschehen ist durch seine 
weltanschauliche Abgeschlossenheit aus der Alltagsrealität herausgenommen. Ein «Wenn und Aber» 
wird ungültig durch das anfänglich akzeptierte «Unter-der-Voraussetzung-Daß» (Koller 10). 
 
cannot simply subsume his varied perceptions to a definite single viewpoint with its roots 
in the unified worldview of the artist and the overarching unity of the artwork itself. The 
process of identification, which takes place precisely by subsuming such a multitude of 
perceptions to a single figure and a single perspective, would culminate in the viewer’s 
appropriation of the “great individual experience” that informs and unifies the entire 
work. As Gerold Koller argues, the success of this process in traditional forms of 
dramatic representation 
rests essentially on the spectator’s acceptance of the poet’s “global” conception. This primary 
conception – one could designate it as an “aesthetic frame” – is the prerequisite for the causal progress 
of the action. The structure of the plot presents an aesthetic totality that cannot be transcended […]. 
Therefore, it allows no confrontation with the reality that lies beyond its aesthetic bounds. […] 
Criticism is possible merely as criticism of the presentation, as aesthetic criticism, since the events on 
stage are removed from everyday reality through the self-contained character of their governing logic. 
Any ‘Ifs, Ands, or Buts’ are rendered invalid by the ‘Under-the-Condition-That’ accepted at the start. 
                                                          
36  See figure at end of chapter. 
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For Brecht, the masterfully applied alienation effect of Brueghel’s painting depends on 
the fact that the image refuses to offer a hermetic “‘Welt’-Entwurf,” a “global 
conception” contained in a focal experience, despite the fact that it goes out of its way to 
create every possible expectation for one – in its subject matter (classical, mythological, 
and tragic), its genre (landscape), and its intended mode of reception (contemplation and 
introspection in the private home). Each of the central points of interest in the painting – 
the resplendent ship, the distant city, the pastoral scene surrounding the hard-working 
farmer, the idle and distracted shepherd, and the violent collision between Icarus himself 
and the water’s surface, with legs flailing helplessly – is separated from the others by a 
system of spatial and existential gaps. Brueghel renders each of these foci as inhabiting 
distinct and simultaneous points in three-dimensional space, but the viewer apprehends 
them serially, as a network of points spread across the plane of the painting, such that 
their enlargement or diminution through perspective actually contributes to the force of 
their contending commentaries – witness, for instance, the fact that even the rear-end of 
the farmer’s horse fairly dwarfs the entire “Icarus event.” Each focal point suggests to the 
viewer an evaluation of the whole, but each of them also strictly delimits the emotional 
and intellectual effect of all the others, imposing different criteria of evaluation on the 
very same situations and objects, and delivering a sobering shock to any claim, whether 
tragic or comic, exalted or mundane, that takes itself too seriously. In Brecht’s words, 
each viewpoint remains as much unzerstört (literally, ‘undestroyed, intact’) as it is 
systematically gestört (‘disturbed, unsettled’). Furthermore, the specific character of its 
“intact” state (seine Besonderheit) jumps into sharp relief precisely because it has been 
roused from the indolence of unity and harmony into the wakefulness of confrontation 
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and contradiction – or, to put a finer point on it, from identification to dis-integration. The 
“master perspective” of the work, the prerequisite of its viewer’s appropriation – its 
aesthetic frame, in Koller’s terms – undermines itself by demanding that the viewer 
simultaneously accept more than one perspective, one prerequisite, and one frame. The 
viewer’s grasp of the work as a whole depends on the degree to which he can bring 
himself to perceive, think, and judge from within a multitude of contradictory 
perspectives – including those which arise from outside the “global conception” of artists 
and art in general and address themselves to a work from a position of critique. In short, 
the authority upon which its interpretive mimēsis is based is already plural: neither 
classical nor modern, but both; neither exalted nor everyday, but both; neither aristocratic 
nor democratic, but both. In exactly the same way, Brecht’s techniques of alienation 
establish the authority of dramatic representation in the reciprocal interaction of response 
and critique, rather than the one-sided penetration and appropriation of experience 
through identification. As Koller writes, “Der »Rahmen« des aristotelischen Dramas ist 
es gerade, der im epischen Theater thematisiert wird” (Koller 11; “The ‘frame’ of the 
Aristotelian drama is precisely what is thematized in epic theater”). The univocal 
authority of the bourgeois individual and his integrated dramatic form is single-handedly 
replaced by the plurality of voices and perspectives that inhere in the constantly dis-
integrating and re-integrating structure of the modern mass.37
                                                          
37  With respect to the alienation effect, Brecht’s ongoing engagement with Brueghel, as a vehicle for 
both refining his theoretical reflections and increasing their historical depth, has precedents in his lifelong 
fascination with various forms of “low” or folk culture in Germany as providing models of representation 
that run against the grain of traditional methods of drama associated with “high” culture. See, for instance, 
his seminal essay “Verfremdungseffekte in der chinesischen Schauspielkunst” (“Alienation Effects in 
Chinese Acting,” 1936; AW 6:232-242), in which he begins his reflections on alienation in the theater by 
discussing effects of distanciation common to certain forms of German folk art (232-233). 
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 Brecht’s interpretation of Brueghel lays the groundwork for understanding how 
alienation worked on a practical level in the methods of dramatic mimēsis adopted by 
actor and director, and how these were designed to interact with the attitudes, desires, and 
expectations of audiences whose interpretive approach to theater was predicated upon 
identification. The techniques of alienation that Brecht describes in his 1939 essay 
“Kurze Beschreibung einer neuen Technik der Schauspielkunst, die einen 
Verfremdungseffekt hervorbringt” (“Short Description of a New Dramatic Technique 
That Produces An Alienation Effect”) function as catalysts of critical reflection for both 
actor and spectator on the interpretive authority invoked in and by dramatic mimēsis. In 
the context of my intergeneric reading here with LdG, two of these techniques concern us 
directly: the first, what might be called incomplete impersonation; the second, textual 
displacement. 
The first group of techniques outlined in the “Beschreibung” and elsewhere 
explicitly depend upon the perspectival dis-integration of the actor from the dramatic 
figure he represents, or what Brecht calls “die nicht restlose Verwandlung” (“incomplete 
transformation”). For Brecht, the actor’s imitation of action must rigorously separate the 
imitator from that which he imitates, and relate the former to the latter through critique 
and interpretation: 
Der Schauspieler läßt es auf der Bühne nicht zur restlosen Verwandlung in die darzustellende Person 
kommen. Er ist nicht Lear, Harpagon, Schwejk, er zeigt diese Leute. Er bringt ihre Aussprüche so echt 
wie möglich, er führt ihre Verhaltungsweise vor, so gut es ihm seine Menschenkenntnis erlaubt, aber er 
versucht nicht, sich (und dadurch andern) einzubilden, er habe sich hiermit restlos verwandelt. 
Schauspieler werden wissen, was gemeint ist, wenn man als Beispiel für eine Spielweise ohne restlose 
Verwandlung das Spiel des Regisseurs oder des Kollegen, der ihnen eine besondere Stelle vormacht, 
anführt. Da es sich nicht um seine eigene Rolle handelt, verwandelt er sich nicht völlig, er unterstreicht 
das Technische und behält die Haltung des bloß Vorschlagenden bei. (Beschreibung einer neuen 
Technik AW 6:469-470) 
The actor on stage does not allow his performance to reach the point where he has completely 
transformed himself into the character he represents. He is not Lear, Harpagon, or Schwejk, [rather] he 
is showing [us] these people. He presents their statements as authentically as possible, he demonstrates 
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their modes of behavior as well as his knowledge of human beings allows him, but he does not attempt 
to deceive himself (nor anyone else, for that matter) into thinking that he has achieved complete 
transformation. Actors will know what is meant if, as an example of a method of acting without 
complete transformation, we consider the acting of the director or of a colleague who makes a 
demonstration for them of how to act a particular moment in a play. Since the demonstration does not 
concern his own role, he does not transform himself completely [sc. into character], he emphasizes the 
technical component and retains the attitude of one who is merely making a suggestion. 
The performer actively resists his complete transformation into character chiefly by 
presenting his performance not as the immediate and spontaneous unfolding of an action 
before the eyes of his audience, but as the conscious and manifest representation of an 
action which occurs at a place and time other than the here and now of performance. It is, 
in a sense, mimēsis with a good conscience: the inauthentic unity of actor and role in the 
activity of impersonation is replaced with an authentically unbridgeable gap – like one of 
Brueghel’s – between the one who impersonates and the one who is impersonated. 
The technique of alienation thus makes dramatic mimēsis explicitly function as a 
kind of symbol or sign which refers back to, takes up a particular attitude towards, and 
repeats an action which never appears in its “immediate” or “spontaneous” form: in a 
word, it makes action signify rather than appear.38
                                                          
38  To be fair, Brecht does stipulate that actors can and must identify with their roles to a certain 
degree, but stresses that the method of identification must either serve a strategic purpose in the effect they 
ultimately seek to create, or function as a transitional phase in the work of role-construction and rehearsal 
(Beschreibung einer neuen Technik AW 6:468-469). He nonetheless expressly prohibits the use of these 
techniques to facilitate the spectator’s identification in performance. Such allowances by no means 
undermine Brecht’s claims here or his broader theoretical commitments; rather, they demonstrate his 
dialectical appropriation of the techniques of dramatic tradition, only to press them into service for 
radically different aims. 
 In doing so, the alienation effect 
provokes the spectator to recognize and question the invisible, unquestionable ‘aesthetic 
frame’ by which the thoughts and actions of a given character are validated as necessary, 
justified, and inevitable in the world of the play – to interrogate, in short, the authority 
that legitimates them. The alienation effects achieved in Chinese drama, for instance, 
share in precisely the symbolic-repetitive character that Brecht values in dramatic 
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performance: “Der [chinesische] Artist stellt Vorgänge von großer Leidenschaftlichkeit 
dar, aber dabei bleibt sein Vortrag ohne Hitzigkeit. [… D]as ist wie ein Ritus, alles 
Eruptive fehlt ihm. Es handelt sich deutlich um eine Wiederholung des Vorgangs durch 
einen andern Menschen, eine, allerdings kunstvolle, Schilderung” (Verfremdungseffekte 
in der chinesischen Schauspielkunst AW 6:235; “The [Chinese] actor presents events of 
great passion, but his performance thereby remains without heated excitement. […] It is 
like a ritual, there is nothing explosive about it. It is clearly marked as a repetition of the 
event by another person, a depiction – but certainly an artful one”).39
                                                          
39  See also Jendreiek 71-74. 
 With the 
establishment of this referential or deictic distance, the Brechtian actor can assume a 
distinct interpretive perspective on the character he represents, from whom he always 
remains separate, and about whose actions his performance issues an ongoing critique: 
“Da […] sich [der Schauspieler] mit der Person, die er darstellt, nicht identifiziert, kann 
er ihr gegenüber einen bestimmten Standpunkt wählen, seine Meinung über sie verraten, 
den Zuschauer, der auch seinerseits nicht eingeladen wurde, sich zu identifizieren, zur 
Kritik der dargestellten Person auffordern” (Beschreibung einer neuen Technik AW 
6:472; “Since [the actor] does not identify with the person whom he represents, the 
former can choose a certain standpoint towards the latter, betray his opinion about him, 
encourage the spectator – who for his own part is also not invited to identify – to 
undertake a critique of the person so represented”). As a result, the spectator must 
constantly vacillate between at least three different perspectives on a given character, all 
of which exist in a relationship of dis-integration with each other and are related 
stereoscopically: the perspective of the actor, as subject of dramatic deixis, that of his 
character, as object of deixis, and that of the spectator himself, who evaluates and 
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criticizes both the other perspectives as much as he introduces questions and problems of 
his own. As with Brueghel’s painting, the spectator must constantly renegotiate the 
authority with which he identifies at a given moment and which governs his overall 
interpretation of a specific character or of the drama as a whole. The jagged, abrupt shift 
he experiences from one authority to another, or from one perspective to another, 
constitutes the experience of the alienation effect. 
 A second group of alienating techniques articulated by Brecht depends upon the 
actor’s exploitation, throughout the process of role-formation and in performance itself, 
of the possibilities for alienation inherent to the drama as a textual object. Brecht’s 
textually-centered strategies compel the actor to build up his relationship to his character 
as a relationship with a textual object rather than one with a real and concrete subject. 
The dramatic text as such is never allowed to drop out as the mediating term in the 
relationship between actor and character: instead, it becomes a kind of refracting prism 
by means of which possibilities of interpretation and representation are multiplied 
through a number of verbal and textual transformations. The objectivity of the text – its 
unique and arbitrary grammatical and syntactic structures – becomes one more 
instrument by means of which the actor can alienate himself from his character. By 
strategically altering the form of the text and undermining its status as an authoritative 
“given,” the actions and attitudes that the text represents likewise become available for 
criticism: 
Drei Hilfsmittel können bei einer Spielweise mit nicht restloser Verwandlung zu einer Verfremdung 
der Äußerungen und Handlungen der darzustellenden Person dienen:  
 1. Die Überführung in die dritte Person. 
 2. Die Überführung in die Vergangenheit. 
 3. Das Mitsprechen von Spielanweisungen und Kommentaren. 
Das Setzen der Er-Form und der Vergangenheit ermöglicht dem Schauspieler die richtige distanzierte 
Haltung. Der Schauspieler sucht außerdem Spielanweisungen und kommentarische Äußerungen zu 
seinem Text und spricht sie auf der Probe mit (»Er stand auf und sagte böse, denn er hatte nicht 
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gegessen:...« oder »Er hörte das zum erstenmal und wußte nicht, ob es die Wahrheit war« oder »Er 
lächelte und sagte allzu sorglos:...«). Das Mitsprechen der Spielanweisungen in der dritten Person 
bewirkt, daß zwei Tonfälle aufeinanderstoßen, wodurch der zweite (also der eigentliche Text) 
verfremdet wird. […] Das Setzen der Vergangenheit dabei stellt den Sprecher auf einen Punkt, von 
dem aus er auf den Satz zurücksieht. Damit wird der Satz ebenfalls verfremdet, ohne daß der Sprecher 
einen unrealen Standpunkt einnimmt, denn er hat ja, im Gegensatz zum Zuhörer, das Stück zu Ende 
gelesen und kann also vom Ende her, von den Folgen her, über den Satz besser urteilen als dieser, der 
weniger weiß, dem Satz fremder gegenübersteht. (Beschr. einer neuen Tech. der Sch. 6:470-471) 
When using a dramatic method with incomplete transformation, three expedients can help accomplish 
the alienation of the statements and actions of the dramatic character: 
 1. Transposition into the third person. 
 2. Transposition into the past tense. 
 3. Reading stage directions and commentary out loud along with the scripted lines. 
The use of the third-person form and of the past tense enables the actor to attain the correct, 
distanciated attitude. In addition, the actor solicits stage directions and commentaries to his text and 
recites them [sc. along with his lines] in rehearsal (“He stood up and said angrily, since he had not 
eaten…” or “He heard that for the first time and did not know whether it was the truth” or “He smiled 
and said all too carelessly:…”). Reading stage directions transposed into the third person along with 
one’s lines has the effect of making two different speaking registers clash with each other, whereby the 
second (i.e. the actual text) is alienated. […] The transposition into the past tense in the same situation 
places the speaker in a position from which he looks back at the sentence. The sentence is likewise 
alienated thereby without forcing the speaker to take up an unreal perspective, since after all, in 
contrast to the listener, he has finished reading the play and thus, from the viewpoint of the end, from 
the viewpoint of the consequences, can judge the sentence better than the listener, who knows less and 
confronts the sentence as something more foreign. 
The method described here treats the dramatic text not as a vehicle of universally human 
virtues or passions to be appropriated and reproduced in performance, but as an arbitrary 
verbal and conceptual structure that can be freely manipulated in a variety of ways. As a 
result, the actor comes to approach his role not through the mandates of a primal human 
necessity that links him directly to his character, but by the subtle contours of a quasi-
algebraic textuality that separates one from the other through a series of free choices.40
                                                          
40  At least two German scholars have investigated in more detail the verbal and textual 
characteristics of the alienation effect in Brecht’s dramas: Gisela Debiel, Das Prinzip der Verfremdung in 
der Sprachgestaltung Bertolt Brechts. Untersuchungen zum Sprachstil seiner epischen Dramen. Diss. 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1960. Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1960; 
in a wider historical context, Gertrud Fankhauser, Verfremdung als Stilmittel vor und bei Brecht (Tübingen: 
Verlag Elly Huth, 1971). 
 
Brecht called a closely-related variation of this procedure, which was designed for final 
performance rather than rehearsal, the “Fixieren des ‘Nicht – Sondern’” (“establishment 
of the ‘not-rather’”): 
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Geht [der Schauspieler] auf die Bühne, so wird er bei allen wesentlichen Stellen zu dem, was er macht, 
noch etwas ausfindig, namhaft und ahnbar machen, was er nicht macht; das heißt er spielt so, daß man 
die Alternative möglichst deutlich sieht, so, daß sein Spiel noch die anderen Möglichkeiten ahnen läßt, 
nur eine der möglichen Varianten darstellt. […] Das was er nicht
When [the actor] goes on stage, in all the crucial moments he will make something which he does not 
do distinct, detectable, and surmisable in addition to that which he does do; that is to say, he acts in 
such a way that the alternative can be seen as clearly as possible, that his performance permits one to 
surmise the other possibilities, [but] only represents one of the possible variants. […] Whatever he 
does not do must be preserved [enthalten] and cancelled [aufgehoben; note that these are both 
Hegelian terms] in what he does do. In this way, all sentences and gestures come to signify decisions 
[…]. 
 macht, muß in dem enthalten und 
aufgehoben sein, was er macht. So bedeuten alle Sätze und Gesten Entscheidungen […] (Beschreibung 
einer neuen Technik 6:469; see also Jendreiek 74-77). 
Whether through verbal transposition or the establishment of the ‘not-rather’, each of the 
possible negated alternatives recovered and exploited by these methods offers a distinct 
perspective from which the totality of the action appears as a composition of arbitrary 
decisions – like language itself – rather than a transparent and self-enclosed process that 
unfolds according to the necessity authorized by the play’s ‘aesthetic frame.’ As Brooker 
writes, the establishment of the ‘not-rather’ “would therefore produce a jolt of surprise 
and illumination, as the familiar and predictable were not […] seen afresh but ‘seen 
through’; judged with the eyes of a suspicious, quizzically naïve spectator. [A]s a 
particular attitude, action or event was revolved to expose the shadow of its alternative, 
the taken-for-granted would be negated under the impetus of a new understanding and 
grasp of social alternatives” (Thomson & Sacks 191). In textual terms, this latter 
conception – that of Lessing’s bourgeois tradition – treats the dramatic text as a 
mediating representation of an immediate action. Its mediation must eventually be 
overcome as the imaginary action itself increasingly supplants, and finally replaces, its 
real representation. Since dramatic action must eventually appear in performance as a 
unified, necessary, and spontaneous totality, and since the subjects represented therein 
must appeal to the spectator on the level of identification, performance must elide the 
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mediating and objectifying matrix of the text – paradoxically! – by perfecting its im-
personation of that text. Brecht’s technique, on the other hand, takes this textual matrix as 
an instrument with which to interrogate the authoritative categories of unity, necessity, 
and spontaneity in the action itself through a series of alienating displacements, whereby 
the actor gains access to alternative authorities and interpretive perspectives. In short, 
rather than reading the dramatic action out of the dramatic text in order to dispense with 
the text, Brecht’s method attempts to read the structure of the text back into the action, 
only to dispense with dramatic action as we are accustomed to understand it: “Ist die 
restlose Verwandlung aufgegeben, bringt der Schauspieler seinen Text nicht wie eine 
Improvisation, sondern wie ein Zitat” (Beschreibung einer neuen Technik AW 6:470, 
emphasis mine; “If [the actor] foregoes complete transformation [sc. into character], he 
performs his lines not like an improvisation, but like a quotation”). A similar effect is 
achieved through the recitation of scripted lines alongside stage directions and 
commentary: here, the stereoscopic perspective created between the putatively 
immediate, embodied voice of the dramatic character and the mediating, disembodied 
voice of the dramatist leaves the former intact (unzerstört) even as it is subtly but 
decisively unsettled (gestört) by the latter’s interruptions, directions, descriptions, or even 
contradictions. As a result, the interpretive authority of any character – rooted in his or 
her specific perspective, formed in response to the entire progress of the drama as it 
happens, and performed in his or her speech and action – never becomes properly 
“universal,” never becomes perfectly interchangeable with the interpretive authority by 
means of which the actor or spectator is encouraged to make sense of the play as a whole. 
As the spectator’s interpretive approach to the actor’s performance, so the actor’s 
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interpretive approach to his dramatic character is governed by the plurality of viewpoints 
opened by the alienating techniques he applies to the dramatic text. 
As methods that achieve the alienation effect, Brecht formulated both incomplete 
impersonation and textual displacement as parts of a critical response directed not only at 
the Aristotelian authority of the bourgeois dramatic tradition, but also at the unifying and 
universalizing authority inscribed in the ‘aesthetic frame’ of traditional mimēsis. These 
techniques of alienation aimed to draw his spectators into the same situation of response 
and critique with regard to the forms of action and imitation they saw on stage. Whatever 
mimēsis the spectator might take up in his own actions after leaving the theater would be 
tempered by the critical and dynamic distance between two interlocutors, rather than the 
cramped proximity shared by the impersonator and the impersonated. The perspective on 
interpretive authority that Brecht developed through these methods was – at least within 
certain limits – plural, relative, and critical rather than unified, absolute, and obedient. It 
shared these characteristics with the alienation of modern mass experience, which 
provided both the political reality that authorized its techniques and the stereoscopic 
medium in which it was designed to exert its wider effects. 
But this story is not quite finished. In order to do justice to the intergeneric 
approach to Brecht’s oeuvre which governs my discussion here, we must now return to 
Leben des Galilei, the primary dramatic intertext on interpretive authority from which we 
began, so that we may at last reckon with the multi-dimensional parallelism between 
Brecht and Galileo suggested by Johnston. We have investigated how both Galileo and 
Brecht negotiated the responsibility of their methods to a presiding Aristotelian authority 
by redefining the interpretive authority of vision in similar ways. Now we must likewise 
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consider how the ambiguity and indeterminacy inscribed in this responsibility compels 
either figure to assume, and potentially to succumb to, the risk of complicity in error.41
 
 
These risks are ascertainable within both the perspective on bourgeois dramatic tradition 
that Brecht establishes through his theories of alienation, and the perspective on scientific 
practice that Galileo introduces through his assertion of the authority of the senses and 
inductive method against the authority of textual tradition and deductive method. The 
manifold ironies and ambiguities that unfold from Galileo’s response at the end of LdG, 
as we shall see presently, provide surfaces of reflection upon which we can read the 
indices of risk not just for the daring interpretive venture of Galilean science, but also for 
the equally daring venture of Brechtian theater. The displacement of visual perspective 
demanded by both Brecht and Galileo, the experience that finally pluralizes and liberates 
vision, is all too easily reappropriated by a regime of interpretation that seeks instead to 
subjugate vision to a master perspective. In short, the authority of pluralized vision that 
defines the new age, for both Brecht and Galileo, offers itself up all too willingly to the 
authoritarian, all-seeing eye that reasserts the old. 
5. Galileo, Author: The Risk of Complicity and the Indifferent Instrument in 
Brechtian Theater and Galilean Science 
                                                          
41  Brecht’s own complicities in some of the more egregious political and intellectual errors of his 
time were far more numerous and complex than I can hope to treat here, except through his Galileo by 
proxy. Chief among them, at least for most commentators on Brecht’s biography, was his ambiguous, 
apologetic, and often self-serving relationship to the Stalinist hard-line that unilaterally defined the 
direction of international Marxist politics and theory for most of Brecht's productive life. That Brecht 
himself chose to assume (and, sometimes, not to assume) perilous risks, and has consequently been 
shouldered with sometimes devastating responsibilities, is a historical fact that explains some scholars’ 
delicacy of approach in treating Brecht’s Marxism, or, indeed, many scholars’ resolute unwillingness to 
reckon with Brecht at all, despite his persistent relevance. It is also a fact which stands in the background of 
the present discussion as a tacit motivation to reckon with Brecht according to the terms I have chosen here. 
David Pike offers a balanced and clear-headed assessment of Brecht’s often baffling complicities in his 
“Brecht and ‘Inoperative Thinking’,” in: Critical Essays on Bertolt Brecht, ed. Siegfried Mews (Boston: 
G.K. Hall & Co., 1989), 253-275.  
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It is hard to believe that we encounter the same Galileo in Scene 14 of Brecht’s play as 
we did in Scene 4. As we have seen in the latter passage, Galileo cuts in – after the 
Philosopher delivers his overwrought apologia for the Ptolemaic universe – to catch his 
interlocutors in the hapless irony now imposed on their thinking by a visible universe 
which, in its abrupt expansion with the advent of the telescope, has indeed shaken a grand 
edifice – not of the firmament, but of the Scholastic theater of interpretation built to 
contain and explain it. When accused of trying to disturb the Aristotelian harmony of the 
spheres, Galileo brazenly answers, “Wie, wenn Eure Hoheit die sowohl unmöglichen als 
auch unnötigen Sterne nun durch dieses Fernrohr wahrnehmen würden?” (LdG 2:40; 
“How could I, if Your Highness were to perceive these both impossible and unnecessary 
stars through this telescope right now?”). With this Galileo, who has cast his senses into 
the impossible distances of outer space and now asserts to his respondents, through a 
bitingly precise irony, the incontrovertible evidence of his interpreting eye, compare now 
the Galileo of Scene 14, after he has recanted the theory of a heliocentric universe before 
the court of the Inquisition. He has become an interpretive prisoner not just of the earth, 
but of his own house, the doctrine of the Church, his spinster daughter Virginia – now a 
nun collaborating with his clerical overseers – and, worst of all, his own accelerating 
blindness. Virginia approaches him with two geese left for him as a gift by an anonymous 
traveler, who we are later led to believe is his former student, Andrea Sarti: 
VIRGINIA  Jemand auf der Durchreise hat ein Geschenk abgeben lassen.  
GALILEI  Was ist es?  
VIRGINIA  Kannst du es nicht sehen?  
GALILEI  Nein. Er geht hin. Gänse. Ist ein Name dabei?  
VIRGINIA  Nein. [… W]as ist wieder mit deinen Augen los? Die [Gänse] müßtest du sehen vom Tisch 
aus.  
GALILEI  Du stehst im Schatten.  
VIRGINIA  Ich stehe nicht im Schatten. Sie trägt die Gänse hinaus. […] 
VIRGINIA zu dem Mönch: Wir müssen nach dem Augendoktor schicken. Vater konnte die Gänse vom 
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Tisch aus nicht sehen.  
DER MÖNCH  Ich brauche erst die Erlaubnis vom Monsignore Carpula. (LdG 2:95-96) 
VIRGINIA  Someone traveling through has sent you a gift. 
GALILEO  What is it? 
VIRGINIA  Can’t you see it? 
GALILEO  No. He approaches. Geese. Is there a name with it? 
VIRGINIA  No. […W]hat’s wrong with your eyes now? You must be able to see them from the table, at 
least. 
GALILEO  You’re standing in shadow. 
VIRGINIA  I’m not standing in shadow. She carries the geese out. […] 
VIRGINIA  to the Monk: We’ll have to send for the eye-doctor. Father couldn’t see the geese from his 
table. 
Now Galileo himself is the object of an irony just as precise as the one he threw 
into the teeth of the professors, an irony expressed through his own words but against his 
will. The bare empirical fact that he now needs the approval of a higher ecclesiastical 
authority merely to see an eye doctor only scratches the surface of this contradiction. 
Having in part built his reputation and prepared his downfall on his keen-eyed discovery 
of the phases of Venus at the telescope (Scene 5, AW 2:48), whereby he sought to prove 
the heliocentric Copernican theory by the planet’s passage into and out of shadow, 
Galileo’s decaying vision prevents him from seeing even so far as the two geese his 
daughter is holding on the other side of the room. Not only, then, does the self-protective 
excuse he offers – Virginia was standing in shadow, like the planet Venus itself – 
ironically recall one of the greatest of his astronomical discoveries, it also plays directly 
upon the willfully crass statement he makes to Virginia’s erstwhile fiancée Ludovico 
Marsili when Galileo decides (Scene 9, AW 2:67-79) to venture once again into 
controversial terrain with his research. When Marsili, who belongs to prosperous landed 
gentry, withdraws from his engagement to Virginia because he cannot risk associating 
himself with her father’s heterodoxy, Galileo asks him flippantly: “Was hat meine 
Astronomie mit meiner Tochter zu tun? Die Phasen der Venus ändern ihren Hintern 
THE MONK  For that I’ll need permission from Monsignore Carpula. 
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nicht” (LdG 2:75; “What does my astronomy have to do with my daughter? The phases 
of Venus don’t change the shape of her ass at all.”) The grand interpretive triumph that 
brought Galileo to his zenith and the reckless interpretive error that led to his 
imprisonment and his daughter’s spinsterdom are juxtaposed in Scene 14 in a statement 
that is at once both a trivial ephemera and an over-saturated vertex of significance 
accumulated in the entire course of the drama. As in Scene 4, furthermore, the spectator 
is offered more than one interpretive perspective from which to evaluate the meaning of 
the dramatic action. The whole image of this meaning does not emerge through the lens 
of Galileo’s immediate pathos, frailty and shame-faced rationalization alone. We must 
stereoscopically counterpose this single image through the retrieval, and reinterpretation, 
of at least three more distinct images: the past image of the middle-aged scientist, trapped 
in plague-wracked Florence (Scene 5, AW 2:44-49) but poised on the cusp of an epochal 
publication; the past image of his youthful daughter, flush with eagerness for an erotically 
satisfying and socially advantageous marriage (e.g. Scene 7, AW 2:55), but powerless in 
the face of her father’s intellectual foolhardiness and her fiancée’s Realpolitik; and not 
least of all, the present image of their gazes intersecting in Galileo’s half-darkened study. 
One of them is compromised, embittered, and self-loathing for his errors of foresight and 
of insight; the other is driven by the magnitude of the former’s errors to take cold comfort 
in the bosom of the authority that destroyed him and thereby to become her own father’s 
persecutor, caretaker, and reeducator. Each of these four images is inscribed within the 
frame of a distinct interpretive perspective, whether it becomes available through partial 
identification with a character, through the form of dramatic representation, or remains 
available to the spectator alone. Most importantly, each generates a specific quantum of 
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critique with reference to the present action by recourse to a horizon of interpretation that 
stands apart from that action and confronts it as something arbitrary, alien, curious and 
unforeseeable. And yet – beneath the technique of alienation, beneath the multiplication 
of interpretive perspectives, do we not sense here, in this telling snippet of dramatic irony 
that doubles back on and crosses over itself several times over, the reappearance of 
something like the tragic descent of Oedipus' language into impenetrable noise? 
When we turn to the question of the interpretive authority from which each of 
these perspectives stakes its critical claim on the meaning of the present event, we find a 
mechanism at work in Scene 14 that remains distinctly different in tone and consequence 
from the optimism of either Galileo's science or Brecht's theater. Rather than facilitating a 
conversation between distinct authorities as in Scene 4, where the difference in 
interpretive responses to the nature of the universe quickly uncovers the mutual 
complicity and responsibility shared by authorities that remain distinct, the stereoscopic 
dynamic of Scene 14 collapses and cancels the difference between contending 
perspectives. In short, we cannot ultimately separate the perspective of the younger 
Galileo who boldly and willingly lays eyes upon the phases of Venus from that of the 
elder one who unwillingly and ironically recalls this discovery in the shameful revelation 
of his blindness – nor that of the younger from that of the elder Virginia, for that matter. 
For as much as we may want to approach these perspectives as opposed to each other, the 
raw pathos and vertiginous irony of the scene compel the spectator to see them as 
continuous with each other. This moment is one of many, in fact, in which we glimpse a 
Brechtian version of the “marriage that is no marriage,” the self-cancelling, self-
escalating interpretive noise we saw at the climax of the OT. Scene 14 marks the point at 
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which the negotiation of interpretive responsibility in Brechtian theater has definitively 
moved into the territory of interpretive risk: a risk which is inscribed within the mimetic 
form of that theater itself. This could not be clearer than in the moments following the 
passage just quoted, in fact, where we see Galileo voluntarily desist from the embodied 
vision that has authoritatively shaped the trajectory of his interpretive career, and proceed 
instead, almost unreflectively, to its extreme antithesis – namely, he dictates a number of 
textual interpretations to his daughter: 
GALILEI  Wie weit war ich?  
VIRGINIA  Abschnitt vier: Anlangend die Stellungnahme der Heiligen Kirche zu den Unruhen im 
Arsenal von Venedig stimme ich überein mit der Haltung Kardinal Spolettis gegenüber den 
aufrührerischen Seilern ...  
GALILEI  Ja. Diktiert: ... stimme ich überein mit der Haltung Kardinal Spolettis gegenüber den 
aufrührerischen Seilern, nämlich, daß es besser ist, an sie Suppen zu verteilen im Namen der 
christlichen Nächstenliebe, als ihnen mehr für ihre Schiffs- und Glockenseile zu zahlen. Sintemalen es 
weiser erscheint, an Stelle ihrer Habgier ihren Glauben zu stärken. Der Apostel Paulus sagt: 
Wohltätigkeit versaget niemals. -- Wie ist das?  
VIRGINIA  Es ist wunderbar, Vater. 
GALILEI  Du meinst nicht, daß eine Ironie hineingelesen werden könnte? 
VIRGINIA  Nein, der Erzbischof wird selig sein. Er ist so praktisch. 
GALILEI  Ich verlasse mich auf dein Urteil. (LdG 2:96-97) 
GALILEO  How far did I get? 
VIRGINIA  Section four: in the matter of the position statement of Holy Church with regard to the unrest 
in the Venetian Arsenal, I stand in agreement with the attitude of Cardinal Spoletti towards the 
seditious ropemakers … 
GALILEO  Yes. Dictates: … I stand in agreement with the attitude of Cardinal Spoletti towards the 
seditious ropemakers, namely, that it is better to distribute soup to them in the name of Christian 
charity than to pay them more for their ship- and bell-ropes. Wherefore it seems wiser to strengthen 
their belief instead of their avarice. The Apostle Paul says: Charity never faileth. – How’s that? 
VIRGINIA  It’s wonderful, father. 
GALILEO  You don’t suppose an irony could be read into it? 
VIRGINIA  No, the archbishop will be pleased. He’s so practical. 
GALILEO
By this point in the drama, we have seen Galileo represented as the theoretical visionary 
(Scene 1, in his monologue to Andrea), the individual practitioner (Scene 3, in his 
discovery of the moons of Jupiter), the experimental demonstrator (Scene 9, in his 
refutation of Aristotle), and the agonistic defender (Scene 4, in his disputation with the 
Paduan professors) of a new modern science predicated upon the authority of sense. 
  I’ll rely upon your judgment. 
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Here, however, after his recantation, we see him applying the same breadth of 
interpretive acumen, the same talent for perspectival alienation, developed through all 
these roles pressed into service for the interpretive regime diametrically opposed to his 
own through its reliance on the authority of textual discourse. The confrontation between 
the sense-giving form of nature, which offers its meaning in visible form, and the sense-
making mind of the empirical scientist, who reproduces that meaning through visual 
demonstration, has been replaced by another: between the mind of the interpreter, who 
generates meaning in textual form, and the form of human society, which reproduces that 
meaning through its subjection to textuality. This latter confrontation, as we can see from 
the exchange between Galileo and Virginia, employs a multitude of specifically textual 
mediations: Galileo submits to textual authority – most obviously, to the Apostle Paul, 
but no less so to the Archbishop himself – to legitimate his interpretation of the political 
situation in Venice, and he likewise acquiesces in his daughter’s interpretive authority – 
“Ich verlasse mich auf dein Urteil,” as he says – with regard to the possible political 
signification of his letter to the Archbishop. The real source of the subversive irony that 
Galileo fears the Archbishop might read into the former’s words – namely, the attitude 
that distributing soup to the ropemakers, rather than raising their wages, is in fact a 
failure of charity because it leaves thoroughly uncharitable political and economic 
conditions untouched – lies in Galileo’s own ability, well-honed through his practice of 
empirical science, to alienate himself from his own interpretive viewpoint and assume 
another. In short, Galileo’s second thoughts in this passage provide a textbook instance of 
both the Brechtian techniques of alienation I have discussed: incomplete impersonation, 
because he treats his invocation of textual authority as a game to be played prudently and 
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skillfully, not as an expression of credited truth; and textual displacement, because he 
evalutes how the language he uses might be interpreted from a number of different 
viewpoints. In applying these consummately Brechtian skills to his own words here, 
however, he achieves aims diametrically opposed to those he pursued as an innovative 
scientist. Rather than use the techniques of alienation to underline the revolutionary 
political ideas implied in the interpretation of nature, he uses the same technique with 
equal efficacy in the attempt to suppress every last trace of seditious thinking – every 
trace, that is, of a voice which is not that of Biblical authority – in his letter. In a word, 
Galileo identifies with his role. Here we have found clear indices of the risks in which 
Brechtian theater and Galilean science are jointly and inescapably entangled: the risk that 
the dialectical hammer of alienation can be used to erase critique and delay historical 
progress just as well as it can be used to provoke thought and give impetus to the dawn of 
a new age. This is the meaning of Galileo’s recantation: the seeing eye has willingly 
become the accomplice of the reading eye, and the new age has, at last, proven complicit 
in the old. 
The risk to which Galileo has succumbed here becomes even more clear when we 
consider the mode of interpretation presented to us by this exchange in its relation to 
Brecht’s techniques of alienation. Galileo’s employment of dictation here, while 
necessitated by the weakness of his vision, provides a consummate poetic image of the 
double bind that now governs his interpretive agency. By dictating to his daughter, 
Galileo submits his interpretation to be both written and read by others only in order to 
assert the authority of what has been written and read by others, thereby both 
impersonating the authority of text and strengthening its claims to provide a blueprint for 
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political reality. The question that now arises is whether we can draw a meaningful 
dividing line between this mode of interpretation, which is clearly symptomatic of 
Galileo’s interpretive condition after his recantation, and the mode Galileo employed as 
an empirical scientist – the kind of dividing line that would allow us to juxtapose these 
viewpoints stereoscopically, as the alienation effect demands. For in Galileo’s practice of 
empirical science, he likewise submitted his interpretation to seeing through an 
instrument of observation provided by others (the telescope; cf. Scenes 1 & 2, AW 2:9-
24), and to being seen by others in the performance of experimental demonstration. All of 
this he did in order to assert the authority of a vision which in either case is never 
authentically and immediately his own, to claim that authority nonetheless for his own 
through a kind of impersonation, and to strengthen its claim on the present meaning and 
future course of the political sphere. Can we, in good faith, separate these two forms of 
responsibility to authority, use each to alienate us from the other, and so bring them into 
stereoscopic engagement? Do they unsettle each other, or do they actually reinforce each 
other? The next exchange between Virginia and Galileo, minimal as it is, seems to 
suggest a definitive answer, and brings us back to the terrain of apocalyptic vision from 
which we set out here: 
GALILEI  Was kommt als nächstes? 
VIRGINIA  Ein wunderschöner Spruch: »Wenn ich schwach bin, da bin ich stark.« 
GALILEI  Keine Auslegung. 
VIRGINIA  Aber warum nicht? 
GALILEI  Was kommt als nächstes? (LdG 2:97) 
GALILEO  What’s next? 
VIRGINIA  A wonderful proverb: “Where I am weak, there I am strong.” 
GALILEO  No commentary. 
VIRGINIA  But why not? 
GALILEO
Galileo evades interpreting the proverb Virginia feeds him because the bare logical 
contradiction it expresses as proverbial wisdom – the possibility of ascribing both 
  What’s next after that? 
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strength and weakness simultaneously to one and the same position – presents in a 
surprisingly direct form how the stereoscopic dynamic of the alienation effect, whether 
Brechtian or Galilean, is already deeply entrenched in the counterrevolutionary ideology 
of the Church in the play. Rather than functioning as an exhortation to recognize how the 
weakness and suffering of the oppressed unfold within the material and historical 
processes of the immanent world, it figures precisely that weakness and suffering as the 
expression in the immanent world of connection with a transcendent deity of limitless 
strength. The interpretive move executed by the proverb, and, moreover, the move in 
which it is designed to train its interpreter, is an apocalyptic gesture: the transient and 
apparent world in which human beings suffer weakness is wrested aside, like a mask or a 
veil, to reveal that weakness, in the permanent and spiritual world, is true strength. Rather 
than opening a pathway into critical, historical consciousness, the proverb opens a 
pathway into ideological mystification – but it does so, furthermore, by application of the 
same technique of alienation, which does not dictate the political ends to which it is put, 
only the technical means. Its apocalypse moves backwards into the old age, not forwards 
into the new: but it is no less an apocalypse for that. Galileo’s terse evasion – “keine 
Auslegung” – betrays his awareness that the path of alienation, like the path of empirical 
science or, further back, the twisted interpretive path of Oedipus, is fundamentally 
Heraclitean: ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή (Diels-Kranz B60; “the path that leads up and 
the path that leads down are one and the same”). The ideological instruments of the 
authority that legitimates one interpretive perspective can all too easily be pressed into 
service by its antagonist. As a result of his recantation, Galileo has appropriated the 
perspective of his enemies just as much as they have appropriated his – each has come to 
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impersonate the other. His past desire to interpret the universe for himself has proven 
inextricably, though paradoxically, integral to his present desire to impersonate the 
authority of the Church: he can only withdraw his power of interpretive vision, as it were 
neurotically, whenever the terrible blindness that underwrites this power draws near. One 
could well argue, then, that Galileo’s interlocutor in this scene is not actually Virginia: 
rather, it is the untranscendable condition of interpretive risk, here articulated in subtly 
tragic terms.  
The energizing stereoscopic interaction between interpretive viewpoints and their 
legitimating authorities, the dis-integration that culminated in the experience of the 
alienation effect, has, it seems, suddenly dropped out of the equation. The polar 
confrontation of distinct authorities has been replaced by the aporia of self-confrontation; 
the possibility of mutual alienation and mutual critique has been subsumed by the 
harrowing acknowledgment of a limit that cannot be crossed and a necessity that must be 
obeyed. This is the paradoxical condition of risk in which Galileo writes the Discorsi 
during his imprisonment, with a mixture of hope and fear that recalls the ambivalent 
attitude of the Theban suppliants at the beginning of the OT (δείσαντες ἢ στέρξαντες OT 
11; “in fear or in hope”): hope that the interpretive theater of the seeing-eye can be 
transferred intact into the theater of the reading-eye, and fear that the authority of the 
visible universe will lapse after all into the authority of the text. If Galileo’s final 
interpretive wager is to bet it all on crossing the figurative frontier from seeing to reading, 
its underlying paradox thickens as Andrea (Scene 15, AW 2:106-109) transports the text 
itself in the opposite direction, across the literal frontier between a regime of reading and 
one of seeing: out of the Italian provinces controlled by the Church, with its libraries and 
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Inquistors, into the free nations of northern Europe, with their laboratories and scientists. 
Not, however, without issuing in a final, ironic and “noisy” coda to the contrapuntal 
fugue played out between the rival authorities of Galileo and Aristotle throughout the 
entire drama. When Andrea submits his belongings to search at the border, he carries the 
contraband manuscript of the Discorsi openly in his hands, since he cannot desist for a 
moment from reading it. The border guard eyes him with the suspicion demanded by his 
profession: 
DER GRENZWÄCHTER  Was ist das für ein Buch? 
ANDREA  ohne aufzusehen: Das ist von dem großen Philosophen Aristoteles.  
DER GRENZWÄCHTER  mißtrauisch: Was ist das für einer?  
ANDREA  Er ist schon tot. […] 
DER GRENZWÄCHTER
THE BORDER GUARD  What sorta book is that? 
  Die ganze Sucherei hat ja auch wenig Zweck. So offen würde uns ja keiner 
hinlegen, was er zu verbergen hätte. (LdG 2:107) 
ANDREA  without looking up: It’s by the great philosopher Aristotle. 
THE BORDER GUARD  suspiciously: What sorta writer is he? 
ANDREA  He’s already dead. […] 
THE BORDER GUARD  All this searching is really pretty pointless anyway. Nobody would carry in plain 
view whatever he had to hide. 
Andrea’s ruse succeeds in throwing the border guard off the scent, ensuring the 
dissemination of Galileo’s findings in Northern Europe, but the practical dramatic aim of 
this device falls far short of its larger resonance as the play’s final comment on the 
problem of interpretive authority. Like Galileo’s terse excuse for his blindness in the 
previous scene, the form of Andrea’s deception paradoxically communicates a truth 
which is lost on the border guard and may even be lost on its speaker, but cannot be lost 
on the spectator. It is another textbook case – not so much of alienation as of tragic irony. 
By making recourse to textuality, Galileo has willingly submitted to the risky double bind 
of the alienation from seeing-eye to reading-eye: he has both guaranteed the futurity of 
his research, which can only unfold in the absence of his own now-failing eyes, and 
subjected it to the risk of becoming one more textual authority like Aristotle himself, in 
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the presence of many yet-unborn eyes. This provides the link to the meaning of the 
second, and equally resonant, component of Andrea’s deception: the guard’s ignorance of 
who Aristotle might be compels Andrea’s protective assertion that the author of the text 
is “already dead.” The dissemination of Galileo’s work, the entrance of his text into the 
regions of risk and the unforeseeable currents of interpretive futurity, announces the 
death of its author. As in the language of Oedipus, Andrea is more truthful in his lie than 
he realizes, and perhaps more truthful than he would like to be. Among each of the 
unforeseeable and uncontrollable scenes of interpretation that can now occur in futurity 
between this single text and its plurality of readers – for this is, after all, what textual 
dissemination means – it stands a chance of slowly but surely usurping the interpretive 
privilege of the empirical seeing-eye with that of the philosophical reading-eye. Andrea’s 
savvy bit of practical sophistry could very well turn into a poetic figure for historical 
truth: he has made himself an apocalyptic poet-prophet against his will. As if to presage 
this possibility, Andrea himself does not even look up from the authoritative arguments 
of its pages to confront the suspicious representative of another authority, whose only 
interest in him is, appropriately enough, to observe, notate, and regulate his journey. The 
figurative tableau thus presented repeats in a single image the entire progress of Galileo’s 
interpretive career as the scientist who will not tear his inquiring gaze away from the 
instruments of his research to confront the inquiring gaze and the instruments of political 
authority. Instead, the tableau subjects this career to a foreboding alienation by making a 
single, provocative substitution: the text of the Discorsi now stands in for Galileo’s 
telescope trained on the heavens. The genuine tragic terror and pathos of this moment, the 
resonant echo of Oedipus' desperate roaring, hit the mark for us once we recognize that 
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there may not be a definitive difference between Jupiter’s moons in the lens and the 
formulae describing their orbits in the book: the whole question of interpretive authority, 
whether dramatic or scientific, is carried in the dangerous parallax between one eye and 
the other. The whole exchange, in fact, “carries in plain view” exactly that which both 
Galilean science and Brechtian theater have to hide: perhaps not in the border guard’s 
plain view, nor in Andrea’s, nor in Galileo’s, nor in Brecht’s, but in ours. 
From this perspective, the linked activities of the Brechtian spectator – 
understanding, criticizing, and overcoming – each of which feeds upon the stereoscopic 
fuel of the alienation effect, can be read as embodiments of a Brechtian katharsis – 
whereby his “non-Aristotelian” theater tacitly asserts itself as more faithful to its 
“Aristotelian” authority in certain ways than its bourgeois forebear. Just a few years after 
Brecht, sounding the Galilean battle-cry of alienation, wrote that “die nichtaristotelische 
Dramatik […] spaltet ihr Publikum” (Mittelbare Wirkung des epischen Theaters ST 59; 
“the non-Aristotelian dramaturgy […] divides its audience”), the Swedish student-actors 
who came to hear the war-exiled Brecht deliver his lecture “Über experimentelles 
Theater” in Stockholm on 4 May 1939 found him far more conciliatory towards the 
classical horizon and the formation of a unified collective response to drama: 
Was konnte an die Stelle von Furcht und Mitleid gesetzt werden, des klassischen Zwiegespanns zur 
Herbeiführung der aristotelischen Katharsis? [...] Welche Haltung sollte der Zuhörer einnehmen in den 
neuen Theatern, wenn ihm die traumbefangene, passive, in das Schicksal ergebene Haltung verwehrt 
wurde? Er sollte nicht mehr aus seiner Welt in die Welt der Kunst entführt, nicht mehr gekidnappt 
werden; im Gegenteil sollte er in seine reale Welt eingeführt werden, mit wachen Sinnen. War es 
möglich, etwa anstelle der Furcht vor dem Schicksal die Wissensbegierde zu setzen, anstelle des 
Mitleids die Hilfsbereitschaft? Konnte man damit einen neuen Kontakt schaffen zwischen Bühne und 
Zuschauer, konnte das eine neue Basis für den Kunstgenuß abgeben? [...] Das Prinzip besteht darin, 
anstelle der Einfühlung die Verfremdung
What could be put in place of fear and pity, in place of that classical carriage-and-pair for the 
inducement of Aristotelian katharsis? […] What attitude should the listener take up in the new 
theaters, if we refuse him the passive, dream-entangled, fatalistic attitude? He should no longer be 
abducted from his world into the world of art, no longer be kidnapped [gekidnappt]; on the contrary, he 
should be led into the reality of his world, with wakeful senses. Was it possible, for instance, to replace 
the fear of destiny with the desire for knowledge, the feeling of pity with the readiness to lend aid? 
 herbeizuführen. (Über exper. Th. 6:417-418, emphasis mine) 
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Could one thereby create a new point of contact between stage and audience, could that provide a new 
basis for artistic pleasure? […] The principle is this: to induce, in place of identification, alienation. 
Here, Brecht descibes the cathartic effect of his modern theater not in terms of the 
oneirics and narcotics of bourgeois identification, with its attendant falsifications and 
stupefactions, but rather in terms of a keen and crisp awakening to truth, reason, and will: 
his juxtapositions are between dream and reason, illusion and reality, even passion and 
action. But the aggressively modern and class-conscious polemic against a mystifying 
and ideologizing Aristotle that we find in his previous essay from 1932/1936 has 
completely receded, and in its place we find an unmistakable desire to rehabilitate a 
classical authority on behalf of modern experience. Where the former shouted for a 
radical change in paradigm and the toppling of authority, the latter almost meekly 
suggests a strategic reorientation of attitude towards this authority, a series of 
substitutions in a paradigm already given – whereby we should immediately be reminded 
of the ironic and troubling series of substitutions we saw in Scene 15. The point to be 
made here is an essential one for understanding the risks and responsibilities of Brechtian 
alienation as a political critique of the theater’s interpretive authority. We would not be 
far off, in perceiving Brecht’s apparent vacillation of perspective on Aristotle here, to be 
immediately reminded of Galileo’s shadow-play with the disembodied textual authority 
of Scripture in the play’s final scene, the intensity of which lies in the way each 
perspective implicates itself ever more in the other, losing instead of gaining a distinct 
outline in its response. Galileo’s struggle against classical or biblical authority, however 
immediate and transparent his arguments may seem, must ultimately establish and justify 
a new source of interpretive authority that risks the resurrection of the old: that is, after 
all, the way responsibility is tacitly born within the act of response. In the same way, 
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Brecht’s effort to alienate his spectator from the attitude of identification ultimately 
compels him to formulate a new practice centered on the alienation of perspective – itself 
a perspective with which the spectator must nonetheless at least partially identify. 
Complex ironies such as these form the virtual signature of Brecht’s dialectical thinking. 
Even more so, they are subtle but potent indices of the risks inscribed in his critique of 
the authority that underwrites dramatic mimēsis, and of the responsibilities his practice 
bears within the past and future conversation contained in its tradition. 
 In one of the central passages of Brecht’s major theoretical statement, the 
“Kleines Organon für das Theater” from 1948, he invokes the scientific gaze of Galileo 
as providing a prototype of the alienating gaze – not only for modern, disenchanted, 
capitalized humanity, but also for the spectator of Brechtian theater. As we read Brecht’s 
anecdote, we cannot help but feel at this point some of the perilous and illuminating light 
of risk suffusing his account, as it were, from below: 
Das lange nicht Geänderte nämlich scheint unänderbar. Allenthalben treffen wir auf etwas, das zu 
selbstverständlich ist, als daß wir uns bemühen müßten, es zu verstehen. Was sie miteinander erleben, 
scheint den Menschen das gegebene menschliche Erleben. Das Kind, lebend in einer Welt der Greise, 
lernt, wie es dort zugeht. Wie die Dinge eben laufen, so werden sie ihm geläufig. … Damit all dies 
viele Gegebene ihm als ebensoviel Zweifelhaftes erscheinen könnte, müßte er jenen fremden Blick 
entwickeln, mit dem der große Galilei einen ins Pendeln gekommenen Kronleuchter betrachtete. Den 
verwunderten diese Schwingungen, als hätte er sie so nicht erwartet und verstünde es nicht von ihnen, 
wodurch er dann auf die Gesetzmäßigkeiten kam. Diesen Blick, so schwierig wie produktiv, muß das 
Theater mit seinen Abbildungen des menschlichen Zusammenlebens provozieren. Es muß sein 
Publikum wundern machen, und dies geschieht vermittels einer Technik der Verfremdungen des 
Vertrauten (152, §44). 
That which has not been changed for a long time appears unchangeable. On every side we encounter 
something that is too obvious for us to take the trouble to understand it. What human beings experience 
with each other appears to them to be human experience as such, as it is given. The child, living in a 
world of old people, learns what goes on there. For him, the way this world just happens to go 
becomes, for him, the way of the world. … So that all these ‘givens’ might appear to him as just so 
much to question and to doubt, he would have to develop that alien gaze with which the great Galileo 
observed a swinging lantern. The swinging astonished him, as if he had not expected it to be thus and 
did not understand how he might then grasp the law that governed its regular movements. It is this 
gaze, as difficult as it is productive, that the theater must provoke with its representations of human life 
in society. The theater must make its audience feel astonishment, and this occurs by means of a 
technique [Technik] of alienation from the familiar. 
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The modern will to change, whether the object of that will is seen in the structure of 
society or in the structure of nature, forms the point of departure for Brecht’s 
interpretation of the Galilean anecdote, just as surely as the instrument of that change – 
the technique of alienation – forms its ultimate point of arrival. Here and elsewhere 
Brecht inscribes his theater within a historical narrative of modern consciousness, 
realized in the interaction between a science that produces new technologies, and 
technologies that bring forth new resources for science (Kleines Organon AW 6:525-527; 
§15-20). The word for technology in German is the same as the word for technique: 
Technik, and it is this word that Brecht uses to describe the alienation of the familiar 
(Verfremdungen des Vertrauten) in his theater. Thus we can say that Brecht’s Marxist 
science produces the new technique and/or technology of alienation as the pre-eminent 
instrument of the modern will to change society, and takes as its prototype the alienating 
and disenchanting gaze of the scientist developed as a kind of interpretive technology, an 
attitudinal instrument of the will to change nature. Galileo’s gaze functions as more or 
less the subjective correlative to the technology of his telescope: both open up new 
perspectives to interpretation by removing the enchanted haze of familiarity. Nonetheless, 
for as surely as the technological instrument connects the human will to change with the 
social or natural object of change, it is entirely disconnected from the nature of the 
change desired and the consequences of that change once effected. The nature of the 
change one desires to make in the dialectic – literally, in the conversation – between man 
and matter in history establishes the limits of the subject’s responsibility; the 
consequences of that change once effected in the dialectic – the response returned to us in 
the movement of conversation, whatever its impact – constitute the subject’s risk. In view 
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of my intergeneric reading, I think that where both Brecht and Galileo err is in imagining 
that the instrument alone can guarantee the soundness of responsibility and exorcise the 
specter of risk: that the interpretive technology of alienation, in itself, possesses the 
authority, and assumes the responsibility, that can only properly belong to a plurality of 
interpretive agents and their plural wills to change. These agents, after all, are the ones 
for whom and by whom interpretive risks are assumed in the first place. The instruments 
of interpretation risk nothing, but the interpreter always risks something, if not 
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INTERMEZZO: THE WELL-TEMPERED CLAVIER 
 




Brecht’s Leben des Galilei may end on a sober and guarded note of hope, but even this 
tone is tempered, as it were, by the minor chord of risk and complicity in which that 
single note sounds. As a sense-making instrument, Galileo’s alienating technique of 
interpretation itself ultimately falls victim to its own mechanism, the redoubled or 
recursive alienation that it bore as an implicit risk from the beginning. The scientist’s 
concupiscent and autonomous eye all too easily identifies itself with the diffident and 
surveilling eye of the Church; the apostate’s explosive language all too easily becomes 
the passive conduit for citations and imitations derived from Biblical authority. The 
promise of the new age – not just the prospect of scientific and technological 
transformation, but even that of political revolution – on which Galileo builds his 
magisterial ‘aria’ in the opening scene has, indeed, born its fruit in season, but the harvest 
is bitter with irony. Rather than seeing the new interpretive instruments of science 
transform the world, the virtuoso of these instruments has allowed them to transform him 
into a being utterly alien to himself, altered beyond his own recognition. The play frames 
his failure of responsibility as at once an individual compromise, an historical 
                                                 
1  Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling/Repetition. Kierkegaard's Writings, Volume 6. trans. 
Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1983), 27. 
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catastrophe, and an object-lesson in the stakes of interpretive risk: for Galileo’s tragedy 
lies in the fact that the same instrument of dissonance with which he shattered the 
crystalline harmony of the Ptolemaic universe has also, at last, shattered his own concord 
with himself. He has become other than himself, opposed to himself – in fighting his 
enemies with the power of a new vision, he has become his own enemy and willingly 
made himself blind. In this respect, Galileo’s voluntary self-alienation simply repeats, in 
the form of historical allegory, the experience of the spectator of bourgeois theater – the 
theater against which, as we have seen, Brecht exerted all his practical and theoretical 
energies, precisely because it concealed the deadly poison of renewed self-alienation in 
the saccharine of identification: 
[D]er Zuschauer wird nicht etwa ins Nichts geführt, nicht in eine fremde, sondern in eine verzerrte 
Welt, und er bezahlt seine Ausschweifungen, die ihm nur als Ausflüge vorkommen, im realen Leben. 
Nicht spurlos gehen die Einfühlungen in den Gegner an ihm vorüber. Er wird sein eigener Gegner 
damit. Der Ersatz befriedigt das Bedürfnis und vergiftet den Körper.2
The spectator [of bourgeois theater] gets carried away not merely into a void, not into a foreign world, 
but rather into a distorted [version of the real] world – and he pays the price for this debauchery, which 
appears to him only as a temporary excursion, in his real life. His experiences of identification with his 
enemy do not pass over him without leaving a trace: under their influence, he becomes his own enemy. 
The substitute satisfies his needs and poisons his body. 
 
Insofar as the spectator enters the theater in an involuntarily alienated condition that 
blocks his access to an authentic (read: historical-materialist) interpretation of himself 
and his world, the modern subject can be said, like the compromised Galileo, to stand at 
odds with himself in equal measure. The false promises of bourgeois theater, however, 
not only reproduce the spectator’s condition of self-contradiction, but make the spectator 
himself complicit in its reproduction – the doctor persuades the patient, as it were, to 
swallow his poison as if it were a panacea. Every technique developed by Brecht in his 
theater, as we have seen, aims to reenact alienation as the conscious focus of dramatic 
                                                 
2  Bertolt Brecht, “[A 8] Dritter Nachtrag zur Theorie des »Messingkaufs«,” in: Werke, Bd. 22, ed. 
Werner Hecht et al, 700; trans. mine. 
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spectacle, in order to reveal to the spectator how he exists within and can overcome the 
self-opposition imposed by his historical condition. Nonetheless – and again, precisely 
like Galileo – in reenacting alienation as a dialectical instrument of enlightenment, 
Brechtian theater risks handing over the alienated subject to renewed delusion and dis-
integration by the very same device that promised his enlightenment and emancipation, 
his hard-won coherence with himself. At worst, the interpreter may only be freed from 
his slavery to alien perspectives only so that the future can imprison him in a blindness all 
his own. 
As I have tried to demonstrate, the danger of self-opposition appears no less 
intractable in Brecht's classical progenitor, the Oedipus Tyrannus, where the interpreter’s 
kinetic drive to arrive at truth brings him back – terribly, inexorably, uncannily – to the 
error from which he sought to escape. We have seen how, in Brecht, the ‘scientific’ 
alienation that aims to purge the modern mass subject of its historical narcosis only 
administers a drug that risks deepening the patient’s addiction by convincing him of his 
hard-won sobriety. In Sophocles, on the other hand, the bold kinesis of autonomous 
reason that aims to cure Thebes of its plague only paralyzes the structure of political 
space and the meaningfulness of common language by provoking the interpreter’s own 
disease – dislocation, disorientation, polyphony – to emerge in full bloom. When we last 
left Oedipus, his voice – the haplessly self-opposed voice of the tragic interpreter – was 
getting carried away by the force of its own revelations, shattered and dispersed into a 
multitude of meanings instead of coalescing in the singular clarity it originally sought: πᾷ 
μοι / φθογγὰ διαπωτᾶται φοράδαν; (Soph. OT 1309f.; “Where is my voice being swept 
away to, born on the wings of the air?”). Having tried to silence the interpretive noise 
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generated first by the oracle, then by the riddle, then last of all by the plague, he has now 
recognized that the real source of this noise – a noise more extraordinary and unsettling 
than any of these partial and provisional manifestations – lies in the infinite cacophony 
that infects his own ordering, calculating, sense-making voice, revealing this voice as 
both his own most intimate possession and yet also something alien and abhorrent to him. 
In this moment, all the voices that have thus far come to meet him from elsewhere, from 
outside himself – the voices of the calamitous oracle, the baffling Sphinx, the suffering 
Thebans – appear at last as premonitions or reflections of his own self-divided speech. It 
is almost as if they had been addressing him all along, on his own behalf, so that he might 
actually come to hear himself in them before he and his voice cross that final threshold 
into irresolvable tragic discord, before, indeed, he has no choice but to reveal the nature 
of his own voice, a semantic echo-chamber in which the infinity of echoes eventually 
drowns out the original sound. 
As explorations of interpretive risk and responsibility, then, the bond of tragic 
thought that links Brecht and Sophocles can perhaps best be expressed in terms of the 
musical figure with which I began here: the interpreter’s pursuit of harmony with himself 
and with others unfailingly arrives at a point of dissonance so extreme that it destroys the 
ethical and political medium, shattering the instrument with which the music of meaning 
is made. As long as interpretation admits this tragic potential as a danger to be faced in 
the task of sense-making, the echo of this terminal discord – whether it comes from the 
bestial cry of Oedipus or the disastrous silence of Galileo – can never cease to ring in the 
ears of the one who sets before him- or herself the task of making sense. 
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 All the same: even in this cataclysmic burst of discord, there were, and still are, 
the first strains of another music. The alto saxophonist Ornette Coleman (b. 1930), who 
helped begin a radically new era in American improvised music during the late 1950s and 
early 60s, once wrote of his early musical training: “It was when I realized I could make 
mistakes that I decided I was really on to something.”3
First, the new musician plays, as it were, in constant and direct confrontation with 
the possibility that his music, at any moment, can and even must dissolve into tragic 
dissonance. But the exceptional and brilliant discipline of this new virtuoso is such that 
he meets the inevitable arrival of dissonance with an inward, ironic, and melancholy 
laughter, and takes it as an invitation, even an imperative, to start the music again in a 
direction dictated by his error – as if the mistake opened a path for free play rather than 
 In a sense, Coleman’s statement 
lays the groundwork for the music that can, and must, still be made once the music of 
interpretive tragedy, whether ancient or modern, plays itself to a point where it is no 
longer possible for the interpreter finally to resolve himself with himself or with others in 
the harmony of understanding. Although, as we shall see, the realization of ethical and 
political harmony does remain the ostensible aim of the new interpretive musician, there 
are at least two fundamental differences that both inscribe his music within what I have 
defined (ever so loosely) as the Sophoclean-Brechtian territory of tragedy and, at the 
same time, cast him out of its conservatories with violent force. Into the new and 
unforeseen wilderness of sound and sense that lies before him, moreover, he follows an 
unclear and distant summons, the tenuous promise of a concord upon which, without 
risking any hyperbole, it is fair to say he stakes his very life. 
                                                 
3  Ornette Coleman, “The Harmolodic Manifesto,” from Ornette Coleman's official web site 
(http://ornettecoleman.com), 10 February 2010. 
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merely struck an impassable barrier, and even if the pursuit of this previously unthinkable 
path only turns out to invite yet another harmonic catastrophe. This inward confrontation 
with the possibility of discord, furthermore, the ethical relation of self to self forged by 
this imminent possibility, is so continuous, so intimate, and so penetrating in the new 
musician’s awareness that its shock, horror, and shame have not only settled into his very 
marrow and nerves, but have lent their tempo to a way of life that is distinctly his own 
and, against all odds, endlessly renews him every time it renews itself. Not for him the 
faith in a future concord – Thebes restored to health, Europe liberated by human reason – 
that ends by closing its ears to the future music it once hoped to hear, destroying its 
instruments, casting the orchestra to the four winds. Instead, the ever-imminent 
possibility of discord becomes the medium in which he holds a constant and excruciating 
vigil over himself and the task of his playing: the new musician relates to himself, 
becomes his own accompanist and interlocutor, through his prolonged and perverse 
romance with dissonance and error. His is a discipline above discipline, a rigor against 
rigor: after all, the pianist meticulously destroys the natural posture of his body, his arms, 
his hands to achieve the proper timbre on the keyboard; the jazz trumpeter consciously 
works at building up the scar tissue on his lips that will solidify his embouchure and 
enrich his tone; the cellist calmly drags a razor in parallel lines through the calluses 
formed on his left hand to improve his control of the strings.4
                                                 
4  While the first of these two examples of self-imposed corporeal discipline represent part of the 
common experience of musicians, I owe the third of them to my former student Kenneth Koshorek, an 
amateur cellist who related to me the following anecdote from his own experience. Mr. Koshorek knew a 
professional cellist who, because the calluses that had formed on the latter’s left hand after decades of 
intense and concentrated pressure had begun to interfere with his technique, carefully cut them open in 
parallel lines that would match the spacing of the strings on the fingerboard of the cello. The subsequent 
wounds and scarring resulted in a substantial improvement in technique for the cellist, as well as a visible 
and, to all accounts, grotesque mutilation of his hand. 
 How much more tortuous 
and perverse, how much more hell-bent on self-mutilation and self-negation, would be 
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the discipline of the player who craves not merely to attain and master harmony, but then, 
having come within a hair's breadth of attaining and mastering it, desires nothing more 
than to overcome and destroy it? In short, this new musician, the virtuoso of negation, 
plays the interpretive instrument in contact with a risk that he does not dread and flee, but 
instead affirms and even desires – even more than the pianist desires the distortion of his 
spinal column and the cellist desires the disfigurement of his hands. Indeed, his virtuosity 
lies in his ardent pursuit of the next mistake, the arousing and invigorating suspense of an 
error that is sure to arrive again and again, because he recognizes the risk of error as the 
true material and the true medium of his art. 
Second, and as if both to heighten what I have just called the suspense of error 
even further and to cast the entangling net of its complicities even more broadly, this 
musician must play his music with and among others, he must implicate them in the stern 
discipline of its conversation – because they are, as ethical and political subjects, already 
implicated – and in so doing more deeply implicate and discipline himself, more 
completely put his own existence at risk.5
                                                 
5  Mutatis mutandis, the new interpreter undertakes dialogue with others as a duty imposed upon 
him by the imperatives of his own internal dialogue: οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα σὲ 
ἐλέγχω, ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ἐλέγχειν ἢ οὗπερ ἕνεκα κἂν ἐμαυτὸν διερευνῴμην τί λέγω, φοβούμενος μή 
ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή. καὶ νῦν δὴ οὖν ἔγωγέ φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον 
σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα, ἴσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων (Plat. Charm. 166c-d; “‘Oh 
come,’ I said, ‘how could you possibly think that even if I were to refute everything you say, I would be 
doing it for any other reasons than the one I would give for a thorough investigation of my own statements 
– the fear of unconsciously thinking I know something when I do not. And this is what I claim to be doing 
now, examining the argument for my own sake primarily, but perhaps also for the sake of my friends’” 
[Cooper/Sprague 653, emphasis mine in trans.]); quoted in Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith, 
Plato’s Socrates (New York: Oxford UP, 1994), 14. All quotations from the Greek text of Plato are cited 
according to their standard abbreviations as given in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, the standard 
Stephanus pagination used in all modern editions of the Greek texts, and the most recent edition of the 
Oxford Classical Text (OCT). In the case of the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, 
Sophist, and Statesman, the most recent OCT is Plato, Opera, Vol. I, eds. E.A. Duke, W.F. Hicken, W.S.M. 
Nicoll, D.B. Robinson & J.C.G. Strachan (New York: Oxford UP, 1995); in the case of all other Platonic 
texts, the standard OCT remains Plato, Opera, Vols. II-V, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1900-
1907). All translations of Plato into English are taken from the currently authoritative English translation of 
 The properly ethical interplay between the 
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musician and himself through the instrument can be neither sustained nor consummated 
without the political interplay between the musician and his fellow musicians. But then 
again: placed alongside this sui generis apparition, who exactly will these fellow players 
prove to be, and how will their music sound in concert with his? Will they be prepared to 
tear apart, as eagerly and as passionately as their companion, the fabric of sonic white lies 
that justifies all the familiar tempos, the harmonic fakes and melodic shortcuts, the 
shallow but flattering scales and modes – in other words, the threadbare fabric that holds 
together the music of their third-hand wisdom, petty dogmatisms, or hardened habits of 
being? Are their ears and minds keen enough to perceive, as this new musician can, the 
distant echo of Oedipus’ roar or Galileo’s silence within the cadences of their most banal 
assumptions and everyday judgments? And can they possibly follow his lead when he 
quietly and methodically converts this pianissimo counterpoint within their idle thoughts 
into an overpowering fortissimo that leaves them speechless and eviscerated,6
                                                                                                                                                 
his complete works: Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, various trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1997), from which I will cite henceforth as follows: Cooper/[surname of respective translator], [page 
number]. 
 only to 
find that this was just the first lesson, an étude for raw beginners, in a master class that 
will and must consume their whole lives? Will they perform vivisection upon their minds 
and thoughts with the same meticulous, detached, craftsmanlike devotion with which the 
cellist slashes open his own hands – all in the name of music alone? The ethical mission 
of the new music – and it is by no means inappropriate to speak of it as a mission – 
6  Two examples of such breathlessness and evisceration, from countless similar ones: ἀλλὰ μὰ 
τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε οὐδ' ὅτι λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι: τοτὲ μὲν γάρ 
μοι ἕτερα δοκεῖ σοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, τοτὲ δ' ἄλλα (Plat.[/pseudo-Plat.] Alc. I 116e; “I swear by the gods, 
Socrates, I have no idea what I mean – I must be in some absolutely bizarre condition! When you ask me 
questions, first I think one thing, and then I think something else” [Cooper/Hutchinson 573]); ἀλλ', ὦ 
Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι εἴπω ὃ νοῶ: περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν ἀεὶ ὃ ἂν προθώμεθα καὶ οὐκ 
ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἱδρυσώμεθα αὐτό (Plat. Euthyph. 11b; “But Socrates, I have no way of telling you 
what I have in mind, for whatever proposition we put forward goes around and refuses to stay put where we 
establish it” [Cooper/Grube 11]). 
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always and deliberately both to fall short of and overcome the harmony it seeks to 
achieve, founds the integrity of the musician upon an impossibly sensitive responsibility 
to himself. Although the political mission of this practice, as we shall see, remains 
posterior to the ethical, the former cannot in good faith be divorced from the latter, since 
the practice assumes that the musician can never achieve self-responsibility without at 
once developing relations of responsibility between different musicians and forms of 
music, that is, between interpreters and practices of interpretation. In essence, the 
discipline of the new music demands that its ever-deepening, ever-broadening 
responsibility to itself involves a complementary responsibility to others. To accept this 
responsibility, naturally, is freely and knowingly to make oneself complicit in its risk, to 
take a share in a common wager the stakes of which encompass nothing less than the 
whole of one’s life – precisely because under the terms of this wager, there is nothing in 
human life that falls outside music, outside the task of interpretation. 
 I have described this new interpreter as journeying upon an uncertain and 
unmarked path that may lead him into peril as easily as it may lead him to salvation. But 
unlike Oedipus, whose kinetic and topographic situation he shares in this respect, this 
new interpreter knows and accepts with his first step that the path he marks out leads into 
a labyrinth that will only generate further labyrinths, and that the epistrophic turn in 
which disaster and deliverance coincide only really returns the traveler to the chastened 
self-recognition that now motivates his ‘second first’ step. And yet in all these 
wanderings he willingly undertakes, through all the missteps and stumblings and 
vertiginous turnings he suffers – incredibly! – he believes in the possibility of an arrival 
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just as much as he believes that it will most likely never belong to him, nor, perhaps, to 
the few bold enough to follow him. 
In his resolve to follow this path, furthermore, I have also described the new 
interpreter as one who has been called upon to respond to a summons: cast out of the 
conservatories of high concord, he capitalizes upon his alien status by transforming it into 
an interpretive task, by perceiving himself as the addressee of an interrogating voice, the 
recipient of a mission, communicated from a remote and indefinite ‘there’ counterposed 
to the ‘here’ from which he already stands at one remove. Yet again, unlike Galileo, 
whose power of perspectival alienation he shares in this respect,7
                                                 
7  See also Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy? trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press/Harvard UP, 2002), 198, on the origin of philosophical activity in the sudden awareness of 
one’s own “alienation, dispersion, and unhappiness”, and 230 on “the rediscovery of […] naïve vision.” It 
is well nigh impossible to ignore the resonances with Brecht generated by these passages. 
 this new interpreter 
does not intuit his mission by subjecting his ‘here,’ in the form of his determinate, 
historical-material condition, to that oblique gaze by means of which its indwelling 
meaning, the potential ‘there’ of a future contained in it and conceived as necessary and 
emancipatory, literally makes itself present to him. In other words, the question posed to 
him does not ultimately issue from the experience of what we, existing within the 19th-
century legacy of Hegel, Marx, and Darwin, would call history, nor does he submit to the 
categories of this experience in forming his answer. As this new interpreter conceives and 
pursues his mission, the technique of negation and alienation must surpass even this 
experience in order not merely to interpret, but even to receive in the first place the voice 
that addresses him: beyond sense, perspective, or the body as such; beyond historical and 
material condition; beyond time, space, change, circumstance, relation or qualification of 
every sort – beyond, indeed, the common limits set by every heretofore conceivable 
204 
human experience. To all this, to everything that has given definition and meaning to the 
reality incontrovertibly recognized and interpreted as real by human beings, this 
interpreter makes himself an alien – all this he negates as delusion, as dream and mist, as 
a rumor half-recalled by a madman and then reported by a liar – in order to receive at last 
the voice addressed to him from the only true being and the only true reality. 
To call this the voice of the divine – and the new interpreter can perhaps only call 
it by that name as a concession to common usage – renders it somewhat less alien, 
domesticates its danger, and places an illusory safety net beneath the tightrope upon 
which we, along with him, nonetheless remain poised, with our ears open, straining to 
hear that voice, the terrible and thrilling question posed by that music. For this virtuoso 
of negation will not allow either us or himself simply to remain poised there alone on that 
utmost precipice, absorbed in the tireless and imperturbable effort to listen, risking all 
and reserving nothing. At the same time, he asks of himself and his fellow travelers that 
we exist both ‘here’ and ‘there’ at once, that we make the same effort to listen to and 
recognize the contour of that sound in this ungodly noise and pandemonium called 
human experience – because the perilous and interminable search for harmony amid the 
very acts of playing and listening, the real task of the new interpretation, lies in the 
dialogue of each music with the other, of each musician with the other. The only music 
worth playing unfolds not as a single melody, but contrapuntally; the only path of thought 
worth following does not follow a straight line, but zig-zags between truth and error. It is 
in this sense that the participants in interpretive dialogue truly submit to the discipline of 
risk: they most resolutely fight against error when they deliberately perpetuate it; they 
most strictly follow the path when they pursue every possible digression and diversion, 
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indulging and cultivating every obstacle to progress; they play with the richest 
imaginable harmony – as Coleman says, they get “on to something” – whenever they turn 
the music violently against itself over and over again, tapping into the immense fertility 









A RECKLESS VOICE OF CONSCIENCE: 
SOCRATES AT RISK IN THE APOLOGY 
 
 
IN MEMORIAM MICHAEL ROTH 
 
εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας.   [Plat. Phd. 89b] 
 
I. Introduction: Living with Noise 
 
The advent of the new interpreter, the dialogist – that disciplined musician of dissonance, 
that tireless traveler of the forking paths of error, that impious and corrupt alien to any 
state who nonetheless approaches them as the god-sent prophet of ethical and political 
conscience – announces itself in a personality as inevitable as he is improbable in both 
the history and the literature of the West. As if his identity had not already become 
obvious, this was Socrates.1
                                                 
1  Among all the scholarly works on Plato – the epitome of a critical literature that would take more 
than a dozen lifetimes to absorb, let alone digest – the most broad-ranging, most approachable, and most 
concise modern work that offers a general crash-course in Plato and/or Socrates for the raw beginner is 
Richard Kraut, “Introduction to the Study of Plato,” in: The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Kraut 
(New York: Cambridge UP, 1992), 1-50. While Kraut’s piece is addressed to the “philosophical” much 
more than the “literary” reader of Plato, there is probably no better single survey of the questions and 
problems that concern most modern scholarship on Plato than Kraut’s, and it merits reading even by those 
more advanced in Platonic studies, whether in the “literary” or the “philosophical” direction. Gregory 
Vlastos’ brilliant essay “The Paradox of Socrates” (in: Vlastos, Studies in Greek Philosophy, Volume II: 
Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition, ed. Daniel W. Graham [Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1995], 3-18) is 
perhaps the single most trenchant invitation to the study of Plato and Socrates in modern scholarly 
literature; Vlastos is the most influential Platonic scholar of the 20th century bar none, and his challenging 
and expansive theses must be reckoned with, whether directly or indirectly, in every serious contemporary 
attempt to understand Plato. Terry Penner’s article “Socrates and the Early Dialogues” (Kraut 1992, 121-
169), which draws on most of the major modern commentators on Plato (T.H. Irwin, Kraut, Vlastos, inter 
 Reflecting Socrates’ capacity as the agent provocateur of 
207 
radical alienation and negation, for instance, the Callicles of the Gorgias responds to a 
characteristically Socratic conclusion dispiritedly, speaking from within the all-too-
ordinary human territory that Socrates has long since left behind, à la Oedipus, on his 
wandering ways. Gorgias’ sense of consonance is quite undone by the single jarring tone 
Socrates strikes: 
εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε θῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ 
σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος 
ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἃ 
δεῖ; (Plat. Gorg. 481b-c) 
Tell me, Socrates, are we to take you as being in earnest just now, or joking [παίζοντα]? For if you are 
in earnest, and these things you’re saying are really true, won’t this human life of ours be turned upside 
down, and won’t everything we do evidently be the opposite of what we should do? 
Callicles earnestly strives to break free of the alienation he has suffered at Socrates’ 
hands, a disorienting turnabout of perspective that suggests to him nothing less than the 
total reorganization of ordinary human values and attitudes, by recasting the whole 
preceding argument as an extended jest, the kind of childish indulgence (παίζω [v.] = to 
joke, mock, or jest > παῖς [n.] = small child) that can easily be dismissed. Callicles' 
reaction is as typical for Socrates' interlocutors as it is revealing for the character of 
Socrates; as Hadot writes, “Socrates’ fellow citizens could not help perceiving his 
                                                                                                                                                 
alios) is representative of the modern mainstream view on the chronology of the dialogues, the diachronic 
development of Plato’s thought in them, and the relationship between the historical and the “fictional” 
Socrates in the group of shorter, mainly aporetic dialogues that scholarly consensus marks as “early” in 
Plato’s writing career; it is to this group that the Apology is thought to belong. For a cogent and wide-
ranging historical overview of the last half-century of Platonic scholarship, see Gerald A. Press, “The State 
of the Question in the Study of Plato,” in: Plato: Critical Assessments, Volume I: General Issues of 
Interpretation, ed. Nicholas D. Smith (New York: Routledge 1998), 309-332. On the contemporary 
consensus concerning the dating and organization of the Platonic canon, see also J.A. Philip, “The Platonic 
Corpus,” op. cit., 17-28; Holger Thesleff, “Platonic Chronology,” op. cit. 50-73. For a strongly-argued 
alternative thesis on the chronology of the dialogues that has gained some currency against the prevailing 
view, see Charles H. Kahn, “Did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?” op. cit. 120-140. Furthermore, Kahn’s 
Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (New York: Cambridge UP, 
1996), 36-100, marks one of the few attempts by a scholar interested in the literary dimensions of Plato to 
offer new hypotheses from this quarter addressed to the traditional questions about Plato’s intellectual 
development, the chronology of the dialogues, and the historicity of Plato’s Socrates. Although many of the 
questions pursued in this vein of literature will not directly concern my analysis here, these works have at 
least offered me a wide-angle view of the playing-field on which the present discussion tries to find a new 
position. 
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invitation to question all their values and their entire way of acting, and to take care for 
themselves, as a radical break with daily life, with the habits and conventions of everyday 
life, and with the world which they were familiar [sic]” (Hadot 2002, 36). Callicles wants 
– and perhaps we want, along with him! – to be reassured that the path Socrates has 
opened is after all certainly a path of error, a mistake exploited purely for comic effect 
that justifies the infallibility of common sense, the common paths of interpretation, the 
common harmony that domesticates the music of sense. 
But as always, infuriatingly, Socrates himself leaves the question of his own 
earnestness open – indeed, he leaves the path open, the harmonic resolution open – and 
instead claims that his obsequious fidelity to an ‘other’ voice, that of philosophy, like the 
fidelity of a (male) lover to his (male) beloved, demands that he always speak the same 
words and think the same thoughts as his beloved. This sly claim to indirect discourse 
presents Socrates as the transmitter of words and thoughts that properly belong to his 
beloved; he only acts as a kind of wireless router that selflessly conveys signals from the 
distant ‘there’ where the beloved truth lies to the ‘here’ of dialogue, shared by Callicles 
and his other interlocutors: μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ 
παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ἃ νῦν ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις […] ἡ δὲ 
φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν [sc. λόγων], λέγει δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς 
λεγομένοις. (Plat. Gorg. 482a-b; “[I]nstead of being surprised at my saying [these things], 
you must stop my beloved [τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά], philosophy, from saying them. For he always 
says what you now hear me say, my dear friend […]. [W]hat philosophy says always 
stays the same, and he’s saying things that now astound you, although you were present 
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when they were said” [Cooper/Zeyl 826f.].2
                                                 
2  With masculine pronouns substituted for the translation’s feminine ones. 
) We, along with Callicles – whose own 
erotic and political obsequiousness Socrates subtly lampoons with the same rhetoric 
elsewhere in this passage – might reasonably conclude that the trope itself, namely, the 
dictatorship of speech and thought exercised by the beloved over the lover, entails that 
the philosopher as interlocutor plays a transmissive or plainly submissive role. In this 
respect, his role would be analogous to prophetic speech, for instance, where the 
speaker’s language is clearly marked as indirect discourse, a language not his own, on 
behalf of an absent (because divine) party. The rhetorical figure of the philosopher qua 
desirous prophet, if taken in earnest, implies the negation or elision of the philosopher as 
an independent ethical subject, an agent in propria persona: he seems to invoke a kind of 
diplomatic immunity, or even to riff elaborately on the dictum “Don’t shoot the 
messenger.” On this (flat) reading, in short, Socrates claims no responsibility for what he 
has said, in both the conventional sense of the term and its special meaning in the 
problem of interpretation. But this rhetoric of ‘irresponsibility’ naturally proves ironic, or 
at least enthusiastically polysemous: as Socrates goes on to claim, it is not in spite of, but 
by virtue of this conscious ethical self-deferral, the ceding of one’s own voice before that 
of Philosophy, that he outlines an exceptional and authentic ethical status for himself qua 
philosopher. This special status not only far surpasses the status of the prophet or the 
lover, but also casts into radical doubt the glib ethical self-affirmation of Callicles and his 
all-too-human common sense. Socrates’ apparent irresponsibility, as we will see in a 
moment, emerges as the only authentic ethical and interpretive responsibility; through a 
subtle play on words, his apparent childish joking (παίζοντα 481b) likewise twists around 
to reveal a lover’s earnestness (παιδικά 482a > παιδικός [adj. > παῖς, as above] = childish, 
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boyish; neut. pl. παιδικά [n.] = beloved [male] youth, darling, favorite) in the relation of 
the philosopher to truth. The life of this relation subsists on the thrilling and harrowing, 
light-hearted and dead-serious wager made every moment in the chosen life of love – the 
same wager, it bears mentioning, that is made every moment in the chosen life of 
thought.3
To Callicles, the paradoxically active zeal with which Socrates has passively 
channeled that distant voice, the indirect discourse of his absent and obscure beloved – 
the dogged persistence with which he has followed an interpretive path dictated not by 
any real beloved, whether human or divine, but rather by the process of interpretation 
itself – has put him completely out of tune with the present and transparent dictates of 
common sense. As a preemptive response against this line of thought, Socrates executes a 
characteristically virtuosic epistrophy at Callicles’ expense that cuts straight to the root of 
Socratic philosophy as a quest for harmony in the perpetual suspense of dissonance and 
 
                                                 
3  In a relatively rare turn among scholars of Plato, Hadot acknowledges the paradoxical light-
heartedness at the core of classic Socratic irony – a concept so hotly debated and so earnestly pursued down 
through the generations of Platonic scholars – when he writes that this irony “is a kind of humor which 
refuses to take oneself or other people entirely seriously; for everything human, and even everything 
philosophical, is highly uncertain, and we have no right to be proud of it” (Hadot 2002, 26). With the 
Socratic turn in the problem of interpretation, the uncertainty of human life and of human knowledge – in a 
word, the risk entailed by living and knowing, or at least presuming to live and to know – lead the 
philosopher to adopt a kind of elegiac levity, a laughing melancholy at once resigned and resolute. If, as I 
have suggested here, Socrates effectively turns against the tragic tradition by transplanting the tragic 
attitude toward risk and responsibility into the realm of everyday interpretation, on the one hand, and by 
affirming the creative rather than destructive power of tragic error on the other, it could be argued that he 
turns just as much against a certain tradition of comedy by transforming laughter into an exhortation to the 
highest earnestness and a chastening reminder of human limits. (For the same reason, I find I must disagree 
with Hadot – at least in terms of nomenclature – when he identifies the “historical tonality” of the Platonic 
philosopher-figure in the Symposium as “ironic and tragic at the same time,” since he defines the “tragic” 
side of this tonality in terms of the philosopher’s unfulfilled desire for wisdom due to the “insurmountable 
distance between philosophy and wisdom” [Hadot 2002, 47]; such unrequited desire may be elegiac or 
melancholic, but cannot, I think, rightly be called “tragic.” This objection gains even more weight, and the 
tragicomic character of the Socratic philosopher comes into even sharper focus, when we consider the 
conclusion of the Symposium itself, where Socrates himself is reported to have argued “that authors should 
be able to write both comedy and tragedy: the skillful tragic dramatist should also be a comic poet” [Plat. 
Symp. 223d; Cooper/Nehamas & Woodruff, 505].) Then again, a redoubled irony lies in the fact that 
Plato’s Socrates, at any rate, hardly ever laughs – though he usually has ample occasion and justification to 
do so, if we view his interlocutors through his eyes – and is all too often the one laughed at by precisely 
those whom he should, by rights, deride. 
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error. Against all expectation, Socrates argues that it is precisely by virtue of his 
conscious and deliberate submission to interpretive reason – his one and only “beloved” – 
and his transmission of what this reason dictates that he can begin the journey towards 
ethical self-coherence, autonomous agency and absolute consistency of thought, word, 
and deed. Callicles, on the other hand, with all his common sense (and his numerous 
lovers) must forever and abysmally fall short of this prize. In essence, Socrates’ 
deliberate choice to live in interpretive dissonance with the human world, rooted in his 
deferral to reason, serves as evidence that he is on the way to achieving concord with 
both himself and truth, and, ultimately, that in this concord with self and truth the 
philosopher alone is identical with himself and speaks in his own voice: 
ἢ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγξον, […] ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, […] οὔ σοι ὁμολογήσει 
Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ 
βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστόν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ 
χορηγοίην, καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ 
ἕνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν. (Plat. Gorg. 482b-c) 
So you must either refute him [sc. philosophy], […] or, if you leave that [sc. the counter-argument] 
unproved […] there will be no agreement [ὁμολογήσει] between you, Callicles, and Callicles, but you 
will be in discord [διαφωνήσει] with him all your life. And yet for my part, my good man, I think it’s 
better to have my lyre or a chorus that I might lead out of tune and dissonant [ἀνάρμοστόν τε καὶ 
διαφωνεῖν], and have the vast majority of men disagree [μὴ ὁμολογεῖν] with me and contradict me, than 
to be out of harmony with myself [ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι], to contradict myself, though I’m only 
one person (Cooper/Zeyl, 827, with masculine pronoun substituted for feminine ἐκείνην [482b] in 
trans.). 
Although Socrates’ prophetic pose makes him appear to speak at odds with the whole 
world, although his otherworldly and dissonant music may sound forth here and now as 
an absurd and laughable clamor – literally, as diaphonic (διαφωνεῖν) rather than 
symphonic (συμφωνεῖν) music – he catches Callicles’ common sense red-handed in a far 
more egregious crime. Although the whole multitudinous world may agree with Callicles, 
he speaks at odds with himself and is out of tune with himself, paradoxically because his 
common-sense voice does not allow him to hear the voice of interpretive reason and 
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perform its peculiar music. Perhaps more than any other passage in Plato, this one 
discloses the priority of ethical self-coherence and concord relative to their political 
counterparts in the Socratic task of interpretation. The philosopher qua radical interpreter 
should rejoice in the flat mockery he receives from the stern professors of common sense, 
he should even exult in his own degradation and, indeed, political endangerment at their 
hands, because these are living proofs of his progress in the task of traveling towards 
himself and harmonizing himself with himself as an authentic ethical agent. But we must 
likewise be careful to understand mockery and degradation – in Greek, katagelōs 
(κατάγελως [n.] = mockery, derision, ridicule > καταγελάω [v.] = to laugh at, jeer at, lit. 
‘to laugh down’4
                                                 
4  See e.g. Plat. Euthyph. 3d-e, where γελάω and παίζω are paired as virtual synonyms that Socrates 
uses ironically to describe the discourse of a person who simultaneously holds mutually contradictory 
propositions: on Socrates’ view, the ‘joke,’ of course, is on the one who speaks in this manner, not on the 
one to whom he speaks. 
) – of philosophical discourse in Platonic dialogue as a variation, but not 
strictly an inversion, of the genuine dialogic response, the apokrisis (ἀπόκρισις [n.] = 
answer > ἀποκρίνω [v.] = to separate, distinguish; to give answer to, reply). Both are 
equally interpretive responses, and in the machinations of Socratic interaction, both can 
be almost equally provocative to further dialogue and interpretation. Whereas the move 
of katagelōs, however, seeks to restore, to dis-alienate the perspective of a bewildered 
interlocutor back to his former common-sense position of safety, the critical and, in a 
sense, super-alienating move of apokrisis seeks to redefine the terms of dialogue, to 
redirect its path or retune its elements – in sum, to renew contact with the suspense of 
error in dialogic exchange. But where the danger imposed by and renewed through 
apokrisis in the discursive form of dialogue remains on the ethical plane – namely, the 
interlocutor’s relation to himself through truth – the risk posed by katagelōs, with its 
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fundamentally restorative and reactionary motivation, modulates this same risk on to the 
political plane – namely, the philosopher’s relation to others through truth. And it 
scarcely bears mentioning that this political risk is the one to which Socrates, poised over 
his cup of hemlock, ultimately succumbs. 
The priority of ethical harmony directly shapes what I have described as Socrates’ 
crucial and distinctive choice, in both this passage from the Gorgias and, as we shall soon 
see, the entirety of the Apology: for him, the risks of ethical dissonance far outweigh the 
risks of political dissonance – or, to use a bolder term, dissidence.5
I will try to explain here, in a preliminary way, what can only be called the motive 
for dialogue as the genre of Socratic interpretation in terms of the central preoccupations 
 By making his 
vigilant self-relation into the center of his interpretive practice, nonetheless, the 
philosopher’s effort to respond to the singular voice of truth once and for all, to follow 
the path towards himself that it traces out in all earnestness, is precisely what initiates and 
endlessly perpetuates his efforts to respond to the multiple voices of his interlocutors in 
the political arena. This complicity shared by the ethical and political, self and other, 
singular and plural, is the fundamental paradox that justifies Platonic dialogue as the only 
literary genre suited to reflect the Socratic moment in the interpretive problem of risk and 
responsibility. 
                                                 
5  Emerson’s thinking draws a distinction precisely parallel to this Socratic priority of the ethical 
over the political in “Self-Reliance,” when he writes on the priority of ‘direct’ over ‘reflex’ duties: “The 
populace think that your [sc. the non-conformist’s] rejection of popular standards is a rejection of all 
standard, and mere antinomianism; and the bold sensualist will use the name of philosophy to gild his 
crimes. But the law of consciousness abides. There are two confessionals, in one or the other of which we 
must be shriven. You may fulfil your round of duties by clearing yourself in the direct, or in the reflex way. 
Consider whether you have satisfied your relations to father, mother, cousin, neighbour, town, cat, and dog; 
whether any of these can upbraid you. But I may also neglect this reflex standard, and absolve me to 
myself. I have my own stern claims and perfect circle. It denies the name of duty to many offices that are 
called duties. But if I can discharge its debts, it enables me to dispense with the popular code. If any one 
imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day.” Ralph Waldo Emerson, The 




                                                 
6  A considerable portion of recent scholarship has been devoted to the relatively new question of 
why dialogue should prove to be the indispensable literary-discursive form for Platonic philosophy. My 
own attitude here has chiefly been informed by Charles L. Griswold, Jr., “Plato’s Metaphilosophy: Why 
Plato Wrote Dialogues,” in: Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, ed. Griswold (New York: Routledge, 
1988), 143-167, and Michael Frede, “Plato’s Arguments and the Dialogue Form,” in Smith 1998, 253-269. 
 By the same token, moreover, I hope to adumbrate why the Apology – 
which, as a public, narrative monologue, immediately seems the least likely candidate for 
an ars poetica of the Platonic dialogue – in fact contains a comprehensive matrix for 
understanding how this motive for a specific literary form serves equally as the motive 
for a specific ethics and politics of interpretation. As we will soon see in more detail, 
Socrates’ philosophical mission as he describes it in the Apology has its root in a desire 
not to engage that ‘other voice’ of the Delphic oracle in conversation – a voice which, 
like the voice of Socrates’ fictional beloved in the Gorgias, he receives as identical with 
the voice of philosophy itself – but instead utterly to refute its claim and refuse its 
address. Here, at what turns out to be the founding moment of his career as a dialogist, 
Socrates would only all too gladly forego the entanglements of interpretive conversation, 
both with himself and with others, and make his way with all due haste back into a 
silence that has just now become irretrievable. Just as Oedipus responds to the oracle 
concerning his own atrocious fate, to the Sphinx’s tangled speech, and then again to the 
cacophony of plague-ridden Thebes, by seeking to impose silence upon these objects 
through his power of interpretation, so does the Socrates of the Apology seek to impose a 
comparable silence upon the unbearable noise generated within his own ethical relation, 
within his self-awareness and self-estimation, by the god’s affirmation of his unsurpassed 
wisdom. Yet was there ever before, or has there ever been since, such an impassioned 
lover of undisturbed hermeneutic silence, such a studied nostalgist for a pre-ethical and 
pre-political quietude of mind, who turned out to be such a tireless thinker and champion 
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talker as Socrates? And was there ever before, or has there ever been since, one who has 
been told by the infallible voice of a deity that he possesses the utmost measure of human 
wisdom – that is, of interpretive concord with himself and truth – but who then, in a 
triumph of perversity, uses this statement itself as a blunt instrument to shatter the very 
same concord he is said to enjoy? 
These paradoxes issue from, and feed back into, no other origin than the fertility 
of the intentional error, the power of the deliberate and cultivated mistake, which gives 
the Platonic dialogue its generic motive just as the most minute irregularity in a 
mathematical system can generate an infinite and irresolvable iteration. Though the 
oracle seems auspicious enough, its words doom Socrates endlessly to reenact Apollo’s 
disintegration of the former’s hermeneutic silence into the ‘noisy’ ethical activity of 
thought and the even ‘noisier’ political activity of conversation, both of which achieve in 
equal measure the disintegration of the interpreting subject into confrontation with itself 
in the act of interpretation. More importantly, this ethical and political disintegration, the 
experience of separating oneself from oneself and becoming other than oneself, here and 
now ceases to be the source of tragic horror. Instead, it has become the arduous and 
ardent work of Platonic dialogue, and it is undertaken with the hope, but not the certainty, 
of a reintegration that always lies just over the horizon.7
                                                 
7  Hadot describes precisely this process of disintegration as both the end-product and the constant 
impetus of dialogic discourse. Under the influence of dialogue, Socrates’ interlocutor “becomes aware of 
the contradictions in his discourse, and of his own internal contradictions. He doubts himself; and, like 
Socrates, he comes to know that he knows nothing. As he does this, however, he assumes a distance with 
regard to himself. He splits into two parts, one of which henceforth identifies with Socrates, in the mutual 
accord which Socrates demands from his interlocutor at each stage of the discussion. The interlocutor thus 
acquires awareness and begins to question himself” (Hadot 2002, 29, emphasis mine; qv. 200f. on Seneca’s 
“inner court” and its reappearance in Kant). But the philosophical experience of disintegration achieved at 
crucial moments in the Platonic dialogues – regardless of whether it produces positive results or aporetic 
perplexities – never represents a final achievement: disintegration is not a state to be attained nor a location 
to be reached, but a principle of movement that must be sustained in order to retain its force and meaning, 
 The motivation of dialogue as 
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the literary form par excellence of Socratic interpretation thus lies in Socrates’ reluctant 
embrace of the iteration and itineracy imposed by self-disintegration: the interpreter must 
not silence noise, but must live in and through noise, he must consciously and eagerly 
risk noise – and yet strive to hear its nascent music. In the peregrinations of dialogue 
form and of philosophical life, no one – not even, or especially not, Socrates – is able to 
demarcate where the territory of ethical self-consonance and the anticipation of truth ends 
and where the territory of political dissonance and the suspense of error begins. It may all 
be noise; it may all be music. 
Nonetheless, the complicity of ethics and politics, truth and error, noise and music 
in the Platonic dialogue, with all its transactions in risk, error, and responsibility, is not in 
itself the reason why Socrates presents such a vital moment of synthesis and departure in 
the genealogy that directly concerns us here. We have seen similarly intractable 
complicities before in Oedipus’ figuration of movement in space, or Brecht-Galileo’s 
figuration of visual perspective, according to the terms of the interpretive task. The 
quality, or even better, the decision that both connects and separates Socrates from the 
interpretive problematics of what I have loosely called the tragic tradition lies in the fact 
that he affirms and practices precisely that which both Brecht and Sophocles render 
impossible to affirm or to practice for both their protagonists and their audiences. In a 
word, the Socratic turning point in this genealogy consists in the fact that Socrates 
affirms, practices, and ultimately sacrifices his life for the right to prove oneself wrong as 
                                                                                                                                                 
which rigorously organize the philosopher’s entire way of life. This is why Hadot goes on to write, “The 
real problem is therefore not the problem of knowing this or that” – which would imply the subject’s 
achievement of a final condition by certain instrumental or methodological means, and the subject’s 
coming to rest in that condition – “but of being in this or that way” (ibid.; qv. 36). The concept of existing 
in and through disintegration as a principle of interpretive movement – a principle, it bears mentioning, not 
unlike Oedipus’ tragic kinesis – is one which will loom large in my reading of Socrates in the Apology as 
the persistent interlocutor of his own and others’ voices. 
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an interpreter. He affirms risk not just as a necessary evil imposed upon the interpreter’s 
task, but as an invigorating tonic to its aims; he affirms error not as a final and 
cataclysmic point of descent into horror and vertigo, but as the sobering point of ascent to 
an infinitely renewable beginning; he affirms responsibility not in terms of inexorable 
complicities or involuntary self-alienation, but in terms of the constant and not 
displeasurable vigilance of the ensemble player, giving to and partaking in the music of 
logos wherever it leads. All this he affirms not with the superhuman resignation to the 
final un-making of both subject and sense that proves to be Galileo’s or Oedipus’ sole 
mark of distinction in the face of death, but instead with a – dare I say it? – divine 
exultation in the endless re-making of both subject and sense that constitutes the 
intensified, clarified, elevated life of conversation. The new interpreter – musician, 
wanderer, prophet at once – strives for nothing else than to embody this life in his own 
person, which is not the life of a kind of corporate, super-individual subject, but the trans-
individual life of an activity, a relation, a praxis. For the limits of this life are coextensive 
not with those of the interpreter’s life, bound as it is to time, space, matter, circumstance, 
and then at last to death, but rather with those of interpretation, of sense-making as such, 
which endlessly seeks out what is true in what is false, and listens to the wrong notes that 
together compose the right music. For Socrates, the life we attain when we consciously 
resolve to exist in pursuit of meaning and harmony, on the way to truth, is the sole form 
of life that can be said to grant us a share in immortality. In the practice of dialogue that 
pursues truth, as Pierre Hadot writes, “the ‘I’ which must die transcends itself and 
becomes an ‘I’ which is henceforth a stranger to death, since it has identified itself with 
the logos and with thought” (Hadot 2002, 68) – that is, with the life of conversation. In 
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comparison to all the other famous Socratic paradoxes, perhaps the greatest lies in 
Socrates’ faith – and it can only rightly be described as faith – that conversation, in more 
than one sense, forever out-lives its participants. 
 
II. Figures of Endangerment: Socratic Spirituality and the Language of Platonic 
Dialogue 
Now that I have, as it were, constructed an improvisation upon an introductory set of 
harmonic changes, let me now, following the custom of jazz musicians, step forward after 
the end of the first tune and address the audience in order to introduce the members of the 
ensemble with whom I have been playing, to whom I have been responding, thus far. In 
bringing my fellow musicians into the foreground, moreover, I will seek to render them 
the greatest Socratic tribute – at least in terms of the fiction(s) of Socrates I have thus far 
constructed – by foregrounding the noise and discord entangled within the structure of 
their own delicately harmonized interpretations, and letting it sound out loud. At the same 
time, and by the very same move, I of course invite my auditors to render the same 
paradoxical honor to my own music: this combined tribute and invitation is, after all, the 
true meaning and proper enactment of what I mean by interpretive responsibility.8
It should be evident by this point that I have not tried to approach the singularity 
of the Socratic moment in this genealogy by constructing the object of investigation as 
 
                                                 
8  It should be noted that with this same gesture, I make myself, as my interlocutors do and every 
other interpreter of the ‘new music’ must, a metaphorical son of Socrates: τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι: τοὺς 
ὑεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν 
δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε 
αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταῦτα ποιῆτε, 
δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ὑεῖς. (Pl. Ap. 41e-42a; “This much I ask from them [sc. 
the jurists who sought to punish Socrates by their votes of condemnation]: when my sons grow up, avenge 
yourselves by causing them the same kind of grief that I caused you, if you think they care for money or 
anything else more than they care for virtue, or if they think they are somebody when they are nobody. 
Reproach them as I reproach you, that they do not care for the right things and think they are worthy when 
they are not worthy of anything. If you do this, I shall have been justly treated by you, and my sons also” 
[Cooper/Grube 36].) 
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either (A) the exposition in Plato of a coherent system of Socratic doctrines that makes 
either implicit or explicit claims about the practice of interpretation; or (B) the exposition 
in Plato of a coherent Socratic method of philosophical thinking which can be treated as 
both a demonstration of, and a model for, a certain practice of interpretation; or even (C) 
the exposition in Plato of a full-blown Socratic theory of interpretation, if there even is 
one, or a reconstruction of what such a theory might look like based on extant evidence.9 
It would be an understatement to claim that the panorama of questions related to doctrine 
and method in the Platonic dialogues has provoked and inspired generations of 
scholars;10
                                                 
9  In making this statement, I am not at all polemicizing against the vast body of scholarly literature 
which approaches the study of the Platonic corpus along these or similar avenues. Rather, I am trying to 
approach this corpus strictly in terms of its historical and ‘conversational’ position in the present 
genealogy, in which I believe Plato’s work is deeply embedded along pathways that this same scholarly 
tradition has often criss-crossed but only sporadically and recently developed. This is the implicit reason 
why, rather than trying to reconstruct the concrete, historical reality of Socrates as an individual thinker – 
as so much scholarship is still motivated to do – I refer generally to a ‘Socratic moment’ in the genealogy 
of the problem of interpretation, and why I approach Socrates as a rich and complex literary invention on 
the part of Plato. Any alternative route means not only entering into any number of long-standing debates 
about the relative historicity of Plato’s Socrates (or rather, any one of his Socrateses) that simply do not 
belong in the present project, but also endangering the coherence of the project itself. The interpretive risks 
and responsibilities posed by the literary character of Socrates inevitably count much more in the present 
discussion, after all, than any extratextual historicity of Socrates as a concrete individual. The question at 
stake here has always been how new possibilities and new realities are raised for the problem of 
interpretation in the production and reception of literary texts, which by no means stand outside of their 
historical context, but do not consistently or reliably present themselves as historiography or doxography. 
All of this is also to say, however, that Plato’s fiction of Socrates motivates the question of its historicity 
not in spite of, but precisely because of its power to engage us as a literary invention – to which we should 
compare the relative power of Xenophon’s or Aristophanes’ fictions of Socrates, and then ask whether the 
scholarly tradition would be half as motivated as it is to recover ‘the historical Socrates’ in the absence of 
Plato’s art. 
 it would be at least narrow-minded to claim that the Platonic dialogues do not 
explicitly raise or try to answer any questions about interpretation as an activity that has 
10  For some recent treatments of the problem of ‘Socratic method,’ see Gerard Kuperus, “Traveling 
with Socrates: Dialectic in the Phaedo and Protagoras,” in: Gary Alan Scott, ed., Philosophy in Dialogue: 
Plato’s Many Devices (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 193-211, and Gary Alan Scott, 
ed., Does Socrates Have A Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State UP, 2002), passim. For a widely influential reading of Plato’s ethical 
theory that takes an exemplary stance in favor of Plato’s doctrinalism, see Terence Irwin’s monumental 
Plato’s Ethics (New York: Oxford UP, 1995). 
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certain conditions, limits, and dangers; and certainly it would be near-idiotic to claim that 
any of these questions are unimportant. 
For the purposes of my present project, however, the full significance of the 
Socratic moment cannot exclusively derive from a certain set of “objective” doctrines, 
methods, or theories presented in Plato’s dialogues. Such an approach, I believe, would 
entail an abrupt though tacit shift in method from “literary” to “philosophical” analysis, 
whereas it is one of my key contentions here that what we call “philosophical discourse” 
on the problem of interpretation – beginning at least as early as Plato – responded to, and 
thus participated in, a long-standing conversation about this problem conducted through 
the production and reception of literature. A shift in method at this point, in other words, 
would nullify the very argument the method is meant to defend. It would render Socrates 
as the absolute origin of a brand-new conversation, the conversation of “philosophy,” 
which would seek to silence completely the unbearable noise and confusion generated by 
“literature” and replace it with the rational, hierarchical, and harmonious movement of 
dialectic.11
                                                 
11  This method, of course, would “take Socrates at his word” concerning the expulsion of the poets 
and the critique of mimesis in the Republic, the demolition of poetic inspiration in the Ion, the interrogation 
of cultural values inherited from Homeric literature in the Hippias Minor, and probably also the critique of 
rhetoric and of writing in the Phaedrus. Taking Socrates at his word on these and other occasions, of 
course, demands that we efface the poetic, mimetic, rhetorical, and literary dimensions of the texts in which 
Socrates’ words appear – and this demands an art that I cannot master. 
 What we actually encounter in the reading of the Platonic corpus is not 
merely a paragon of eminently literary richness inseparable from philosophical 
complexity; viewed within its historical context, we also encounter a many-layered 
intervention in a host of pre-existing conversations from which “philosophy” does not or 
cannot declare its radical independence, and in which instead it makes itself deeply, even 
enthusiastically complicit. In Plato’s hands, philosophy becomes not the patricide, but the 
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prodigal son of literature. In terms of the problem of interpretation, moreover, the 
dialogues enact not a usurpation, but an ambivalent drama of departure and return, a 
strenuously applied effort to give new form, content, and context to a conversation Plato 
inherited from his culture and its literature – a culture and literature that, like Socrates, he 
so dearly wishes to reawaken, reinvigorate, and perhaps even save.12
Reading the dialogues as embedded within, rather than over-against, their literary 
tradition means that we must attend to the dynamic and uncertain play generated between 
Plato’s “objective,” “philosophical” ideas about the practice of interpretation, on the one 
hand, and the more properly “subjective,” “literary” forms of interpretive experience 
presented to the reader of the dialogues, on the other. In its main outlines, this approach 
has slowly gained ground in scholarship over the past fifteen years or so: there has been 
renewed interest in the prosopography of Socrates’ interlocutors
 
13 and in Plato’s 
exploitation of dramatic and literary devices,14
                                                 
12  Rosemary Desjardins, for instance, argues that the problem of interpretation is perhaps the 
cornerstone problem in Plato’s thought in general. In her view, the primary task of Platonic dialogue lies 
not so much in the positing of doctrines that signify universally and univocally, but in discriminating 
between more or less legitimate interpretations of a given doctrine – that is, to use my own terms, in 
discovering the true “voice” in which a given doctrine, or, indeed, any discourse at all, is spoken. Each such 
process of evaluation and discrimination, for Desjardins, represents a specific reckoning with, and response 
to, part of the ancient Greek cultural tradition inherited by Socrates and/or Plato. As she writes, “the 
dialogues might even be seen as dialogues with the tradition”, a tradition in which Plato’s philosophy 
consciously situates itself as both a new response to the tradition and a new method of responding to 
tradition in general (122). The philosophical task of self-knowledge becomes possible only by making 
oneself conversant with the tradition in which one stands. Invoking Gadamer, Desjardins concludes that 
“self-understanding must seek to resolve that tension between acceptance and interrogation, respect and 
critique, reconstruction of the past and application in the present”: as good a description as any of what I 
call interpretive complicity and responsibility writ large. Rosemary Desjardins, “Why Dialogues? Plato’s 
Serious Play,” in Griswold 1988, 110-125. 
 both of which help to excavate an 
13  The most comprehensive recent work on Platonic prosopography, an incomparably rich and well-
researched reference of particular use to the literary- and historically-minded among interpreters of Plato, is 
Debra Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2002). 
14  The principal texts in my own understanding of this recent scholarship include the following: 
James A. Arieti, Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991); 
id., “How to Read a Platonic Dialogue,” in Smith 1998, 273-286; Jill Gordon, Turning Toward Philosophy: 
Literary Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato’s Dialogues (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 
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implicit, and often ironic, commentary within the dialogues on both the philosophical 
“action” itself and the widely varying political and intellectual fates of the historical 
individuals whom Plato translates into his fictions, including Socrates.15
All of the scholars who have pursued this direction of inquiry, however, have had 
to confront at least two crucial questions. First, how can the critic who approaches the 
Platonic dialogues as both literature and philosophy present a coherent argument that 
bridges the methodological, disciplinary, and discursive gap that separates literary from 
philosophical modes of analysis?
 This research 
has achieved much in retrieving those aspects of the dialogues that render them genuinely 
“historical fictions” – with all the poetic license, retrospective insight, and implicit 
paradoxes that that genre entails. This effort to retrieve the literary, and in particular the 
dramatic, qualities of the dialogues has in turn opened up new viewpoints, many of them 
yet to be fully exploited, on some of the perennial concerns of more strictly philosophical 
scholarship on Plato: for instance, the relationship between the universal and particular; 
between the embodied, temporal nature of personality and the disembodied, atemporal 
nature of truth; between mythical narrative and philosophical dialogue; between the 
historical Socrates and his contemporary Athenians; and between philosophy and politics 
more generally. 
16
                                                                                                                                                 
1999); and Ruby Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues (New York: Cambridge UP, 2002). 
Gordon’s introduction (1-17) offers a concise summary of what she calls the “analysis and argument-
focused methods” of modern philosophical debates on Plato (3-6) and delivers a virtual manifesto of an 
“alternative” approach (7-13) interested in reclaiming the “philosophical function” of literary device in 
Plato’s dialogues (7). Blondell’s brilliant and far-reaching work incorporates intergeneric and intertextual 
study of Plato’s work within its literary and cultural context, paying particularly close attention to ancient 
theories of character and its representation in dramatic literature; the debt I owe in the present discussion to 
many of her insights is more than I can hope to acknowledge explicitly. 
 Second, how can such an argument also respond (in 
15  On whom see Nails 2002, 263-269. 
16  So, for instance, in formulating a literary-dramatic approach to Plato’s dialogues, Gordon claims 
to make “an implicit argument for the union of philosophy and literature in the works of Plato. But I must, 
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the fullest sense) to the historical, conceptual, and institutional conditions that created and 
widened this gap in the first place – a schism for which it is clichéd and myopic to indict 
Plato’s ideas themselves without taking into account (somehow!) the subsequent history 
of Western philosophy and literature? These are, in fact, huge and crucial questions, and 
any attempt to answer them must have ramifications far beyond the province of 
scholarship on a writer of prose in ancient Attic Greek. They are questions about how and 
why we are inclined to respond to the language of literature and the language of 
philosophy differently as interpreters, how and why these sets of responses have 
                                                                                                                                                 
paradoxically, make the very distinction I want to efface. […] The bifurcation of philosophy and literature, 
in part, grows out of the analytic conception of philosophy. If philosophy is defined as the activity that uses 
logic and focuses on appropriate objects such as arguments and their constituent parts, then whatever is 
extralogical is also deemed extraphilosophical” (Gordon 10, 11). As we shall see, Gordon’s attitude 
towards analytic philosophy tacitly registers a certain impatience with the ‘post-spiritual’ outlook of 
modern philosophical discourse as Foucault defines it. Alan C. Bowen (“On Interpreting Plato,” in 
Griswold 1988, 49-65) offers an earlier definition of the conflict between these approaches and marks the 
beginning of the trend, now gaining ground in Platonic scholarship, to try to resolve the tensions between 
these approaches. In the history of modern Platonic reception, Bowen distinguishes between “philological” 
and “philosophical” methods, both of which, as he puts it, are founded upon “a response to a bad question” 
first raised by the “late eighteenth-century German assumption that the Platonic text is the means by which 
we are to construct and verify our views of Plato’s philosophical thought,” and that philosophical thought, 
by definition, is systematic (63; qv. 52-55 for a succinct history of this assumption and its consequences). 
Neither the philological nor the philosophical approach that develops from this assumption, Bowen argues, 
“involves interpreting Plato’s philosophical thought: philologists interpret Plato’s texts and philosophers 
think with the text as a guide. […] The ultimate object of philological concern is the literary artifact taken 
by itself in abstraction from all its historical accidents: the philologist argues from the written word, about 
the written word, to the written word. […] Unlike philology, […] philosophy – or more precisely, the 
philosophical study of Plato’s writings – seeks to answer the questions these writings raise and thus moves 
from the text toward solution of general problems” (60, 61). As he concludes, “the philosophical response 
to a dialogue must be predicated on sound philology if it is to be guided by the text,” which means “that 
one cannot isolate the logical and dialectical structure of the argumentation in the dialogue without paying 
heed to the humor and irony at the dramatic level” (64). The method I try to formulate and apply here, 
despite its flaws, assumes that if Plato’s philosophical thought does, in fact, have any systematic character, 
this thought must be approached and interpreted as constituting a system of (literary) figures, and such a 
system necessarily varies its structure and meaning depending on the intra- or intertextual frame of 
reference. Furthermore, my method tries to demonstrate how these Platonic systems of figures implicitly 
draw upon a preexisting literary currency, and how his figurations have been received and reconfigured in 
turn by his modern interlocutors. On the surface, such a method would seem to have more in common with 
a “philological” than a “philosophical” approach, as each is defined by Bowen. On a deeper level, however, 
I think that Plato’s originality both as philosopher and writer derives from his bold and galvanizing 
intervention in a pre-existing conversation, and that this intervention attempted to reorganize completely 
the terms and categories of interpretive exchange in literature itself. Philosophia, in Plato’s coining of the 
term, can be understood as the name he gives to this decisive shift in the relationship between, and the 
significance of, certain literary figures. 
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separated into parallel, though sometimes intersecting, interpretive conversations, and not 
least of all what is at stake – what we risk – in perpetuating their mutual non-
confrontation. 
For the purposes of this genealogy, I want to propose that the real interpretive 
activity of Socratic philosophy and the real content of its discourse lies in the way of life 
that renders the “subjective” and “objective” elements in the experience of the 
philosopher-interpreter inseparable – so much so, in fact, that we must at last confront our 
reflex to separate them as a violent and unjustified anachronism. As I have already 
argued, what at once separates and connects the tragic-literary “solution” to the problem 
of interpretation from the Socratic-philosophical “solution” is that tragedy sees an end, a 
point of absolute limitation and dissolution, in precisely the same situation where 
Socrates sees an infinitely renewable beginning. The revelation of error becomes not a 
reason to disavow life at last, but a reason and a way to live it – at last. Philosophy, in 
short, offers a way to live literature, to transform one’s whole life into a field of play for 
the risks and responsibilities of interpretation: this way of life ultimately eludes every 
possible terminus in error – contradiction, transgression, even death itself – because, by 
nature, it can always begin its search for meaning again. 
The idea that Socrates generalizes the problem of interpretation to apprehend the 
whole of human life, and creates a specific way of life in response to it, shows a strong 
affiliation to Pierre Hadot’s organizing claim in his What Is Ancient Philosophy?, which 
is worth quoting at length: 
[T]he history of ‘philosophy’ is not the same as the history of philosophies, if what we understand by 
‘philosophies’ are theoretical discourses and philosophers’ systems. In addition to this history, however, 
there is room for the study of philosophical modes of life. [… A]t least since the time of Socrates, the 
choice of a way of life has not been located at the end of the process of philosophical activity, like a kind of 
accessory or appendix. On the contrary, it stands at the beginning […] Philosophical discourse, then, 
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originates in a choice of life and an existential option – not vice versa. […T]he task of philosophical 
discourse will therefore be to reveal and rationally justify this existential option, and it leads back to it, 
insofar as – by means of its logical and persuasive force, and the action it tries to exert upon its interlocutor 
– it incites both masters and disciples to live in genuine conformity with their initial choice. In other words, 
it is, in a way, the application of a certain ideal of life. […] We will not be concerned with opposing and 
separating philosophy as a way of life, on the one hand, and, on the other, a philosophical discourse that is 
somehow external to philosophy. On the contrary: we wish to show that philosophical discourse is a part of 
this way of life. […] Can Socrates’ discourse be separated from the life and death of Socrates? (Hadot 
2002, 1, 3, 5, 6) 
In the case of Socrates, what I have identified as the explicit and decisive affirmation of 
risk and responsibility in the interpretive task, and the reorganization of human life 
around this task alone, together represent the innermost content of his “existential 
option.” Hadot traces the relationship between various such “options” and the discourse 
inseparably linked to them throughout the entire history of philosophy in the West, but 
marks its inception with Socrates and its golden age in the Hellenistic and Roman eras. In 
Hadot’s conception, the discourse of philosophical dialogue as practiced by Plato’s 
Socrates represents not only a kind of objective, textual, or a posteriori trace of the 
interpretive practice that follows upon this existential decision, but also, by the very same 
token, works as a constant a priori justification and provocation to renew and enrich this 
interpretive way of life in every moment – and to summon others to heed its call. As 
Hadot goes on to argue, citing textual sources as historically dispersed as Polemo, 
Epicurus, Epictetus, and Seneca, the bond between philosophical discourse and the 
philosophical way of life in antiquity was conceived in such strong terms that the 
possibility of discourse alone taking precedence before, or even usurping the place of, the 
corresponding way of life presented the locus of a specific and dire risk. The resulting 
“ambiguity of philosophical discourse” pursued for its own sake, as Hadot describes it, 
meant that 
all schools [of ancient philosophy] denounced the risk taken by philosophers who imagine that their 
philosophical discourse can be sufficient to itself without being in accord with the philosophical life. 
[…] Traditionally, people who developed an apparently philosophical discourse without trying to live 
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their lives in accordance with their discourse, and without their discourse emanating from their life 
experience, were called ‘Sophists’ (Hadot 2002, 174). 
On the one hand, then, we have the Socratic affirmation of the risk of discord and error, a 
risk which at once integrates and threatens the discourse and life of the philosopher, but 
must be acknowledged and negotiated in every moment of the subject’s experience and 
existence. On the other hand, we have the mirror-image of this Socratic risk, what might 
be called the Sophistic risk, whereby the “subjective” or existential component, and the 
“objective” or purely discursive component of philosophical interpretation, remain 
disintegrated.17
                                                 
17  The scholarly literature on the group of Greek thinkers and teachers who were contemporary with 
Socrates and collectively referred to as ‘the Sophists’ is too vast and specialized to give any adequate 
overview of it here; furthermore, the question of the historical Socrates’ relationship to this group informs 
an entire sub-category of Platonic scholarship. The authoritative collective and translation into English of 
the most significant extant texts produced by the Sophists is Rosamond Kent Sprague, ed., The Older 
Sophists (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001). A brief, accessible, and well-balanced recent treatment of Socrates’ 
relationship to the Sophistic movement is offered by Paul Woodruff, “Socrates Among the Sophists,” in: A 
Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe & Rachana Kamtekar (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 36-47. 
 Under the terms of Socratic risk, the suspense of error works as a catalyst 
of renewal and revision in which discourse, way of life, and their integral relation remain, 
as it were, harmonically unresolved but musically invigorating. Under the terms of 
Sophistic risk, no matter how perfect and alluring the mutual attunement of concepts in a 
given philosophical discourse may appear, the entire symphonic edifice must disavow the 
shifting sands of discord and incoherence upon which it is built – precisely because this 
edifice in no way corresponds to a conscious and resolute existential decision undertaken 
by a real individual. In a sense, it is a music which no one actually plays out loud. The 
bad musical conscience, as it were, of the Sophistic philosopher and the good musical 
conscience of the Socratic philosopher nevertheless share a common root in the question 
of interpretive error, a question in which both discourse and way of life are intractably 
implicated and to which each form of risk offers a response – as troubling and 
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unsatisfying as either response may ultimately be.18
Hadot’s conception of the intimate relationship in antiquity between philosophical 
discourse and the philosophical way of life imposes a number of constraints and grants a 
number of freedoms to the interpreter of Plato: first of all, in approaching the Platonic 
oeuvre as a body of literary-philosophical texts, and second, in approaching the Socratic 
moment captured in these texts as a crux in the genealogy of interpretive risk and 
responsibility. If we allow ourselves to succumb to the Sophistic risk of “objectifying” 
Plato in the process of interpretation – that is to say, if we concern ourselves as readers 
purely with explicating either the literary form of the dialogues, their philosophical 
content, or some combination of the two as discourse per se – we blind ourselves to all 
the complex forms of ethical and political responsibility that are the fertile ground in 
which these texts take root, not least of which is the mutual responsibility between logos 
and bios, between discourse and way of life. Furthermore, if we pursue this “objective” 
mode of interpretation, we deny precisely the same risk and the same responsibility that 
Socrates’ life and death ask us to affirm. First, we deny that our modes of speaking and 
thinking as interpreters, on the one hand, and all the existential choices that govern our 
 With either alternative, along either 
path, the error in question is one that endangers not this or that interpretation, but the very 
being of the interpreter himself, and thus shows its direct kinship to the catastrophic error 
of the tragic tradition. Whereas the ‘Sophists’ take a detour around error and 
endangerment by developing an ever more sovereign and virtuosic discourse, Socrates 
takes up these issues in earnest as the material of an interpretive ethos. 
                                                 
18  See also Jürgen Mittelstrass’ contrast between Sophistic/eristic intention and Socratic/elenctic 
intention, in which, similar to Hadot, he concludes that “Dialectics in the Socratic-Platonic sense is not just 
a form of argumentation but also especially a (philosophical) form of life (Lebensform)” (Jürgen 
Mittelstrass, “On Socratic Dialogue,” in Griswold 1988, 130-132; qv. 136-138, 142). 
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way of life, on the other, are mutually implicated, and that they perpetually exist in the 
suspense of error. Second, we deny that we too, as ethical and political subjects, are – for 
better and for worse – complicit in, and responsible to, the people and things out of which 
we make meaning, and from this meaning make our own ways of life. In responding to 
Plato through interpretation, we have no choice but to respond to Socrates, and this 
means responding to ourselves, to others, to the world as it exists, and to the ever-absent 
voice of philosophy itself by soberly confronting the dangers and pleasures that form the 
habitus of the interpreter. In a word, this means shouldering the burden of the Socratic 
risk, and by this act acknowledging the force of the “subjective” as well as “objective” 
elements of philosophy as a practice of interpretation: it means allowing yourself, your 
text, or your other to address you in the form of a question. In enabling and cultivating 
this experience of address, which, as I have indicated, is the primary work of dialogue, 
the Platonic text cannot and should not be made to represent the sedimentary deposit of a 
certain current of thought, or, as it were, the stable transcription of a certain musical idea. 
Instead, it must be read and reread as an originary exhortation to, and a persistent impetus 
for, the life of interpretation: it embodies the creative gravity that – precariously, almost 
recklessly – moves, shapes, and divides the river, or the improviser’s instinct to elaborate, 
vary, and expand upon a melody or rhythm up to and even beyond the limits of his or her 
ability. The most radical implication of Hadot’s work – a work which scarcely announces 
its radicalism – lies in its logical conclusion that the most important participant in a 
Platonic dialogue is not in fact Socrates, but the reader. The reader is the only one who 
stands to realize whatever still stands as hope and promise, as possibility in the person of 
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Socrates and the text of Plato: the reader must claim the right to prove herself in toto – 
not just in her discourse, but in her very ways of living – wrong. 
While Hadot’s research in many ways culminates with What Is Ancient 
Philosophy?, his earlier work, especially some of the material later collected and 
translated in Philosophy as a Way of Life (1981),19 proved greatly influential on one of 
the preeminent contemporary thinkers in comparative humanistic studies, the French 
philosopher and historian Michel Foucault (1926-1984). Indeed, the very same effort to 
demonstrate, on the basis of historical and textual evidence, the profound integration of 
philosophical discourse and philosophical living gives all its impetus to Foucault’s work 
in this area, albeit with ultimate aims that are far removed from Hadot’s: namely, the 
genealogy of sexuality as a practical, institutional, and discursive category in modernity. 
A valuable portion of Foucault’s research on the genealogy of ancient philosophical 
practices, contemporaneous with the work on the epochal volumes of his History of 
Sexuality20 and clearly indebted to Hadot, was made public in the series of lectures he 
delivered at the Collège de France between January and March 1982 entitled 
L'herméneutique du sujet.21
                                                 
19  Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. 
Arnold I. Davidson; trans. Michael Chase (New York: Oxford/Blackwell, 1995); English translation of 
Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1981). See also Hadot’s 
inaugural address on the occasion of his election to the Collège de France: “Forms of Life and Forms of 
Discourse in Ancient Philosophy,” trans. Arnold I. Davidson & Paula Wissing, Critical Inquiry 16:3 
(1990), 483-505. 
 Transcripts of these lectures have recently (2005) become 
20  Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité (Paris: Gallimard, 1976/1984): Vol. 1: La volonté de 
savoir (1976); Vol. 2: L'usage des plaisirs (1984); Vol. 3: Le souci de soi (1984). English translation: 
Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978-1986): Vol. 1: 
An Introduction (1978); Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure (1985); Vol. 3: The Care of the Self (1986). 
21  Foucault, L'herméneutique du sujet: cours au Collège de France (1981-1982), ed. François 
Ewald, Frédéric Gros, Alessandro Fontana (Paris: Gallimard/Le Seuil, 2001). Where applicable, I have 
cited the French text in this edition. 
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available in English translation as The Hermeneutics of the Subject.22
                                                 
22  Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-82, ed. 
Frédéric Gros & Arnold I. Davidson (New York: Picador, 2005). 
 In engagement with 
the full textual, historical, and practical expanse of ancient philosophy from the Socratic 
moment through the Hellenistic and Roman eras, Foucault lays out a provocative 
alternative genealogy of ancient thought which views the Socratic injunction to the 
epimeleia heautou (“care of the self”) as representing the general form or principle within 
which a broad variety of philosophical practices, each with its own historically variable 
aims, came to be inscribed at different points throughout antiquity. The provocative force 
exerted by Foucault’s mode of account, furthermore, consists in its core thesis that rather 
than the Delphic-Socratic command to know oneself (gnōthi seauton) around which the 
history of ancient philosophy has traditionally been organized, it is the command to care 
for oneself that provides the historical horizon of intelligibility for this proliferation of 
ancient doctrines and practices. In Foucault’s distinction between knowledge of the self 
and care of the self, furthermore, and in his reorganization of their relationship in 
antiquity, we can recognize a provocative reformulation and expansion of Hadot’s 
distinction between discourse and way of life. Foucault’s genealogy represents the 
imperative to self-knowledge as simply a single, though potent and wide-ranging, 
instantiation of the imperative to self-care, which occupies a much broader conceptual 
and practical terrain than the province of self-knowledge alone. This alternative 
genealogy of ancient thought bears significant implications for the history of modern 
thought, as Foucault himself points out. Briefly put, it brings into focus the prioritization 
of self-knowledge, and self-knowledge alone, as the means of access to truth in modern 
(for Foucault, post-Cartesian) philosophy, and the resulting construction, in modern 
231 
historiography, of a false and potentially distorting continuity not only between ancient 
and modern philosophical practice, but between ancient and modern philosophical 
language. By articulating the care of the self as a lever with which to pry apart this false 
continuity, Foucault compels each of these conceptions to confront the singular and 
incommensurate character of the other across the gap of the Cartesian ‘event,’ leaving 
both of them profoundly transformed.23
Without reflexively assimilating Foucault’s ‘self-knowledge’ to Hadot’s 
‘philosophical discourse,’ and the former’s ‘self-care’ to the latter’s ‘philosophical way 
of life’ – an assimilation to which, at a bare minimum, neither writer would be likely to 
assent unconditionally – we can discern in both thinkers an effort to reevaluate the 
apparent fixity, clarity, and objectivity of the knowledge conveyed through philosophical 
discourse by situating it within the contingent and malleable experience of subjects who 
choose to live in and through this language. In essence, for both Foucault and Hadot, 
ancient philosophy poses a deep and troubling question to modern philosophy: a 
question, as I will argue, that the Socratic affirmation of interpretive risk and 
responsibility poses with original and unflinching boldness – perhaps, as we shall see, 
even more than Foucault himself is prepared to admit. In order to define the terms in 
which this question can be posed, Foucault conceptualizes the ancient care of the self by 
distinguishing two areas of its concern which, as we shall see, have wide-ranging 
implications for both our understanding of the philosophical discourse of antiquity in 
general and the literary language of the Platonic oeuvre in particular. While the 
distinction between these two areas operates across the entire breadth of Foucault’s 
 
                                                 
23  In all of the foregoing paragraph, I am nearly as indebted to Arnold I. Davidson’s brilliant and 
incisive introduction to Foucault’s lectures (Foucault, Hermeneutics, xix-xxviii) as I am to the reading of 
these lectures themselves in my attempt to present an overview of Foucault’s thesis.  
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genealogical undertaking in these lectures, its particular resonance in connection to the 
“new music” of the Socratic moment makes it worth quoting at length: 
We will call, if you like, “philosophy” the form of thought that asks, not of course what is true and 
what is false, but what determines that there is and can be truth and falsehood and whether or not we 
can separate the true and the false. We will call “philosophy” the form of thought that asks what it is 
that enables the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to determine the conditions and 
limits of the subject’s access to the truth. If we call this “philosophy,” then I think we could call 
“spirituality” the search, practice, and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary 
transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth. We will call “spirituality” then the set 
of these researches, practices, and experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, 
renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etc., which are, not for knowledge 
but for the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the truth [le prix à 
payer pour avoir accès à la vérité] (Foucault, Hermeneutics 15; Herméneutique 16f.).  
If the properly “philosophical” content of ancient philosophy is to be found in its positing 
the conditions and limits of a subject’s access to truth when that subject consciously sets 
out on the path of philosophical interpretation, then the properly “spiritual” content of 
this philosophy is to be found in the work of ethical transformation which the subject 
performs upon his own being in order to travel on this hermeneutic path, in order – quite 
literally – to realize in his own subjectivity the (still limited and conditional) truth to 
which he has earned the right of access.24
                                                 
24  It is highly instructive to compare Foucault’s conception of philosophical spirituality as the 
wholescale transformation of the subject with Mittelstrass’ description of the development of the 
“philosophical orientation” in subjects engaged in dialogue: “Philosophical reflection […] aims at changing 
the participating subjects and at constituting a dialogical subject […]. Such subjective achievements gained 
in philosophical dialogue are possible only in a give-and-take that involves not the opinions but the subjects 
themselves. The result of philosophical dialogue is a new subject with a new philosophical orientation, a 
subject that comes into existence with the decline of the old subject, inevitably through conflict or combat. 
In philosophical dialogue it is the individuals and not their opinions that are at stake” (Mittelstrass in 
Griswold 1988, 129, emphasis mine). For Mittelstrass, however, such transformation culminates with the 
realized ideal of a “rational being,” which does not necessarily correspond to Foucault’s subject who 
“works on” or “cares for” him- or herself, nor my own idea of a subject who consciously puts his/her own 
subjectivity as such at risk. From the perspective of reader-response theory, Gordon also considers how 
Platonic dialogues are designed to transform the subjectivity of the reader (Gordon 1999, 43-61, esp. 57-
61). 
 It is not too far afield, then, to view the 
function of “philosophy” proper, as Foucault describes it, as setting the rules of a certain 
game – the structure of the board, the significance of the pieces, the relationships between 
players, the permitted and forbidden moves, the choice of strategies, the conditions of 
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victory or defeat – in short, all the elements of a game in which the subject voluntarily 
participates when he chooses to pursue interpretation philosophically. The role of 
“spirituality,” on the other hand, is to motivate and direct actual game-play, on the level 
of the subject’s concrete and singular experience, towards an increasing mastery of the 
game – and perhaps even towards his eventual victory – that would signify his mastery of 
both his own subjectivity and the truth to which he aspires by one and the same token. 
The player of the ancient philosophical “game,” moreover, does not simply play a 
game alien to his being in order to win a prize equally alien to his being, wherein both 
game and player remain unchanged in their structure or meaning. Through Foucault’s 
conceptualization, we can see that in the game constructed between philosophy and 
spirituality in antiquity, the meaning of the game constantly changes because the real 
medium of play is the player himself, his own mode of being and his awareness of truth. 
Accordingly, the final aim of play is achieved not only in the consummate illumination 
and justification of all the moves executed by the player towards the end of truth, but also 
in the wholesale transformation of the player who executed those moves as so many 
difficult and painstaking operations performed upon himself – as so many instances of 
“care for himself.” As Foucault continues: 
Spirituality postulates that the subject as such does not have right of access to the truth and is not 
capable of having access to the truth. It postulates that the truth is not given to the subject by a simple 
act of knowledge (connaissance) […,] that for the subject to have right of access to the truth he must 
be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than 
himself. The truth is only given to the subject at a price that brings the subject’s being into play [à un 
prix qui met en jeu l’être même du sujet]. For as he is, the subject is not capable of truth (Foucault, 
Hermeneutics, ibid., emphasis mine; Herméneutique 17). 
By their very nature, the various and, indeed, sometimes even mutually contradictory 
articulations of this “philosophical spirituality” throughout antiquity demand a kind of 
analysis and fit into a kind of history that are by and large resistant to what Hadot calls 
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the modern “history of philosophies” (Hadot 2002, 1, emphasis mine) – that is, the 
history of philosophers’ systems. The task of understanding the integral relationship 
between the concrete, individual practice of the epimeleia heautou, on the one hand, and 
the philosophical discourse which was at once its justification and its proving ground, on 
the other, therefore poses a unique problem, and not only to the historian of philosophy. 
In a more directly relevant way, it poses a comparable problem for the present effort to 
locate the Platonic dialogue as literature in a genealogy of the problem of interpretation – 
but I will come to this primary problem in a moment, by an indirect route. 
For the historian of philosophy, at any rate, any presumed continuity between 
ancient and modern philosophy becomes contentious or incoherent once we acknowledge 
the integral unity of philosophical thought and spiritual exercise in antiquity as something 
entirely foreign to the modern way of thinking about and doing philosophy. Insofar as the 
Cartesian cogito, in Foucauldian terms, organizes the “event” of modern philosophy 
solely in terms of knowledge – a kind of insurrection, as it were, by the long-subordinate 
gnōthi seauton – it renders ancient philosophical spirituality into something opaque and 
vaguely suspect from the viewpoint of the modern subject: 
We can say that we enter the modern age [in philosophy] when it is assumed that what gives access to 
the truth, the condition for the subject’s access to the truth, is knowledge (connaissance) and 
knowledge alone[, …] when the philosopher […] can recognize the truth and have access to it in 
himself and solely through his activity of knowing, without anything else being demanded of him and 
without him having to change or alter his being as a subject (Foucault, Hermeneutics 17). 
Foucault’s declaration conceals a provocation: Can we moderns conceive a form of 
philosophical, scientific, or even humanistic knowledge that does not merely address us 
mundanely as “one more thing to learn,” but rather calls upon us to alter the very form of 
our subjectivities, to uproot, transplant, and reconstruct not only the faculty by virtue of 
which we know any of the things we claim to know, but our very existence as knowing 
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subjects? Can we imagine a lived experience of knowledge – neither a method of gaining 
it, nor a discipline organized around it, nor a catalog of its objects – in short, an 
experience in which we truly live the practice of interpretation in such a way that it 
summons us to become other than ourselves? Last but not least: can we imagine a 
discourse, an actual language which does not merely help communicate knowledge or 
produce interpretations, but instead turns the knower or interpreter around to confront his 
whole being, in the moment of making sense, and transforms this being from an answer 
into a question addressed to itself?25
This challenge bears powerful implications for both the aforementioned historian 
and the present genealogist, particularly where the latter has a stake in philosophical 
 This, at least in Foucault’s view, sums up the 
challenge posed by ancient philosophy not just to the history of philosophy, but to all 
contemporary institutions, practices, discourses, and subjects who profess and produce 
knowledge of every kind. It is also, from my own point of view, the challenge posed most 
keenly through the figure of Socrates and the dialogues of Plato. 
                                                 
25  This question, which may perhaps only amount to a rhetorical one here, is more often than not the 
most conspicuously unasked and most assiduously avoided question about the nature and power of 
philosophical knowledge in ancient thought within any number of hotly contested conversations going on 
in mainstream contemporary scholarship on Plato and/or Socrates in both philosophy and classical studies. 
The lengthy and still ongoing conversation in which this polarizing question practically screams out to be 
asked – with the potential, furthermore, to make an impact that transcends the merely rhetorical – concerns 
the problem posed by the Socratic denial of akrasia, or “weakness of the will”: the possibility that one can 
willingly choose what is bad over what is good despite knowing what is good in the moment of choice. The 
arguments that have raged about this problem in Platonic-Socratic thought seem to turn on precisely what 
Socrates means when he refers to “knowledge of the good”: as he uses it, the variety of knowledge that 
would truly render akrasia impossible would have to be a knowledge that transforms the subject in his 
being as subject, rather than a mere knowledge of facts that fit into and reproduce preexisting subjective 
categories. Two recent and thoughtful contributions to this debate nearly reach such a redefinition of 
Socratic knowledge without quite embracing the idea of a knowledge that transforms the knower: 
Christopher Rowe, “Socrates in Plato’s Dialogues,” in Ahbel-Rappe & Kamtekar 2006, 159-170; and Heda 
Segvic, “No One Errs Wilingly: The Meaning of Socratic Intellectualism,” op. cit. 171-185. Rowe, in 
particular, goes so far as to argue against the prevailing thesis that the ‘more Platonic’ views on akrasia 
presented in the dialogues of the middle period (Republic, Phaedrus, inter alia) represent a definite 
improvement on the ‘more Socratic’ views on the same presented in the earlier dialogues. The apparent 
Platonic ‘improvement,’ in Rowe’s view, depends upon a watering-down of the strong, transformative 
Socratic concept of knowledge. 
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discourse as literature. The long wake and elaboration of the “Cartesian event” as 
described by Foucault has, I believe, exercised a profound retroactive effect on the very 
language of ancient philosophy by shaping the range of interpretive responses available 
to its subsequent readers – i.e., the hermeneutic categories, interests, and expectations of 
modern philosophers. The chief effect has been to circumscribe radically the full breadth 
of meaning in ancient philosophical discourse – including, to take the most immediate 
example, the literary-philosophical discourse of the Platonic oeuvre – to the domain of 
discovering, justifying, and communicating knowledge, and knowledge alone. Beyond 
the narrow borders of this domain, in the now-deserted outlands of spirituality, such 
discourse has de facto lost nearly all its previous force: 
[T]he consequence [of the “Cartesian event”] is that access to truth, whose sole condition is henceforth 
knowledge, will find reward and fulfillment in nothing else but the indefinite development of 
knowledge. The point of enlightenment and fulfillment, the moment of the subject’s transfiguration 
[…] can no longer exist. We can no longer think that access to the truth will complete in the subject, 
like a crowning or a reward, the work or the sacrifice, the price paid to arrive at it [comme un 
couronnement ou une récompense, le travail ou le sacrifice, le prix payé pour arriver à elle]. 
Knowledge will simply open out onto the indefinite dimension of progress, the end of which is 
unknown and the advantage of which will only ever be realized in the course of history […]. If we 
define spirituality as being the form of practices which postulate that, such as he is, the subject is not 
capable of the truth, but that, such as it is, the truth can transfigure and save the subject, then we can 
say that the modern age of the relations between the subject and truth begin [sic] when it is postulated 
that, such as he is, the subject is capable of truth, but that, such as it is, the truth cannot save the 
subject (Foucault, Hermeneutics 18-19, emphasis mine; Herméneutique 20). 
We can see then that the challenge posed by antiquity for the modern historian of 
philosophy lies in trying to reestablish and investigate the historically variable 
relationship between a subject for whom the task of philosophy is to work on and 
reconstruct himself, and a truth whose function in philosophy is to aid in, and finally 
consummate, the subject’s work on himself undertaken in its name. For the genealogist of 
the problem of interpretation, on the other hand, the task is to decide how Foucault’s dual 
conception of philosophy and spirituality, rooted in Hadot’s concern with the relationship 
between discourse and way of life, helps us understand Socrates as the agent of a crucial 
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and affirmative moment in the genealogy of interpretive risk and responsibility. The first 
question we must ask under this heading is: What relationship can we establish between 
the Socratic affirmation of interpretive risk and responsibility, on the one hand, and the 
“event” of philosophical spirituality on the other, which, per Foucault, Socrates is the 
first to formulate and practice in a recognizable form? I believe that what unites the 
problem of philosophical interpretation with the problem of philosophical spirituality in 
the person of Socrates lies in the remarkable feedback loop that the latter establishes 
between language and life, to which loop he subsequently gives the name of philosophy. 
In the concrete practice of Socratic philosophy, a certain way of thinking and speaking 
about meaningful truth – in essence, a specific choice of interpretive language, or logos – 
entails and is entailed by a certain way of relating to oneself, to others, and ultimately to 
the truth – in essence, a specific choice of ethical and political life, or bios. Neither 
language nor life, once Socrates connects them in this endless circuit, can ever come to 
rest in the complacency of a knowledge which does not demand the continuous 
transformation of the knower, can ever offer an interpretive response which does not 
open up another interpretive question. 
If Socrates is, in fact, the first interpreter with a good conscience to mark out and 
tread upon the circular path of dialogue, which leads into life from language and ever so 
treacherously back into language from life – if, indeed, philosophy exerts its effects by 
affirming constant dislocation and suspended discord, with all their attendant dangers, as 
a basic principle of both thinking and being – then we are immediately led to ask whether 
there is room in the Foucauldian dyad of philosophy and spirituality for a subject in 
whom these two latter categories appear to be as closely united and mutually reinforcing 
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as they are perpetually at odds and on the brink of disintegration. Pace Foucault, Socratic 
spirituality, the seminal form of “care of the self,” consists in casting profound doubt on 
the truth-claims of various discourses (logoi)26
It should become clear at this point that the gaming analogy I employed earlier to 
describe the relationship between philosophy and spirituality was not only somewhat 
contentious and disingenuous in context, but already implied the critique of Foucault’s 
categories which I now bring forth in earnest. In the passages I have cited and in a 
number of comparably crucial points in Foucault’s related writings, a subtle but decisive 
ambiguity embedded in Foucault’s thinking leads to two contending and mutually 
incommensurable descriptions of spirituality – particularly in the phrases I have 
 – indeed, it often seems to consist in little 
else – and, in so doing, this spirituality can suffer a rebound effect by undermining part of 
its own legitimation as a mode of living, which rests with the precariousness of logoi, by 
the same stroke. Can we possibly reconcile this near-reckless risk-taking in a game of 
truth, this self-willed vertigo of dialogical responsibilities, with the austere rigor of a 
technique by means of which the subject “works on himself” in order to receive a truth 
that “transfigures,” even “saves” his very being as the reward for carefully measured 
preparations and freely chosen sacrifices? For if Socrates offers any salvation at all, it is 
indeed an eccentric and precarious salvation: the salvation of the hardened gambler, not 
the salvation of the advanced ascetic. 
                                                 
26  This examination applies regardless of whether the logoi examined by Socrates rate as properly 
“philosophical” or not, either by his or by our own standards. Euthyphro’s addle-headed views on piety in 
the eponymous dialogue, for instance, would probably rate as sub-philosophical by either measure, whereas 
the interlocutors who are closer to the Sophistic and rhetorical tradition or who are actually themselves 
Sophists – for instance, Thrasymachus in the Republic – may not present viewpoints that appear 
“philosophical” to a reader who has already absorbed into her marrow the long afterlife of Socratic culture, 
but do represent viewpoints that demand a more conceptually robust response from Socrates in proportion 
to their insidious dissemination (for Plato and/or Socrates) in contemporary Greek culture. 
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transcribed above in the original French.27
The guiding thread that seems the most useful […] is constituted by what one might call the ‘techniques of 
the self,’ which is to say, the procedures […] suggested or prescribed to individuals in order to determine 
their identity, maintain it, or transform it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of self-
 On the one hand, Foucault generally defines 
the spiritual component of ancient philosophical practices in terms of discrete techniques, 
procedures, or instrumentalities (“purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, 
conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etc.”) that compel the subject to 
follow a prescribed method in order to achieve a foreseeable and relatively secure result. 
To give a schematic instance: in condition X of my subjectivity (delusion, falsehood, 
self-contradiction, etc.), I wish to bring my subjectivity into condition Y (knowledge, 
truth, self-coherence, etc.); hence, in order to achieve this end, I perform steps A, B, and 
C in a specific series – like a carpenter constructing a table – secure in the knowledge that 
by following this technique or method, by paying the price it demands, I will in fact 
achieve my intended result and attain the condition I desire. The effort that goes into this 
process, as Foucault says, amounts to “the price to be paid for access to the truth [le prix 
à payer pour avoir accès à la vérité]”, upon payment of which comes “a crowning or a 
reward [un couronnement ou une récompense]”. Nor is the discursive logic in evidence 
here a phenomenon limited merely to the scope of the present lectures: a comparable 
paradigm governs the language of Foucault’s contemporary research and writing. In 
“Subjectivity and Truth,” the course summary for the preceding year (1980-1981) of 
Foucault’s lectures at the Collège and continuous in many of its central concerns with 
those of Hermeneutics, he undertakes “an inquiry concerning the instituted models of 
self-knowledge and their history,” for which, as he explains, 
                                                 
27  For the understanding of these phrases and for my comprehension of the French text of Foucault’s 
lectures in general, I owe a debt to Spencer Hawkins, Amr Kamal, and Shannon Winston, all of whom 
examined the texts in question, confirmed the translations, and listened patiently to my questions (not to 
mention my scarcely passable French pronunciation). 
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mastery or self-knowledge. […] What should one do with oneself? What work should be carried out on the 
self? How should one “govern oneself” by performing actions in which one is oneself the objective of those 
actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the instrument they employ, and the subject that 
acts?28
The care of the self is, in the strictest sense of the terms employed here, work carried out 
on the self, constituting oneself as a raw material (the sculptor’s marble, for instance) to 
which are then applied a number of instruments or techniques with definite purposes 
(hammer, chisel, sandpaper), and from which definite sacrifices (the chunks and flakes of 
scrap stone that gradually fall away) must be extracted in order for the final product to 
take its proper shape. For the sake of convenience, I will call this way of thinking the 
‘economic-instrumental logic’ in Foucault’s discourse on the care of the self. According 
to this logic, the subject either gives up something in order to gain something else of 
greater relative value (“I pay a dollar in order to get a cup of coffee”: economic) or, more 
generally, submits to a prescribed regimen of actions in order to achieve a desired end (“I 
follow the blueprint in order to build a table”: instrumental). In light of Hadot’s 
distinction between philosophical discourse and philosophical way of life, this version of 
the care of the self would articulate either category as a series of procedures 
complementary to the other: discourse is the instrumental means of which life is the end, 
and life is the instrumental means to which discourse is the end. Spiritual practice draws 
 
                                                 
28  Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in: Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984, Volume One, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: T he New 
Press, 1997), 87, emphasis mine. In the course summary for The Hermeneutics of the Subject, furthermore, 
Foucault writes of the ancient epimeleia heautou in comparable terms: “The very term epimeleia does not 
merely designate an attitude of awareness or a form of attention that one would focus on oneself; it 
designates a regulated occupation, a work with its methods and objectives. […] We may say that in all of 
ancient philosophy the care of the self was considered as both a duty and a technique, a basic obligation 
and a set of carefully worked-out procedures.” Foucault, “The Hermeneutic of the Subject,” in: Ethics, 95, 
emphasis mine. In the aptly titled “Technologies of the Self,” a text deriving from a seminar Foucault gave 
at the University of Vermont in October 1982 (Foucault, Ethics, 223n.), he identifies four different kinds of 
technologies by means of which “humans develop knowledge about themselves”: technologies of 
production, of sign systems, of power, and of the self, the last of which “permit individuals to effect by 
their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault, Ethics, 224f., emphasis mine).  
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the subject along a sort of ascending spiral path, oscillating between language and life 
and proceeding by rigorous and certain steps towards its goal. This goal is at once 
singular and dual: in it are entwined both access to the truth that transfigures and 
authenticates the subject’s very being, on the one hand, and the authentic form of the 
subject itself that has sought this transfiguration on the other. 
Elsewhere in Foucault’s discourse, however, there are traces – perhaps only traces 
– of an entirely different and, to my thinking, entirely incommensurable logic in the 
description of ancient spiritual practices – a latent logic, as it were, which, if we allow it 
some breathing room, lets us both approach the discourse of Plato’s dialogues as literary 
language with genuinely spiritual dimensions (in Foucault’s sense of the term) and gives 
Socrates a precise location in the genealogy of interpretive risk and responsibility. By 
using this latent logic to dislodge the Socratic moment from within Foucault’s genealogy, 
and thereby to reveal its radical force as an ‘event’ that goes well beyond even Foucault’s 
conception, my inquiry will also ultimately open the way – within and beyond my close 
readings of Plato – to what might be called, with good reason, a spirituality of 
interpretation. 
In short, there are indications in Foucault’s discourse on the “care of the self” that 
ancient spiritual practices can also take shape as open-ended, contingent, or even 
dangerous actions, the end results of which may differ widely from the desired outcome 
because all the contributing variables cannot be known or reckoned with in advance. 
While the subjects who perform these actions still perform them in order to attain values 
that appear determinate and attainable, they nonetheless act into a medium of uncertainty; 
in other words, they exist within the suspense of error. Through the rebound effects of 
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their own actions, these subjects can come to interpret themselves qua subjects, or 
interpret the values that had motivated and structured their actions, in ways that cast 
doubt upon their previous conceptions or overturn them completely. To give an example 
that contrasts with the previous schema: in condition X of my subjectivity, I wish to bring 
my subjectivity into condition Y, so in order to achieve this end, I begin to perform steps 
A, B, and C in a certain series, but after I have completed step B, say, I discover that not 
only does condition Y now seem less desirable than some other condition Z, but that 
steps A and C actually work against the realization of condition Z. In order to achieve 
condition Z, I must now retrace my steps to perform some other step A', then B again, 
then C', at which point I achieve condition Z – only to realize that it has led me into an 
even more dire and intractable position than I existed in under condition X, or would 
have come into under condition Y… and so on. The person who puts down a dollar to 
buy a cup of coffee realizes halfway through the transaction that he has picked up not a 
cup of coffee, but a pack of chewing gum; the carpenter who sets out to build a table 
realizes halfway through his task that he is following the blueprint not for a table, but for 
a bookshelf. Although these latter examples, which seek to import this logic back into the 
economic-instrumental situations from which it fundamentally differs, sound a bit 
ridiculous, they offer a clear enough practical image of what can only be called – with an 
admittedly hideous term – the ‘kindyneutic logic’29
                                                 
29  This cumbersome neologism demands more than a little explanation: Grk. κίνδυνος [kindynos] = 
danger, risk, hazard, venture, enterprise > κινδυνεύω [kindyneuō] = to venture, hazard, risk > κινδυνευτικός 
[kindyneutikos] = adventurous, risk-taking > Eng. kindyneutic. 
 of Socratic interpretation and, indeed, 
of the language of Platonic dialogue. This is the perambulatory logic of the new music, 
the philosophical-spiritual suspense of error that, in the strongest sense of Foucault’s own 
language, “brings the subject’s being into play [met en jeu l’être même du sujet]” 
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(emphasis mine).30 The language and life of Socrates himself, I will argue – that model of 
self-decomposing composition – offer in some respects a clear confirmation of, and in 
others a strong challenge to, Foucault’s categorization of philosophical spirituality under 
the heading of “technologies of the self.” For Socrates offers us not a technology, not a 
tool, instrument, or procedure, by means of which we come to know and transform 
ourselves according to unshakeable values or precepts – according to, as it were, a 
blueprint for life. Rather, his gift to us, the gift of Socratic spirituality which we are 
justifiably reluctant to receive, is a kindynology: a terrifying, arousing, maddening game 
of risk, a game from which we are free to walk away without so much as picking up a 
hand, but in which, if we choose to play it, we must in the end wager everything we are, 
say, think, or do. The rules, the board, and the players themselves change drastically, 
often beyond recognition, with every turn in play – but under no circumstances can we 
take back a move once it is played.31
                                                 
30  The ambiguity and incommensurability of which I speak is particularly marked in this very 
passage, which, as I have cited it in full above, combines both the economic-instrumental and the 
kindyneutic modes of description in a single and not insignificant phrase: “The truth is only given to the 
subject at a price [i.e., economic-instrumental] that brings the subject’s being into play [i.e., kindyneutic: à 
un prix qui met en jeu l’être même du sujet].” Does this mean that one pays a price in order to bring 
something into play, or that one pays a price as a result of bringing something into play, or that ‘paying a 
price’ and ‘bringing something into play’ are simply two different ways of saying the same thing? Though 
one can perhaps beg off the question by claiming that the text at hand is the transcription of an oral, ergo at 
least minimally extemporaneous lecture, and hence that the pressure of performance – particularly under 
the adverse conditions of Foucault’s heavily-attended and temporally-constrained lectures at the Collège de 
France – contributed to this incongruous mixing of metaphors, the contemporary published texts cited 
indicate that a similar ambiguity is operative even where Foucault’s language was not subject to 
performative pressure. 
 For Socrates, we can only care for ourselves – to 
use Foucault’s term – by putting our selves at risk. 
31  Let us not forget, either, the possibility in all such games that the game itself can be a con through 
which we become the marks of better players – or even worse, that the game is designed to con all players 
equally, to no one’s ultimate benefit. One is tempted to think of Tegwar, the card-game played by Bruce 
Pearson (Robert DeNiro) and Henry Wiggen (Michael Moriarty) in the film Bang the Drum Slowly (1973). 
Tegwar is (secretly) an acronym for “The Exciting Game Without Any Rules.” Pearson and Wiggen invite 
various suckers to join them in a round of the game, and then improvise nonsensical and arbitrary rules 
designed to confuse and fluster their marks and, more importantly, to separate them from their money. 
There is always the possibility – not entirely negative in its implications – that Socratic philosophy might, 
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In terms of both philosophical doctrine and spiritual transformation, nothing could 
be further from the economic-instrumental mindset, in which present sacrifice and future 
reward are clearly defined and securely linked, than that obscure high-stakes game, the 
confusing and discordant music, into which Socrates draws himself and his interlocutors 
ever more deeply in the progress of dialogue. Nothing other than the tacit embrace of this 
kindyneutic logic, moreover, could illuminate Foucault’s own principled justification, in 
The Use of Pleasure (1984), for the thorough rethinking and reorganization of his 
genealogical project on sexuality that not only delayed the publication of this second 
volume, but altered the scope and viewpoint of the project.32
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple; I would hope that in the eyes of some people it might be 
sufficient in itself. It was curiosity – the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is worth acting upon 
with a degree of obstinacy: not the curiosity that seeks to assimilate what it is proper for one to know, 
but that which enables one to get free of oneself. After all, what would be the value of the passion for 
knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another 
and to the extent possible, in the knower’s straying afield of himself? There are times in life when the 
question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one 
sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all.
 His humble, direct, but no 
less electrifying language could be imagined, without much difficulty, as words placed in 
Socrates’ mouth by Plato in some lost fragment of the Apology: 
33
Here, in a text only a little more than a quarter-century old,
 
34
                                                                                                                                                 
after all, be a game of Tegwar which is nonetheless so fascinating in its inventions that even after we 
realize that we have been taken in, we still want to play. If this is the case, it might be an instance of a con-
game in which everyone is equally conned – even Socrates! – and in which only the game itself prevails in 
the end. 
 a text that introduces a 
historical, discursive, and institutional inquiry into a quintessentially modern question – 
namely, the problematization of ‘sexuality’ – we find in transposed form two of the major 
32  See n. 21 above. The first and – in Anglophone scholarship – still most widely read volume of 
The History of Sexuality was published in 1976; the other two volumes, in quick succession, appeared only 
some eight years later. The most directly illuminating text on the reasons for this delay and the 
reorientation that caused it is an interview with Foucault from April 1983 that was conducted by Paul 
Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus: “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in: 
Foucault, Ethics, 253-280. 
33  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 8 (emphasis mine). 
34  At the time of writing (2008-09). 
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kindyneutic motifs of Socratic philosophy and spirituality. First, there is the idea of 
‘getting free of oneself’ in and through a certain practice of interpretation, a Galilean 
motif, as it were, with positive overtones of hard-won mastery and knowledge: the idea of 
passing beyond or rising above oneself, turning about to confront oneself, seeing oneself 
from the perspective of another, each of which ultimately contributes to attaining a 
certain freedom from, and mastery over, oneself as knower and interpreter. The aim is to 
achieve a coming-together, a meeting or a congress with oneself in which authentic 
autonomy becomes possible. Second, and as the accomplice (as it were) of the first motif, 
there is the counter-idea of ‘straying afield of oneself’ in and through interpretation, an 
Oedipal motif with negative overtones of uncertainty and error: the idea of departing or 
wandering away from oneself, turning away from oneself, becoming different from or 
alien to oneself. This second motif entails seeing oneself not as the sovereign traveler 
who pushes forward knowing the way and the destination, but rather as a stranger in a 
strange land, lured onward by the seductive pull of the path itself rather than the certainty 
and desirability of its endpoint. It culminates in a coming-apart, a departure or a digress 
from oneself in which all autonomy retreats. In the kindyneutic logic of Foucault’s text as 
in that of Socratic philosophy, congress and digress are at one and at odds in the practice 
of dialogic interpretation. Just as one always attains freedom from and mastery over 
oneself only under certain conditions and within certain limits, their attainment never 
represents a final emancipation, a consummate access to truth itself, so much as a new 
limit to pass beyond, a new horizon to rise above, a new interlocutor from whom one 
must slowly and painstakingly draw forth answers to new questions. The freedom and 
mastery thus attained are only worthy of the name, then, when they draw their strength 
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from the intensity of their doubts, when they extract their vital nervous energy from the 
suspense of error in which they exist. They thus become principles of interpretive 
movement and conversation – that is, truly philosophical and spiritual principles – not 
grounds for acquiescence in the canons of knowledge or for silence in the face of the 
other. The one who truly knows the way knows only that he does not truly know the way: 
this Socratic wisdom, reformulated and enacted by Foucault himself in his own 
intellectual practice, suggests a form and content for the Socratic “care of the self” that 
replaces Foucault’s technology of the self with a kindynology. The gaming table 
supplants the artist’s workbench, the cutting contest supplants the symphony 
performance, and the moment-to-moment practice of endangerment supplants the once-
and-for-all salvation of the acolyte. 
 If I am at all justified to locate Socrates’ affirmation of risk and responsibility at 
the very core of the philosophical spirituality he proposes and embodies, we must then 
ask two closely related questions: first, how exactly does this kindyneutic spirituality, this 
mutual endangerment of language and life, inflect or augment the literary meaning of the 
Platonic oeuvre, in which it leaves behind a definite trace in the fictions of Socrates’ 
person and conversations? Second, how does the literary trace of such spirituality aim to 
implicate the reader him- or herself in these fictions, to draw the whole life and being of 
the interpreter on to a path of endangerment that runs closely parallel to, if not finally 
joins, the treacherous and thrilling way of Socratic philosophy? In other words, how does 
the properly spiritual dimension of Plato’s language compel the reader to engage in 
spiritual practice? These two questions are centrally concerned with what we have to risk, 
to what we must respond, if we allow the language of the Platonic dialogue to address us 
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not as subjects who seek different knowledge or different interpretations while remaining 
the same as ourselves, but rather as subjects who seek to know differently and to interpret 
differently, and thereby perhaps to become different from ourselves. I am far from asking 
how we can become good, orthodox Platonists; rather, I am asking how Plato’s Socrates 
shows us one way – a way completely unprecedented, though not unanticipated, in this 
genealogy – that language can, and even must, put life at risk, and that life likewise can 
and must put language at risk. These two questions are crucial, I believe, not only 
because of their pivotal place in this particular genealogy, but also because of the way 
they allow us to reassimilate Socratic-Platonic philosophy into the literary tradition 
within which it emerges at once as both a genre of literature and – for the first time and in 
good faith – a corresponding genre of life. 
 As I see it, then, the only responsible way to propose answers, however initial and 
provisional, to the questions posed by Hadot’s and Foucault’s research in the present 
genealogy is to explore how Platonic texts – in our case, the Apology – represent the 
kindyneutic ethos of Socratic interpretation through a specific form of literary discourse, 
and transform the interpreters of this form from observers into participants, from innocent 
bystanders into accomplices, through the responsibilities this form entails. I propose to do 
this by exploring the literary “figures” of voice central to this text: the voice of the divine 
in the oracle, the voices of others in the city of Athens, and the voice of the philosopher 
himself. On the one hand, Socrates converses agonistically with each of these voices in 
the ethical experience he narrates in his speech; on the other hand, he designates himself 
the prophetic representative of these voices in the equally agonistic conversations he 
initiates in the political realm, not least of all in his defense speech itself. In short, he 
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consciously uses his voice from ‘here’ as both adversary and agent of the voices from 
‘elsewhere’ – a voice he knows is at once his own and not his own, at once ethically self-
opposed and politically oppositional. Thus, I place the word “figures” in quotes above 
because the concept is only useful here if it is applied in a dual sense: each Socratic 
“figure” of voice, in the sense of a figurative language about voice, presents a coherent 
series of tropes, motifs, or images that functions on the level of literary-philosophical 
discourse to transform the subject that receives it on the level of spirituality. Conversely, 
the “figures” of voice, in the sense of “persons” or “characters” created through voice, 
jointly define a certain way of life, a subject that responds to objects through a discourse 
that effects spiritual transformation. 
By either understanding of the term “figure,” the addressee of Socrates’ 
philosophical discourse and the subject of spiritual transformation ultimately prove to be 
the reader him- or herself. These “figures” are personae of Socrates, but they also provide 
us with a literary grammar for the language of philosophy; they are likewise personae of 
the reader, but they also provide us with a critical grammar for the language of 
interpretation. If we approach these “figures,” furthermore, not by avoiding their double-
sidedness – if not, indeed, their veritable duplicity – but by freely joining in the games 
they play, I think we come as close as any critical methodology can to understanding 
these texts on their own terms: that is to say, according to the mutual interplay of 
figurative speech and speaking figures, the Socratic interplay of language and life. As we 
will see, the three “figures” I want to investigate will not only recall Sophocles’ Oedipus 
and Brecht’s Galileo in significant ways, but will also point forward to Hannah Arendt’s 
development of a Socratic form of life as the common ground shared by acting and 
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thinking. As far as Plato’s Socrates is concerned, the voice from within, the voice from 
beyond, and one’s own voice among others – however inextricable they might prove to 
be from one another – create the plural matrix of discourses from which the philosophical 
interpreter draws life itself. 
 
III. In (im)propria persona: Socratic Figures of Voice and the Birth of Interpretive 
Conscience in the Apology 
The explicit generic frame of Socrates’ discourse in the Apology is simple enough to 
understand: he has been called upon to answer the charges lodged against him by his 
accusers, and his speech is his response to those charges.35
                                                 
35  For a detailed treatment of how the dialogues grouped around Socrates’ trial and execution (in 
narrative order: Theaetetus, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo) reflect the concrete actuality of ancient 
Athenian law and what is likely to have been the experience of the historical Socrates in submitting to the 
procedures of this law, see Debra Nails, “The Trial and Death of Socrates,” in Ahbel-Rappe & Kamtekar 
2006, 5-20; on the Apology in particular, see 12-14. For an influential and authoritative argument 
concerning the possibility of political and personal motives for the charges against the historical Socrates, 
see Gregory Vlastos, “The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy,” in: Socratic Studies, ed. Myles 
Burnyeat (New York: Cambridge UP, 1994), 87-108. 
 His accusers have articulated 
their interpretation, their response to his words and deeds, and Socrates addresses his own 
response as much to this interpretation as to the words and deeds by which his accusers 
had first felt themselves addressed – Socrates’ own way of life. In short, Socrates must 
respond not only to his accusers’ understanding of him, but also to his own self-
understanding. Even before he utters a single word, Socrates’ speech bears the burden of 
this dual responsibility: his response to his accusers, on the one hand, makes him 
complicit in the terms of a political conversation about him conducted by others – a 
conversation to which he has (ironically) arrived late in the game. Socrates’ response to 
his own self-understanding, on the other hand, renews his complicity in the terms of an 
ethical conversation about himself that he has been conducting with himself and with 
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others for quite some time. He must not only negotiate the dangerous terrain mapped out 
by either complicity – one in the language and life of philosophy, the other in the 
language and life of politics – but furthermore, he must succeed in showing that these two 
parallel and mutually hostile conversations are really one: that they have the same basic 
objects and concerns, that they aim for the same ultimate ends, that they need to be 
combined or integrated in order to achieve these ends, and, most of all, that it is and has 
been Socrates’ special mission to achieve the integration of these conversations. Only by 
achieving this integration can he resolve the contradiction between ethics and politics, 
between philosophical and civic life, expressed in the indictment against him. 
Yet when we return to the simple generic frame of the defense-speech, we 
discover at the outset that virtually everything is stacked against Socrates and the 
possibility of integration for which he stands. By responding to the charges against him, 
by trying to answer in political terms the question about himself that they pose, he risks 
reinforcing the political discourses, practices, and institutions that proscribe his ethical 
way of life as something hostile to politics. On the other hand, by trying to answer in 
ethical terms the question about himself posed by the charges, and moreover by doing so 
in a genre of discourse – the public, forensic monologue – diametrically opposed to the 
dialogue of ethical inquiry, he risks distorting or misrepresenting philosophy not just as 
one possible relationship between language and life, but as the specific option that has 
defined his own self-understanding. By either the ethical or the political route, Socrates 
risks becoming his own enemy the moment he opens his mouth: he risks speaking in the 
voice of his accusers. In terms of literary “figures” of voice, then, we can say that 
Socrates’ risks and responsibilities in the Apology – or more generally, the risks and 
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responsibilities of philosophical interpretation when it speaks in the political realm – 
make him assume a persona and use a language that must listen to, and speak in, two 
voices at once. Insofar as politics and ethics are already mutually inextricable in 
philosophical conversation, as I have argued above, this double-listening and double-
speaking are endemic to Socratic dialogue, in which the interrogator must interrogate 
both himself and the other and the respondent must respond to both himself and the other 
(see Hadot 2002, 29). But in this respect, the Apology – as a monologue! – raises the 
stakes attached to these Socratic voices as no other Platonic text does: Socrates must 
make his audience accept a blatant political paradox – that the voice of the philosopher 
speaks on behalf of the city because it speaks against it – on the basis of a blatant ethical 
paradox – namely, that the voice of the god speaks on behalf of Socrates’ wisdom 
because it speaks against human wisdom in general. Through his own voice, Socrates 
must listen and respond to a voice from ‘elsewhere,’ the voice of the god, as well as a 
voice from ‘here’: the clamorous and uncomprehending voice of Athens and his accusers. 
If we take the word prophet in its etymological sense – prophētēs (προφήτης), one who 
speaks (phēmi) on behalf of (pro-) another – then Socrates’ mediating position in this text 
between ethics and politics, between the god and the city, makes him a kind of two-faced 
prophet, the single point at which the circumferences of two self-enclosed circles of 
meaning make contact and through which they can communicate. 
What throws this plural voice of Socrates into particularly high relief in the 
Apology, furthermore, and what makes this text such a brilliantly indirect revelation of 
the literary character of Platonic dialogue, is the fact that Socrates’ dialogic voice and the 
monologic voice of the genre in which he speaks are intractably at odds. One can 
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compare it to the experience of hearing a musical composition intimately bound to the 
structure and resources of the piano – say, Thelonious Monk’s “Straight, No Chaser” – 
played on an instrument with completely different structure and resources, such as the 
tenor saxophone. Virtually at once, one actually hears what had been most fundamental 
to the original composition all along – its quintessentially “pianistic” logic – through its 
remapping on to the logic of another instrument. The instrumentally-bound character of 
the composition, as well as the specific character of the instrument itself, only becomes 
audible negatively, when it sounds forth with an altered voice. Socrates’ monologue in 
the Apology makes the structure and resources unique to dialogue palpable by precisely 
the same negative route. Can we really expect philosophical discourse from Socrates, or a 
philosophical response from his audience, when both are subject to a genre that polarizes 
the voice of one against the silence of innumerable others? Can we really expect that the 
invitation to danger that always remains enfolded in Socrates’ kindyneutic ethical 
language – a danger he invites for himself and to which he invites others – will somehow 
deliver him from the real and immediate political danger to his mortal being now facing 
him in Meletus’ accusation? 
Of course not. Nevertheless, the manifest rhetorical and legal failure of the 
Apology – a text written by Plato precisely because the speech it commemorates failed so 
brilliantly – reveals by its very failure the dialogic nature of Socratic interpretation, which 
condemns in its turn the standards of rhetorical and legal success as even more 
spectacular failures. Socrates finds a way to begin from the foregone conclusions 
imposed by monologue, to open up his speech so that he can resist and even, to a certain 
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degree, defeat the foreclosure forced upon the voice of the philosopher. As Peter Warnek 
writes, 
To begin by asserting that the Apology does not belong to the dialogue form is only to preclude […] 
the very possibility of encountering the great difficulty raised by the text, which concerns namely how 
Socratic dialogue […] remains deeply incompatible with the conventions of public speaking[. …] The 
Apology has to be read as a deeply dialogical logos that is already enacting its own impossibility, as it 
attempts to speak its truth in a situation that already limits its very way of speaking, threatening to 
render dialogue altogether impossible.36
Under conditions that make dialogue impossible, he proves that dialogue is the most 
urgent necessity; expecting that the Athenians will silence the ‘noise’ of his voice forever 
in death, he proves that the silence of the philosophical interpreter robs the city of its own 
true voice and reduces its language to noise – all for the lack of his conversation. While it 
has often been noted that Socrates meets death in order to preserve the integrity of his 
conscience, it has not as often been noted that by the same token, Socrates allows the 
Athenians to silence the voice of their own conscience by silencing him – conscience, not 
necessarily in the moral sense of the term, but in the sense of an active, interpretive con-
scientia, knowing (scientia) something along with (con-) others, and, by engaging their 
viewpoints on the thing known, coming to know one’s own way of knowing it as well. As 
the voice of the oracle is to Socrates as an ethical being, so is the voice of Socrates as a 
political being to the city – and so, in turn, is the fiction of that voice in the Platonic text 
to its reader. It is a voice from inside that comes from outside; it demands that one care 
for oneself by constantly putting oneself at risk; it repeatedly derails the monologic and 
singular voice by converting it to the dialogic and plural voice. All of this sets the stage 
on which we can see the Socratic “figures” of the philosopher’s voice step forward: it is a 
voice of conscience in the augmented sense, a doubly listening and doubly speaking 
 
                                                 
36  Peter Warnek, Descent of Socrates: Self-Knowledge and Cryptic Nature in the Platonic 
Dialogues (Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 2005), 55, 56. 
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voice that constantly reinserts plurality and dialogue into singularity and monologue, 
whether in relation to itself or others. The figures of this voice, I will argue, organize the 
spiritual content and exert the spiritual force of Socrates’ language in the Apology. 
I want to focus on Socrates’ presentation to the Athenian court of the interpretive 
problem that proves central to his ethical self-understanding – and it is all too fitting that 
this phenomenon manifests itself to him in the form of a voice: the voice of Apollo’s 
oracle, which issues the well-known, though no less provocative judgment about 
Socrates’ wisdom. This voice emanates from an absolute “elsewhere” beyond both ethics 
and politics, inhabited by all-seeing, all-knowing divinities, but by addressing Socrates 
directly (as he sees it) and demanding his interpretive response, it assumes a troubling 
central position in the extremely intimate “here” of Socrates’ self-awareness. The shape 
this trouble takes, the precarious play of interpretive questions and answers set in motion 
by this visitation, traces an expanding spiral in which first Socrates himself, through the 
disintegration of his ethical awareness, gets caught up, and then in turn begins to pull 
others in along with him.37
                                                 
37  The figurative language I employ here owes a certain debt to a famous passage from Heidegger: 
“Sind wir auf das Sichentziehende bezogen, dann sind wir auf dem Zug in das Sichentziehende, in die 
rätselvolle und darum wandelbare Nähe seines Anspruchs. Wenn ein Mensch eigens auf diesem Zug ist, 
dann denkt er, mag er noch so weit von dem Sichentziehenden entfernt sein, mag der Entzug wie immer 
auch verschleiert bleiben. Sokrates hat zeit seines Lebens, bis in seinen Tod hinein, nichts anderes getan, 
als sich in den Zugwind dieses Zuges zu stellen und darin sich zu halten. Darum ist er der reinste Denker 
des Abendlandes. Deshalb hat er nichts geschrieben. Denn wer aus dem Denken zu schreiben beginnt, muß 
unweigerlich den Menschen gleichen, die vor allzu starkem Zugwind in den Windschatten flüchten. Es 
bleibt das Geheimnis einer noch verborgenen Geschichte, daß alle Denker des Abendlandes nach Sokrates, 
unbeschadet ihrer Größe, solche Flüchtlinge sein mußten. Das Denken ging in die Literatur ein.” (“If we 
are related to what withdraws itself, then we are drawn along with the self-withdrawing, in the enigmatic 
and thereby elusive nearness of its claim upon us. If a human is properly drawn along, then that one is 
thinking, however far that one may be removed from the self-withdrawing, and even if the withdrawal also 
remains, as ever, veiled. Socrates, in the time of his life, up until and into his own death, did nothing other 
than place and keep himself in the pulling draft of this drawing. For this reason he is the purest thinker of 
the West. Because of this he wrote nothing. For whoever begins to write from out of thinking inevitably has 
to resemble those humans who seek refuge in the lee before this overpowering draft. It remains a strangely 
familiar fact of a still concealed history, that all thinkers of the West after Socrates, their greatness 
notwithstanding, have had to be such refugees. Thinking turns into literature.”) Martin Heidegger, Was 
 Dialogue forms the medium of this strange spiraling current – 
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its spiritual medium, to use Foucault’s term – and what gives this current its initial 
momentum is the birth of what I have called interpretive conscience in Socrates’ 
experience of his own voice confronting the voice of an absolute Other: the god. 
Examining the way this ethical dilemma takes shape through the manifestations of a 
divine voice to Socrates will help us understand the subsequent political dilemma posed 
by Socrates’ way of life, and then in turn the plural nature and spiritual effect of Socrates’ 
own voice. 
After arguing to the Athenian court (19a-20c) that the reputation he has gained is 
unfounded – the reputation, that is, as a paid purveyor of rhetorical technique or natural 
knowledge in the manner of the Sophists, and thus one among the typical civic 
troublemakers of 5th century Athens – Socrates imagines the words of a respondent 
(ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν, 20c; “perhaps one of you might then answer” [my trans.]) 
who raises what would be the next logical question. If you are not in fact one of these 
Sophistic troublemakers, says this imaginary interlocutor, then what exactly have you 
been doing that is so out of the ordinary (τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον, something “in excess 
of” or “beyond [what] others [do],” with transgressive overtones; see τι […] ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ 
πολλοί) that you have gained such a scandalous reputation (διαβολαί, “slanders” or 
“calumnies”; φήμη τε καὶ λόγος, “talk and stories”)? Having thus dispensed with a 
widespread mis-interpretation of his way of life, Socrates must now present a counter-
interpretation. This task is made all the more difficult, furthermore, by at least three 
considerable dangers. First, the way of life he must interpret on behalf of his audience is 
itself centrally preoccupied with a problem of interpretation, if not the problem of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Heisst Denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954), 52, quoted in Warnek 2005, 207 (Ch. 3, n. 1, 
spelling corrected); trans. Warnek, 49. 
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interpretation as such. Socrates’ response risks exacerbating the hostility of his fellow 
citizens in the very effort to ameliorate them. If his outward way of life presents a 
threatening enigma to them in the political realm, wide open to misinterpretations and 
misrepresentations, then by revealing its roots in the even more inscrutable enigma of 
Socrates’ ethical experience, he might only be adding fuel to the flames of hermeneutic 
frustration that will consume him. Second, and as a result of this first danger, Socrates’ 
own interpretation, in its present context, makes itself a priori responsible to and 
complicit in the “talk and stories” he seeks to refute, because it is presented as part of the 
same conversation. In other words, the narrative of ethical experience Socrates offers 
must necessarily refer and relate itself to the well-established, though no less erroneous, 
narrative of his political reputation. As an interpretive response, it cannot substitute, but 
only supplement prior ‘readings’ of his words and deeds – one can only try to ‘correct’ 
the terms of a conversation by submitting to them first. Third, as Socrates puts it a 
moment later, his self-interpretation is so jarringly out of tune with the popular 
conception in its points of reference that “perhaps some of you will think I am joking” 
(καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν, 20d; my trans.), the same reaction we have seen 
with Callicles in the Gorgias. The chasm that separates the terms so crucial to Socrates’ 
interpretation of his ethical experience, as we shall see, and the terms applied to him in 
the long-standing conversation about him in the polis, is so unimaginably wide that his 
response risks appearing, in a sense, ‘irresponsible’ to the established conversation. 
Whatever truth about himself he speaks in conversation may only seem an utterance 
coming from left field, a ridiculous and churlish non sequitur that forces itself out of the 
very dialogue it seeks to join. From all three perspectives, Socrates must dispel the 
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misinterpretation that has caused his political endangerment by relating the process of 
interpretation that started him on the path of ethical endangerment – namely, the 
kindyneutic path of philosophy. The only weapon he has to fight against the danger he 
has not chosen is another danger that he has chosen, and will choose now and always. 
This chosen danger, the pearl of Socratic ethical experience, is made to reveal its 
original grain of sand in the (in)famous statement that opens the narrative of Socrates’ 
experience with the Delphic oracle:38
ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. 
ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία: τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω 
ταύτην εἶναι σοφός. οὗτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον 
σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις φησὶ 
ψεύδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. […] οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, 
ἀλλ' εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ οἵα, 
μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που. […] καὶ δή 
ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι -- καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ 
θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες -- ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία 
μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, 
ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν. (Pl. Ap. 20e, 21a) 
 
What has caused my reputation is none other than a certain kind of wisdom [σοφίαν τινὰ].39
                                                 
38  While I take it for granted that this portion of the Apology presents Socrates narrating his own 
experience, many more strictly “philosophical” interpreters of the Apology tend to elide the narrative 
dimension of his discourse, with the result that they synthesize into a set of propositions or paradoxes (e.g. 
Socrates’ denial of wisdom) what is in fact a number of discrete and sequential steps in Socrates’ thinking 
over time, each of which is interpreted and reinterpreted in the light of subsequent revelations. So, for 
instance, Mark McPherran (“Elenctic Interpretation and the Delphic Oracle,” in Scott 2002, 114-144) 
reorganizes the narrative of Socrates’ interpretation of the oracle as a (rather cumbersome) progression 
through a series of logical propositions (122-126) as a demonstration of the method of elenchus. For an 
interesting treatment of some of these narratological issues, focused on the function of Socrates as narrator 
or frame-narrator in several dialogues other than the Apology, see Anne-Marie Bowery, “Know Thyself: 
Socrates as Storyteller,” in Scott 2007, 82-110. 
 What kind 
of wisdom? Human wisdom, perhaps. It may be that I really possess this, while those whom I 
39  The qualifying and delimiting force of τινὰ [= one, a certain one, one among others] is not to be 
overlooked here, as it perhaps is by Socrates’ audience in the ensuing uproar to which he reacts in 20e. 
Plato and his philologists have the privilege of relishing subtleties which the internal audience(s) of a given 
dialogue cannot – not to speak of its external audience(s). Then again, if the Athenian jury in Plato’s text 
had been composed of philologists and/or philosophers, Socrates would most likely have been acquitted 
and Plato would never have been prompted to bring the text into being in the first place. The text of the 
Apology – not, perhaps, unlike Plato’s dialogues as a whole – thus necessarily demands a less-than-ideal 
internal audience if it is to have any existence or meaning at all: the inarticulate noise of the 
uncomprehending crowd, like Euthyphro’s pious puffery or Meno’s cynical sophistication, creates the 
asymmetry of viewpoints that fuels Plato’s language. Somebody in the text has to miss the force of the τινὰ, 
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mentioned just now [sc. the Sophists] are wise with a wisdom more than human; else I cannot explain 
it, for I certainly do not possess it [οὐ (…) αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, lit. “I do not know it”], and whoever says I 
do is lying and speaks to slander me. […] The story I tell does not originate with me, but I will refer 
you [ἀνοίσω] to a trustworthy source. I shall call upon the god of Delphi as witness [μάρτυρα] to the 
existence and nature of my wisdom, if it be such. You know Chaerephon. […] He went to Delphi at 
one time and ventured [ἐτόλμησε] to ask the oracle – as I say, gentlemen, do not create a disturbance – 
he asked if any man was wiser than I, and the Pythian replied [ἀνεῖλεν] that no one was wiser. 
Chaerephon is dead, but his brother will testify [μαρτυρήσει] to you about this. (Cooper/Grube 21) 
There are two characteristics of this passage which sound out the keynotes in the 
narrative that is to follow. First, in support of his assertion that his reputation is due to a 
certain kind of wisdom, Socrates implicitly claims that if there is such a thing as wisdom, 
there may be different varieties or degrees of wisdom, that human beings can only 
possess the kind of wisdom appropriate to them (ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία, “human wisdom”), 
and that it is only this wisdom that he claims to possess. He is conspicuously careful to 
qualify and delimit his initial claim to wisdom in this way – εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ οἵα, 
lit. “if [my own wisdom] is wisdom at all, and namely wisdom of this sort [i.e. human]” – 
because the outright, unqualified claim to possess wisdom endangers the one who makes 
it, judging by the sudden uproar in the court that has clearly ignored this careful 
qualification (μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες, “gentlemen, do not create a disturbance”). In a 
characteristically backhanded manner, he does not explicitly deny that the Sophists, 
whose reputation he wrongly shares (ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεταί, “whoever says [sc. that I am a 
Sophist] lies”), may possess a variety or degree of wisdom that surpasses the human 
(μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν, lit. “a kind of wisdom greater than [that which] 
befits a human being”). He does, however, deliver a very subtle judgment on their claim 
by suggesting that the ascription of such wisdom to his own person amounts not to praise, 
but to slander: ὅστις φησὶ […] ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει, “whoever says [that I possess such 
                                                                                                                                                 
for instance, so that we can catch it; but just as we begin to feel proud of our refined perceptions, Plato 
gives us yet another reason to wonder what else we might still be missing. 
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wisdom] speaks to slander me.” This is not merely because such a claim is untruthful in 
his own case, but also because, following Socrates’ implicit view about human wisdom, 
the alleged possession of a more-than-human wisdom would be a willful transgression – 
something that would mark a person’s conduct as truly τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον in its 
more sinister aspect, “in excess of” the limits prescribed for normal human life (20c, see 
above). If Socrates endangers himself by making a claim in this context to any wisdom at 
all – if, that is, he assumes a certain political risk by founding his counter-interpretation 
on this claim – his claim already adumbrates the greater risk in store for those who either 
denounce him for this claim or claim any other kind of wisdom for themselves. His 
apparent arrogance only holds up a magnifying mirror to the concealed arrogance of 
those who accuse him. What Socrates’ specifically human wisdom amounts to, he has not 
yet made clear, but what is already coming into focus is the implicitly dialogic character 
of his voice, which provokes its hearers in order to chasten them, which exposes itself to 
the suspense of error in order to reveal the grave error in which its hearers may already 
dwell. If pro forma dialogue is impossible in this context for generic reasons, Socrates 
finds ways to exploit the potential polyvocality of monologue to seek comparable ends. 
The second characteristic of this passage that proves crucial to the figures of voice 
in the subsequent narrative lies in the way the Socratic claim to wisdom is authorized by 
a chain of referrals (ἀνοίσω) to absent authorities:40
                                                 
40  The play of authority and impersonation so deeply impressed upon my reading of the Apology 
stands in stark contrast, for instance, to Mittelstrass’ claim that “In Socratic dialogue the beginnings of 
reason do not have their origins in reference to someone else’s or to one’s own authority. ‘To orient oneself 
in thought (in dialogue)’ means finding together with others the place where reason resides. It does not 
mean putting oneself in someone else’s place” (Mittelstrass in Griswold 1988, 134). Granted, I have not 
devoted enough attention to the question of a universal and impersonal faculty of reason in Plato’s thought 
to respond fully to the line of thinking Mittelstrass represents here; I do think, however, that there is much 
more semantic and historical distance between Mittelstrass’ post-Kantian use of the term Vernunft (Ger.: 
‘faculty of reason’) and Plato’s use of the term logos than Mittelstrass seems prepared to admit. Logos, for 
 first to the account of the deceased 
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Chaerephon, which in its turn is authorized by reference to the utterance of the spatially 
and, one might say, ontologically removed oracle at Delphi. The “figure” of Socrates’ 
voice in this passage depends upon a conscious, critical impersonation of absent voices 
worthy of the Brechtian stage: as Socrates puts it quite explicitly, οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν 
λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω (lit. “the word I speak is not my own”). As with his playful citation of 
the “voice of philosophy” in the passage from the Gorgias already discussed, we see 
Socrates again making recourse to the ironic figure of “prophetic irresponsibility”: by 
referring his discourse to an absent or inaccessible source, Socrates avoids responsibility 
for the claim that he is wise because he was not the one who originally made that claim – 
yet at the same time, as we shall see, it is precisely this claim made by another that 
Socrates transforms into his own, most intimate ethical possession. The conspicuous 
absence and/or otherness of these authorities, furthermore, implicitly criticizes the 
legalese forced upon Socrates by infusing this language with sharp irony: he undercuts 
the usual rhetorical force of μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι (“as my witness before you, I shall 
call upon…”) by making its object an entity that cannot possibly be made present to the 
court as a witness except through Socrates’ own prophetic mediation, namely, τὸν θεὸν 
τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς (“the god at Delphi”). The only witness who can be called upon to voice 
the truth about Socrates cannot be summoned before the court of Athens; mutatis 
mutandis, the only qualified outside observer who can be called upon to voice the 
philosopher’s ethical experience cannot present itself in the political realm. By drawing 
attention to the twofold remove of his own present voice in the forensic monologue from 
the absent voices that would authorize its truth, Socrates deliberately undermines his own 
                                                                                                                                                 
Plato’s tradition as well as for Plato himself, was inextricably bound to the faculty of verbal expression and 
interaction in a way that Vernunft is not, or at least not necessarily. 
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legal-political authority in order to criticize his hearers’ inability to acknowledge any 
other authority – especially the authority they should most of all acknowledge, the voice 
of a god. The referential chain of voices likewise reveals how the ethical experience 
Socrates is about to narrate must necessarily suffer the distortions or misrepresentations 
of indirect discourse as it tries to express itself in a political voice – and how 
impoverished political expression and understanding must be if such indirection and 
distortion are par for the course. For every finger Socrates playfully points at himself, 
there are three more pointing at his accusers; for every risk he brazenly assumes, he 
uncovers the far more dire risks in which his auditors are entangled. Hearing Socrates’ 
apparent monologue, we are very much listening to a dialogic plurality of voices – and 
woe unto us if we fail to discern the music in the noise. 
At this point in the narrative, Socrates’ own ‘direct discourse,’ to the effect that he 
possesses a certain positive wisdom (though it remains to be defined) shares a limited 
coherence with the oracle’s ‘indirect discourse,’ to the effect that there is no one wiser 
than Socrates. What the voice of the oracle states in negative and comparative terms 
about Socrates, the voice of Socrates declares in positive and determinate terms: their 
propositional contents appear to be more or less interchangeable. If the narrative ended at 
this moment, the substance of Socrates’ defense would amount to separating himself 
from the Sophists and declaring himself a sage on the basis of Delphic authority. No one 
is wiser than Socrates: ya basta. But the apparently straightforward unison harmony 
shared by these two interpretive ‘voicings’ is anything but straightforward. At the 
beginning of his narrative, Socrates does not confront his listeners (and readers) simply 
with a claim and its supporting evidence, but rather juxtaposes the first seed and the final 
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flower of an arduous process of interpretation – a process all the more remarkable for the 
apparent simplicity and transparency of its original material.41
Rather than blandly ceding the priority of the former voice over the latter, rather 
than invoking “prophetic irresponsibility” in earnest, Socrates makes the opening move in 
a dialogic game between these two voices, making each complicit in and responsible to 
the other. This is his defining decision: the decision neither to submit to nor to reject 
offhand the interpretive voice of the other, but to dwell in the suspense of error it creates 
in his own awareness.
 What makes the oracle’s 
statement into an interpretive problem for Socrates, and indeed into the ethical basis for 
the risks and responsibilities he assumes in philosophizing, is the fact that the god’s 
judgment on Socrates’ wisdom directly contradicts Socrates’ judgment of the same, and 
Socrates cannot find a way to set aside his own judgment. To put more of a point on it: 
Socrates’ ethical awareness, and along with it the interpretive practice of dialogue, is 
born from and dwells in the irresolvable tension between a divine voice from ‘elsewhere’ 
that always speaks the truth about human beings, and the human voice from the most 
intimate ‘here’ of self-awareness that wants, hopes, needs to speak the truth about itself. 
42
                                                 
41  Warnek argues in very similar terms for Socrates’ apparently eccentric relationship to the 
straightforward language of the oracle, and emphasizes the character of Socratic dialogue as the natural 
extension of Socrates’ interpretive response to it: “The oracle, if it does issue a command, also does not tell 
Socrates what to do in unambiguous terms, does not give him straightforward instructions at all. Thus, it is 
not possible to account for Socratic practice simply by tracing it back to a divine imperative. […] Instead, it 
must be emphasized that Socrates himself understands his practice first of all as a way to interpret the 
oracle, as a way to test its meaning, to determine what the god is saying. What is decisive, then, is that the 
practice must already have established itself by first of all refusing to accept the divine word – by not 
simply accepting what the word only appears to say” (Warnek 2005, 95). 
 From this choice the ethical and political mandates of the 
42  So Warnek describes something very similar to this voluntary suspense when he writes that 
Socrates’ “philosophical practice begins by insisting that the possibility of a genuine obedience to the god 
calls for an interpretive response. This response, while it must appear to reject the oracle, also cannot 
amount to its simple rejection. […] Because the difficulty raised by the oracle goes beyond the alternatives 
of its simple acceptance or rejection, the interpretive response of Socrates demands that he hold himself in 
an openness toward the oracular claim without becoming indifferent to it. Socrates must challenge the 
word, attempt even to refute it, precisely so that the word may nevertheless be accepted, received. […] The 
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philosophical way of life, as we shall see, issue forth with transparent rigor: Socrates 
decides to live simultaneously through the oracle’s voice and his own. He receives the 
oracle not as a statement at face value, but as a new medium of ethical life, a new way to 
relate to and interpret himself. The oracle has answered, and Socrates, from the oracle of 
his own awareness, now boldly answers the god: 
ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὑτωσί: “τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε 
αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν: τί οὖν ποτε 
λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί γε: οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ.” καὶ 
πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει: ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ […] 
ἐτραπόμην. (Pl. Ap. 21b) 
When I heard of this reply I asked myself: “Whatever does the god mean? What is his riddle? [τί ποτε 
αἰνίττεται, lit. “What is he riddling about”]? I am very conscious [σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ] that I am not wise at 
all [οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν, lit. “(in matters) neither great nor small”]; what then does he mean by 
saying that I am the wisest? For surely he does not lie, it is not legitimate for him to do so [οὐ γὰρ θέμις 
αὐτῷ].” For a long time I was at a loss [ἠπόρουν > ἀπορέω (v.), ἀπορία (n.) inter alia, see below] as to 
his meaning; then I very reluctantly [μόγις πάνυ] turned to […] investigation […]. (Cooper/Grube 21) 
Socrates shatters the apparent simplicity of the truth that comes to him through the 
oracle’s voice by hoping, even insisting, that his own voice must somehow speak the 
truth as well. The sense of the oracle’s message has suddenly rendered Socrates’ 
experience of himself into nonsense, just as the sense of Socrates’ experience has 
rendered the oracle’s message into nonsense. As if a curtain on a quiet stage has just been 
drawn back to reveal a violent struggle, the apparent consonance of viewpoints that 
Socrates expressed in 20e-21a has been split open to reveal its original dissonance: each 
music, as it were, here confronts the other as noise. Particular attention, first of all, must 
be paid to the ethical structure of Socrates’ vocabulary in expressing the denial of 
wisdom that leads to this dissonance: when he says (in Grube’s translation) “I am very 
conscious that I am not wise at all,” the phrase he uses to describe the precise quality of 
                                                                                                                                                 
response, as the call to a practice, must be able to suspend the apparently inevitable closure belonging to 
interpretation” (Warnek 2005, 96, 97, latter emphasis mine). 
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his awareness is σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ. The verb οἶδα (without the συν- prefix) is a common 
verb form that usually translates simply as “I know.” The συν- prefix, combined with the 
reflexive dative pronoun ἐμαυτῷ (“myself”), alters its meaning subtly but significantly. 
Whereas Grube, with good authority (LSJ III.), takes σύνοιδα as simply an emphatic form 
of οἶδα (hence the “very”), σύνοιδα also (per LSJ II.) denotes knowledge of a common 
object shared with (σύν [prep.] = with, along with) another subject.43 In Socrates’ case, 
the common object of knowledge is Socrates himself, and the other subject who shares 
this knowledge is – Socrates again, after the act of ethical self-reflection has concluded.44
                                                 
43  It is worth noting that the LSJ itself lists this passage from the Apology under I.a., where its 
meaning boils down to “to know something from one’s experience of someone or something such that one 
can bear witness to it.” Socrates’ statement would then translate roughly (and maximally) as “I know from 
my experience of myself, and can bear witness to the fact, that etc.” ἔξοιδα (a word especially favored by 
Sophocles) and κάτοιδα both mean “to know thoroughly or very well” in a sense closely corresponding to 
Grube’s preferred σύνοιδα III. and would have been available to Plato; although the usage of these latter 
verbs appears mostly restrained to tragedy, it is interesting to note that of the three compounds, only 
σύνοιδα takes a reflexive pronoun. The philological point I make here, I think, remains equally true whether 
one takes σύνοιδα in sense I.a. or II., both of which (relying solely on LSJ’s witnesses) appear to be 
somewhat more well-attested in contemporary Attic Greek than Grube’s preferred sense III. The discrete 
act of συνείδησις to which Socrates refers requires (a) that he actively take himself as an object of his own 
knowledge, i.e. enter into an ethical relationship with himself, (b) that the self-knowledge he achieves be 
incorporated into his awareness as if another subject had achieved it and shared it with him, and (c) that he 
can readily bear witness to this knowledge as certain and true. 
 
The subject of this self-reflection delivers a verdict on its object – that this guy over here, 
Socrates, is not wise at all – and proceeds to share this knowledge of itself with itself 
(ἐμαυτῷ) as it would with another subject. In effect, by accepting the interpretive voice of 
this ‘other Socrates’ when it has judged his wisdom, Socrates at this point makes himself 
complicit in and responsible to himself and only himself. It must be stressed, furthermore, 
that this ethical structure, the relation of self to self embedded in Socrates’ vocabulary 
here, is not yet dialogic in the proper sense. Having posed the question of his own 
44  This verbal shading is ignored even by Vlastos in his magisterial reading of this and other 
passages in Plato concerning Socrates’ claims to knowledge: Gregory Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of 
Knowledge,” in Vlastos 1994, 39-66 (see esp. 42). 
265 
wisdom to himself, he definitively answers the question and silences his (internal) 
questioner. Digress is completely resolved by a subsequent congress: the case is closed. 
In view of what follows, however, we likewise cannot afford to downplay the 
extraordinary character of this initial ethical achievement – and this achievement is not 
limited to the fact that Socrates manages to separate himself from himself and give 
judgment on himself as another. What is most significant about the initial act of ethical 
self-reflection that figures the voice of this ‘other Socrates’ is that it directly paves the 
way for Socrates’ extraordinary reckoning with the voice of the oracle. Socrates’ 
examination of his own wisdom has already opened and prepared a space of possible 
dialogue in which other positions, other assessments, other interpretations of its object 
can be – but have not yet been – voiced. The advent of the oracle’s contrarian voice into 
this ethical space, its entry into conversation about a common object, now begins to 
transform into kinetic energy what Socrates’ own ethical examination had stored up as 
potential energy. In one of the few and vital instances in the Platonic corpus where 
Socrates applies this (quintessentially Socratic-Platonic) term to himself, Socrates freely 
admits that the irruption of the oracle into his ethical awareness put him “at a complete 
loss” (ἠπόρουν > ἀπορέω [v.]), into the condition called aporia (ἀπορία). The ethical 
synthesis Socrates achieved beforehand in “shar[ing] with myself the knowledge [σύνοιδα 
ἐμαυτῷ] that I am not wise at all” has now disintegrated, and he must find a way to form 
a new συνείδησις, a new con-science, that integrates the oracle’s voice and his own within 
a stable, common language for conversation. Like Oedipus, whose aporetic horror 
derived from the fact that his voice had unknowingly debased the normative language of 
space and movement it was meant to protect and preserve, Socrates, in entering the 
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suspense of error concerning wisdom, faces the possibility that the normative language he 
and his contemporaries use to talk about wisdom only enacts a similar debasement of its 
meaning. Moreover, the possibility that everyone, including Socrates, is dead wrong, 
even tragically misguided, when they talk about wisdom is what ultimately makes 
Socrates’ ethical aporia the occasion for a capital trial in Athens. The conflict of 
interpretations, the clash of voices that Socrates experiences in his own person, about his 
own person, does not merely concern the authenticity of his ethical self-awareness as 
such – a crisis which would perhaps be sufficient to cause dismay on Socrates’ part, but 
would not in itself pose significant ethical and political risks for him. The oracle could 
very well have contradicted Socrates’ self-evaluation on his knowledge of arithmetic, or 
his manner of dress, or his culinary skills. Because nothing other than wisdom itself in 
toto – access to and communication of the truth by human beings – is the central term in 
both interpretations, and because this concept has now become a locus of risk, this 
conflict concerns every subject who has any stake at all in a truth arrived at by 
interpretation. Most distantly, that includes us; most immediately, it includes the entire 
city of Athens in the late 5th century BCE. And it is in the context of this city and its 
citizens that Socrates yet again distinguishes himself from the tragic tradition – and from 
Oedipus, whose situation in many respects he shares – by taking the aporia of error not as 
a terminus but as a point of departure for a renewed effort of interpretation. Through the 
practice of dialogue, as Socrates presents it in the Apology, he tries to resolve his ethical 
aporia, the dissonance shared by human and divine interpretations of (his) wisdom, by 
reinventing the normative language about wisdom so as to reconcile his interpretation 
with that of the god. 
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Just as the concept of ‘wisdom’ is no longer so transparent that it does not require 
interpretation, becoming instead a question that must be answered, so the ‘wise person’ – 
and let us not forget that the oracle puts Socrates at the very top of this genus – is no 
longer an entity transparent to himself, but instead a question posed to himself about 
himself. To seek an answer to this question that he has become through the interpretive 
noise of the oracle’s voice, Socrates turns to others, to the domain of politics, and to the 
practice of dialogue proper – where his own mode of living becomes just as much a 
source of noise, an incessantly contrarian voice addressed to others’ modes of living. This 
turn to politics, it must be noted, while it represents a necessary extension of Socrates’ 
ethical project, modulates the suspense of error from Socrates’ ethical relation into his 
political relations. The ethical risk that attaches itself to ‘wisdom’ in the face-off between 
Socrates’ voice and that of the oracle now becomes a political danger attached to the 
‘wise man’ in the face-off between Socrates’ voice and those of his interlocutors. As 
usual, furthermore, the risks Socrates knowingly faces in his dialogic peregrinations, as 
one who denies himself wisdom, adumbrate the far more dire risks that his interlocutors 
unknowingly face in claiming wisdom for themselves. The three groups he “investigates” 
(ζήτησιν 21b), through their dialogic responses, indirectly reveal different kinds of risk 
attached to the outright claim of wisdom. I want to focus here on the first two groups, the 
statesmen and the poets. Socrates’ encounter with the statesmen lays much of the 
groundwork for what is to follow with the poets: 
ἦλθον ἐπί τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα εἴπερ που ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον 
καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι “οὑτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα.” 
διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον […] ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι 
ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ--ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν 
εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὔ: κἄπειτα 
ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὔ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε 
ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων. (Pl. Ap. 21b-21d) 
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I went to one of those reputed wise [δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, including “those who appear to be wise,” 
“those who think (themselves) to be wise,” and “those who are thought (by others) to be wise”], 
thinking that there, if anywhere, I could refute the oracle and say to it: “This man is wiser than I, but 
you said I was.” Then, when I examined this man – […] he was one of our public men [τις τῶν 
πολιτικῶν] – my experience was something like this: I thought that he appeared wise to many people 
and especially to himself, but he was not. I then tried to show him that he thought himself wise, but 
that he was not. As a result he came to dislike me, and so did many of the bystanders. (Cooper/Grube 
21) 
Before outlining how Socrates’ encounters uncover different kinds of risk in store for 
those who claim wisdom, I would like to make two general points about Socrates’ pursuit 
of dialogue that make their initial appearance in this passage. First: it cannot be 
emphasized enough that, in the wake of his aporetic experience, Socrates’ self-
proclaimed purpose in turning to the investigation of his fellow Athenians through 
dialogue is basically a reactionary and restorative one on behalf of his own – and 
presumably his contemporaries’ – judgments about wisdom. He sets out, as he says, ὡς 
[…] ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον (21c), “in order to refute [ἐλέγχω] the oracle” – in order to 
silence the noise that its response has forced into both his ethical awareness and the 
language of wisdom.45
                                                 
45  Arieti expresses the view that “Socrates’ simultaneous belief and disbelief” in the oracle 
constitutes “a classic instance of tragic hamartia” (Arieti 1991, 159), even going so far as to claim in a note 
that “his hamartia is just like that of Oedipus, who both believes and disbelieves the Delphic oracle” (n. 8, 
164). While this idea reflects a comparative approach to tragedy and philosophy amenable to my own, I 
think Arieti's focus on the issue of belief rather than the issue of meaning obscures this point in his 
argument. By focusing on Socrates' “simultaneous belief and disbelief” without exploring how this dialogic 
attitude plays out in the process of interpretation, Arieti's idea only telescopes the diachronic dimension of 
his narrative into an all-too-neat paradox. More importantly, however, it begs the question of what “belief” 
in anything might entail when one does not yet understand the meaning of the thing in which one is to 
believe or disbelieve, as Socrates does throughout his story and perhaps even beyond its end. Secondly, I 
see nothing that is necessarily tragic, and indeed much that is resolutely anti-tragic, about the practical, 
personal, and political results of Socrates’ reckoning with the oracle – that hypothesis is the bedrock for 
much of my argument here. As for the comparison to Oedipus, similarity of interpretive situations does not 
entail congruity of responses: if Plato had Sophocles’ tragedy directly in mind at all when narrating 
Socrates’ process of interpretation, it was not as a model but as an antagonist. The point of repeating certain 
elements of Oedipus’ reaction to the Delphic oracle in Socrates’ reaction – and these elements are 
numerous and very rich, as Arieti is right to point out – is not merely to reproduce, but rather to comment 
on and respond to the tragic tradition in which such narrative situations involving oracles had an 
established place and range of meaning. 
 It is almost as if Callicles’ scoffing in the Gorgias were now 
placed into the mouth of Socrates: ‘Apollo, surely you must be joking by saying that no 
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one is wiser than me – a person who doesn’t think he’s wise at all? For if you’re being 
serious, won’t the way we talk and think about wisdom be turned upside down, and won’t 
everything we do with regards to wisdom be the opposite of what we should do?’ The 
second part of Socrates’ declaration of purpose underscores this boldness further: ὡς […] 
ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ (21c) is far more muscular than Grube’s “say to [the oracle]”: 
ἀποφαίνω means “to declare, make known, or prove” (LSJ A.II.) with a strong undertone 
of making something directly manifest to the senses so as to be irrefutable (φαίνω) – in 
other words, a verb more suited to describing the declaration of an oracle to a man than 
that of a man to an oracle. That Socrates imagines himself in a position to reply to an 
oracle at all already sets him quite apart from virtually every other personage in ancient 
Greek literature who comes to deal with oracular pronouncements. If one is dismayed or 
confused by an oracle, the most one can typically arrogate to oneself is to ask the oracle 
another, more focused question, one putatively less likely to yield an ambiguous 
response. But to engage the prophet of Apollo in the sort of animated, vernacular 
conversation Socrates imagines – “οὑτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα” (21c; 
“This guy here is wiser than me, but you said I [was the wisest]!”) – is practically comic, 
verging on the irreverent or even openly impious. We are quite far indeed, at this point in 
the narrative, from the view taken by many scholars who – primarily, no doubt, with the 
intent to exculpate Socrates of impiety – want to construe his pursuit of the philosophical 
way of life in terms of unreflectively pious dedication to a divine mission.46
                                                 
46  A contemporary treatment by Bussanich, for instance, is at pains to exclude all possibility of 
impiety in Socrates’ conduct towards the oracle: John Bussanich, “Socrates and Religious Experience,” in 
Ahbel-Rappe & Kamtekar 2006, 200-213 (see esp. 200-206). My own broader view on the question, which 
I do not have space to treat in detail here, coincides almost precisely with that of M.F. Burnyeat, “The 
Impiety of Socrates,” in: Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito: Critical Essays, ed. Rachana Kamtekar 
 Socrates’ 
270 
piety – if it can be called such – is the fruit of long and perilous labor in the fields of 
interpretation, and only later does it become the food of his convictions. Both the 
expectation that he can refute the word of a god, and the kind of street-level banter in 
which Socrates anticipates this refutation, clearly exacerbate the risks of his situation as 
he faces down capital charges of impiety. By one and the same token, however, Socrates 
offers an ironic ‘acting-out’ of his auditors’ indignity, directed at a god who would 
declare this incorrigible wise-ass as the wisest of all mortal men. Socrates’ playful but 
purposeful impiety and his conscious self-endangerment form a dialogic image of his 
auditors’ unconscious impiety and self-endangerment in satirical miniature; his voice 
impersonates both Socrates himself qua aloof, ironic interrogator and the dullest and 
most reactionary of his listeners. In essence, the dialogic voice of the ‘other Socrates’ – 
the detached, scrupulous, negative mask that scrutinizes both the face it conceals from the 
world and the world from which it conceals the face – never does cede its place to either 
the voice of the oracle or the din of the crowd. It only strives towards speaking a common 
language with both. 
The second general point that must be made before getting to the specific risks 
assumed by the statesmen and the poets involves what I will call the ontological status of 
‘wisdom’ and ‘the wise man’ at the point in Socrates’ narrative when he turns to 
dialogue. If Socrates’ acute perception of the dissonance between his own and the 
oracle’s ‘voicings’ of wisdom motivates his turn to dialogue, what he discovers in the 
course of his conversations with various representative individuals in Athens is their 
chronic deafness to a dissonance of a different sort in their own voices. It is all too easy 
                                                                                                                                                 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 150-162. The seminal essay for contemporary debate on the 
problem of Socrates’ piety is, of course, Gregory Vlastos’ “Socratic Piety,” op. cit. 49-71.  
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to ascribe this latter dissonance, furthermore, to a failure on the part of Socrates’ 
interlocutors to negotiate the (threadbare) dichotomy between appearance and reality, or 
‘seeming’ and ‘being’ wise – though this passage positively (and necessarily) teems with 
the various Greek terms that delineate between seeming and being. I think that this 
portion of Socrates’ narrative can only be adequately understood in light of the profound 
ethical experience that serves as its motivation, namely, the birth of what I have called 
interpretive conscience in Socrates’ experience of aporia. Because the ontological status 
of ‘wisdom’ and ‘the wise man’ has suffered such a serious blow through the effects of 
the oracle’s proclamation, Socrates can no longer rely on these ideas as absolute givens, 
as reliable names for reliable realities. Rather, the only thing he can do in good faith is go 
forth and examine ‘wisdom,’ as it were, placed firmly inside its scare quotes, as a locus 
of indeterminacy and potential risk. Socrates expresses quite subtly the attitude of 
disenchanted apprehension that guides him throughout his dialogic examinations: he does 
not approach his first victim, for instance, as “one of those who are wise” (which would 
be τινα τῶν σοφῶν ὄντων) but rather as “one of those reputed to be wise” (τινα τῶν 
δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, 21b). The careful locution indicates how ‘wisdom’ has been 
dislodged from the ontological pride of place it had enjoyed before, and makes this 
dislocation palpable to the minds of Socrates’ auditors. The meaningful reality, if any, of 
‘wisdom’ can only be justified by the way of life of individuals who claim to live in and 
through the language of wisdom; their way of life, on the other hand, can only be justified 
by the logical coherence and normative force in their language of wisdom – a language 
that now bears the burden of proof against the oracle’s clearly very different language. In 
short, if Socrates is to refute the language of wisdom by which the oracle judges him to 
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be the wisest of men, he must vindicate the language – one among many languages, 
perhaps – by which men judge other men to be wise. This he can only do by demanding 
the very highest standards of coherence from the language of men – demanding that when 
men talk about wisdom, they speak with a single voice about a single truth, and that when 
men live wisdom, they live a single way of life governed by the same single truth. While 
Socrates uses a language of ‘seeming’ and ‘being’ to narrate his own experience in the 
dialogues about wisdom, he only does so by working the suddenly quite fluid and 
precarious boundary between them – by living not on the side of ‘being’ against mere 
‘seeming,’ but rather in the suspense of error between ‘seeming’ and ‘being.’ Moreover, 
Socrates’ cultivation of this suspense through dialogue depends upon the action of 
interpretive language, of voices and voicings, in both constructing and deconstructing 
interpretive authority. In essence, each group of Socrates’ interlocutors remains deaf to 
the nature of their own voices, claiming for those voices an original and authoritative 
‘wisdom’ that originates in, and is authorized by, voices which are not their own. The 
dialogues that Socrates narrates can be read as his interlocutors’ involuntary and 
unsuccessful education in the risks of interpretive ventriloquism: all unawares, they 
become other than themselves, create dissonance in themselves, by speaking in any voice 
but their own. 
In this light, the chief failure of the statesmen in 21b-e in regards to wisdom is 
their lack of the kind of ethical self-reflexivity that allowed Socrates, for one, to deliver 
judgment on his own wisdom in the voice of another: theirs is the most basic failure of 
interpretive conscience. Because they have not made the ethical effort to find a 
vocabulary of wisdom in which they can carry on an interpretive conversation with 
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themselves about themselves, their voices simply impersonate other voices speaking 
about them: τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον […] -- ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος [sc. ὁ πολιτικὸς] δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι 
σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὔ (21c; “my experience 
was something like this: I thought that this [statesman] appeared wise to many people and 
especially to himself, but he was not”). The diffuse and indiscriminate voice of “many 
other people” (ἄλλοις […] πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις) produces a sort of apparition of the ‘wise 
man’ – a δοκεῖν εἶναι (‘seeming-to-be’) persona – and the statesman, all unawares, 
obliges them by transforming himself into this very same apparition. His capacity for 
self-reflection is thus limited to reflection in a borrowed mirror, as it were: his political 
self, concatenated from others’ judgments, serves as stand-in for an ethical self. He 
appears to himself to be wise – and with a vengeance (μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, “most of all to 
himself,” emphasis mine) – only because he is reflected back to himself through the 
medium of other voices. The ethical failure of the statesman, once it is repeated often and 
by enough people, erodes whatever value the concepts of ‘wisdom’ and ‘the wise man’ 
may have as media of interpretive conscience – the very value Socrates seeks to reclaim 
for the language of wisdom – and flattens out this value into an instrument of self-interest 
and relative advantage in the political realm. 
The most significant verbal feature of Socrates’ assessment of the statesman’s 
wisdom, furthermore, is the fact that the latter’s condition of seeming-wise (δοκεῖν μὲν 
εἶναι σοφὸς, 21c) just as much as his condition of not-being-wise (εἶναι δ' οὔ [σοφός]) are 
grammatically and conceptually dependent upon the way these conditions appear to 
Socrates’ faculty of interpretive judgment. Socrates does not say ‘this man seemed wise, 
but was not,’ a statement which would implicitly fix ‘being’ and ‘seeming’ as absolute 
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categories of which Socrates implicitly claims a privileged knowledge, and thus also a 
knowledge of ‘wisdom’ per se. Instead, he says (in the most literal terms) “this man 
seemed to me [ἔδοξέ μοι] to seem to be wise […], but not to be wise.” At no point, then, 
does Socrates position himself beyond the limits of his individual ability to interpret and 
judge; if the oracle has taught him anything by now, it is certainly the fact that this 
faculty of intepretation exists in the suspense of an error that patiently waits to be 
revealed by the response of another. We are only too apt to forget that this same Socrates 
has already had his negative self-assessment about ‘being wise’ uprooted by the oracle 
and cast into the uncertain currents of ‘seeming-being,’ and that this aporetic experience 
has led him directly into the dialogic effort to reassert a stable ontological status for 
‘wisdom.’ 
Yet in his actual dialogue with the statesman, ironically, Socrates repeats the 
oracle’s demolition of ‘seeming’ and ‘being’ rather than finding the means to recover 
from it. The statesman suffers precisely the same uprooting of his positive self-
assessment about ‘being wise’ through Socrates’ response, where Socrates speaks in the 
voice of the oracle and the statesman speaks in the voice of (a previous) Socrates – but 
with decidedly different results: κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι 
σοφός, εἴη δ' οὔ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων (21c-d); “I 
then tried to show him that he thought himself wise [ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός], but that 
he was not. As a result he came to dislike me [ἀπηχθόμην, lit. “I came to be hated”], and 
so did many of the bystanders” [Cooper/Grube 21]). Socrates refuses to add his own 
voice to the chorus of admirers whose collective ‘voicing’ of the statesman’s wisdom 
issues from the statesman’s own mouth, just as the oracle refused to put its voice in 
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harmony with Socrates’ individual ‘voicing’ of his non-wisdom to himself. The situation 
with the oracle, as we have seen, puts the authenticity of both Socrates’ ethical awareness 
and ‘wisdom’ itself at risk, imposing the task of dialogue on him as the means to restore 
their authenticity. The situation with the statesman does more than just renew the oracle’s 
threat to the authenticity of ‘wisdom’ instead of resolving it, by the strange twist already 
noted. More importantly, it repeats for Socrates in the intersubjective domain of politics 
what had already transpired in the intrasubjective domain of ethics: aporia, the condition 
of danger in which one loses one’s grasp on the language one shares with oneself, now 
becomes apechtheia (ἀπέχθεια [n.] = intense hatred, enmity, abhorrence > ἀπηχθόμην 
21d), the condition of danger in which one loses one’s grasp on the language one shares 
with others. The crucial mis-step made by Socrates here lies in his expectation that the 
statesman already possesses an interpretive conscience that has developed enough to 
admit the kind of ethical aporia Socrates himself has already experienced – that he 
already possesses a dialogic voice that can confront itself as another and make other 
voices present in itself. What Socrates finds instead is a voice entirely subsumed by other 
voices, a pseudo-authoritative language that simply speaks itself in the absence of any 
identifiable authority, an intersubjectivity in place of a subjectivity – in short, the 
veritable incarnation of interpretive irresponsibility. The statesman’s potential embrace of 
the ethical self-endangerment to which Socrates invites him rebounds instead against 
Socrates himself in the shape of the latter’s political endangerment at the hands of others. 
In trying to defeat the oracle’s ethical kindynology by using dialogue as an ad hoc 
political technology, Socrates has only driven the oracle’s point further home by putting 
everything he has – ethics and politics, life and language – at stake in an increasingly 
276 
dangerous game. In a Heraclitean turn, Socrates’ pursuit of dialogue has made what at 
first seemed to be the path up and out of the labyrinth of risk and responsibility identical 
with the path that leads down into its very center: ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὡυτή [“The road 
up and the road down are one and the same”; fr. 60 Diels-Kranz]. Thus we can say that 
Socratic dialogue aims to become a technology that restores the originality and authority 
of the voices that take part in it, and integrates their disparate languages into a shared 
vocabulary; nonetheless, it can only be and remain a kindynology that constantly reveals 
how voices in dialogue displace and undermine themselves and each other, and that dis-
integrates the language through which they seek reconciliation. 
Socrates’ dialogue with the poets, furthermore, not only reveals that they lack 
interpretive conscience as much as the statesmen, but gradually heightens the ethical and 
political condition of risk in which Socrates stands. In other words, the attempt to use 
dialogue as a technology to restore ‘wisdom’ and ‘the wise man’ to their previous status 
consistently bears its fruit only as a kindynology in which these same concepts and the 
subjects who make use of them are put at risk. The increasing endangerment of Socrates, 
moreover, yet again offers a dialogic mirror-image of the greater danger in which his 
interlocutors continually exist but of which they remain continually ignorant. Like the 
voice of the ‘wise’ statesman, which originates in and is authorized by a diffuse, 
collective voice that the statesman appropriates for his own, the voice of the ‘wise’ poets 
can make no substantial claim to an authority that originates in the speaker himself: 
μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ᾖα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς […] ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ 
καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ 
ποιήματα ἅ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί 
λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. […] ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν 
ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ 
περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ 
ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί: καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ 
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καὶ καλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ 
πεπονθότες, καὶ ἅμα ᾐσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τἆλλα σοφωτάτων 
εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. (Pl. Ap. 22a-c) 
After the politicians, I went to the poets […] intending in their case to catch myself [ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ 
καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν, lit. “to catch myself red-handed”] more ignorant than they. So I took up those 
poems with which they seemed to have taken the most trouble and asked them what they meant, in 
order that I might at the same time learn something from them. […] Almost all the bystanders might 
have explained the poems better than their authors could. I soon realized that poets do not compose 
their poems with knowledge [οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν] but by some inborn talent [φύσει τινὶ] and by 
inspiration [ἐνθουσιάζοντες], like seers and prophets who also say many fine things without any 
understanding of what they say. The poets seemed to me to have had a similar experience [τοιοῦτόν τί 
(…) πάθος (…) πεπονθότες]. At the same time I saw that, because of their poetry [διὰ τὴν ποίησιν], they 
thought themselves very wise [sc. the wisest] men in other respects [οἰομένων καὶ τἆλλα σοφωτάτων 
εἶναι ἀνθρώπων], which they were not (Cooper/Grube 22). 
Even more transparently than the statesman, the poets do not speak their wisdom in their 
own voices. Socrates sets aside the question of whether or not their poems contain actual 
wisdom – indeed, by conspicuously tabling this question, he leaves it open that they very 
well might – and focuses purely on whether or not the poets themselves, actively 
speaking for themselves in dialogue, are in fact the authoritative origin of this wisdom. 
He finds that, in place of the vox populi so thoroughly imitated by the statesman that it 
becomes his own voice, the poets claim for their own human voices a wisdom that rightly 
belongs to a divine power that speaks through them – whether, as Socrates says, by an 
indwelling receptivity to divine influence that passively bears fruit among human beings 
(φύσει τινὶ 22c, roughly “by a certain innate generative power”) or by a similarly passive 
capacity to be possessed by a divine spirit that takes control of the poets’ faculties in 
order to achieve its own ends (ἐνθουσιάζοντες 22c, lit. “possessed or inspired by a god,” 
or even “in a state of ecstasy”). In other words, the poet’s voice can only exercise its 
eminently active and creative power – of which the chief evidence is the tangibility of 
that definitive “created thing,” the poem itself (ποίημα) – by making itself into the 
passive instrument of a divine voice; they rightly possess neither the wisdom their voices 
speak through their poems nor these voices themselves in the moment of poetic utterance. 
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Hence when Socrates goes on to claim that the poets οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν (21e-22c), 
literally “they do not create the things they create by means of wisdom,” he clearly means 
a wisdom that the poets themselves would possess as speaking subjects – i.e. the very 
wisdom he is out to discover, articulate, and defend against the oracle – not the wisdom 
that may very well belong to the divine power that acts through them. 
Like the statesman, then, the poets are dependent upon an origin and authority 
other than themselves for the wisdom attributed to and transmitted by their voices, and 
they endanger themselves through the tacit plagiarism they commit in claiming 
ownership of this wisdom. The poets’ failure to measure up on the scale of interpretive 
conscience is in some ways, however, even more devastating than that of the statesman: 
not only are the poets’ voices not their rightful possessions, but their voices in turn 
depend upon other voices – ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες (22b), “all those who were present” – to 
yield the full measure of whatever meaningful wisdom the former communicate. A divine 
voice has to speak through them, and other human voices have to speak for them, if the 
‘poet’s voice’ is to speak for itself at all and the ‘poet’s wisdom’ is to speak on behalf 
human wisdom in general. Whereas the political hyperreflectivity, as it were, of the 
statesman’s voice at least functionally stands in for an ethically self-reflexive voice, the 
poets emerge from Socratic cross-examination as ethical and political non-entities. Their 
interpretive irresponsibility, their incapacity to answer for what they say and be answered 
in turn, is so deep that it nearly beggars description: theirs are voices that truly ‘speak 
themselves,’ like automata, in the complete absence of a human subject that both speaks 
and knows what it speaks. Where ‘wisdom’ is concerned, trying to weigh the poets on the 
scales of interpretive conscience – evaluating their ability to converse with themselves 
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and others about their relationship to ‘wisdom’ – makes as much sense as expecting my 
word processing program to converse with itself and me about its relationship to my 
dissertation. 
 Nonetheless, there is still at least one point in Socrates’ treatment of the poets that 
undercuts what would otherwise be a savage indictment of these particular ‘wise men’ 
with a kindyneutic turn, implicating Socrates and his auditors in the self-endangerment of 
the poets. When he locates the authorizing source of the poets’ ‘wisdom’ in their passive-
receptive capacity for divine inspiration, he compares them to οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ 
χρησμῳδοί: καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι (22c; 
“seers and prophets [θεομάντεις, lit. ‘divinely-inspired prophets’ and χρησμῳδοί, lit. 
‘oracle-chanters’] who also say many fine things without any understanding [ἴσασιν […] 
οὐδὲν, lit. ‘they know nothing’] of what they say” [Cooper/Grube 22]). Here Socrates 
addresses specifically and explicitly the rhetorical attitude which, in the context of both 
the passage from the Gorgias discussed above and Socrates’ report of the oracle’s 
message at 21a, I previously called “prophetic irresponsibility.” Socrates’ ironic 
assumption of this attitude in the passage from the Gorgias, as I argue above, provokes 
reflection on how the philosopher’s voice achieves ethical authenticity and autonomy 
through conscious self-negation or -elision. In the earlier passage from the Apology, it 
similarly polarizes and brings into dialogic confrontation the contradictory threads 
running through Socrates’ voice in its context: the certainty of divine knowledge against 
the uncertainty of human interpretation, the exoteric here-and-now of conventional 
courtroom rhetoric against the esoteric beyond of gods and truths, the language one 
speaks in one’s own voice against the language one speaks by reference to another’s. 
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Both of these parallels, I think, serve to bring out the dialogic motivation behind 
Socrates’ reference to prophets and oracles in his characterization of poetic inspiration at 
22a-c. We cannot forget that Socrates’ own oracle, the interpretandum which has given 
impetus to his entire undertaking, was issued as a response to Chaerephon’s question by 
the Pythian priestess of Apollo (ἡ Πυθία 21a), herself one of those “oracle-chanters” 
(χρησμῳδοί) who, like the poets, “say many fine things without any understanding of 
what they say.” Chaerephon’s transmission of this response to Socrates is structurally 
identical to the priestess’ transmission of the god’s response, or the poets’ transcription of 
their divine inspiration: all are merely links in a chain of indirect discourse, each one not 
acting or speaking in propria persona but simply “suffering the same kind of suffering” 
as the one before (rendering τοιοῦτόν τί (…) πάθος (…) πεπονθότες, 22c, very literally). 
Unlike the priestess, Chaerephon, or even the poets, however, Socrates claims outright 
that he does not understand what the divine voice is actually saying when it speaks to him 
(τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; 21b; “Whatever does the god mean? What is 
his riddle?” [Cooper/Grube 21]). Socrates’ self-proclaimed lack of understanding, a direct 
analogue to his denial of wisdom, breaks the spell of “prophetic irresponsibility” under 
which such chains of indirect discourse stand by discovering that there is no necessary 
and binding relation between the truth one speaks and the one who speaks it, between 
language and life: Socrates himself would have no more or less access to the oracle’s 
meaning if he repeated it to himself or to others a hundred times. The person-to-person 
transmission of indirect discourse stops with him, in effect, because he allows this 
discourse to address him as a problem that threatens the integration of language and life 
in his ethical self-reflection. The oracle's language is no longer merely spoken through 
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him; rather, it is now spoken to him. That he insists on mutually re-integrating language 
and life through the pursuit of meaning, on relating the subject’s voice and the subject 
itself through the pursuit of knowledge – these are the aims for the sake of which he 
undertakes the task of interpretation, with its hidden risks and entangling responsibilities. 
The poets’ failure to undertake the task of interpretation with the very gifts that divine 
wisdom lavishes upon them corresponds to their failure to relate the voices they project 
with the lives they live. True, Socrates endangers himself with his auditors by 
interrogating poetry, yet another of the traditional cornerstones of wisdom in 5th- and 4th-
century Greek culture; nonetheless, the dialogical counterpoint running through his attack 
is that the poets (not to mention Socrates’ auditors) endanger themselves by transmitting 
poetry without interrogating it – or, even worse, without allowing poetry to interrogate 
them. Ultimately, the poets and their readers denigrate the divine wisdom with which 
they have been solemnly entrusted by simply not asking the archetypal question of the 
interpreter: “What does this mean?” Even the oracle’s proclamation remains a sequence 
of arbitary signs, without a true speaker and without a true hearer, until this crucial 
question is asked. 
 Now, at this point, it must be admitted that there is an extraordinarily fine line 
separating the nature of Socrates’ voice as I have described it thus far – that is, as a 
conscious, kindyneutic play of impersonations that binds together his dialogic 
interrogation of others with his self-interrogation – and the nature of the voices he hears 
in conversation with the statesman and the poets. No one Socrates encounters – neither 
the statesman, nor the poets, nor (most importantly!) Socrates himself – truly speaks for 
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himself, in his own voice.47
The delicate difference that separates Socrates from his interlocutors, nonetheless, 
takes root in the denial of his own wisdom that was the first fruit of his ethical self-
reflection. In precisely this act of conscience, of standing apart from himself and 
speaking about himself in the voice of another, Socrates discovers that as far as both his 
own wisdom and his own voice are concerned, he has nothing to say for himself:
 Insofar as this is true for all of them alike, none of them has 
any legitimate claim to a wisdom that originates in, and derives its authority from, the 
respective human subject that their voice represents to others through language. Their 
ways of speaking and their ways of life must necessarily remain out of tune with each 
other as long as they believe that, as subjects of speech, they possess their own voices, 
and as subjects of knowledge, they possess their own wisdom – for as long as wisdom is 
something communicable in speech, these must be two sides of the same coin. 
48
πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός 
εἰμι: κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν 
οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι: ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου 
γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. (Pl. Ap. 
21d) 
 he 
only comes to possess his own voice fully when he speaks from the position of another, 
just as he only comes to possess wisdom by denying that he possesses any of it at all. 
And what a difference this difference makes, as we see in his reflections following the 
exchange with the statesman: 
So I withdrew and thought to myself: “I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows 
anything worthwhile [οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν], but he thinks he knows something when he does not 
[οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς], whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know [ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, 
                                                 
47  It is possible to see this characterization of Socrates as an implicit addition to, or even critique of, 
the modern critical problem of “Platonic anonymity,” that is, Plato’s refusal as a writer to speak in his own 
voice, or present his ideas as his own, in his dialogues. For a couple differing assessments of the 
significance of Plato’s anonymity, see Ludwig Edelstein, “Platonic Anonymity” in Smith 1998, 183-200; 
Paul Plass, “Philosophic Anonymity and Irony in the Platonic Dialogues,” op. cit. 201-220. 
48  As Warnek puts it quite neatly: “The singularity of Socrates lies in the fact that he would be 
nothing special at all. And this already intimates his great transgression” (Warnek 2005, 101). 
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οὐδὲ οἴομαι]; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent [σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ, lit. “by this 
small thing”], that I do not think I know what I do not know [ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι].” 
(Cooper/Grube 21) 
This passage marks a vital and striking shift in Socrates’ use of what I have called the 
language of wisdom, and thereby also a crucial refiguration of his elusive voice. Whereas 
the language of his original self-assessment applied a familiar human language in 
negative terms (‘not wise at all’), and the language of the oracle’s assessment of him 
applied an utterly foreign, divine language in superlative terms (‘wisest of all’), suddenly 
Socrates’ negation – quite counterintuitively! – here becomes the basis of a qualitative 
comparison (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου […] σοφώτερος, 21d: “wiser than this man”). How can the 
complete absence of a given quality in a certain entity – i.e., wisdom in Socrates – 
become a positive standard of comparison such that we can say the same quality is 
actually more absent in other entities, e.g. in the statesman? The only solution is to flip 
the script, as Socrates does, and talk about wisdom with a different voice – that is, 
reinterpret the positive character of wisdom as a quality possessed by human beings. 
What matters in his use of comparative terms is no longer relative degrees of presence, 
but rather relative degrees of absence: one cannot be more or less wise, only more or less 
unwise. By virtue of this semantic shift, his language now occupies a point precisely 
halfway between the positive human conception of wisdom and the equally positive, but 
diametrically opposed divine conception. By the same token, his voice now issues from a 
point somewhere between his own understanding and that of the oracular god. 
In Socrates’ process of dialogic interpretation, we have seen how the formation of 
his ethical relation represented an initial interpretive response to himself, and how the 
aporetic confrontation with the oracle represented a definitive counter-response. In terms 
of this process, the partial impersonation of the oracular voice that we witness here, in the 
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guise of Socrates’ shifting vocabulary, represents not so much a grand dialectical 
synthesis, a recovery of ethical self-identity on a higher plane, as it does the moment of 
Socrates’ voluntary entry into a state of suspense. The conversation he has carried on 
with himself, with the oracle, and with his fellow Athenians, has not, as it turns out, 
foreclosed on the meaning of wisdom as such: rather, it has opened this term up, brought 
it into play and put it at risk, in order to renew the promise of its inherent possibilities. 
Nor has this conversation divorced forever the subject of speech from the voice in which 
the subject speaks: it has only prised them apart in order to suggest the multitude of their 
possible relations, the many languages in which it is possible and perhaps even necessary 
to speak. Thus, as a subject who willingly takes risks with language and who consciously 
speaks in many voices at once, Socrates’ ethical self-reflection reacts to the dialogue with 
the statesman with a revised disavowal of knowledge – ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι (21d; 
“I do not think I know what I do not know”) – that functions dialogically as an intense 
positive stimulant for the work of interpretation. Where Socrates’ original disavowal of 
wisdom had a purely ethical origin and endpoint, this disavowal operates on both the 
political and ethical levels. On the one hand, it points an accusing finger at the poverty 
and barrenness of interpretive certainty, by virtue of which so many of his fellow 
Athenians think they already know what they do not know and feel no need to interpret 
further. On the other hand, it offers an open invitation to the relative wealth and fertility 
of interpretive suspense, by virtue of which Socrates enjoys an infinity of places, times, 
and occasions on which to begin thinking and interpreting all over again. If Socrates 
starts from the assumption that he has nothing to say for himself, then everything that can 
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be said, and every voice in which it can be said, stand at his disposal as so many 
dangerous and thrilling possibilities for conversation. 
Not only does Socrates both narrate and perform this kindyneutic opening-up of 
the voice and the subject in the Apology: it is also what leads him directly to the 
interpretation by means of which, at last, he finds a common language with the oracular 
response he originally set out to refute and silence. He now finds himself committed to 
this language – a language conspicuously not his own – as a prophet of an entirely new 
kind, one who impersonates other voices not in order to deny responsibility for them, but 
rather precisely in order to assume responsibility for them, to take up for himself the 
dangerous burden of interpreting them. Measuring the wisdom of the statesmen, poets, 
and craftsmen alike by the new language of ‘comparative absence’ described above, he 
finds that his own non-wisdom constantly falls short of theirs by the absence of the very 
same “small thing” (σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ, 21d) in each case – namely, the belief that 
he is wise. Returning, as it were, to the original conversation with the oracle that had 
been interrupted by the dialogues with his fellow citizens, he asks and answers a new 
question by dialogically occupying both his own position and that of the oracle at once: 
ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, 
μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι 
ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν 
(22e; “so that I asked [ἀνερωτᾶν] myself, on behalf of the oracle [ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ], 
whether I should prefer to be as I am, with neither their wisdom nor their ignorance, or to 
have both. The answer I gave [ἀπεκρινάμην] myself and the oracle was that it was to my 
advantage to be as I am” [Cooper/Grube 22]). Socrates’ partial impersonation of the 
oracle in addressing himself with its voice serves a distinct dialogic purpose in his 
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process of interpretation: it grants interrogative force to the oracle’s original, purely 
declarative statement about Socrates’ wisdom. In short, the baffling “No one is wiser 
than Socrates” gives way to the provocative “Which man is wiser, the one who believes 
he is wise but is not, or the man who neither is wise nor believes he is wise?” Socrates’ 
answer, that the ‘wiser man’ is of the latter kind – his own kind – is inserted equally into 
three conversations: his ethical conversation with himself (ἀπεκρινάμην […] ἐμαυτῷ, “I 
answered myself”); his conversation with the oracle (ἀπεκρινάμην […] τῷ χρησμῷ, “I 
answered the oracle”); and the political conversation with the court, in which the 
narration of this imaginary response itself serves as an implicit response to the 
accusations of his fellow citizens (hypothetically: “in telling you how I answered then, I 
answer you now as well”). Because this threefold answer, however, necessarily adopts 
the oracle’s language of wisdom and changes its addressee from Socrates alone to every 
Athenian present in the court, Socrates de facto makes himself into the same sort of 
ethical and political problem for Athens that the oracle originally became for him: he 
invites others to put themselves at risk at the same time as he puts himself at risk in their 
eyes. And such an invitation – to give up the “small thing” of interpretive certainty and 
enter into the suspense of error, to give up one’s own voice to enter into a dizzying game 
of impersonations – is not easily taken. 
As we have seen, Socrates’ efforts to refute the oracle have paradoxically made 
him into its advocate and its proxy before the entire political body of Athens. Having 
interpreted the oracle’s declaration as a provocative interrogation, and in full awareness 
of the danger in which he now stands as a result, he turns at the end of his narrative to 
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reinterpreting its language as an imperative squarely directed at his own life and the lives 
of his auditors: 
ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι 
καὶ οἷαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, 
ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι: οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν 
εἶναι σοφὸν ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, 
καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν 
καὶ οὐδενός. καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ 
ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴποι ὅτι “οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, 
σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ 
πρὸς σοφίαν.” ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιιὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν καὶ 
τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι: καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ 
βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. (Pl. Ap. 22e-23b) 
As a result of this investigation, men of Athens, I acquired much unpopularity [πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί 
μοι γεγόνασι, lit. “many enmities (apechtheiai) arose against me”], of a kind that is hard to deal with 
and is a heavy burden; many slanders came from these people and a reputation for wisdom [ὄνομα δὲ 
τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι, more lit. “the name of ‘wise man’ came to be spoken (sc. about me)”], for 
in each case the bystanders thought that I myself possessed the wisdom that I proved that my 
interlocutor did not have. What is probable, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise and that his 
oracular response meant that human wisdom [ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία, cf. 20e quoted above] is worth little 
or nothing, and that when he says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as an example [παράδειγμα: 
paradeigma [n.] “pattern, model; precedent, example; lesson, warning” > Eng. paradigm], as if he 
said: “This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is 
worthless [ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν].” So even now I continue this 
investigation as the god bade me [κατὰ τὸν θεὸν] – and I go around seeking out anyone, citizen or 
stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I come to the assistance of the god [τῷ θεῷ 
βοηθῶν] and show him that he is not wise. (Cooper/Grube 22) 
In returning to the question of Socrates’ ‘slanderous’ reputation as a wise man (σοφός), 
the narrative has come full circle to its original point of departure (at 20c-d) in the 
question posed by a hypothetical interlocutor who demands to know what Socrates has 
done to earn the reputation of a sophos if he is not, in fact, a Sophist proper. Where 
Socrates’ carefully qualified claim to human wisdom in that passage provoked an outcry, 
his return to the term sophos here achieves a remarkable ‘plural voicing’ of this key term 
in the two competing languages of wisdom we have seen thus far. 
In the language of Athens, the epithet sophos already speaks with a forked tongue. 
On the one hand, it is applied as a term of buoyant praise to the δοκούντες σοφοὶ εἶναι – a 
phrase that all at once signifies “those who appear to be wise,” “those who think 
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(themselves) to be wise,” and “those who are thought (by others) to be wise” (see 21b, 
quoted above) – among whom are the statesmen, poets, and craftsmen. On the other hand, 
it is applied as a dangerous slander against Socrates, who – in the praise-giving sense of 
the term – neither appears to be wise, nor thinks himself wise, nor is thought by others to 
be wise; instead, he comes to share in the same epithet by appearing to outstrip the 
wisdom of the δοκούντες σοφοὶ εἶναι, distinguishing himself as ‘wiser than the wise’ and 
making himself passionately despised for it. 
In the language of the oracle – a language for which Socrates’ preceding narrative 
now appears as a strange and circuitous vindication – Socrates is indeed a sophos, just as 
he originally claimed at 20c-d, but this title comes to him without any particular charge of 
praise or blame. This is because Socrates’ interrogative reading of the oracle’s statement 
entails that wisdom, as we have seen, can only be attributed to human beings in terms of 
its greater or lesser absence as a quality in them. Following the logical dictates of this 
interpretation, Socrates concludes that the oracle has paradoxically made him the 
exemplary or paradigmatic case of human wisdom as such (παράδειγμα 23b), precisely 
because “he has recognized that he is truly worth nothing in regards to wisdom” (ἔγνωκεν 
ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν, 23b). In place of the purely social function 
of praise or blame, his nomination as a sophos by the oracle bears not only a declarative 
and interrogative significance, but also, as we see now, the imperative force of a divine 
command to Socrates that compels him to bring language and life into confrontation 
through the practice of dialogue. 
In both the human and divine languages of wisdom, then, Socrates both is and is 
not a sophos. By a supreme dialogical paradox, he must deny that he is a sophos in 
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human terms by arguing that he is, in fact, a sophos, but only in Apollo’s terms. In the 
effort to find a common language with both the god and the city, Socrates cannot help but 
‘voice’ the term sophos plurally, speaking all its contradictory meanings at once. His 
paradigmatic interpretation of the oracle, after all, amounts to an injunction to make his 
life and his voice into the arena where all such meanings are dislodged from their 
positions of certainty, pitted against one another, and put at risk: the arena, in short, of 
interpretive conscience. As a result, Socrates puts his very “name” (ὄνομα 23a, b; see also 
Warnek 2005, 65f.) at risk – not only what others call him (‘Socrates, the wise man’?), 
but also what value they give him, how they understand him. Socrates transforms this 
name into an interpretive question for all those who speak it: the kind of question that 
turns the respondent around to meet himself, question himself, and put himself at risk. 
Whenever we try to make sense of Socrates – his ‘name,’ voice, and life – we must also 
make sense of ourselves – our own ‘names,’ voices, and lives – caught up in the 
interminable and dangerous game of making sense. 
 Like Sophocles' Oedipus and Brecht's Galileo, Socrates sets his life and his voice 
before the city as a challenge to their powers of interpretive response: responding to any 
of these figures means making oneself complicit in his duplicitous language, joining him 
on the tightrope suspended between one possible meaning and another, between one 
possible subject and another. In Socrates’ case, however, the inevitable fall from the 
tightrope does not throw the interpreter into an abyss, as it does with Oedipus or Galileo, 
nor does it bring him down softly on the safety net of certainty: the jolting fall from one 
tightrope is simply the first firm step one takes on another. For Socrates, what does 
remain certain and unshakeable lies not in any safety net below, but rather in the drive to 
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travel the length of the rope ahead. The mandate that he reads in the god’s words, the 
command to face down the dangers of thought and the entanglements of conversation, 
wherever they lead, offers him an inviolable refuge from the greater peril of 
thoughtlessness and irresponsibility: the danger in which and from which he lives as a 
philosopher paradoxically offers a greater security than any alternative. This is the 
paradox that binds together the philosopher’s language with his way of life, and, later in 
the Apology, Socrates describes it in terms of the command given to a soldier to stay at 
his post, even and especially when he faces great risks in doing so: 
οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, 
ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο 
μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε 
μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν 
Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ 
ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, 
φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ 
φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. (Pl. Ap. 28d-29a) 
Wherever a man has taken a position [τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ, lit. “stations himself”] that he believes to be best 
[ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι], or has been placed by his commander [ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ], there he must 
I think remain and face danger [μένοντα κινδυνεύειν], without a thought for death or anything else, 
rather than disgrace [πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ]. It would have been a dreadful way to behave, men of Athens, if, 
at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium, I had, at the risk of death [ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν], like anyone 
else, remained at my post where those you had elected to command had ordered me [με (…) ἔταττον, 
“stationed me”] and then, when the god ordered me [τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, lit. “with the god stationing 
(me)”] as I thought and believed [ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον], to live the life of a philosopher, to 
examine myself and others, I had abandoned my post [λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν] through fear of death or 
anything else. (Cooper/Grube 27) 
The risk taken by the philosophical interpreter – in ethics and in politics, in the midst of 
life and in the face of death – does not amount to simply thinking and acting with the 
courage of one’s convictions, regardless of the danger: it means putting at risk both 
oneself in the moment of thought or action and the convictions from which one acts and 
thinks as well. “Wherever a man stations himself […] or is stationed by his commander” 
(οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ […] ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ 28d), he does so without any guarantee of 
safety or certainty except whatever he gains through the exercise of his interpretive 
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conscience with himself and others. Socrates has taken up his own ‘post’ (τάξις 29a 
“post, station” > τάσσω [Attic: τάττω] “to draw up, station, marshal, post”) at a command 
that was given to him as much by himself as by the god: this was possible only after he 
had made the strenuous and still unconsummated effort to hold a conversation with a 
being that cannot finally be known in a language that cannot be fully understood. By 
submitting his life to the dialogic discipline of conscience – that is, in striving to make 
sense of himself and others through the matrix of this unimaginably foreign language – 
he believes to have discovered in and through the practice of dialogue itself an imperative 
that summons both language and life to confrontation. And while this belief is grounded 
in a voice and source that Socrates takes to be divine, he has arrived at this belief not by 
any unimpeachable, direct revelation but by his own faculty to make sense, to weigh 
appearances, and to judge. He speaks this belief, at last, in his own voice: Socrates does 
not say that the god gave him this ‘post’ in no uncertain terms; rather, he only says he 
“thought and believed” (ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον 28e) this to be the god’s meaning, 
using two words for subjective belief (οἴομαι and ὑπολαμβάνω) that freely admit a great 
deal of uncertainty. Death, after all, is not the real danger that faces Socrates at this 
moment, at least not according to his own lights: it is far worse to fall victim to the 
“disgrace” (τὸ αἰσχρόν 28d)49
                                                 
49  For reasons of space, I cannot do full justice here to Socrates’ comparison of himself to Achilles 
in 28b-28d, which precedes the passage on taxis in 28d-29a and sets its heavily-charged cultural 
background. See Angela Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good (New 
York: Cambridge UP, 2000), 178-186, for an excellent discussion of this passage that pays careful attention 
to the Homeric allusion that gives Socrates’ military language a broader context. 
 of betraying whatever concord between language and life 
he has achieved through his own powers of interpretation, however erroneous or 
discordant they may prove to be in the very next turn of the conversation, the very next 
change in the music. 
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 To speak of the “voice of conscience” is to invoke a dead metaphor, but with 
Socrates, the metaphor is not only very much alive, it is the crucial metaphor of the 
philosopher’s ethical and political practice of interpretation. If the reading I have offered 
here has tried to give a new voice to a metaphor that has long since lost its voice, by the 
same token I am trying to give a new voice to Socrates himself – and the attempt to do 
this, in the end, marks the point at which I think the properly spiritual dimension of 
Plato’s language once again stakes its claim in the present. The ethical function of the 
Socratic voice, as we have seen, is to be the conscience of its subject, to allow this subject 
to carry on a conversation with itself in itself, and so to become the medium of the 
subject’s self-reflection; the political function of this voice is to be the conscience of its 
auditors, to offer them a medium of reflection in which they hear the many different 
voices that echo within their own, and so to bring those voices into conversation within 
them as well. If Socrates is, as I have tried to show here, a virtuoso impersonator of 
voices, every interpretation of Socrates that meets him on his own terms is an attempt to 
impersonate the impersonator, to add yet another voice to the murmuring crowd of voices 
that issue forth from him already. When we make this attempt, what happens – with a 
remarkable and jolting turn in logic – is that we discover Socrates impersonating our 
voices back at us, reading us, just as much as we are impersonating his voice back at him 
in the act of reading him. The spiritual turn, the properly kindyneutic turn, in this process 
of reading and being read by Socrates arrives when we find ourselves called upon by 
Socrates – as he himself was called upon by the oracle – to impersonate ourselves, 
speaking what we only just now thought to be our own language in our own voices, back 
to ourselves. It is at that moment that one fully enters the spiritual game of interpretation, 
293 
and takes on the impossible task of making oneself, like Socrates, into a “real fake”: 
giving life back to one’s own dead language in another and bringing another’s dead 
language back to life in oneself. That is the moment of the greatest danger – and of the 
greatest pleasure – in the life of the interpreter. 
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A STRANGE NEW FORM OF LIFE: 
THINKING, ACTING, AND ENDANGERMENT 
IN THE THOUGHT OF HANNAH ARENDT 
 
1. Taking Responsibility for Past and Future: The Task of Thinking and the End of 
Tradition 
 
Each new generation, every new human being, as he becomes conscious of being inserted between an 
infinite past and an infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave anew the path of thought. And it 
is after all possible, and seems to me likely, that the strange survival of great works, their relative 
permanence throughout thousands of years, is due to their having been born in the small, 
inconspicuous track of non-time which their authors’ thought had beaten between an infinite past and 
an infinite future by accepting past and future as directed, aimed, as it were, at themselves – as their 
predecessors and successors, their past and their future – thus establishing a present for themselves, a 
kind of timeless time in which men are able to create timeless works with which to transcend their own 
finiteness. This timelessness, to be sure, is not eternity; it springs, as it were, from the clash of past and 
future, whereas eternity […] indicates the collapse of all temporal dimensions. The temporal 
dimension of […] the act ivity of thinking gathers the absent tenses, the not-yet and the no-more, 
together into its own presence. 
 
      – Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind1
 
 
As we embark upon the last portion of this project, it only seems fitting to begin by 
considering that each of the writers and thinkers I have dealt with here, each with his 
distinct role in the genealogy of interpretation, also finds an unlikely common ground 
with the others in the attitude towards past and future defined in this passage by Arendt. 
In order for the activity of interpretation to become questionable to the one who 
interprets, and, indeed, in order for the interpreter to become questionable to himself, he 
must open his ears to the questions addressed to him by both the past and the future – 
                                                 
1  Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 210-211; 
hereafter LM. 
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questions that are determined from either side by his inhabiting this singular present and 
no other.  To think about interpretation in Arendt’s terms means allowing oneself this 
experience of address in the midst of time, the experience of being called upon to answer 
by a living process of thought that far exceeds the limits of one’s own life, preceding 
one’s birth and outlasting one’s death. In heeding this call to think and interpret, the one 
who thinks achieves a supremely paradoxical feat: on the one hand, she acknowledges the 
peculiar finitude of her own concrete existence – peculiar because birth and death simply 
limit the living and thinking done by a human being without necessarily completing 
them. On the other hand, she claims for herself, as the authentic past and future of her 
own present life, the life of the conversation in which she participates, into which she 
inserts and reveals her own irreplaceable self through word and deed. In acknowledging 
the condition of finitude that circumscribes thought and interpretation, the thinker 
actively overcomes it for as long as she persists in thinking and interpreting; moreover, 
she also takes responsibility, in the broadest sense of this word, for the world she thinks 
about and interprets. 
Insofar as thinking for oneself and educating others are two sides of the same 
coin, we can thus say with Arendt – as she writes in her 1961 essay “The Crisis in 
Education” – that interpretation, like education, represents “the point at which we decide 
whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility for it and by the same token 
save it from that ruin which, except for renewal, except for the coming of the new and 
young, would be inevitable.”2
                                                 
2  Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006), 193; hereafter 
BPF. 
 The complementary tasks of interpreting and educating, of 
making meaning and talking about meaning, are thus deeply rooted in the human 
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condition of finitude and the interpretive condition of responsibility. In responding to the 
world with the full measure of her being, the thinker responds to others and herself on its 
behalf, transforming her own present, finite life as a thinking being into the arena where 
the infinite forces of both past and future confront and contest one another, and where the 
thinker herself becomes in turn participant and referee in the struggle.3
The curious bond between the finitude of the one who thinks and the infinity of 
the thinking process itself
 In short, the life 
of the individual thinker or interpreter offers itself up as the scene for the life of 
interpretation par excellence, the life that “gathers the absent tenses, the not-yet and the 
no-more, together into its own presence” not in order to escape from lived time into 
eternal time, but rather to receive fully the double address of past and future in the 
present moment of life. 
4
                                                 
3  Here I am making a somewhat elliptical reference to the parable of Kafka which so intrigued 
Arendt that she devoted two different and provocative commentaries on it in both BPF (7-15) and LM (202-
213, where it is combined with a discussion of a passage from Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra, Part 
III, Section 2, “On the Vision and the Riddle”). Kafka’s text runs as follows in the English translation used 
by Arendt: “He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind, from the origin. The second blocks 
the road ahead. He gives battle to both. To be sure, the first supports him in his fight with the second, for he 
wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the first, since he 
drives him back. But it is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but he 
himself as well, and who really knows his intentions? His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded 
moment – and this would require a night darker than any night has ever been yet – he will jump out of the 
fighting line and be promoted, on account of his experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his 
antagonists in their fight with each other.” German text: Franz Kafka, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. V (New 
York, 1946), 287; English translation: Kafka, The Great Wall of China, trans. Willa & Edwin Muir (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1946), 276f.; cited in BPF 7 and LM 202 (with Arendt’s emended translations in 
both cases). 
 finds ironic expression for Arendt in the surprising durability, 
4  Arendt’s conception of the thinking activity as inherently infinite demands some clarification 
here, although it will not concern us much in the following discussion. In the context of the clash between 
past and future that figures so prominently in her description of the thinking-activity in the preface of BPF 
and the closing chapters of LM, Arendt explains this infinity most succinctly in the latter text, where it 
arises from a sort of calculus of forces: “The two antagonistic forces of past and future are both indefinite 
as to their origin; seen from the viewpoint of the present in the middle, the one comes from an infinite past 
and the other from an infinite future. But though they have no known beginning, they have a terminal 
ending, the point at which they meet and clash, which is the present. [The movement of thinking in the 
present], on the contrary, has a definite origin, its starting-point being the clash of the two other forces, but 
it would be infinite with respect to its ending since it has resulted from the concerted action of two forces 
whose origin is infinity. This […] force, whose origin is known, whose direction is determined by past and 
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the “strange survival” of the works of thinking through the eons of time: it is as if the 
resolutely and incorrigibly present character of all thinking, its humble plodding up and 
down in the narrow gap between past and future, paradoxically conquered for the thinker 
the broad empires of time that press in upon it on both sides. Only by constantly staking 
anew her claim over the tiniest sliver of time in the present can the thinker-interpreter lay 
claim to all time, can the life she lives in thinking gain the permanence that remains 
denied to her given, literal life because her thinking takes root in a past before her birth 
and a future after her death. The representatives of both the tragic and the philosophical 
traditions whom we have examined so far thus share not only the peculiar experience of 
address that Arendt describes, but also the desire for a life that exists beyond life as a 
mere given. In so many different ways, each of them says: Only by responding to the 
present world as it is given to us, by thinking about and interpreting this world, do we 
take responsibility for ourselves and for it; similarly, only by assuming the risks and 
complicities entailed by this responsibility do we gain some measure of a life that does 
not stand secure and sovereign over the paltry domain of its own concerns, but rather 
ranges freely over and beyond itself in time and in thought, in freedom and in danger – a 
life that finds its true home only when it stands outside its own bounds. Insofar as the act 
of interpretation takes responsibility for its own past and future – that is, its own 
prehistory and afterlife in the interpretive conversation – as well as the past and future of 
its object, it willfully imposes the radical finitude of meaning on the infinities of time, 
space, and matter, constantly aware that it risks error and disaster in this violent 
imposition. Only with the courage to accept past and future as “aimed” and “directed” at 
                                                                                                                                                 
future, but which exerts its force toward an undetermined end as though it could reach out into infinity, 
seems to me a perfect metaphor for the activity of thought” (LM 209). 
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herself, and with the patience to tread the winding paths of meaning in the present, 
wherever they lead, can Arendt’s thinker take possession of time, and of life, through 
thought. 
By rearticulating the thinking ego’s experience of time, whereby the forces of past 
and future meet and oppose one another in the present rather than following one another 
in linear succession, Arendt forges a conception of the thinker’s or interpreter’s task that 
is uniquely modern and thus resolutely post-traditional in temperament. First and 
foremost, she dispels the notion that we are still the direct inheritors of an illuminating 
tradition that binds past, present, and future in an unbroken chain.5
                                                 
5  In terms of the history of philosophy in general and of political thought in particular, Arendt 
argues that the Western tradition came to an end in the writings of Karl Marx: “The beginning [of the 
tradition] was made when […] Plato described the sphere of human affairs – all that belongs to the living 
together of men in a common world – in terms of darkness, confusion, and deception which those aspiring 
to true being must turn away from and abandon if they want to discover the clear sky of eternal ideas. The 
end came with Marx’s declaration that philosophy and its truth are located not outside the affairs of men 
and their common world but precisely in them, and can be ‘realized’ only in the sphere of living together 
[…]. The end came when a philosopher turned away from philosophy so as to ‘realize’ it in politics” 
(“Tradition and the Modern Age,” BPF 17). She makes parallel claims in this essay – a crucial text for 
understanding what tradition means to Arendt – for the end of traditional religion in the thought of 
Kierkegaard and the end of traditional metaphysics in the thought of Nietzsche. In terms of concrete 
political and historical reality, on the other hand, Arendt argues elsewhere, and with great pathos, that the 
end of the Western tradition became a fait accompli with the emergence of the totalitarian regimes. As she 
writes, “We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply call it our heritage, to 
discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The 
subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface [in the shape of totalitarianism] and 
usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in which we live. And this is why all efforts to 
escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion 
of a better future, are vain.” Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1973), ix; quoted in Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt 
(London: Routledge, 1994), 30. See also Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996), 8-10. For a cogent recent treatment of Arendt’s 
conceptual narrative concerning tradition in modernity, see Dana Villa, “Totalitarianism, Modernity, and 
Tradition,” in: Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999), 180-203; for an approach grounded in Arendt’s intellectual and 
personal influences in Germany before and after the Second World War, see Antonia Grunenberg, “Arendt, 
Heidegger, Jaspers: Thinking Through the Breach in Tradition,” Social Research 74.4 (2007): 1003-1028. 
Arendt is quite emphatic, furthermore, in both “Tradition and the Modern Age” and elsewhere that the end 
of the Western tradition as a historical fact was not ‘caused’ in some sense by the critique and inversion of 
that tradition in the work of Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche – as if a straight line connected these three 
 Indeed, according to 
her, dwelling within such a tradition guarantees the present’s possession of the past and 
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future by default – a possession that makes demands on the present, to be sure, but 
entirely different in kind from those imposed by the precarious and circuitous process of 
genuine thinking. As eternal and transcendent life is related to time-bound and contingent 
living, so tradition is related to the thinker who exists within it: in each case, the former 
constitutes the source and prerequisite of the latter, and the proper function of the thinker 
is to reveal the unchanging truth of her tradition under the changing guise of her moment. 
Thinking within a tradition preserves and augments the renewed life that the thinker has 
received from it as much as the renewed life it has received from her. A perfect symmetry 
governs their relation: the one who thinks preserves the life of what comes down to her 
from the past, retrieves it from oblivion in the present, and renews it for the future, and 
that which is preserved by thinking does the same for the life of the thinker.6
Arendt, on the contrary, repeatedly asserts that amidst the unprecedented events 
of the modern world, the guiding thread of tradition has been effectively frayed and 
broken, its living force extinguished; that the traditional questions and answers by means 
of which Western culture, at least since Roman antiquity,
 
7
                                                                                                                                                 
men to the Nazi death camps or the Stalinist gulag. See section 4 below for a discussion of “Understanding 
and Politics,” a crucial text in Arendt’s argument that totalitarianism marked the end of tradition. 
 has understood its 
6  This formulation of the relationship of the individual to a living tradition freely combines and 
condenses Arendt’s description of the Roman concept of tradition as informed by authority (auctoritas) and 
the appropriation and modification of the this concept by the early Catholic church (see in particular section 
IV of “What Is Authority?”, BPF 120-128). 
7  Arendt’s striking and provocative commentaries on the specifically Roman invention of what we 
now call tradition emerge in sharpest relief in the manuscripts recently edited by Jerome Kohn and 
published as The Promise of Politics. In “The Tradition of Political Thought,” Arendt writes: “Our 
tradition, properly speaking, begins with the Roman acceptance of Greek philosophy as the unquestionable, 
authoritative binding foundation of thought, which made it impossible for Rome to develop a philosophy, 
even a political philosophy, and therefore left its own specifically political experience without adequate 
interpretation […] Plato, to be sure, was not aware that tradition, whose chief function it is to give answers 
to all questions by channeling them into predetermined categories, could ever threaten the existence of 
philosophy. […] Plato’s violent treatment of Homer, who at the time had been considered the ‘educator of 
all Hellas’ for centuries, is for us still the most magnificent sign of a culture aware of its past without any 
sense of the binding authority of tradition. Anything even remotely resembling this is quite inconceivable 
in Roman literature.” Arendt, “The Tradition of Political Thought,” The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome 
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philosophical and political experiences have lost their validity. As for Nietzsche, whose 
words she often quoted in this connection, both the originary, transcendent sphere to 
which the tradition belonged and the immanent realm in which the interpreter of the 
tradition moved have been abolished by one and the same stroke: “We abolished the true 
world: which world has remained? perhaps the world of appearances? … But no! 
together with the true world we abolished the world of appearances.”8
[T]hese two temporalities concern each other, mutually relate to each other. We feel that interpretation 
has a history and that this history is a segment of tradition itself. Interpretation does not spring from 
nowhere; rather, one interprets in order to make explicit, to extend, and so to keep alive the tradition 
itself, inside which one always remains. It is in this sense that the time of interpretation belongs in 
some way to the time of tradition. But tradition in return, even understood as the transmission of a 
depositum, remains a dead tradition if it is not the conceptual interpretation of this deposit: our 
‘heritage’ is not a sealed package we pass from hand to hand, without ever opening, but rather a 
treasure from which we draw by the handful and which by this very act is replenished. Every tradition 
lives by grace of interpretation, and it is at this price that it continues, that is, remains living.
 In this respect, 
Arendt’s conception of the relationship between tradition and the modern age stands 
diametrically opposed to that of a thinker like Paul Ricoeur, in whose essay “Structure 
and Hermeneutics” the temporal structure of interpretation is characterized by the 
incorporation of what Ricoeur calls “the time of interpretation,” or the lived temporality 
of sense-making, into “the time of transmission,” or the historical continuity of the 
tradition: 
9
Ricoeur’s “treasure,” passed hand-to-hand from the past to the future via the present, 
conspicuously resembles the divine gift of transcendent grace, “from which we draw by 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 54f. For a pathbreaking study of the still-underestimated 
Roman influence on Arendt’s thought, see Dean Hammer, “Hannah Arendt and Roman Political Thought,” 
Political Theory 30.1 (2002): 124-149.  
8  Friedrich Nietzsche, Götzendämmerung, in: Werke, Vol. 2, ed. Karl Schlechta (München: C. 
Hanser, 1954-56), 963; cited in BPF 30. Arendt cites the passage again, in a different context, and using 
another translation, at LM 11. 
9  Paul Ricoeur, “Structure and Hermeneutics,” in: The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in 
Hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 27. Insofar as 
Ricoeur is speaking from and to a specifically structuralist standpoint in this and other works, it is worth 
considering to what extent structuralist and even post-structuralist critical vocabularies, which still largely 
307 
the handful and which by this very act is replenished.” On the other hand, the gift of 
transcendent life bestowed by tradition wholly depends upon and is reproduced by the 
continuous resurrection of tradition in the immanent present of interpretation: “Every 
tradition lives by grace of interpretation, and it is at this price that it […] remains living” 
(emphasis mine). In order to integrate these two temporal perspectives, Ricoeur forges a 
third temporality, “the time of meaning itself,” in which the vital intersection between 
traditional-transcendent and interpretive-immanent time “would permit the struggle 
between these two temporalities, one transmitting, the other renewing” (Ricoeur 28). 
Even pending this dialectical resolution, however, the life of the tradition in the 
immanent world for Ricoeur inhabits and is bound to a temporality of linear succession: 
the present is solely responsible to the past, and the future merely offers the empty, 
homogeneous medium in which the consequences that follow upon the present’s response 
appear and play themselves out. 
For Arendt, what distinguishes the problem of thinking or interpretation in the 
modern world, after the end of tradition, is twofold. First, we face the ubiquitous danger 
of losing the depth of meaning normally granted by a past that we now encounter as 
something alien and uncertain, incapable of guiding us in the activity of thought. For 
Arendt, the coin in which Ricoeur’s treasure of the past is minted, as it were, finds its 
value irrevocably debased by the turnings of modern history. The language we receive 
from the tradition has suddenly grown opaque and obscure, and our experience becomes 
even more alien and impenetrable than it was before we tried to make sense of it. In 
effect, the modern break with tradition threatens to devolve into a state of affairs where 
                                                                                                                                                 
operate in the tension between structure and event, have to gain from Arendt’s phenomenological 
description of the temporality of thought, which is by no means clearly reducible to this dichotomy. 
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“thought and reality have parted company, […] reality has become opaque for the light of 
thought, and […] thought, no longer bound to incident as the circle remains bound to its 
focus, is liable either to become altogether meaningless or to rehash old verities which 
have lost all concrete relevance” (BPF 6).10 By the very same loss of tradition, however, 
we face an equally ubiquitous opportunity to approach, grasp, and reawaken that past in 
ways that have never been attempted before precisely because they were rendered 
impossible by a tradition that set boundaries to the possible meanings of the past even as 
it kept that past alive.11
looks like a field of ruins which, far from being able to claim any authority, can hardly command their 
interest. This fact may be deplorable, but implicit in it is the great chance to look upon the past with 
eyes undistracted by any tradition, with a directness which has disappeared from Occidental reading 
and hearing ever since Roman civilization submitted to the authority of Greek thought (BPF 28, 
emphasis mine; see also LM 212). 
 “To most people today,” Arendt writes, the tradition of Western 
culture 
Historically, intellectually, and experientially, we exist after the effective end of the 
tradition that still gives us the language, the distinctions, and the values we use every day 
to interpret a world that may indeed have already rendered our methods of interpretation 
obsolete, erroneous, and dangerous. If we depend upon this tradition to give a meaning 
and a life to our experiences over and above their immediate present, we will render them 
                                                 
10  See also the “Prologue” to Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), 1-6; hereafter HC. In the “Prologue” to HC, Arendt formulates the earth-alienation of 
the modern scientific worldview in terms of the radical split between experimental-technological doing and 
verbal-conceptual thinking: “The ‘truths’ of the modern scientific world-view, though they can be 
demonstrated in mathematical formulas and proved technologically, will no longer lend themselves to 
normal expression in speech and thought” (HC 3). The mutual alienation of action and thought in scientific 
rationality – the prime symptom of which for Arendt was the invention of the atomic bomb – represents on 
the stage of contemporary history the same state of affairs that the mutual alienation of traditional 
categories and real experience represents in the realm of philosophical and political reflection. 
11  Elisabeth Young-Bruehl notes the same ‘positive duplicity’ with which Arendt characterized the 
demolition of the Western tradition: “The breakdown of tradition which Hannah Arendt viewed, in political 
terms, as the decline and fall of the nation-state and, in social terms, as the rise of mass society, she 
experienced, in spiritual terms, as the spread of nihilism. Fully aware of the political and social dangers of 
nihilism, she was also aware that nihilism can have as its correlate – though it is very rare – free thought, 
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stillborn. Nonetheless, for Arendt, it is precisely by bringing oneself to face the error and 
obsolescence of the traditional categories, by directly confronting a worldly reality that 
defies timeworn metaphors and bars the usual paths of approach, that the one who thinks 
can prepare herself for the dangerous, burdensome, but quintessentially human task of 
beginning something new. For Arendt, the new beginning achieved in thought, 
furthermore, demands a retrospective as well as a prospective dimension; as Maurizio 
Passerin d'Entrèves writes, “To re-establish a linkage with the past is not, for Arendt, an 
antiquarian exercise; on the contrary, without the critical reappropriation of the past our 
temporal horizon becomes disrupted, our experience precarious, and our identity less and 
less secure.”12
                                                                                                                                                 
the ‘beaten pathways of thought’ having been swept away, dynamited.” Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, “Hannah 
Arendt's Storytelling,” Social Research 44.1 (1977): 187. 
 Reckoning with the aporias of our tradition, the aporias of our own 
language, in the confrontation with modern experience demands that we face past and 
12  Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves, “Modernity and the Human Condition: Hannah Arendt's 
Conception of Modernity,” Thesis Eleven 30 (1991): 78; see 76-80 for an excellent discussion of the 
influence of Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin on Arendt’s idea of a critical re-appropriation of the 
past outside the framework of any tradition, and also a defense of the apparent “hermeneutic naiveté” of 
such re-appropriation (80). Similarly, Sheldon Wolin argues that “theorizing was conceived [by Arendt] as 
an act of recovery, of reacquiring lost meanings, of remembering. She did not intend theorizing to be an 
archaeology, an excavation of lifeless political remains; but a mode of re-flection and in-sight which 
carried the mind back to a privileged moment in the history of politics when the genuinely political […] 
was embodied for the first time.” Sheldon Wolin, “Hannah Arendt and the Ordinance of Time,” Social 
Research 44.1 (1977): 96. Similar perspectives on the question of tradition are echoed throughout the 
whole history of scholarship on Arendt; see also Stan Spyros Draenos, “Thinking Without A Ground: 
Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Situation of Understanding,” in: Hannah Arendt, the Recovery of the 
Public World, ed. Melvyn A Hill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 218f. & 221; Jean Yarbrough and 
Peter Stern, “Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa: Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Political Thought in The 
Life of the Mind,” The Review of Politics 43.3 (1981): 328; Elizabeth Minnich, “Thinking with Hannah 
Arendt: An Introduction,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10.2 (2002): 125; Dana Villa, 
“Arendt, Heidegger, and the Tradition,” Social Research 74.4 (2007): 983-1002. In a significant departure 
from the line of thinking I present here, however, Villa argues specifically against assimilating the gesture 
of re-appropriation to dialogue (à la Gadamer) in Arendt’s thought. For Villa, the chief issue in Arendt’s 
thought is not that we have forgotten the content of the tradition and need to reinitiate conversation with it; 
rather, “the tradition itself is the primary form of forgetfulness, essentially a reification” (Arendt and 
Heidegger, 10, emphasis in original). 
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future alike with the “undistracted” eyes of which Arendt writes.13
 
 To invoke again the 
image with which I closed the preceding chapter: it is only by facing the fact that we 
already speak a dead language that we can begin to give it a new life. 
2. Thinking, Acting, Life: Socrates “Made Beautiful and New” 
The connection Arendt draws between, on the one hand, the end of tradition that 
marked the beginning of the modern world, and, on the other, the peculiar urgency gained 
by questions of interpretation as a result, is not all that earns her a distinctive and 
significant place in the genealogy of interpretive risk and responsibility. In the discussion 
presented by this final chapter, I want to examine the force which at one time gave 
continuous historical form to the tradition of which Arendt speaks, but which now can 
only be revived briefly, in exceptional and decisive moments. In Arendt’s thought, this 
                                                 
13  Arendt’s approach to the tradition as a mass of fragments, each as potentially illuminating of 
contemporary experience as it is potentially obfuscating, indirectly depends upon the thought of Walter 
Benjamin and, further afield but no less palpably, the artistic practice of Bertolt Brecht. Brecht’s concept of 
gestus, in fact, especially as we have considered it in Chapter 2, fragments the naturalized and reified 
continuities of dramatic action in a way precisely parallel to Arendt’s fragmentation and interrogative 
reconstruction of the philosophical tradition. The similarity of approach has both historical, biographical, 
and intellectual resonances, as Arendt belonged to the prewar German intellectual and artistic circles in 
which both Benjamin and Brecht moved. Arendt knew Benjamin personally, and was interested enough in 
the life and work of both Benjamin and Brecht to devote significant essays to each of them: “Walter 
Benjamin: 1892-1940” and “Bertolt Brecht: 1898-1956,” in: Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: 
Harcourt Brace & Co., 1968), 153-206 and 207-249. Seyla Benhabib forcefully brings out the parallels 
between Arendt’s and Benjamin’s treatment of historical temporality, inviting a further extension to 
Brecht’s dramaturgy: “The very structure of traditional historical narration, couched as it is in 
chronological sequence and the logic of precedence and succession, serves to preserve what has happened 
by making it seem inevitable, necessary, plausible, understandable, and in short justifiable. Nothing seemed 
more abhorrent to Arendt than the dictum that die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht […]. Her response to 
this dilemma was the same as Walter Benjamin's: to break the chain of narrative continuity, to shatter 
chronology as the natural structure of narrative, to stress fragmentariness, historical dead ends, failures and 
ruptures. Not only does this method of fragmentary historiography do justice to the memory of the dead by 
telling the story of history in terms of their failed hopes and efforts, but it is also a way of preserving the 
past without being enslaved by it […].” Seyla Benhabib, “Hannah Arendt and the Redemptive Power of 
Narrative,” Social Research 57.1 (1990): 181f.; see also Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves, The Political 
Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London: Routledge, 1994), 4f. We can extend Benhabib’s point here by 
saying that Arendt’s treatment of the reified continuity of the philosophical tradition is closely allied to the 
way Benjamin treated the reified continuity of historical time and the way Brecht treated the reified 
continuity of dramatic representation: each shattered the monolithic, univocal surface of the object before 
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force is none other than the life of interpretation as such – both the mode of life it dictates 
for those who interpret and the figurative life interpretation possesses by itself as a 
‘doing’ over and above its doers. Of course, this idea of a distinctive life of interpretation 
was first raised in my reading of the Apology, and it gains a powerful, if idiosyncratic, 
significance for modern philosophical and political experience in Arendt’s work. 
Furthermore, the relationship between thinking and life articulated in her writing is 
exactly what compels her (perhaps ironically) to rediscover and resurrect Socrates, that 
paradigmatic origin of the Western tradition of philosophical thought, as a model thinker, 
precisely because his historical position before the formation of the tradition as such 
strangely mirrors our own position after its definitive end. As Dana Villa has acutely 
observed, Arendt defines our contemporary situation as “weirdly parallel to the one 
Socrates confronted in fifth-century (BCE) Athens. There, too, traditional morality had 
fragmented or been hollowed out, [yet] the way out of this situation, for Arendt as well as 
Socrates, is no return to a shattered tradition, nor a simple call to action, but a radical 
questioning of all the old ‘yardsticks’ for action and judgment.”14
knew that she lived in […] times in which a long tradition had unraveled and scattered in a vast mental 
diaspora to the ends of the memories of men. But she viewed this rupture as a sign that the threads, the 
thought fragments, were to be gathered, freely and in such a way as to protect freedom, and made into 
something new, dynamic, and illuminating. […] When the past is not transmitted as tradition, it can be 
freely appropriated; and when such free appropriation presents itself historically, it becomes the 
occasion for dialogue (Young-Bruehl 1977, 183, emphasis mine). 
 Furthermore, as 
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl notes, such interrogation must necessarily take on the same form 
for us as it did for Socrates: that of a dialogue between equals. Arendt 
What appears to the overhasty reader of Arendt’s reception of Socrates, then, to be 
merely another conservative effort to reassert the authority of a classical origin over a 
                                                                                                                                                 
them in order to bring to the surface the contradictions, multiple voices, failed efforts, and suppressed 
experiences that moved in its depths.  
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confusing and uncertain modernity actually turns out to be something at once more 
rigorous and more subversive. As I hope to show, Arendt does not rehabilitate Socrates as 
the guardian of a tradition to be reclaimed, reconstructed, and revered from a comfortable 
distance, but instead greets him as a formidable contemporary of the deconstructive and 
post-metaphysical temperament of the modern world – what we would call, in the terms 
of this project, its condition of heightened interpretive risk and responsibility. In short, 
Arendt finds in Socrates the embodiment of a life of interpretation that does not depend 
upon a living tradition, the embodiment of what we have characterized here as the 
kindyneutic nature of thinking in extremis: for Arendt, Socrates’ thinking submits to the 
condition of risk, enters upon the suspense of error, in order to realize a form of life 
through the endangerment of life. In Arendt’s thought, as John McGowan writes, “not 
only does [Socrates’] example flesh out more of what thinking entails than a more 
abstract description could, but […] it offers an image of a possible life that we might 
wish not so much to emulate as to be worthy of.” Socrates, McGowan concludes, 
“embodies another standard, another way of being in the world, against which we can 
judge our own lives.”15
By stressing the groundless, interminable, and kindyneutic characteristics of 
thinking, furthermore, Arendt does not merely retrieve an explicitly Socratic model of 
“the soundless dialogue between me and myself” (LM 31 inter alia) for the life of 
interpretation alone. By defining the life of interpretation qua life, she also (perhaps 
unwittingly) forges a link between thinking and acting by explicitly defining both 
activities as complementary variations on a common form of life. This will sound at first 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
14  Villa, “Thinking and Judging,” in: Politics, Philosophy, Terror, 100. 
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as if I were merely reiterating the distinction between the vita contemplativa and the vita 
activa that maps the path of Arendt’s thought after The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1951),16
As far as the separation of active and contemplative forms of life is concerned, 
Arendt consistently, and with good reason, retains a robust distinction between thinking 
and acting throughout her work – albeit one that has confused and frustrated many of her 
scholarly commentators.
 or as if I want to relocate Arendt into the tradition of “life-philosophy” 
(Lebensphilosophie) represented by figures such as Bergson and Nietzsche. I believe, 
however, that Arendt’s language of life points towards a deeper, stranger, richer 
homology shared by thinking and acting than either such argument could bring out. In the 
contexts I will explore here, Arendt’s ‘life’ surpasses the premodern distinction between 
action and contemplation and stands diametrically opposed to the vitalistic life-force of 
the much more recent Lebensphilosophie tradition. 
17
                                                                                                                                                 
15  John McGowan, Hannah Arendt: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998), 141. 
 “It is difficult to imagine,” writes Jerome Kohn, 
16  Although this scheme organizes Arendt’s oeuvre around the (allegedly) opposite poles 
represented by HC and LM – at the obvious expense of the interceding work, which includes On 
Revolution, Eichmann in Jerusalem, and her voluminous essays and articles – the developmental approach 
to her thought in terms of early-political and late-philosophical periods has hardened into something of a 
commonplace since it first appeared in scholarly discourse in the late 1970s and early 80s; see, for instance, 
Yarbrough & Stern, passim, and Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, “Reflections on Hannah Arendt's Life of the 
Mind,” Political Theory 10.2 (1982): 277-305. I would not categorically disagree with alternate 
periodizations of her oeuvre, such as that of Hans Jonas, who quite early on proposed an alternative view 
on Arendt’s changing viewpoint and range of concerns: “What [Arendt] comprised under The Life of the 
Mind went beyond the vita contemplativa which she originally thought to oppose to the vita activa of the 
earlier work. Only ‘Thinking’ would come under the head of contemplation, surely not ‘Willing’ and 
‘Judging.’ Indeed, the new twist which Hannah Arendt gives to the classical polarity of the active and the 
contemplative life, of the practical and the theoretical, is its substitution by the not unrelated but 
significantly different and characteristically modern polarity of man in the plural and man in the singular, 
or man in the world and man with himself.” Hans Jonas, “Acting, Knowing, Thinking: Gleanings from 
Hannah Arendt's Philosophical Work,” Social Research 44.1 (1977): 28. I would only argue, pace Jonas, 
that it is by no means so simple to align Arendt’s earlier work with ‘man in the plural’ and the later with 
‘man in the singular,’ since even in the conception Arendt proposes in LM, thinking requires a certain 
experience of plurality. 
17  While her writing and thinking most often took the firmness of this distinction as a matter of 
course, Arendt was provoked to assert it directly – and rather piquantly – in her remarks at a conference 
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the distinction between the activities of thinking and acting more sharply drawn than it is by Arendt. It 
is not a question of two ways of life, an old story, or of the relation between theory and practice, a 
modern variant. It is rather that the two experiences have nothing in common: doing something in the 
world that is irrevocable, and doing ‘nothing’ in the world, in fact ‘undoing’ the thought trains that 
have been followed as soon as the thinking process ceases.18
The melancholy incredulity that tempers Kohn’s partisanship of Arendtian categories 
here sets the tone for most scholars in discussing this dimension of her thought: either 
they want to recruit Arendt in elevating the activity of theorizing about politics to the 
level of active political engagement;
 
19 or they want to take Arendt to task for repudiating 
the motivation of political action by an instrumental rationality of means and ends 
without elaborating a transparent alternative account of the relationship between action 
and thought;20
                                                                                                                                                 
dedicated to her work not long before her death. The failure to maintain the distinction, as she claims in the 
sequel, and the privileging of action over thought – whether action is called ‘engagement,’ ‘commitment,’ 
‘opposition,’ or ‘resistance’ – accounts for the constitutionally bad conscience of politically-minded 
intellectuals in the modern age: “Now I will admit one thing. I will admit that I am, of course, primarily 
interested in understanding. This is absolutely true. And I will admit that there are people who are primarily 
interested in doing something. I am not. I can very well live without doing anything. But I cannot live 
without trying at least to understand whatever happens. […] You know, all the modern philosophers have 
somewhere in their work a rather apologetic sentence which says, ‘Thinking is also acting.’ Oh no, it is not! 
And to say that is rather dishonest. I mean, let’s face the music: it is not the same! […] The unwillingness 
of people who actually are thinking and are theorists to own up to this, and to believe that [thinking] is 
worthwhile, and who believe instead that only commitment and engagement is worthwhile, is perhaps one 
of the reasons why this whole discipline is not always in such very good shape. People apparently don't 
believe in what they are doing.” Hannah Arendt, “On Hannah Arendt,” in: Hill, 303, 304, 309. For a broad 
but extraordinarily incisive overview of Arendt’s reception in journalistic, philosophical, and academic 
circles up to the mid-1990’s, see Craig J. Calhoun and John McGowan, “Introduction: Hannah Arendt and 
the Meaning of Politics,” in: Hannah Arendt and the Meaning of Politics, ed. Calhoun & McGowan 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 1-24, esp. 5-8. 
 or they seek to bridge the gap between thinking and acting by 
18  Jerome Kohn, “Thinking/Acting,” Social Research 57.1 (1990): 129. 
19  This attitude is especially evident in the questions and challenges posed to Arendt by the various 
interlocutors in “On Hannah Arendt” (in Arendt/Hill, esp. 301-315), and in the scholarship of the decade 
immediately following Arendt’s death (roughly the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s). 
20  George Kateb’s early essay, “Freedom and Worldliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt,” 
Political Theory 5.2 (1977): 141-182, poses the questions and sets the (enthusiastic but exasperated) tone 
for a lengthy conversation in Arendt scholarship: what exactly, according to Arendt, should the content or 
purpose of politics be, when giving politics a definite purpose to fulfill or a content to embody outside of 
politics itself instantly assimilates it to an instrumental rationality that Arendt defines as non- or anti-
political? Margaret Canovan’s broad-ranging exegeses of Arendt’s central texts have often guided the 
progress of the debate: see Canovan, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt (London: Dent, 1974) – the 
first monograph devoted to Arendt as an original thinker; id., “The Contradictions of Hannah Arendt's 
Political Thought.” Political Theory 6.1 (1978): 5-26; and id., Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her 
Political Thought (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1992). Although entering upon this thorny debate 
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foregrounding the portions of Arendt’s work that construe the thinking activity as the 
narrative recounting of actions;21 or they cannot reconcile Arendt’s earlier valorization of 
action in HC with her (apparent) later valorization of thought in LM, and thus want to 
interpret LM as the lamentably incomplete project in which she would have articulated 
the meaning of thinking for acting with an account of the faculty of political judgment.22 
The latter perplexity has given rise to the most persistent and varied interpretive efforts 
over the last three decades, including the intensification of interest in the brief treatments 
of judgment that appear in both the writings Arendt published during her lifetime23
                                                                                                                                                 
lies far beyond the scope of my discussion here, it must be noted that these and related questions about 
Arendt’s thought are quite far from being settled. 
 as 
21  Outside of the voluminous discussions of political judgment in Arendt’s work, the scholarship on 
Arendtian storytelling provides probably the most fertile and engaging angle on the problematic 
relationship of thinking and acting, although, as I note here, it tends to concentrate on the narratological 
dimensions of the thinking activity in Arendt’s work at the expense of her equally strong interest in forms 
of thought that do not depend on the strictly narrative recounting of experience: to name just two examples, 
the Socratic practice of dialogue and the Augustinian concepts of imagination and memory. An early article 
by Melvyn Hill (“The Fictions of Mankind and the Stories of Men,” in Hill (ed.), 275-300) inaugurates the 
discussion of Arendt’s investment in narrative thinking, continued by Seyla Benhabib, “Hannah Arendt and 
the Redemptive Power of Narrative.” Social Research 57.1 (1990): 167-196; Lisa Jane Disch, “More Truth 
Than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah Arendt,” Political Theory 21.4 
(1993): 665-694; and Disch, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1994) – perhaps the definitive and certainly the most fertile and imaginative work on the topic. 
22  The massive quantity of scholarship on this subject resists any attempt at easy summary. Key 
recent treatments include: Albrecht Wellmer, “Hannah Arendt on Judgment: The Unwritten Doctrine of 
Reason,” Hannah Arendt: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, ed. Garrath Williams 
(London: Routledge, 2005 [orig. publ. 2001]), Vol. 4, 217-233, and Dianna Taylor, “Hannah Arendt on 
Judgment: Thinking for Politics,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10.2 (2002): 151-169. A 
recent and significant dissident voice in this scholarship appears with Dana Villa’s piece “Thinking and 
Judging,” in: Politics, Philosophy, Terror, 87-106. Villa repudiates the tendency in the debates surrounding 
Arendt’s distinction between thinking and acting to look toward her (largely unwritten) thought on 
judgment for a resolution; as he writes, “I want to dampen the tendency among political theorists to view 
her theory of judgment as the crowning synthetic moment of her political philosophy, the moment in which 
the gap between thinking and acting is finally overcome [...]. In my opinion, Arendt had very good reasons 
for preserving the distinction” (88). 
23  The closing pages of Arendt’s 1960 essay “The Crisis in Culture” (BPF 216-222), in which 
Arendt first outlines a theory of judgment based on Kant’s third Critique, comprises the slender, but still 
most substantial and most discussed text in the scholarly debates. 
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well as the series of lectures she gave on Kant’s political philosophy at the University of 
Chicago in 1964 and the New School in New York City in 1970.24
While each of these basic concerns and the various interpretive approaches that 
have arisen from them serves a legitimate purpose, the scholarly conversation thus far has 
yet to take account of the striking similarity of conceptual structure and the unifying set 
of metaphors that create a kind of mutual gravitational pull between thinking and acting 
in Arendt’s language even as she retains and defends the difference between them as 
activities. The mutual attraction between these two concepts through a common language 
is, I believe, strong, suggestive and widespread enough to allow us to elaborate their 




                                                 
24  Now published as Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1982). 
 Rather than connecting thinking and acting via judgment, in short, I 
want to argue that life is the central term of a common language that joins them – but this 
is not just any life, nor is it the ‘life’ of the Lebensphilosophen. Thinking and acting are 
related to each other in Arendt’s thought by reconstituting, even authenticating the life of 
the one who thinks or acts, but this authentication of life is granted at the price of the 
individual’s endangerment of ‘mere’, natural life as it is given to all living beings. What 
Kimberley Curtis writes of the actor applies in equal measure to the thinker, where their 
shared attitude toward this merely given life is concerned – namely, that he or she “needs 
25  Or, for that matter, simply disregarding the rigor with which Arendt maintains the distinction and 
mistaking the give and take of interpretive conversation for authentic action, as does Jonas: “Plato did not 
only articulate his ‘wonder’ for himself in thinking, but wished to share and propagate it. […] And no one 
will contend of Socrates's life of conversation that it served his own instruction only. Thinking has the will 
to communicate itself, and communication is action into the world. […] Thus, whoever added to this 
tradition did act; and the gap between those contraries, visible action and invisible thought, closes. 
Nobody will deny the ‘withdrawal’ of thought from the world of appearances, the turning inward into 
oneself; but the countermovement outward, the utterance, the telling as it were of its story, belongs to it by 
nature” (Jonas 41-42). 
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a certain (uneasy) sense of alienation from and even hostility toward life.”26
Thinking and action are, as [Arendt] expresses it with a nod to Bergson’s élan vitale, ‘pure being 
alive,’ which ‘creates its own tension, which stretches a human life and challenges it, and without 
which one would basically collapse with boredom.’
 In essence, 
the one who thinks or acts does so in order to realize a strange new form of life that 
depends upon the mere life he possesses by default even as it revolts against it, puts it in 
question, interrogates its limits. Ingeborg Nordmann, for one, describes what she calls the 
‘aporia of life’ that renders Arendt’s conceptual vocabulary of life ambiguous, even 
duplicitous: 
27 A concept of life, on the other hand, that glorifies 
the unadulterated dynamic of the life process offers a paradigm for the destruction of the world by 
dragging all that which constitutes the world into a process of absorption and consumption.28
Nordmann’s dramatic juxtaposition of these two forms of life in Arendt’s thought only 
underscores their eccentric continuity with one another. The new form of life suggested 
by Arendt’s language ‘lives’ only through thinking or acting, is equally ‘alive’ in the 
actualization of both, and the decisive conditions to which it consciously subjects itself 
are risk and responsibility – rather than the twin necessities of ‘mere’ life, namely, self-
preservation and the preservation of the species.
 
29
                                                 
26  Kimberley Curtis, Our Sense of the Real: Aesthetic Experience and Arendtian Politics (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 43. 
 In essence, Arendt’s articulations of 
both thinking and acting jointly adumbrate a concept of life that turns against necessity in 
order to ground itself in freedom, that turns against certainty and univocality in order to 
ground itself in danger and dialogue. This strange new form of life, as I have called it, 
with its clear investment in the ethos of endangerment, expands the possible domain of 
27  Nordmann’s citation here is from Arendt’s own translation of HC into German: Arendt, Vita 
Activa, oder, Vom Tätigen Leben (München: R. Piper, 1981), 184. The German edition has received scant 
attention in Anglophone scholarship – all the more remarkable considering that this passage, like many 
other passages in Vita Activa, does not appear in the original English edition of HC. 
28  Ingeborg Nordmann, “The Human Condition: More Than a Guide to Practical Philosophy,” 
Social Research 74.3 (2007): 777. 
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Socratic spirituality – to invoke Foucault’s term again – from the realm of philosophy 
into the realm of politics. In a manner of speaking, then, we can say that Arendt 
modulates Socrates’ dialogic voice into yet another register – that is, the tonality of a 
modern and plural politics without any absolute ground; she repeats, as it were, (pseudo-
)Plato’s mysterious attribution of his writings to a “Socrates made beautiful and new” in 
the Letters (Σωκράτους […] καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος; [pseudo-]Plat. L. 2.314c) – a 
Socrates reborn not just for philosophical thought, but also for modern political action. 
For Arendt, then, risk and responsibility, which we have understood thus far as conditions 
for the activity of interpretation, thus come to constitute nothing less than the existential 
condition of the properly human life as it is lived in action and in thought. 
Before asking how Arendt’s appropriation of Socrates allows her to articulate risk 
and responsibility as the conditions of a life lived in thinking and acting, let me take a 
moment to perform two preliminary tasks. First, I want to justify an assumption inherent 
in my approach to Arendt thus far, and second, I want to answer a possible question about 
the relevance of my central concerns to the interpretation of Arendt’s thought as a whole. 
This assumption and this question, furthermore, will help mark out my position within 
the scholarly conversations surrounding Arendt, and will suggest the novel angle of 
approach that will reveal the existential as well as political and philosophical depth of 
Arendt’s work in relation to interpretive risk and responsibility. First: for a writer who 
insisted so strongly on the importance of making clear distinctions in thinking and 
speaking – often at the expense of making herself clear to readers unfamiliar with the 
distinctions upon which she depended – my reader will do well to ask what justifies my 
                                                                                                                                                 
29  Dana Villa puts the sharpest point on the conundrum where action is concerned: “For Arendt, 
genuine political action is never a means to (mere) life, but the embodiment or expression of a meaningful 
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conflating Arendt’s notion of ‘thinking’ with my own notion of ‘interpretation’ and 
assigning the same conditions and limits to both. Why should risk and responsibility 
condition Arendt’s concept of thinking in the same ways as they do interpretation in the 
present project? Second: for a thinker whose work is now so closely integrated into the 
canon of twentieth-century political theory, my reader will also do well to ask what 
relevance, if any, the present argument may bear to her political thought – an argument 
which so far has been concerned with the least overtly political elements of her work. 
How can Arendt’s fascination with Socrates, then, tell us something significant about 
Arendt’s thought as a whole – not just her ideas concerning how and why individuals 
engage in the inward activity of thought and interpretation, but also the ideas for which 
she is chiefly known, namely, those concerned with how and why individuals engage in 
the outward undertaking she calls political action? Addressing the former assumption and 
the latter question does not merely eliminate a couple obstacles to the progress of the 
present discussion. As we shall see, it will lead us directly to the core issue in Arendt’s 
thought that marks out her contribution to the narrative of this project: namely, in directly 
relating thinking, qua interpretation, and acting by means of the concept of life. 
 
4. Danger and Dialogue: Thinking About Thinking 
Let us first consider whether the conflation of Arendt’s concept of thinking with 
my own concept of interpretation does, in fact, reflect some deeper identity shared by 
both, and whether approaching the former through the terms established for the latter 
proves productive for both. To do so, I want to make recourse to an early essay by 
Arendt, “Understanding and Politics,” a piece that serves two useful functions in this 
                                                                                                                                                 
life” (Arendt and Heidegger, 31). 
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context: first, it foreshadows to a remarkable degree the concept of thinking – here, 
“understanding”30 – that gets elaborated more fully in her later work; second, it expresses 
her conception in terms that make it remarkably amenable to the ideas of risk and 
responsibility. “Understanding and Politics,”31
In terms of the task Arendt sets for her own essay, then, the question of thinking 
about totalitarianism becomes just as much a question of thinking about the nature of 
thinking, or trying to understand the nature of understanding: 
 published three years after Arendt’s 
monumental The Origins of Totalitarianism, speaks directly to the political, moral, and 
intellectual pathos – in the etymological sense of that term: a thing one both experiences 
and suffers – of totalitarian power. For Arendt, the nature of thinking itself comes into 
question when we try to respond to totalitarianism through thought, above all because 
totalitarianism possesses “a horrible originality which no farfetched historical parallels 
can alleviate […] not because some new ‘idea’ came into the world, but because its very 
actions constitute a break with all our traditions; they have clearly exploded our 
categories of political thought and our standards for moral judgment” (“UP” 309-310). 
The experience of totalitarian power, in other words, throws thinking back upon the 
thinker, compelling him or her to reflect upon the conditions and limits of the thinking 
activity itself, and without recourse to the same traditional frameworks that have 
collapsed in its wake. 
Understanding, as distinguished from having correct information and scientific knowledge, is a 
complicated process which never produces unequivocal results. It is an unending activity by which, in 
constant change and variation, we come to terms with and reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to 
be at home in the world. […Understanding] is the specifically human way of being alive; for every 
                                                 
30  John McGowan (Introduction, 108) also sees ‘understanding’ in Arendt’s earlier essay as 
continuous with her elaboration of ‘thinking’ in her later work. 
31  Hannah Arendt, “Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding),” in: Essays in 
Understanding 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 1994), 
307-327; hereafter “UP”. This piece was originally published in Partisan Review 20:4 (1954). 
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single person needs to be reconciled to a world into which he was born a stranger and in which, to the 
extent of his distinct uniqueness, he always remains a stranger. […] The result of understanding is 
meaning, which we originate in the very process of living insofar as we try to reconcile ourselves to 
what we do and what we suffer. (UP 307-309) 
What Arendt describes here as the conciliatory function of understanding throws into 
sharp relief the conversational character of interpretation performed under the conditions 
of risk and responsibility. The activity of interpretive response can be understood quite 
literally as a coming-to-terms with the world as it is, and with others as they are, in the 
course of an unending dialogue: the effort to think, understand, or interpret is 
fundamentally an effort to arrive at a set of common terms, to articulate a common 
language with one’s interlocutors. It is crucial to see, nonetheless, that Arendt stresses the 
inherently equivocal nature of such language, which reflects both the radically shifting 
terrain of the world it seeks to describe as well as the gaps and fissures of the 
conversation through which it emerges. In working against the “constant change and 
variation” of experience, the sheer unfolding of understanding in time and in language 
ironically perpetuates it; the language that would finally allow us to “be at home in the 
world” undercuts its own achievement by altering the very world in which we had sought 
to come home, changing us back into “strangers,” new arrivals on its shores, all over 
again. 
Hence the aim and object of understanding appears in the form of neither 
“knowledge” nor “information,” as Arendt writes, but “meaning.”32
                                                 
32  Though analysis of this issue is certainly both necessary and significant, it must lie outside the 
scope of the present discussion to consider whether or not Arendt’s writings attest to a content for the 
concept of “meaning” more specific than its general usage. Attempts to perform this analysis in recent 
scholarly literature have been few; in relation to my own concept of interpretation, George Kateb, in 
“Ideology and Storytelling,” Social Research 69.2 (2002): 321-357, takes a very germane point of 
departure in arguing that “the quest for meaning” in Arendt’s work “is not the desire for an ordinary 
explanation that remedies one's ignorance, that adds one more bit of knowledge to one’s store of 
knowledge, while leaving that store cumulatively richer but basically unaltered” (326f.). Nonetheless, 
Kateb ultimately argues the troubling point that “An event, or an experience, or a condition, or a whole 
 Responding to 
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experience with meaning may protect us against the dangers inherent in meaninglessness, 
but the act of response itself imposes other, unforeseen, and sometimes even greater 
dangers on those who undertake it. The conciliatory work of the thinker or interpreter 
ultimately generates sources of blockage, incoherence, and conflict that escape his or her 
own immediate notice and move towards not reconciliation, but disintegration. In the 
end, the ‘noise’ – as I have called it elsewhere – created by the language of understanding 
itself forms a part of the “what we do and what we suffer” that proves as intransigent and 
as irreducible as any other experience to which interpretation responds. Near the end of 
the same essay, Arendt acknowledges the reflexive movement that necessarily 
characterizes the process of understanding as a result, transforming arrival into renewed 
departure, reconciliation into repeated disintegration, and so on, taking this circularity as 
evidence of the conversational nature of understanding: 
Understanding will not shy away from this circle but, on the contrary, will be aware that any other 
results would be so far removed from action, of which understanding is only the other side, that they 
could not possibly be true. Nor will the process itself avoid the circle the logicians call ‘vicious’; it 
may in this respect even somewhat resemble philosophy, in which great thoughts always turn in 
circles, engaging the human mind in nothing less than an interminable dialogue between itself and the 
essence of everything that is. (“UP” 322) 
The dialogic form of understanding explains why interpretation must constantly 
encounter and respond to itself whenever it encounters and responds to its object, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
individual life, or the world as a whole, can be made to be meaningful if the thinking imagination takes 
hold of mere thereness or ‘sheer happenings’ and manages to persuade the reader or auditor that sheer 
happenings point to or actually fall into a pattern or design, or betray the presence of an intention or 
purpose that is more than that of the actors or that of human beings altogether” (334). From here, it is a 
short leap for him to conclude that “ideologies, whether totalitarian or not, whether murderous or not, are 
not different in their appeal from fictional stories, historical stories, personal stories, myths, legends, 
religion, and metaphysical systems [...] if that appeal stems from the ability of any of these intellectual 
modes to confer meaning on reality” (355). To be brief, I cannot bring myself to agree with Kateb here, not 
least of all since Arendt’s articulation of ideological thinking (see esp. “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form 
of Government,” the final chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt, 1994), 460-479) 
contrasts so completely with the ideas she explores in connection with thinking proper (as in LM and 
elsewhere). Furthermore, the interpretive dimension Arendt views as essential to the task of thinking – that 
which separates meaning as the result of thinking from knowledge as the result of cognition, to borrow 
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also why, as a source of sustenance as much as threat, interpretation constantly 
accompanies the process of living itself. As Ernst Vollrath has argued, understanding for 
Arendt is not and can never be a finite, instrumental activity, but rather becomes “a way 
of being in the world in which human deeds and misdeeds happen, that is, new 
phenomena appear” to which human beings must respond.33
The Socratic motif that remains implicit in this early formulation of Arendt’s 
thinking about thinking is announced outright when she returns to the phenomenology of 
the thinking experience in her later work. The more aggressively and expansively she 
pursued this phenomenology, the more she was drawn to Socrates as a figure for whom 
the dangers and pleasures of the thinking experience always proved more significant and 
valuable than any of the always-provisional results of thinking in the form of concepts, 
doctrines and systems. Arendt’s definitive approach to Socrates as a model of the 
  Above all, the existential 
element is what must be stressed in Arendt’s account here: meaning is something 
“originate[d] in the very process of living”, and understanding, the activity that brings 
forth meaning, is “the specifically human way of being alive” (emphases mine). In this 
pair of phrases and in Arendt’s characterization of understanding as an “interminable 
dialogue,” we can hear quite distinctly the first overture in Arendt’s writing to what I 
have identified as one of the dominant motifs of Socratic philosophy, namely, the 
dangerous and pleasurable dialogue between language and life. For Arendt as for 
Socrates, understanding is the deliberate, distinctively human way of living the dangers 
and pleasures of meaning. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arendt’s Kantian terminology (see LM 53-65) – manifestly resists the reduction of the thinking activity to 
the mere identification of “pattern or design” in its object. 
33  Ernst Vollrath, “Hannah Arendt and the Method of Political Thinking,” Social Research 44.1 
(1977): 173, emphasis mine. 
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thinking activity – in a passage later incorporated nearly verbatim into her final book, The 
Life of the Mind – appears in her stunning essay “Thinking and Moral Considerations.”34
The trouble is that few thinkers ever told us what made them think and even fewer have cared to 
describe and examine their thinking experience. In this difficulty, unwilling to trust our own 
experiences because of the obvious danger of arbitrariness, I propose to look for a model, for an 
example that, unlike the ‘professional’ thinkers, could be representative for [everybody], that is, to 
look for a man who counted himself neither among the many nor among the few […]; who did not 
aspire to being a ruler of cities or claim to know how to improve and take care of the citizens’ souls; 
who did not believe that men could be wise and did not envy the gods their divine wisdom in case they 
should possess it; and who therefore had never even tried his hand at formulating a doctrine that could 
be taught and learned. In brief, I propose to use a man as our model who did think without becoming a 
philosopher, a citizen among citizens, doing nothing, claiming nothing that, in his view, every citizen 
should do and had a right to claim. You will have guessed that I intend to speak about Socrates […]. 
(“TMC” 17f.) 
 
Frustrated at the absence of evidence in the tradition for the phenomenology of thinking 
she was trying to construct – as opposed to the surfeit of evidence for the results and by-
products of the thinking activity in ‘philosophies’ – Arendt writes: 
Two elements in Arendt’s proposal here to take up Socrates as a representative of the 
thinker’s activity are particularly striking, and prepare the way for the argument I would 
like to pursue in the following discussion. The first of these further justifies why we 
should approach Arendt’s articulation of the thinking experience through the concepts of 
interpretive risk and responsibility; the second indicates how this approach is in a unique 
position to help us bridge the gap between Arendt’s ‘thinking about thinking’ and her 
‘thinking about acting,’ and to what productive conclusions such an approach might bring 
us not only for understanding Arendt, but for facing the larger existential stakes of this 
genealogy. 
In the passage just quoted, Arendt describes Socrates – quite against the grain of 
his near-universal reputation – as a person “who did think without becoming a 
                                                 
34  Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture,” Social Research 51.1/2 (1984): 
7-37. This essay has been republished in Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New 
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philosopher.” In a single, striking phrase descriptive of Socrates’ thought, Arendt 
dissolves the ossified link between the activity of thinking as such and what has become 
the profession or institution of ‘philosophy’: at a single stroke, she neither divests the 
former of its potential dignity and legitimacy nor leaves the latter’s dignifying and 
legitimizing power unquestioned. If Socrates is to be a model of the thinking activity with 
contemporary bearing, it is not only because Plato’s fiction of Socrates, in word and in 
deed, offers more direct evidence of the experience of thinking than any other thinker we 
know of. It is also because this Socrates represents the ubiquitous possibility of thinking 
even and especially without ‘philosophy’ as such or ‘a philosophy’, and without any of 
the professional, disciplinary, or intellectual prejudices and limitations that accompany 
‘philosophy’ as a specific institutionalization of thinking. In Socrates’ pre-traditional 
context, Arendt finds the sole guidepost for our own post-traditional condition, where the 
task of thinking is de facto addressed universally to every living human being qua human 
being: as Jean Yarbrough and Peter Stern write, “the decline of traditional philosophy 
abolishes the age-old distinction between the few who philosophize and the many who do 
not” (Yarbrough & Stern 328). The astonishing magnitude of Arendt’s underlying claim 
here only becomes explicit later in this same essay: “Thinking in its noncognitive, 
nonspecialized sense as a natural need of human life […] is not a prerogative of the few 
but an ever-present faculty of everybody; by the same token, inability to think is not the 
‘prerogative’ of those many who lack brain power but the ever-present possibility for 
everybody – scientists, scholars, and other specialists in mental enterprises not excluded” 
(“TMC” 35f.). The success of the thinking activity does not depend on the authority 
                                                                                                                                                 
York: Schocken Books, 2003), 159-189. In the present discussion, I cite the Social Research version, 
hereafter “TMC”.  
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invested in the thinker by the institutions of philosophy, science, or scholarship; nor does 
this authority, in whomsoever it is invested, offer any solid guarantee against the 
individual’s failure to think at all. For Arendt, once we are suspended on the high-wire of 
thought, no matter what aptitude or authority for thinking we claim in advance, there are 
no ultimate safety nets. 
In consequence, we should take Arendt very much at her word when she writes 
that thinking – or, in our nomenclature, interpretation – is “a natural need of human life” 
(emphasis mine). Thinking and interpretation are not only everybody’s business for 
Arendt: they form one of the natural and necessary conditions of the way of life we define 
as human. Even as such a condition, however, thinking and interpreting are not activities 
that are performed by default and achieve success as a matter of course: it is only the 
successful prosecution of thought and interpretation that in fact forms such a precondition 
– a prerequisite, even – of an authentically human life. This fairly tremendous assertion, 
nonetheless, simply radicalizes the Socratic dictum from the Apology that ὁ δὲ 
ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ (Pl. Ap. 38a; “the unexamined life is not worth 
living for human beings”) – a statement that can be translated equally well as “the 
unexamined life [i.e. one lived without thinking] cannot be lived by a human being.” 
Despite all evidence to the contrary, then, Arendt’s Socrates qua model thinker would 
exemplify the argument that the lives we live rank as human if and only if our living is 
engaged or, indeed, fully realized in the activity of thinking. At all other times, it seems, 
our lives are something other than human, perhaps even less than human; at any rate, the 
potential for realizing such an authentically human life in the modern age, where the 
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pursuit of thinking is constantly endangered by the absence of a stable tradition to nourish 
its energies and preserve its products, seems quite fragile indeed in Arendt’s vision. 
In terms of mutual illumination, then, I think we are on solid ground to see 
Arendt’s definitions of ‘thinking’ and ‘understanding’ as being of one piece with my own 
idea of interpretation, especially considering how risk and responsibility (though not, of 
course, under these names) come into the foreground of Arendt’s ‘thinking about 
thinking’ in light of the modern end of tradition. The link seems even more compelling 
when we perceive how both Arendt’s ‘thinking’ and my ‘interpretation’ – especially in 
view of the Socratic moment – do not merely define the specialized activities of the 
professional scholar, scientist, or philosopher, but rather give a name to one of the 
constitutive aspects of human life and the activity of human beings as a specific genus of 
living beings. Taking my point of departure in the same decisive passage from “TMC” 
quoted above, I now want to cross over from my guiding assumption, which concerns the 
interpretive character of thinking, to the question about the broader relevance of my 
approach, the implications of thinking thus conceived for Arendt’s political thought. 
 
5. Anarchy and Groundlessness: Thinking about Acting 
If Arendt’s Socrates, purely in his role as a model thinker, does indeed represent 
“a citizen among citizens, doing nothing [and] claiming nothing that, in his view, every 
citizen should do and had a right to claim”, then what possible model of citizenship – or 
indeed, of political life in general – must Arendt have in mind that would allow her to 
modulate Socrates’ exemplarity from the sphere of private contemplation and 
conversation to that of public deliberation and action? Furthermore, Arendt’s 
radicalization of the Socratic dictum about the constitutive force of thought for human 
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life would seem to contradict – or at least sit very uncomfortably with – the much more 
recognizably Arendtian conception of political action as the ultimate ground of whatever 
meaning is to be found in a truly human existence. After all, it is the significance of 
action, not thought, for human life that forms the dominant theme of Arendt’s political 
thought, to the details of which we will soon have reason to turn. 
The question of the relevance of my approach now appears as a question of the 
internal coherence of Arendt’s thought itself over the three decades of its maturity. To 
offer a preliminary answer to this quandary, I want to examine the revision and expansion 
of the key passage from “TMC” quoted above as it appears towards the end of the first 
volume of LM, in the context of the question “What makes us think?” Directly prior to a 
revised presentation of Socrates as a model thinker, taken directly from “TMC”, Arendt 
writes: 
The best, in fact the only, way I can think of to get hold of the question is to look for a model, an 
example of a thinker who was not a professional, who in his person unified two apparently 
contradictory passions, for thinking and acting – not in the sense of being eager to apply his thoughts 
or to establish theoretical standards for action but in the much more relevant sense of being equally at 
home in both spheres and able to move from one sphere to the other with the greatest apparent ease, 
very much as we ourselves constantly move back and forth between experiences in the world of 
appearances and the need for reflecting on them. (LM 167, emphases mine) 
Although it remains merely prefatory to a much longer discussion, this description of 
Socrates is a striking and delicately worded statement that rewards close attention. First 
of all, we are brought up rather short by the implicit idea that Socrates as we know him 
from Plato is a model actor as well as a model thinker. The Socrates that speaks in the 
Apology, at any rate, is so preoccupied with examining himself and his fellow citizens in 
philosophical dialogue that he has scarcely any time left over for other activities; 
furthermore, he only serves the city in an official capacity – that is, acts in the public 
sphere – grudgingly, when he is compelled to do so by law, and even in these cases 
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makes himself remarkable only by refusing to act.35
But this is indeed a peculiar form of anarchy: for although thinking and acting 
take place without any absolute ground on either side of the equation, each constantly 
makes recourse to the other as if the other could offer such a ground, just as each resists 
and challenges the other in order to overturn such a ground. In the anarchic mutual revolt 
of acting and thinking, then – what we might call the centrifugal energy of conversation – 
 Nonetheless, Arendt’s language here 
suggests quite palpably that the “passions for thinking and acting,” at least insofar as (she 
claims) they appear in Socrates, are only “apparently contradictory”: the implication 
being that they spring from one and the same source and realize one and the same desire. 
The passion that apprehends both thinking and acting, by Arendt’s reckoning, does not 
move one to “establish theoretical standards for action,” nor, as she writes later in the 
same passage, does this passion make one “aspir[e] to be a ruler of men” or submit 
“meekly to being ruled”. In a word, the passion for thought and action has nothing to do 
with governing or being governed: it aims for neither the regulation of action by some 
standard or doctrine discovered in thinking, nor the regulation of thinking by the 
conventional standards that regulate human affairs, nor, furthermore, the submission of 
either action or thought to inflexible rules and standards immanent in their own 
respective realms. By implication, both thinking and acting can only be anarchic in a 
dual sense: the basic character they hold in common resists or even dissolves all 
hierarchical relations of rulership, whether those of governing or of being governed. 
They are anarchic, in short, because conversation between equal partners is always 
fundamentally anarchic. 
                                                 
35  Most notable in this regard is Socrates' refusal to participate in the arrest of Leon of Salamis when 
he is enlisted to do so by agents of the oligarchy (Pl. Ap. 32a-e). Indeed, instead of acting one way or the 
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we can discern the equal share of actor and thinker in the condition of risk; in the 
reciprocal grounding and stabilization of thinking by acting and vice versa – what we 
might call the centripetal energy of conversation – we can discern the equal share of actor 
and thinker in the condition of responsibility.36
                                                                                                                                                 
other, he simply goes home. 
 If we move in a circular path between 
acting and thinking, between “experiences in the world of appearances” and “the need for 
reflecting on them,” and if these activities find a common ground and rule only in the 
way they mutually negotiate and perhaps even perpetuate their anarchic groundlessness, 
then – all evidence to the contrary! – Socrates does indeed offer an exemplary case of the 
36  What I call here the ‘anarchic’ relationship between acting and thinking in Arendt’s political 
thought can really be considered a shorthand description of her fundamental difference in outlook from that 
of mainstream, empirically-based political science since at least the middle of the 20th century. On Arendt’s 
relationship to this mainstream, Wolin writes, “Prior to the appearance of The Origins of Totalitarianism 
and The Human Condition, the study of political theory was essentially a special branch of the history of 
ideas. It was neither political nor theoretical. As a consequence, political theory was exceedingly vulnerable 
to the challenge posed shortly after WWII by the proponents of the scientific study of politics who argued 
for an idea of theory based upon the methods of the natural sciences. The version of theory which political 
scientists borrowed from their colleagues in the more advanced social sciences was remarkable not only for 
its tendency to associate theory with ‘methodology’ but for its distinct hostility toward history and 
philosophy. As a consequence, this new form of theory had nothing very significant or interesting to say 
about the issues which dominated the politics of the twentieth-century” (Wolin 1977, 92f.). The 
relationship between critical discourse and political reality sketched out by such a political science, as 
Richard Bernstein has persuasively argued, is chiefly explanatory and predictive: like empirical science, the 
task of political thinking is to identify and articulate a nexus of causes that explains how certain phenomena 
arise ‘in the wild’ and predicts how similar phenomena will arise given identical preconditions. Like the 
Baconian scientist who subjects nature to his own ends by submitting to nature’s own laws, the empirical 
political scientist’s basic attitude is that of a technologist of human behavior – and here the relationship 
between thinking and acting must needs be anything but anarchic. Arendt’s conception of human action, on 
the other hand, always assumes that action is far from completely determined by any given nexus of causes 
– that human actors fail to be fully human, or fully actors, unless their actions are at least in some respect 
unforeseen and spontaneous. The oppositional stance to an explanatory-predictive model of political 
science that Arendt pursued through her entire career, as Bernstein writes, is rooted in the insight “that such 
a development of empirical political theory presupposes and encourages the development of a world in 
which repetitive regularities come to dominate behavior. Ironically and tragically, this would be a world in 
which political action [as Arendt understands it] comes to play an increasingly insignificant role.” Richard 
J. Bernstein, “Hannah Arendt: The Ambiguities of Theory and Practice,” in: Political Theory and Praxis: 
New Perspectives, ed. Terence Ball (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 143; see also 
Vollrath 167-171, and David Luban, “Explaining Dark Times: Hannah Arendt's Theory of Theory,” Social 
Research 50.1 (1983): 215-248 passim. This same world would organize all the energies of political 
science and practical reality as much as possible so as to minimize or even eliminate the risks and 
responsibilities associated with both thinking and acting that are basic to Arendt’s conception – and along 
with them, all traces of human spontaneity, uncertainty, and indeterminacy. A world, in other words, not 
entirely unlike our own. 
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strange passion that Arendt describes. We can see a foreshadowing, as it were, of this 
unlikely exemplarity in Arendt’s statement quoted above, written some twenty years 
before in “UP”, that action is in fact “only the other side” of thinking. Only Socrates – the 
thinker who left behind no positive doctrine of thought, and the actor who made himself 
conspicuous and memorable by not acting – resolves to live in and through the passion 
for risk and responsibility, those ‘groundless grounds’ in which thinking and acting find a 
common source. 
It is worth noting that in this context, the only way to reassert the coherence of 
Arendt’s discourse on thinking and acting, a discourse which insists on the common 
source of political and philosophical activity even as it rigorously separates those same 
activities, is by making recourse to the groundlessness that characterizes risk and the 
dialogic reciprocity that characterizes responsibility. The horizon of comprehension, as it 
were, for Arendt’s thinking thus necessarily transcends the already high-level categories 
of thinking and acting, such that we are led to ask whether it might be better to 
characterize her neither as a political thinker per se nor as a politically-minded critic of 
the philosophical tradition, but as a theorist – perhaps the modern theorist par excellence 
– of risk and responsibility. Without necessarily belaboring this last point, we can at least 
perceive quite vividly that approaching Arendt’s writings through her ‘re-voicing’ of 
Socrates between philosophy and politics illuminates not only her appropriation and 
interrogation of a philosophical tradition that now exists only in fragments, but also her 
searching critique of a modernity that has obscured and effaced the meaning of political 
action. 
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From this insight, then, the basic issues that will guide the rest of the present 
inquiry arise more or less directly. First, I want to discuss in some detail how risk and 
responsibility, as we have defined them here, form the basic conditions for the unique 
form of life realized in thinking for Arendt, and how in turn the figurative language of 
life Arendt creates, quite aside from what might have been her own intentions, bridges 
the conceptual gap between thinking and acting in a subtle but significant way. Since the 
present project must necessarily emphasize the risks and responsibilities of thinking as a 
form of interpretation, however, a full-scale treatment of this last argument – which 
would have to present a reinterpretation of not just the philosophical, but also the political 
dimensions of Arendt’s thought in their totality – lies well beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Nonetheless, my discussion should at least open the path to such a 
reinterpretation by drawing critical attention to one particularly significant constellation 
of figurative terms that bridge the gap between thinking and acting in Arendt’s discourse 
– namely, that of appearance and disappearance. As we shall see, the development of this 
single strand in Arendt’s conceptual vocabulary culminates in her ‘re-voicing’ of 
Socrates as the exemplary case of a thinker-actor who makes the paradoxical relation 
between appearance and disappearance into not only the basis for an entire way of life, 
but also the sine qua non of a properly human life – the life that comes into being only by 
taking up the burden of risk and responsibility. The strange new ‘endangered life’ 
embodied in Arendt’s reconstructed Socrates, most importantly, comes to represent a 
mode of being which, using Foucault’s language, can be articulated as a spirituality that 
comprehends politics as well as philosophy. 
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5. The Danger of Disappearance: Arendt’s Language of Phenomenality 
By way of justifying my approach to Arendt as a figure in this genealogy, I have 
already indicated in a preliminary way how the activity of thinking or understanding, by 
definition, unfolds under the conditions of risk and responsibility in Arendt’s work. In 
order to show just how pervasive these underlying conditions are in the whole span of 
Arendt’s work, however, and just how much their tacit presence builds an invisible 
bridge, as it were, between thinking and acting in her conceptual vocabulary, I want to 
explore in detail a single aspect of her articulation of thinking that takes the guise of a 
figurative language of appearance and disappearance. The ambiguities and tensions of 
this language, as we shall see, reflect the forms of risk and responsibility inherent in the 
activity of thought, but they also find transparent parallels in her articulation of acting. 
The investment in an ethos of risk and responsibility that underwrites Arendt’s language, 
moreover, helps highlight the importance she gives to Socrates as exemplar of that 
peculiar form of human life, realized exclusively in either thought or action, upon which 
the entire edifice of her political and philosophical reflection is built. 
 It is no accident, then, that as far as the importance of this form of life to Arendt’s 
thought is concerned, the most extensive document we have of her conception of the 
thinking activity is the first part of a (projected) trilogy of volumes collectively titled The 
Life of the Mind – which title, incidentally, tacitly calls upon us to reimagine the relative 
weight and meaning of both ‘life’ and ‘mind’ in the range of activities covered by this 
traditional expression.37
                                                 
37  In the same vein, and although practical circumstances ultimately obliterated the neat symmetry, 
we should note that Arendt’s original projected title for HC was Vita Activa, the Latin term for ‘the life of 
action,’ traditionally opposed to the vita contemplativa, ‘the life of the mind.’ Arendt’s own German 
translation of HC retains this original title: Vita activa, oder, Vom tätigen Leben [Vita activa, or On the Life 
 The argument of the work itself, furthermore, pursues the same 
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practice of disrupting and reconfiguring expectations as its title presages. For instance: 
although it seems entirely counterintuitive to begin a book on thinking – the least visible 
or perceptible of all human activities – with an exposition of the fundamentally 
phenomenal, ‘appearing’ character of the world, not to mention a rigorous critique of the 
being/appearing dichotomy that forms one of the taproots of traditional Western 
metaphysics, this is precisely what Arendt does at the outset of LM. The resulting 
approach, in part, organizes her subsequent discussion on the structure and meaning of 
the thinking activity around the conceptual polarity between appearance and 
disappearance and forges a unique language around this dichotomy: 
The world men are born into contains many things, natural and artificial, living and dead, transient and 
sempiternal, all of which have in common that they appear and hence are meant to be seen, heard, 
touched, tasted, and smelled, to be perceived by sentient creatures endowed with the appropriate sense 
organs. Nothing could appear, the word “appearance” would make no sense, if recipients of 
appearances did not exist – living creatures able to acknowledge, recognize, and react to – in flight or 
desire, approval or disapproval, blame or praise – what is not merely there but appears to them and is 
meant for their perception. In this world which we enter, appearing from a nowhere, and from which 
we disappear into a nowhere, Being and Appearing coincide. […] Nothing and nobody exists in this 
world whose very being does not presuppose a spectator. In other words, nothing that is, insofar as it 
appears, exists in the singular; everything that is is meant to be perceived by somebody. (LM 19, 
emphases in original) 
This opening statement does not merely set forth the first and most important 
philosophical premise for Arendt’s exposition. More importantly, it orients her argument 
not towards the definition of an unchanging and univocal essence of the thinking activity, 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Action] (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960). Arendt criticizes the separation and mutual alienation of this 
pair of concepts in antiquity (namely, in Aristotle’s distinction between the bios politikos and the bios 
theoretikos) and their reception and modification in medieval Latinity even more so. (See HC 7-21 for 
Arendt’s historical and theoretical investigation of this opposition in Western thought.) The point is that 
Arendt is not merely taking up a very old pair of terms at face value, nor that she is trying to undermine the 
distinction from within, but rather that she is trying to articulate a contemporary meaning for them that 
draws upon traditional meanings and concepts even as it interrogates the tacit assumptions behind them. 
(This interrogation, I should reiterate, does not go so far in Arendt’s work as to cancel the difference 
between thinking and acting altogether.) The common concern that draws together HC and LM in her 
oeuvre – not the least evidence for which is the fact that this concern is announced in the respective title of 
either work – is in the last analysis a form of (human) life. It remained an open question for Arendt – just as 
it should remain open for us – whether we can retain the traditional distinction without automatically 
privileging one form of life over the other; or, for that matter, whether we can propose a new taxonomy for 
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but rather towards a retrieval of the plural and variable experiences of thinking that 
become possible in a world defined by an ‘ontology of appearance’ and a multitude of 
subjects to whom that world appears in a multitude of ways. Arendt does not necessarily 
mean, moreover, that sentient beings exist only insofar as they appear to each other and 
themselves, nor that sensible objects exist only insofar as they appear to sentient beings – 
at its worst, that line of thinking threatens the kind of solipsism Arendt is at pains to 
avoid. Rather, her point is that sentient beings and sensible objects alike exist expressly in 
order to appear and perceive appearances. In short, whatever appears does not appear in 
order to give evidence of what (truly) exists beyond appearance; rather, whatever exists, 
exists in order to appear. 38
                                                                                                                                                 
forms of life that could overcome the mutual alienation of thinking and acting – or knowing and doing – 
that has plagued the Western tradition of philosophy at least since Plato and Aristotle. 
 Indeed, this is what Arendt means when she describes 
sentient beings and sensible things as “meant for” each other, “meant to” perceive and be 
perceived; both spectacle and spectator are “meant for” each other, not in the sense of 
existing in a relation of mutual adequation (as, broadly speaking, in the Kantian 
experience of the beautiful), but rather in the sense that the reality of each is confirmed 
and, indeed, even constituted by the sensing and sensible presence of the other. Whatever 
meaning the world has, whatever meaning we have, does not lie in the dark and 
unfathomable depths of things, but is borne forth on a series of brilliant surfaces – each of 
which may appear in a multitude of ways to each among the multitude of its beholders. 
38  One of the most striking demonstrations Arendt offers for this fundamental thesis, in fact, points 
to the role of appearance in the life process. Arendt challenges the near-universal tendency of biologists, 
sociologists, and psychologists “to interpret all appearances as functions of the life process.” Drawing on 
the work of Swiss zoologist and biologist Adolf Portmann (LM 27-30), she asks “Could it be that 
appearances are not there for the sake of the life process but, on the contrary, that the life process is there 
for the sake of appearances? Since we live in an appearing world, is it not much more plausible that the 
relevant and the meaningful in this world of ours should be located precisely on the surface?” (LM 27). 
336 
 Proceeding beyond this starting point in the analysis of the thinking activity for 
Arendt means resolving a striking and multiple paradox: how can we reconcile the non-
appearing character of the thinking process, the non-appearing character of the thinker 
insofar as s/he thinks, and the non-appearing (or at best only metaphorically appearing) 
character of thought-objects with a world strictly governed by the regime of appearances? 
For a world in which manifest visibility is the preeminent criterion of reality, how can the 
invisible, obscure, and traceless process of thought have any substance or meaning at all? 
Arendt first approaches this problem by defining the transition in experience from 
sensing to thinking, from appearances in the world to the dis-appearance that marks the 
thinking activity, as a process of withdrawal: 
[Mental activities] all have in common a withdrawal from the world as it appears and a bending back 
toward the self. This would cause no great problem if we were mere spectators, godlike creatures […]. 
However, we are of the world and not merely in it; we, too, are appearances by virtue of arriving and 
departing, of appearing and disappearing […]. These properties do not vanish when we happen to be 
engaged in mental activities and close the eyes of our body, to use the Platonic metaphor, in order to be 
able to open the eyes of our mind […] As Merleau-Ponty once put it, “I can flee being only into 
being,” and since Being and Appearing coincide for men, this means that I can flee appearance only 
into appearance. And that does not solve the problem, for the problem concerns the fitness of thought 
to appear at all, and the question is whether thinking and other invisible and soundless mental activities 
are meant to appear or whether in fact they can never find an adequate home in the world. (LM 22-23, 
emphases in original) 
By defining thinking as a withdrawal from immediate appearance, Arendt suggests, we 
only give a name to its paradoxical and, indeed, perhaps even dangerous character 
without resolving the tensions it creates. Here we catch the first glimpse of the fact that – 
in Arendt’s later borrowing of a phrase from Heidegger – the thinking activity is 
fundamentally “out of order” when viewed from the perspective of phenomenal 
experience, “as though men, whenever they reflect without purpose, going beyond the 
natural curiosity awakened by the manifold wonders of the world’s sheer thereness and 
their own existence, engaged in an activity contrary to the human condition” (LM 78). As 
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we have seen so often before in this genealogy, the ‘place’ of interpretive thinking lies 
wherever it will be ‘out of place.’ 
In terms of the risks of interpretation, then, we can perceive that thinking always 
proves more or less dangerous for the thinker because thinking by nature exceeds, and in 
so doing turns against and negates, whatever is merely given in sense experience: in a 
word, its predilection for dis-appearance openly defies the universal regime of 
appearances. The primary risk of interpretation, in effect – the first danger of 
interpretation from which all its other dangers follow – is that interpretation always turns 
away from what is apparent and given in order to seek the meaning of the apparent and 
given, risking the loss of precisely that which it sought to gain in earnest. The quest for 
meaning, in effect, must run the risk of meaninglessness: “Thinking always deals with 
absences and removes itself from what is present and close at hand. This […] means that 
reality and existence, which we can only conceive in terms of time and space, can be 
temporarily suspended, lose their weight and, together with this weight, their meaning for 
the thinking ego” (LM 199). Just as the thinker-interpreter, moreover, resists appearance 
and of necessity takes refuge in the dis-appearance of his thinking ego and his thoughts 
from a world of brilliant surfaces, so, too, does he risk severing the vital relation he 
possesses to such a world in the very effort to deepen and strengthen that relation. “The 
Epicurean [dictum] lathē biōsas, ‘live in hiding,’” Arendt writes, is “an at least negatively 
exact description of the topos, the locality, of the man who thinks […W]e would call 
thinkers the inconspicuous men by definition and profession” (LM 71, 72). Just as the 
thinker risks losing himself in thought, as we say, because he is temporarily lost to that 
world of appearance to which he still belongs and must ultimately return, so the 
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interpreter risks losing himself in interpretation because he no longer exists in the same 
realm inhabited by the real object he seeks to interpret. 
 Despite the fact that Arendt’s sharply paradoxical formulation of thinking as 
withdrawal or dis-appearance from appearance threatens at times to rend the logical 
fabric of her language, it already contains within itself the means to resolve its paradox – 
at least as it appears in this form. What the thinker pursues in and through the activity of 
thinking “can be conceived only as another ‘appearance,’ another phenomenon originally 
hidden but supposedly of a higher order, thus signifying the lasting predominance of 
appearance” (LM 24). In other words: if the rule of the world is appearance, as Arendt 
begins to argue via Merleau-Ponty in the passage above, the withdrawal achieved in 
thinking can only represent a flight from appearance into appearance – albeit perhaps into 
a different order of appearances: 
Since mental activities, non-appearing by definition, occur in a world of appearances and in a being 
that partakes of these appearances through its receptive sense organs as well as through its own ability 
and urge to appear to others, they cannot come into being except through a deliberate withdrawal from 
appearances. It is withdrawal not so much from the world […] as from the world’s being present to the 
senses. Every mental act rests on the mind’s faculty of having present to itself what is absent from the 
senses. Re-presentation, making present what is actually absent, is the mind’s unique gift, and since 
our whole mental terminology is based on metaphors drawn from vision’s experience, this gift is called 
imagination […]. (LM 75-76, emphases in original) 
This key passage modulates Arendt’s pairing of sensible appearance and intelligible dis-
appearance into the pairing of presence and absence.39
                                                 
39  It is worth noting here that Arendt’s vocabulary of presence and absence extends beyond her 
discussion of thinking, which is my focus here, to inflect her articulation – or what would have been her 
articulation – of political judgment as well. For Arendt, judgment depends upon not so much the presencing 
of absent objects to the mind, as in thinking, as the inscription of one’s own present viewpoint within the 
viewpoint of an absent other. Michael Denneny’s language makes clear how the play of presence and 
absence underlies Arendtian judgment: “What changes [the] dokei moi, the subjective ‘it seems to me,’ to a 
judgment of taste is our ability to look at the same thing from the perspective of other people. We do not 
judge as they might judge; our judgments are not identical with their judgments (which would be empathy), 
but we judge from their point of view. By the utterly mysterious power of the imagination, that strange 
ability to make present what is absent and to make ourselves absent from our immediate presence and 
present to some absent perspective, we are able to put ourselves in the other's position and see, not as he 
 Arendt resolves the paradox by 
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reconstituting its key terms; in doing so, however, she betrays the fact that neither of her 
key pairings can be conceived of as a polar opposition, but rather must be imagined as 
extreme points on a continuous spectrum. The thinker withdraws into dis-appearing 
absence – absence from the appearing world and from himself qua appearing thing – 
because it is only in this absence that he can “imagine” or truly make present the objects 
of his thought, which are themselves absent from his senses, in the mind’s inner space of 
appearance.40
In order for us to think about somebody, he must be removed from our presence; so long as we are 
with him we do not think either of him or about him; thinking always implies remembrance; every 
thought is strictly speaking an after-thought. It may, of course, happen that we start thinking about a 
still-present somebody or something, in which case we have removed ourselves surreptitiously from 
our surroundings and we are conducting ourselves as though we were already absent. (LM 78, 
emphases mine) 
 If thinking aims at uncovering the meaning of whatever one thinks about, 
then by virtue of an even more deep-seated paradox, we find that the presence of any 
given thing must be pressed into absence, as it were, in order for thinking to press out its 
meaning. This is precisely what Arendt argues quite boldly a couple pages later: 
In short, the meaning of any phenomenon can only appear in the mind at the threshold of 
the thing’s disappearance from the world: thinking ‘absents’ a thing in order to ‘present’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
sees, but how it looks to us from his point of view.” Michael Denneny, “The Privilege of Ourselves: Hannah 
Arendt on Judgment,” in Hill (ed.), 264, emphasis mine.  
40  The present point on the mutual entanglement of appearance and disappearance, and the entire 
present discussion of thinking, should be considered as running in parallel with the convincing and eye-
opening argument of Dean Hammer in “Freedom and Fatefulness: Augustine, Arendt and the Journey of 
Memory,” Theory, Culture & Society 17.2 (2000): 83-104. In this piece, Hammer sets out to retrieve and 
reveal the Augustinian roots for much of Arendt’s ‘thinking about thinking.’ Rather than appearance and 
disappearance, however, the key terms for his exposition are worldliness and worldlessness; the paradox of 
withdrawal is, however, central to both vocabularies. Hammer writes: “What Arendt drew from Augustine, 
the contours of which remain in her later work, is a journey of memory in which reflection, as it removes us 
from the world, paradoxically reveals us as inserted, through birth, into this world. […] It is this 
Augustinian journey of memory […] that continued to guide Arendt's thinking in developing a political 
ethic that shared with action the ontological foundation of beginning” (84). For Arendt as for Augustine, 
the paradox of withdrawal is resolved by “a two-step process of isolation from and return to the world, a 
journey of memory made possible by our being born into this world. It is in this return that we reconstitute 
our relationship to the world and our responsibilities to each other” (85; see also 90-92). By examining 
Arendt’s reformulation of Augustine’s theological categories into philosophical and political ones, Hammer 
reaches conclusions comparable to those of the present discussion on the relation of thinking and acting. 
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its meaning. Meaning is quite literally the way we ‘re-member’ a thing, how we 
reconstruct its presence when it is absent: “The meaning of what actually happens and 
appears while it is happening is revealed when it has disappeared; remembrance, by 
which you make present to your mind what actually is absent and past, reveals the 
meaning” (LM 132). In spite of the fact that a thing and its meaning, in Arendt’s 
reckoning, both represent appearances in equal measure, they each apparently belong to 
orders of appearance so different in nature as to be mutually exclusive. In purely practical 
terms, furthermore, it seems that the withdrawal and dis-appearance that characterize the 
thinking activity only rebel against immediate, sensible appearance in order to reinstate 
an augmented and intensified tyranny of appearances on another plane. Just as Carl von 
Clausewitz famously wrote that war is politics continued by other means, so one could 
say that, for Arendt, thinking is appearing continued by other means. In thinking, “the 
mind learns how to deal with things that are absent and prepares itself to ‘go further,’ 
toward the understanding of things that are always absent, that cannot be remembered 
because they were never present to sense experience” (LM 77). Thinking does not seek to 
do away with Appearance for the sake of Being – on the contrary; in shrugging off and 
reaching beyond whatever appearances have been or will be given to the senses at any 
point in space or time, the thinker aims to acquire more appearances, to find more 
intense, more powerful, more controllable, more meaningful appearances. If thinking 
itself is, as Heidegger claims, “out of order,” then it forces the thinker’s normal 
experience of presence and absence, space and time, to go completely “out of order” as 
well: 
What is near and appears directly to our senses is now far away and what is distant is actually present. 
While thinking I am not where I actually am; I am surrounded not by sense-objects but by images that 
are invisible to everybody else. […] Thinking annihilates temporal as well as spatial distances. I can 
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anticipate the future, think of it as though it were already present, and I can remember the past as 
though it had not disappeared. (LM 85)41
In effect, thinking as dis-appearance and absence ironically places us in the thick of 
appearance and presence – but an appearance and a presence liberated from the chains of 
mere empirical facticity, freed from the limits of the given, boldly and energetically 
moving, as it were, outside their usual bounds. 
 
If Arendt’s idea of thinking does in fact coincide in main outline with my own 
idea of interpretation, as I have argued, we can thus claim with good reason that insofar 
as interpretation seeks to make the meaning of its object immediately present to the 
interpreter, the activity of interpretation must of necessity leave behind the ‘mere’ 
immediate presence of the object itself and instead ‘re-present’ the now-absent object in 
the mind. In a sense, then, every interpretive response must be fundamentally apostrophic 
in character: the interpreter can only respond, can only offer a counter-address to the 
object that addresses her when the object itself is absent. This condition of the 
interpretive situation, which defines both the risks and the responsibilities of thinking-
interpreting specifically in relation to its object, by no means leaves the interpreter herself 
untouched either. As if by accident, it is in the endangerment of the thinker-interpreter’s 
relationship to herself through thought that we first stumble upon the deep ties between 
the activity of thinking and the strange new form of life that distinguish Arendt’s 
argument. The specific stakes of this endangered life for the thinker-interpreter find 
expression in Arendt’s language through a final modulation of the vocabulary rooted in 
presence-absence, or in appearance-disappearance – namely, through its radicalization 
                                                 
41  The reader of German literature cannot help but be struck by the almost exact correspondence 
between this passage from Arendt, writing in the 1970s, and the closing lines of the dedicatory poem 
(“Zueignung”) that precedes Goethe’s Faust der Tragödie erster Teil from 1828/29: “Was ich besitze, seh’ 
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into a language of life and death. The thinker’s voluntary disappearance from the 
appearing world, as Arendt writes, 
can be understood – from the perspective of the natural and of our common-sense reasoning – as the 
anticipation of our final departure, that is, our death. […] The metaphor of death, or, rather, the 
metaphorical reversal of life and death – what we usually call life is death, what we usually call death 
is life – is not arbitrary, although one can see it a bit less dramatically: If thinking establishes its own 
conditions, blinding itself against the sensorily given by removing all that is close at hand, it is in order 
to make room for the distant to become manifest. […] Everything present is absent because something 
actually absent is present to his mind, and among the things absent is the philosopher’s own body. (LM 
84) 
If the quest for meaning undertaken in thought demands the willful absencing of an 
object present to the thinker’s senses, it demands by the very same token the willful 
absencing of the thinker herself from herself and from others. Recalling the language I 
used in previous portions of the project, we might say that the integration achieved 
between the thinking subject and the meaning of her object entails any number of dis-
integrations in the subject’s relation to herself, to others, or even to the object at hand. In 
terms of either absence or dis-integration, what I have called the apostrophic quality of 
thinking thus seems to apply not only to the object, but also to the subject of thought – 
and in such a way as to suggest the sharply paradoxical character of the life invoked in 
Arendt’s ‘life of the mind.’ For the thinker in thinking anticipates or, as it were, partially 
imitates the form that self-absencing ultimately assumes for everyone, whether they think 
or not: namely, the final absence, disappearance or dis-integration of the subject in death. 
This is not to say, of course, that whenever someone withdraws from the world of 
appearances in order to respond to that world and discover its meaning, he actually risks 
his own death. Much more to the point: the “metaphorical reversal of life and death” that 
Arendt describes as an essential part of the thinker’s experience in fact dramatically 
                                                                                                                                                 
ich wie im Weiten, / Und was verschwand, wird mir zu Wirklichkeiten” (“What I [now] possess, I view as 
if from a distance, / And what has disappeared turns to [present] realities”). 
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destabilizes the life-death opposition itself and proposes an entirely new set of standards 
by which life and death might be defined: “Seen from the perspective of the immediacy 
of life and the world given to the senses, thinking is, as Plato indicated, a living death. 
[…] From the viewpoint of the thinking ego, […] a life without meaning is a kind of 
living death” (LM 87).42
If we keep in mind these peculiar characteristics of Arendt’s discourse of dis-
appearance and absence in her treatment of thinking as we turn to its analogue in her 
treatment of acting, we are likely to be struck by an uncannily consistent inversion of this 
discourse. However, for as much as Arendt opposes it to thinking, acting nonetheless 
converges with its opposite where its mode of life is concerned: for Arendt, both of them 
represent equally necessary and complementary modes of endangered life. Now, many 
volumes have been written on the significance of appearance in Arendt’s concept of 
 Just as thinking deploys dis-appearance and absence in order to 
liberate appearance and presence from their sensible limits, so too does it recast the 
metaphorical death willingly undergone by the thinker as a fuller, richer, and certainly 
stranger form of life – the life that can only be lived in the tenuous and elusive presence 
of meaning. In the last analysis, nonetheless, the thinker’s sustained contact with this 
meaning entails that his response to the world – the response that engenders meaning, 
intensifies presence, and renews life – goes hand in hand with his endangerment by the 
same response – which by the same token limits meaning, intensifies absence, and 
anticipates death. The life of interpretation consists in this choice to endanger one’s life 
qua interpreter. 
                                                 
42  Arendt’s passing reference to Plato as one of the original sources for the metaphorical reversal she 
describes suggests that at least in this instance, she is not guilty of the flat-footed reading of Plato for which 
she is often indicted: I would go so far as to argue that the metaphorical reversal of life and death she 
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political action, spanning the whole history of Arendt’s critical reception since her 
death.43
One of the most significant byproducts of action in Arendt’s thought is generally 
referred to as the ‘self-disclosure of the actor’: any authentically political action reveals 
(or, under certain readings, even creates) the identity of the actor responsible for it.
 I do not intend to intervene in the complex and long-standing debates 
surrounding this issue, most of which lie beyond the scope of my project, except by 
showing how even a fairly uncontroversial interpretation of some of her key texts on 
action and appearance can be illuminated and transformed when we perceive how the 
value of endangered life is as central to them as it is to her texts on thinking. 
44
With word and deed [i.e., with action] we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is 
like a second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original 
physical appearance. […I]ts impulse springs from the beginning which came into the world when we 
were born and to which we respond by beginning something new on our own initiative. […T]he 
primordial and specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked 
of every newcomer: “Who are you?” […] In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal 
actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while 
their physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique shape of the body and 
the sound of the voice. This disclosure of “who” in contradistinction to “what” somebody is – his 
qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide – is implicit in everything 
somebody says and does. (HC 176f., 178, 179) 
 A 
vital group of passages from HC explains this characteristic of action in more detail, 
highlighting action as a kind of deliberate choice to appear, a willed self-revelation on the 
part of the actor within a world governed by just such appearances and revelations: 
                                                                                                                                                 
describes is, in fact, the governing motif for both the dramatic structure and the figurative language of the 
Phaedo. 
43  For some influential and characteristic examples of scholarly viewpoints in this debate, see 
Canovan, Reinterpretation, 110-116, 130-141; Passerin d'Entrèves, Political Philosophy, 65-71, 76-79; 
Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
1996), 107-113; and especially Villa, “Arendt, Nietzsche, and the ‘Aestheticization’ of Political Action,” 
in: Arendt and Heidegger (Ch. 3), 80-109. 
44  Bonnie Honig, among others, strikes precisely this post-Nietzschean stance by arguing that the 
actor comes into existence through the act, not vice versa: “Action produces its actors; episodically, 
temporarily, we are its agonistic achievement.” Bonnie Honig, “Toward an Agonistic Feminism: Hannah 
Arendt and the Politics of Identity,” in Williams (ed.), Vol. 2, 366. See also Passerin d'Entrèves, Political 
Philosophy, 72f. on the disclosure of the agent in action. 
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In terms of modes of life, it is important to note how Arendt describes action as the 
moment in which the actor “confirm[s]” and “take[s] upon” himself “the naked fact of 
[his] original physical appearance,” that is, the appearing body and voice which he 
possesses de facto as conditions of given biological life, and which, more importantly, 
constantly perpetuate “the beginning which came into the world when [he was] born” by 
continuing to appear in visible space. Action becomes the point at which the actor 
confirms, responds to, and, as it were, repeats his initial appearance in the world through 
birth. In a perceptive and influential discussion that seeks to appropriate certain aspects of 
Arendt’s political thought for a feminist politics, Bonnie Honig elaborates precisely these 
paradoxical and kindyneutic aspects of action in relation to the life of the actor: 
A life-sustaining, psychologically determined, trivial, and imitable biological creature in the private 
realm, [the actor’s] self attains identity – becomes a ‘who’ – by acting. For the sake of ‘who’ it might 
become, it risks the dangers of the radically contingent public realm where anything can happen, 
[…and] forsakes the comforting security of ‘what’ it is, the roles and features that define (and even 
determine) it in the private realm […]. (Honig 362) 
Precisely like the thinker, the actor liberates appearing things and appearance as such 
from the limits of the empirically given by negating, turning against, and moving beyond 
‘mere’ life and ‘mere’ appearance in the moment of acting. In a sense, then, acting allows 
the actor simultaneously to affirm and to overcome his own birth, his own life. This 
connection between action and birth, incidentally, constitutes the aspect of action that 
Arendt elsewhere calls natality: action, like birth, initiates something new, something 
unforeseeable and unpredictable in the world.45
                                                 
45  See HC 8f. 
 In a sense, then, we can say that the actor 
constantly affirms his own first appearance in birth by figuratively giving birth to 
himself, over and over again, through the initiating and self-disclosing aspects of his 
actions. 
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In the same moment as the actor figuratively affirms and overcomes the physical 
appearance of his own living body on earth, he also affirms and overcomes the apparently 
supreme value of this life by choosing to disclose his unique identity – “who” as opposed 
to “what” he is – the value and content of which necessarily transcend whatever is given 
in his sensible appearance. As we have seen with the thinker, furthermore, the actor 
enthusiastically asserts the omnipotence of appearance against even the limits of sensible 
appearance itself, bearing forth a whole progeny of brilliant surfaces rooted not in the 
presence of empirical particulars to the senses, but in a virtually infinite range of absent 
things: namely, the ideas, images, and stories that his actions make manifest and 
assemble in the public eye. What could quite literally be called the actor’s re-presentation 
of himself to others in public thus forms a precise analogue to the way the thinker re-
presents a whole range of absent things to himself, in the inner arena of his thought. Both 
thinker and actor respond to, and thus take responsibility for, their own appearance on 
earth and the rule of appearance as such, albeit through ways of life that seem to diverge 
completely in their attitudes towards appearance per se. Just as considerable risk is 
involved, furthermore, in the thinker’s death-like withdrawal from himself and from 
others, so a comparable risk is involved in the actor’s self-disclosure – and it concerns his 
relation to the very identity he discloses: 
[The actor’s identity] can be hidden in complete silence and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can 
almost never be achieved as a wilful purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of this “who” 
in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities. On the contrary, it is more than likely that 
the “who,” which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person 
himself, like the daimōn in Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, always 
looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters. (HC 179f.) 
The actor cannot intend the disclosure of his identity in action, nor can he intend to 
disclose a certain definite identity thereby; he can neither undertake action with the aim 
of revealing himself, nor choose in advance which self, which “who” he will prove to be 
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in the eyes of others, in the moment of his word or deed. As George Kateb has 
memorably characterized Arendt’s thought on this point, the identity revealed by the 
actor as uniquely his own always proves to be “self-surprising.”46 The identity that the 
actor discloses through action, in short, forever eludes the knowledge or control of its 
possessor, in the same way that one can never see one’s face the way another person sees 
it. Peter Fuss’ brilliantly concise definition of Arendtian action captures the mixture of 
self-endangerment and self-disclosure that is vital to the concept for Arendt: “Action 
manifests itself in the initiation of unprecedented processes whose outcome is uncertain 
and unpredictable and whose meaningfulness lies in the disclosure of the identities of the 
agents themselves.”47
The dangerous and paradoxical aspect of the actor’s self-disclosure in Arendt’s 
thinking once again finds its sharpest expression through a radical relativization of the 
life-death dichotomy similar to the one we saw in the case of thinking. Nowhere does this 
relativization appear in starker relief than in Arendt’s brief but pithy gloss on the ancient 
commonplace nemo ante mortem beatus esse dici potest (“Call no man happy before he is 
dead”), an idea that largely defies modern common sense where life, death, and human 
identity are concerned: 
 
Th[e] unchangeable identity of the person, though disclosing itself intangibly in act and speech, 
becomes tangible only in the story of the actor’s and speaker’s life; but as such it can be known, that is, 
grasped as a palpable entity only after it has come to its end. In other words, human essence – not 
human nature in general (which does not exist) nor the sum total of qualities and shortcomings in the 
individual, but the essence of who somebody is – can come into being only when life departs, leaving 
behind nothing but a story. (HC 193) 
Both the sharp contrast and the impeccable symmetry with Arendt’s discourse on 
thinking could not be more marked. Whereas the thinker’s withdrawal from the appearing 
                                                 
46  I borrow this term from George Kateb’s Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil (Totowa, N.J.: 
Rowman and Allanheld, 1984). 
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world into thought, with its figurative resemblance to death, clarified and intensified his 
life through the revelation of meaning, the actor’s literal death becomes the prerequisite 
for the complete illumination of his identity to others – certainly not to himself. The 
actor’s final dis-appearance from the real world of appearances, in other words, allows 
his life and character to appear in their unity and totality to his survivors, to be re-
membered by them as a story with beginning, middle, and end. At the price of his real, 
living presence, the actor has himself become a pure object of others’ remembrance – he 
has at last achieved the luminous absence which, as we have seen, belongs strictly to 
objects of thought and of interpretation. Indeed, only at the utmost risk-taking extremity 
of action – that is, in actions where the actor willingly meets his end in death – does 
Arendt allow him any possibility of deciding the “who” he will prove to be in the 
remembrance of others. If the “essence” of a given individual lies precisely in the 
revelation of this “who”, as Arendt suggests in the passage quoted above, then 
whoever consciously aims at being “essential,” at leaving behind a story and an identity which will win 
“immortal fame,” must not only risk his life but expressly choose […] a short life and premature death. 
Only a man who does not survive his one supreme act remains the indisputable master of his identity 
and possible greatness, because he withdraws into death from the possible consequences and 
continuation of what he began. (HC 193f., emphasis mine) 
Nowhere does the subtle inherent logic of Arendt’s language of appearance and dis-
appearance, presence and absence, or life and death display itself more clearly, and 
nowhere does the paradoxical intimacy and alienation forged by this language between 
acting and thinking manifest itself more strikingly than at just such extreme points of 
these two enterprises. Just as the appearing and present world only reveals its meaning to 
the thinker at the threshold of dis-appearance and absence, whereby the world and the 
thinker alike suffer endangerment, so only the actor who endangers his appearing, present 
                                                                                                                                                 
47  Peter Fuss, “Hannah Arendt's Conception of Political Community,” in: Hill (ed.), 159. 
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life – that is, makes literal the withdrawal into death that still remains figurative for the 
thinker – can gain for his life the surfeit of meaning that will render it, in Arendt’s 
parlance, “essential.”48
 
 That the definition of this ‘essence’ depends on subsequent 
processes of interpretation is unmistakable: “in theorizing action,” as Dana Villa argues, 
“Arendt provides us with nothing less than a phenomenology of meaning itself: its 
sources, conditions, modes of presencing, and possibilities for permanence” (Arendt and 
Heidegger, 11). In their common relationship to meaning and to life, thinking is “only the 
other side” of acting (“UP” 322) after all, but in a way no one could have expected. Both 
activities do arise from one and the same “passion,” but a passion for which we still have 
no name – a passion for the endangerment of life, undertaken for the sake of meaningful 
life. If given life grants each human being definite appearance and limited presence, then 
the mode of human existence achieved in both thinking and acting reaches beyond the 
boundaries established for ‘given’ life in order both to endanger this life and to live it 
more intensely. In doing so, this life seeks to dwell in greater proximity to the meaning 
that stands at the center of what for Arendt is the properly human life, the life of 
interpretation. 
7. Openings to the World: Doxa, Disclosure, and the Socratic Way of Life 
                                                 
48  In an influential article, George Kateb suggests, but does not quite fully articulate, these 
implications of Arendt’s apotheosis of the actor – that is, the transformation of the actor’s life into a 
meaningful “essence” – when he writes: “[T]he revelations of action are perfected only in art, the great 
poems, plays, epics, histories. The story about the virtuoso or persona or principled actor is the last word 
about who he was. Stories thus contribute, as nothing else can, to the illumination of human existence. The 
best stories are about public words and deeds that shine, that compel further attention by their beauty. 
Arendt comes close to saying that we exist in order to be turned into stories, and that we are justified by the 
stories we provoke or inspire writers to tell; and the stories provoke and inspire others to act. […] This is 
not to justify life as an esthetic phenomenon, but to define human life as intelligible meaning.” George 
Kateb, “Freedom and Worldliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt,” Political Theory 5.2 (1977): 154, 
emphasis mine. 
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Meaning holds what can only be called a threshold-position in Arendt’s discourse of 
thinking and acting; that is to say, meaning paradoxically appears only in and through 
dis-appearance and is present only in and through absence.49 Whether it makes itself 
manifest as the singular identity of an actor revealed to a spectator in the public arena of 
appearances, or as the general significance of a phenomenon revealed to the thinker in the 
private arena of thought, meaning for Arendt remains intimately tied to the experience of 
disclosure.50
                                                 
49  Although I have left open in this discussion the questions raised by Arendt’s use of the term 
‘meaning,’ many of these questions have yet to be addressed in detail by contemporary scholarship. An 
early treatment can be found in J. Glenn Gray, “The Winds of Thought,” Social Research 44.1 (1977): 44-
62, where Gray interprets Arendt’s ‘meaning’ as a form of what he calls ‘belonging.’ According to him, 
Arendt insists that thinking “reveals to us a different world in which meaning as belonging and not truth is 
the issue [...]. Though she did not develop at length [...] what she intended by the concept of belonging as 
the substance of thinking, it is clear that the attempt is our incessant and never completed effort to find our 
place and role in creation. [...] As the search for truth is an inquiry into the way things are with its purpose 
and goal knowledge, so the quest for meaning as belonging is the endless occupation of thinking with no 
goal or purpose outside itself” (51f., emphases mine). His account is tantalizing, but remains ultimately 
unsatisfactory, despite his overture to the role of dialogue in the idea of meaning as belonging. Gray argues 
that Arendt “neglected to consider those admittedly rare occasions of ‘the marriage of true minds’ when 
meditative thinking can be concerted. Such dialogue is a thinking aloud, as it were, and the discovery of 
meaning as belonging is rendered concrete by the reality of friendship. [...] Sometimes only a lover or 
friend can make clear to us what we mean. [...] A friend […] does not merely clarify our thinking for us. 
His very being can itself provide assurance that I belong in existence where and when I chance to be” (55, 
emphasis mine). 
 Of course, we have just encountered this term as shorthand for the way the 
actor endangers himself through action – namely because he lacks all certainty about 
what he will actually disclose in the end. Nonetheless, disclosure describes equally well 
the way the thinker, who likewise gives up all certainty about what he, too, will 
ultimately disclose, endangers both the objects of his thought and himself. By relating 
endangerment and disclosure in this way, Arendt compels us to think of interpretive 
disclosure not simply as the drawing-back of a veil that obscures or conceals a definite 
50  Arendt’s debt to Heidegger’s thought is particularly clear in her explorations of the ‘disclosive’ or 
revelatory character of action; see, for instance, section 43 of Being and Time (cited in Villa, “Arendt, 
Heidegger, and the Tradition,” 987). Not only would it take me too far afield from my narrower concern to 
consider this historical and intellectual debt in detail, however, it would also turn me aside somewhat from 
the argument I pursue here, which seeks to expand the significance of ‘disclosure’ as a pivotal term in 
Arendt’s thought beyond the idea of revealing a preexisting reality. 
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truth. Rather, we must think of it quite literally as the dis-closure of an object, as the un-
closing or even re-opening of the apparently settled nature of a thing such that the thing 
appears as a bundle of questions or problems addressed directly to us, the spectators of its 
dis-closure. Drawing on an image from Xenophon’s Socrates, Arendt in “TMC” 
compares the capacity of thinking to dis-close the meaning of its object to the power of a 
strong wind – a force which, while remaining invisible, changes or sets into motion 
everything it encounters, picking up what it once laid down and dispersing what it once 
brought together: 
Socrates himself, very much aware that thinking deals with invisibles and is itself invisible, lacking all 
the outside manifestation of other activities, seems to have used the metaphor of the wind for it: ‘The 
winds themselves are invisible, yet what they do is manifest to us and we somehow feel their 
approach.’51
The wind of thought dis-closes the meaning of all it touches – not because it uncovers 
something formerly unseen, but because it forces open, and keeps open, all the seams and 
gaps in our experience such that reality itself takes on the open-ended, unsettled, 
indeterminate character of a question about ourselves, addressed to ourselves. If a certain 
quantum of risk for the thinker or actor always accompanies such disclosure, then the 
endangerment of life by this dis-closure of its meaning – the re-opening of its paradoxes 
and dilemmas – is the constitutive characteristic of what is, for Arendt, the properly 
human mode of life that appears in thought or action, our way of being “fully awake and 
alive.” 
 […] The manifestations of the invisible wind of thought are those concepts, virtues and 
‘values,’ with which Socrates dealt in his examinations. The trouble […] is that this same wind, 
whenever it is aroused, has the peculiarity of doing away with its own previous manifestations. It is in 
its nature to undo, unfreeze as it were, what language, the medium of thinking, has frozen into thought 
– words (concepts, sentences, definitions, doctrines) […]. These frozen thoughts, Socrates seems to 
say, come so handy you can use them in your sleep; but if the wind of thinking, which I shall now 
arouse in you, has roused you from your sleep and made you fully awake and alive, then you will see 
that you have nothing in your hand but perplexities, and the most we can do is share them with each 
other. (“TMC” 24, emphases mine; see also LM 104, 109) 
                                                 
51  Arendt cites Xenophon’s Memorabilia, IV.iii.14. 
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 The pivotal significance Arendt gives to disclosure, furthermore – an idea that 
seamlessly combines the hermeneutic and the phenomenological elements of her thinking 
just as much as it bridges the apparent gap between her philosophical and her political 
concerns – is what gives the figure of Socrates his peculiarly rich, evocative, and 
paradoxical status in her writing. Socrates, for Arendt, is the first practitioner – and 
Socratic dialogue the first practice – of a disclosure which has not yet decomposed into 
the mutual alienation of thinking and acting, philosophy and politics, that has marked the 
Western tradition ever since.52 In the remarkable and only recently published essay 
“Philosophy and Politics,”53
                                                 
52  For related discussion of this point, see Canovan, Reinterpretation, 253-264, and Philip B. 
Hansen, Hannah Arendt: Politics, History and Citizenship (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1993), 50-88. 
 Arendt presents a provocative vision of Socrates as the 
thinker-actor who formed a whole way of life around the peculiarly Greek concept of 
doxa. This word, a common enough term in Plato’s language, usually translates simply as 
“opinion,” but Arendt draws on the entire, varied field of its signification in the Greek 
53  Hannah Arendt, “Philosophy and Politics,” Social Research 57.1 (1990): 73-103. A slightly 
different version of this essay has even more recently been published as “Socrates” in Arendt/Kohn, 
Promise, 5-39; in the present discussion, I cite the Social Research version, hereafter “P&P”. As the 
editorial note accompanying this work in Social Research notes, “Philosophy and Politics” presents an 
edited version of a lecture that Arendt delivered at the University of Notre Dame in 1954, but which never 
appeared in print until 1990. I should also note here that both George Kateb, in “Arendt and 
Individualism,” Social Research 61.4 (1994): 765-794, and Dana Villa, in “Arendt and Socrates,” Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie 53.208 (1999): 241-257, argue that Arendt’s approach to Socrates in 
“Philosophy and Politics” differs fundamentally from her treatment of him in much later pieces such as 
“Thinking and Moral Considerations.” Kateb takes this tack in relation to the problems of citizenship, self-
examination, and individualism. Villa, on the other hand, goes further in order to argue that “even at her 
most seemingly Socratic, Arendt remains fundamentally un- (even anti-) Socratic” and puts “his 
philosophical activity in the service of a Periclean (that is to say, manly and civic-minded) aestheticism. 
Placed within these limits, the urgency of the Socratic demand for moral integrity is lost, as is the force of 
his relentless negativity” (Villa, “Arendt and Socrates,” 243). While the consistency of Arendt’s approach 
to Socrates is not an explicit concern of the present argument, I do think the evidence I present suggests at 
least a fundamental continuity in the role she ascribes to Socrates for thinking and acting in the Western 
tradition. Despite this pair of arguments for a fundamental shift in Arendt’s construction of Socrates, Kateb, 
at any rate, makes points similar to my own where the decisive status of thinking and acting in relation to a 
specifically human way of life is concerned: “She is not content to say merely that thought may precede, 
guide, explain, and justify action, she also holds that thought and action are united by their common 
dependence on speech. The implication is that action and thought (not only, not especially, philosophical 
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language in a way that brings it very close to the concept of disclosure as I have just 
elaborated it here. In Arendt’s hands, the doxai that form Socrates’ lifelong concern in 
dialogue – whether with himself or with others – combine in a single entity both the self-
disclosure that marks Arendt’s language of action and the world-disclosure that marks her 
language of thinking. Let us begin by considering the latter aspect of Socratic doxa for 
Arendt, namely, how she believes Socrates approached the (mere) ‘opinions’ of his 
interlocutors as so many different ways in which the world discloses its meaning to them 
as thinking subjects: 
To Socrates, as to his fellow citizens, doxa was the formulation in speech of what dokei moi, that is, of 
what appears to me. This doxa had as its topic not what Aristotle called the eikos, the probable, the 
many verisimilia (as distinguished from the unum verum, the one truth, on the one hand, and the 
limitless falsehoods, the falsa infinita, on the other), but comprehended the world as it opens itself to 
me. It was not, therefore, subjective fantasy and arbitrariness, but also not something absolute and 
valid for all. The assumption was that the world opens up differently to every man, according to his 
position in it; and that the ‘sameness’ of the world, its commonness (koinon, as the Greeks would say, 
common to all) or ‘objectivity’ (as we would say from the subjective viewpoint of modern philosophy) 
resides in the fact that the same world opens up to everyone and that despite all differences between 
men and their positions in the world – and consequently their doxai (opinions) – “both you and I are 
human.” (P&P 80, emphasis mine) 
For Arendt, the kind of doxai that were examined and interrogated by Socrates in 
dialogue arose from the convergence between the viewpoint of a specific person and a 
world shared by all, between a subject that ‘opens itself’ to the world through the activity 
of interpretation and a world that ‘opens itself’ to that subject. The interpretive character 
of doxa as Arendt describes it depends on its intermediate position between completely 
arbitrary invention or subjective fantasy on the one hand and the monotonous, dictatorial 
voice of the absolute on the other – both of which fall outside the realm of meaning 
precisely because the mutual ‘opening’ of subject and object that is the sine qua non of 
                                                                                                                                                 
thought) are closer to each other than either is to anything else in the whole range of human activities and 
are set apart as consummately human” (Kateb, “Arendt and Individualism,” 767). 
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meaning never takes place in these extreme cases.54
 The disclosure of any given doxa, furthermore, unavoidably entails the disclosure 
of the subject who holds this particular doxa and no other. As a result of bringing out and 
making palpable a person’s doxa as a realization of the viewpoint or, indeed, of the way 
of life that belongs to that person alone, Socratic dialogue necessarily reveals the person 
himself, the individual and irreplaceable life of the person in its singularity. Socratic doxa 
thus both combines and realizes, as two sides of the same coin, what we have called a 
certain mode of world-disclosure with a certain mode of self-disclosure: a person 
discloses himself, and indeed, dis-closes or re-opens himself as well, in the very same 
moment as he discloses his unique doxa in dialogue.
 In effect, the world becomes an 
object truly held in common, gains its ‘objectivity,’ at the same moment in which the 
human viewpoints we take up on it reveal their mutual differences, or even their points of 
incommensurability, in conversation. To live in and through this world-disclosing 
function of doxa, as Socrates did, means constantly renewing both the ‘commonness’ of 
the common world and the ‘uncommonness’ of each individual opening on to that world 
– constantly reinvigorating these qualities of experience, ironically, by constantly 
endangering them. 
55
                                                 
54  Incidentally, Arendt distinguishes very strongly between what she understands as (the historical) 
Socrates’ enthusiastic embrace of doxa and “Plato’s furious denunciation” of it, “which not only ran like a 
red thread through his political works but became one of the cornerstones of his concept of truth. Platonic 
truth, even when doxa is not mentioned, is always understood as the very opposite of opinion. […] The 
opposition of truth and opinion was certainly the most anti-Socratic conclusion that Plato drew from 
Socrates’ trial.” (P&P 74, 75) 
 Just as the world-disclosure 
enacted in interpretive thinking grounds the non-appearing activity of thought in an 
appearing world, so the self-disclosure enacted in a dialogue between subjects renders 
Socratic philosophy intensely and uniquely political for Arendt: 
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The word doxa means not only opinion but also splendor and fame. As such, it is related to the 
political realm, which is the public sphere in which everybody can appear and show who he himself is. 
To assert one’s own opinion belonged to being able to show oneself, to be seen and heard by others. 
[...] Socrates, who refused public office and honor, never retired into his private life, but on the 
contrary moved in the marketplace, in the very midst of these doxai, these opinions. (P&P 80f.) 
In disclosing to others the way the world discloses itself to us, we necessarily disclose 
ourselves in more than one sense. We not only make ourselves “seen and heard by 
others,” we also add our perspectives and our positions to the repertoire of possibilities 
upon which they can draw freely in present and future interpretation and conversation. In 
a sense, then, each participant in a conversation makes the common world ‘more open’ 
for every other participant, intensifying its power of disclosure and augmenting the 
plurality of its meanings.56
                                                                                                                                                 
55  For an excellent account of self-disclosure in Arendt’s concept of action, see Bonnie Honig, 
Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 76-84. 
 By the same token, nonetheless, each interlocutor also ‘re-
opens’ her doxai and herself as one re-opens a heretofore settled decision and puts it on 
the agenda for examination: the mutual confrontation of doxai in dialogue invigorates 
disclosure as such just as it puts each specific mode of disclosure, each unique doxa, in a 
position of question and challenge, and ultimately one of risk. Here Arendt perceives a 
kind of back-door to public existence, as it were, manifesting itself in the midst of 
Socrates’ self-avowedly private life and a decaying Athenian democracy: the disclosure 
56  These characteristics of dialogic disclosure bear a transparent relation to the peculiar kind of 
impartiality Arendt defines as essential to political discourse and narrative remembrance, an impartiality 
which depends upon the spectator’s capacity to inhabit a number of viewpoints simultaneously and 
evaluate the same phenomenon according to a number of different standards. As Lisa Jane Disch writes, 
“Political impartiality is not secured by means of detachment from politics but by fostering public 
deliberation that depends on the ability ‘to look upon the same world from one another's standpoint. [...]’ 
Thucydides' work[, for instance,] fosters political impartiality by an artistic (though not fictional) creation 
of plurality by his representation of speeches from the multiple, divergent perspectives that constitute the 
public realm. […] This account of political impartiality, characterized not by abstraction but by the 
interplay among a plurality of perspectives, anticipates the conception of impartiality that Arendt discern[s] 
in Kant's description of the ‘enlarged mentality’ in the Third Critique. […] Enlarged thought, in her terms, 
is situated rather than abstract. She calls it training ‘one's imagination to go visiting,’ which involves 
evoking or telling yourself the multiple stories of a situation from the plurality of conflicting perspectives 
that constitute it.” Disch, “More Truth Than Fact,” 681f., 686. Under the heading of ‘situated impartiality,’ 
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of the common world to each individual, and the self-disclosure of each individual to 
others, are public and political events by default, even if they are only shared by two 
individuals in conversation. “The city,” George Kateb writes, “is thus made up of 
speakers learning to speak and helping one another to speak; the real city is a city in 
words” (Kateb 1994, 769).57 To make your doxa public in the fullest sense means 
disclosing not only the way the common world opens and manifests its meaning to you, 
but also the way you open and manifest your own meaning to that world, and to the 
others who share it with you.58
The combinatory logic of world-disclosure and self-disclosure that governs 
Arendt’s analysis of Socratic doxa seems dualistic or paradoxical to us only because it 
disregards to a certain degree the mutual alienation of thinking and acting, of philosophy 
and politics that we inherit from our tradition. If we, like Arendt, are willing to put down 
this inheritance from a tradition already at an end, just as Arendt’s Socrates, who exists 
before the beginning of the same tradition, has not yet taken it up, we can see how the 
logic of the concept seamlessly dictates Arendt’s otherwise puzzling exposition of the art 
 “Our very ability to experience the specific realness of 
another, an event, not to speak of ourselves,” writes Kimberley Curtis, “depends on 
mutual responsiveness to the particularity of others—and by extension to ourselves and 
plural voices within ourselves” (Curtis 25). 
                                                                                                                                                 
Disch synthesizes the interplay in Arendt’s thinking between these varying sources and influences on the 
question of political objectivity. 
57  Although Kateb takes this argument to an extreme, characterizing the Socratic ‘city of 
interlocutors’ as Arendt’s “loveliest utopia” (Kateb, “Arendt and Individualism,” 769). 
58  Kateb pushes Arendt’s presentation rather too far towards agonism, I believe, by overemphasizing 
the role of personal identity in the formation of doxa and by construing dialogue as tolerant mutual 
indulgence rather than a deliberate joint pursuit: “One’s doxa is what one is peculiarly fit or enabled to see 
and say. One’s doxa is what one is, in one’s individual uniqueness; and to be able to assert one’s opinion is 
the reason to want an opportunity to show oneself to others, while patiently allowing others to show 
themselves similarly. […] Her concept of doxa implies such a close tie between one’s opinion and one’s 
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of Socratic dialogue. From what we have already seen, it is not too far-fetched to say that 
the primary experiences of ‘opening’ in which our doxai are first formed, precisely 
because they require a certain reciprocity of response between subject and object, are 
already dialogic in the deepest sense for Arendt. In fact, Michael Denneny’s early and 
eloquent exploration of Arendt’s thought articulates a concept of responsibility that 
bridges thinking and acting by appealing to the interpretive faculties of response and 
disclosure inherent in both: 
Etymologically speaking, [...] the word responsibility has three distinct but tightly connected elements 
of meaning: to declare the presence of that which is present; to declare oneself present; and to declare a 
bond between oneself and that which is present to one. In common language we may say to face the 
facts and to stand up and be counted, which together mean to respond to the facts, to declare ourselves 
in regard to them. (Denneny in Hill (ed.), 1979, 269) 
Nonetheless, our doxai only betray this dialogic provenance – that is, their 
basically partial, perspectival, and contingent nature as responses – when they are 
brought into reinvigorating and endangering conversation, when they enter the process by 
which both the commonness of the world that forms their shared object and the 
idiosyncrasies of the individuals who take up viewpoints on that world are jointly thrown 
into sharp relief. The primary dialogic process of mutual ‘opening’ between subject and 
object crystallized in doxa, then, can only be revealed as such by a secondary dialogic 
process of ‘opening’ between subjects and their doxai in conversation proper. This 
principle of Socratic dialogue, what might be called the disclosure of disclosure itself, 
guides the gradual process by which individual doxai attain, not truth, but the quality that 
Arendt calls “truthfulness.” For Arendt, the singular impulse to engender truthfulness in 
those around him guides Socrates’ entire endeavor – and this impulse takes the figurative 
form of bringing new life into the world of the city: 
                                                                                                                                                 
person that it is difficult to imagine breaking out of oneself, except falsely. [...] What citizens truly learn 
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What Plato later called dialegesthai, Socrates himself called maieutic, the art of midwifery: he wanted 
to help others give birth to what they themselves thought anyhow, to find the truth in their doxa. […] 
Every man has his own doxa, his own opening to the world, and Socrates therefore must always begin 
with questions; he cannot know beforehand what kind of dokei moi, of it-appears-to-me, the other 
possesses. He must make sure of the other's position in the common world. Yet, just as nobody can 
know beforehand the other's doxa, so nobody can know by himself and without further effort the 
inherent truth of his own opinion. Socrates wanted to bring out this truth which everyone potentially 
possesses. If we remain true to his metaphor of maieutic, we may say: Socrates wanted to make the 
city more truthful by delivering each of the citizens of their truths. The method of doing this is 
dialegesthai, talking something through, but this dialectic brings forth truth not by destroying doxa or 
opinion, but on the contrary reveals doxa in its own truthfulness. The role of the philosopher, then, is 
not to rule the city but to be its ‘gadfly,’ not to tell philosophical truths but to make citizens more 
truthful. (P&P 81) 
Our doxai can only give birth to the truthfulness with which they are continually 
pregnant, in a sense, when we who possess these doxai willingly undergo the ardent – 
and often arduous – labor of dialogue, in which they are endlessly endangered and 
reinvigorated. The truthfulness of which Arendt speaks here, then, must be clearly 
distinguished from truth in the same way that disclosure must be distinguished from 
revelation. The dialogic process of disclosure, which culminates in truthfulness, makes 
the commonness of the world and the plurality of perspectives on that world mutually 
dependent even as they remain mutually conflicting; the monologic process of revelation, 
which culminates in truth, can only yield a common world at the price of human 
plurality. This is the reason why Arendt’s Socrates becomes an exemplary figure for both 
philosophy and politics, possessed with equal passion for both thinking and acting: 
Socrates did not want to educate the citizens so much as he wanted to improve their doxai, which 
constituted the political life in which he too took part. To Socrates, maieutic was a political activity, a 
give and take, fundamentally on a basis of strict equality, the fruits of which could not be measured by 
the result of arriving at this or that general truth. It is therefore obviously still quite in the Socratic 
tradition that Plato's early dialogues frequently conclude inconclusively, without a result. To have 
talked something through, to have talked about something, some citizen's doxa, seemed result enough. 
(P&P 81f.) 
In approaching doxa as an artifact of the experience in which the world discloses its 
meaning to and for an individual, Arendt’s Socrates thus not only establishes dialogue as 
                                                                                                                                                 
from one another is how much difference exists in their world.” (Kateb, “Arendt and Individualism,” 771).  
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the activity in which doxai are dis-closed and re-opened to each other, but also reveals 
how the specifically human mode of life, the life of thought and action, depends in the 
first instance on just such dialogue between and disclosure of interpretations. 
For Arendt, then, to enter into the human mode of life constituted by Socratic 
dialogue means submitting to the uncertainty and contingency of a process that unfolds 
simultaneously on the levels of both thought and action. Within the bounds of this 
thinking-acting process, the thoughts and actions of any given subject necessarily forego 
complete sovereignty, just as interlocutors in a conversation must make themselves 
complicit in a regime of terms and categories that they hold in common even though none 
of them can claim it as his own. Just as the world- and self-disclosure that lie at the root 
of every doxa do not posit a specific, absolute truth, but rather confirm the plurality of 
relative meanings, so the process of dialogue does not culminate in any specific end 
product, but rather realizes its full significance only in the endless, fertile interplay 
among the ‘openings’ that enter into it – that is, in the immanent life that is realized in 
and through the process. As Arendt writes: 
The meaning of what Socrates was doing lay in the activity itself. Or to put it differently: To think and 
to be fully alive are the same, and this implies that thinking must always begin afresh; it is an activity 
that accompanies living and is concerned with such concepts as justice, happiness, virtue, offered us by 
language itself as expressing the meaning of whatever happens in life and occurs to us while we are 
alive. […] Thinking accompanies life and is itself the de-materialized quintessence of being alive; and 
since life is a process, its quintessence can only lie in the actual thinking process and not in any solid 
results or specific thoughts. A life without thinking is quite possible; it then fails to develop its own 
essence – it is not merely meaningless; it is not fully alive. (LM 178, 191, emphases mine; see also LM 
123, 124) 
This passage comes as close as any in Arendt’s oeuvre to expressing what I have termed 
the kindyneutic nature of Socratic dialogue and, indeed, of the unique philosophical 
spirituality at work in the language of Plato’s dialogues. The distinctly human life for 
Arendt inheres in the restless momentum of the wind of thought, continually dissolving 
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and re-forming the “solid results” in which it momentarily crystallizes but never persists, 
a movement that continually begins again, casts itself in doubt, puts itself in danger. The 
activity of dialogue, the actual doing of interpretive thought for Arendt never seeks the 
closure of a predetermined end-form for either its subject or object. The Socratic life of 
dialogue, the interpretive way of life par excellence, seeks out precisely the broadest, 
richest, and most dangerous dis-closure for the world and the self, for thinker and actor 
alike – the utmost risk for the sake of the utmost intensity. For Arendt’s Socrates, at least, 
the examined life is only examined and, indeed, is only lived to the extent that our 
thinking and our acting constantly re-open both the question of our world and the 
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HIS MASTER'S VOICE 
 
No, surely he was no deceiver, and how could that voice deceive? It was so calm and yet so agitated; it 
sounded from an inwardness, the depth of which I could scarcely suspect, as if it were breaking a path 
through masses of rock. Can that voice deceive? What is the voice, then – is it a stroke of the tongue, a 
noise that one can produce as one wishes? But it must have a home somewhere in the soul; it must have a 
birthplace. And that it did, in the innermost recesses of his heart it had its home; there he loved me, there he 
loves me. To be sure, he had another voice also; it was cold, chilling; it could murder every joy in my soul, 
squelch every joyous thought, make even my kiss cold and abhorrent to me. Which was the true voice? He 
could deceive in every way, but this I feel – that tremulous voice in which his whole passion throbbed – 
that was no deceit; it is impossible. The other was a deception. Or there were evil forces that gained control 
of him. No, he was no deceiver; that voice that has shackled me to him forever – that is no deception.1
– Kierkegaard 
 
What is the voice? And which, among these many voices we speak, is the true voice? 
Marie Beaumarchais' desperate question looms large at the end of this inquiry precisely 
because, as we have seen, the language spoken by the interpreter turns the voice out from 
its secure home in the personality and sets it adrift in a wilderness of homelessness, 
distraction, and dispersion, where it attaches itself to all and none. Does Galileo speak in 
his own voice when he describes what he sees through the telescope – any more than his 
rivals do when they mouth their unwieldy Latin? And what would it mean for Socrates to 
speak in his own voice, when his whole life seems to offer elaborate proof that the 
attainment of such a voice is both the one worthwhile task of thought and something 
entirely unthinkable? If language begins and ends as indirect discourse, the language of 
the interpreter appears to awaken us to an authentic, immediate, inalienable speech that 
corresponds to the true meaning of things: a voice for everything that does not yet have a 
                                                 
1  Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Part I: Kierkegaard's Writings, Volume III (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1987),188. 
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voice, a direct discourse at last. But this only seems to be the case – for in fact the 
interpreter's voice deepens our error as well as his own, puts the final seal on the 
deception that envelops us as well as him. In Marie's case, only we can see that the dark 
charm of the interpreter's voice seduces the seducer along with the seduced. This 
knowledge forever eludes Marie – because she cannot go on, as we do, to read Diary of a 
Seducer and hear the equally unhappy Cordelia describe the voice of her seducer as “a 
matchless instrument, always sensitive; he had a range such as no other instrument has. 
[…] He could roar like an autumn storm; he could whisper inaudibly. […] With an 
indescribable but cryptic, blissful, unnameable anxiety, I listened to this music I myself 
had evoked and yet did not evoke” (Kierkegaard 310, emphasis mine). Who is the player, 
and who the played? In the process of interpretation, each of us necessarily inhabits both 
positions simultaneously: the moment we open our mouths to speak sense, we put 
ourselves and our hearers at risk. And far from deterring us from speech, this risk is the 
native habitat for all the pleasures we derive from interpretation. 
 And what about this deceiving voice, the one you think you hear in your mind as 
you read these very words, the voice you think belongs to someone with my name who is 
saying these things? Even if you carefully worked through the dense thicket of metaphors 
that allows you to think this peculiar thought, could you say who exactly is deceived by 
it, and who does the deceiving? How can you believe that I, as an interpreter, am 
speaking the truth to you when it is not I who am speaking now at all? Is it not our 
willingness to participate in a shared delusion, our decision to endanger ourselves, our 
thoughts, our ways of life one more time in reading, that even allows this transaction to 
take place across a page? My dear Marie: don't I stand to win or lose just as much from 
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Francis Barraud, His Master's Voice, 1900. 
 
 
